Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA05
In a juvenile delinquency jury trial for indecency with a child by contact, jurors reported that a State investigator seated in the gallery as the child complainant’s “support” repeatedly used gestures (e.g., “thumbs up,” motions to look at him, refocusing cues) that functionally coached the child during live testimony. The Fifth Court of Appeals analyzed the conduct as State-sponsored interference with the juvenile’s right to confrontation and meaningful cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment and Texas Constitution art. I, § 10, emphasizing that confrontation protects not just physical presence but an opportunity to test credibility free from real-time outside shaping. Applying constitutional harm review, the court held the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the child’s testimony was central and credibility-driven, and the jury’s evaluation was tainted by observed prompting from a State agent. The court reversed the adjudication and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a child witness is testifying, a “support person” cannot become a coach. If any aligned adult is visible to the child and signals, gestures, or otherwise prompts answers during testimony, object and demand an immediate inquiry; build a record (including juror/counsel affidavits if discovered later) and seek striking testimony, mistrial/new trial, or appellate reversal. In family cases, use the same due-process/credibility framework to challenge the reliability of child testimony or statements and to request prophylactic courtroom controls (neutral support, no line-of-sight, no signaling, on-the-record admonishments)."
In the Interest of D.R.S., a Child
COA07
In a parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appointed appellate counsel sought to withdraw after briefing due to a newly arising, irreconcilable conflict of interest caused by new employment. Recognizing that termination appeals are accelerated and implicate the parent’s right to effective representation, the Seventh Court of Appeals held it could not proceed on the merits without a trial-court ruling and an adequate record regarding the conflict and any need for substitute counsel. The court therefore abated the appeal, suspended appellate deadlines, and remanded to the trial court to rule on withdrawal, decide whether substitute appellate counsel must be appointed, and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, with a supplemental clerk’s and reporter’s record due by a set expedited deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law appeals—especially parental-termination cases—an attorney conflict is a threshold issue that can halt the appeal. Raise conflicts immediately and build a clear trial-court record (order, findings, and hearing record) on withdrawal and substitution, or the appellate court may abate the case and suspend deadlines until representation issues are resolved."
Diamond Hydraulics, Inc. v. GAC Equipment, LLC d/b/a Austin Crane Service
SCOTX
In a commercial breach-of-contract/warranty dispute where causation turned on expert engineering testimony, the defendant timely designated an expert but, after multiple resets, its testifying expert became unavailable shortly before trial due to a job change, relocation out of state, and an express refusal to testify. The defendant promptly notified the other side and moved to substitute another engineer from the same firm who had helped prepare the report, offering to limit the substitute to the same opinions. The trial court excluded the substitute under Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6, denied continuances, and forced the defendant to try the case with no causation expert; the jury returned a plaintiff’s verdict and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court held that Rule 193.6’s “good cause” exception, while demanding, is not an “impossible” standard, and that the trial court misapplied the rule by rigidly denying substitution when the unavailability was outside the party’s control and the party acted promptly and in good faith to mitigate any prejudice. Because the exclusion was effectively case-dispositive in an expert-driven case, the error was reversible; the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a properly designated expert becomes genuinely unavailable near trial (job change, relocation, refusal to testify), don’t assume you’re stuck: act immediately, document the unavailability, offer a true substitute with the same opinions, and propose cure measures (deposition/limited continuance). Courts cannot weaponize Rule 193.6 deadlines to force trial without essential expert proof when the problem is outside your control and you move diligently."
C. R. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In a bench-trial termination case, the mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting endangerment grounds and the best-interest finding after she led police on a late-night, 100+ mph chase with her three young children in the car and the Department removed the children. The Third Court of Appeals evaluated the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and viewed the evidence cumulatively, not as a single-incident lapse. It held that the high-speed flight, combined with the children’s unstable living conditions (sleeping and eating in the car, poor hygiene and inadequate clothing), outstanding felony warrants (including custodial interference), and unresolved mental-health/substance-use concerns supported findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (endangering conditions) and (E) (endangering conduct). Applying the Holley best-interest framework, the court emphasized the children’s stability and improvement in a Kentucky placement, concerns that the mother’s hostile communications destabilized the placement and the children, and the mother’s failure to document sobriety/treatment after moving out of state. The court affirmed termination, upheld the finding that the Department made reasonable reunification efforts despite the mother’s relocation, and affirmed appointment of the Department as permanent managing conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
"High-risk conduct that exposes children to danger—even without physical injury—can support termination and heavily influence custody outcomes, especially when paired with instability, unresolved mental-health/substance issues, and combative communications that harm the children’s emotional stability. If a parent moves out of state during a CPS/SAPCR case, they must proactively secure admissible proof of service completion and sobriety; courts will not treat the move as shifting the agency’s duty to fund or arrange out-of-state services."
Estate of Samantha Skaggs; Robbin Skaggs, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Samantha Skaggs; and Walter Skaggs Sr. v. Peternett, Inc. d/b/a Showdown
COA02
In this Tarrant County case, the plaintiffs sued a bar under the Texas Dram Shop Act but failed to conduct any discovery during the applicable period. Although their pleadings stated they intended to conduct discovery under Level 3, they never obtained a signed Level 3 discovery-control plan. The trial court applied default Level 2 deadlines, quashed the plaintiffs' late discovery requests, denied a continuance, and granted a no-evidence summary judgment after striking the plaintiffs' unauthenticated evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Level 2 rules govern by default unless a signed Level 3 order is entered, and the plaintiffs waived their right to contest the summary judgment by failing to challenge the exclusion of their evidence on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pleading for 'Level 3' discovery is not enough to extend your deadlines; you must obtain a signed Level 3 discovery-control plan from the court. Without that signed order, default Level 1 or Level 2 deadlines apply, and a failure to conduct discovery within those windows can lead to the quashing of late discovery and an indefensible no-evidence summary judgment. Furthermore, always ensure your summary judgment evidence is authenticated and specifically cited, as 'document dumps' are easily excluded."
Robinson v. Kelley
COA01
In an appeal from a Brazoria County SAPCR modification order, the parties entered a later agreed modification order while the appeal was pending. Appellant’s counsel notified the First Court of Appeals by letter that the agreed order eliminated the need to continue the appeal, and appellee did not oppose. The court construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and, because appellant no longer sought appellate relief and there was no live controversy to resolve, dismissed the appeal under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a) and 43.2(f), also dismissing all pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you settle a parenting-plan modification dispute during the appeal and the trial court signs an agreed modification order that replaces the challenged order, the court of appeals will typically end the case quickly—sometimes even treating an informal “no longer necessary” communication as a dismissal request. Be intentional: decide whether you want immediate dismissal, an abatement while performance occurs, or continued appellate leverage, and communicate that clearly in a formal motion whenever possible."
Carlos Franco Hernandez a/k/a Carlos Alberto Hernandez Orta v. The State of Texas
COA02
In a criminal appeal arising from sexual assault allegations involving a 13-year-old, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed two trial objections that commonly surface in family-law crossover cases: (1) whether the jury charge improperly included a Penal Code § 8.04(a) voluntary-intoxication instruction when the defendant did not affirmatively plead intoxication as a defense, and (2) whether admitting the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) nurse’s written report was reversible error as improper “bolstering.” The court held the intoxication instruction was proper because the record contained evidence of drinking from multiple sources (including the defendant’s admissions and the history reflected in the SANE documentation), and Texas law allows the instruction whenever evidence could lead jurors to think intoxication excuses conduct; the instruction tracked the statute and did not comment on the weight of the evidence. The court also held the SANE report was not excludable or reversible on a “bolstering” theory; bolstering is not a free-standing basis to exclude otherwise admissible evidence, and the argument largely collapses into hearsay/predicate issues that were not the focus of the appellate complaint. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When dealing with SANE/medical records and repeated narratives in SAPCR or protective-order trials, “bolstering” is usually the wrong objection—and often an easy one to defeat if the exhibit is independently admissible. The real battleground is foundation, purpose, and embedded hearsay (plus Rule 403/redactions). Also, if intoxication evidence is in the record, expect courts to give clarifying/limiting instructions to prevent a “drinking excuses it” theme—so plan your proof and objections accordingly and preserve the correct grounds."
City of Houston v. Sancelia Fonteneaux
COA14
A plaintiff sued the City of Houston (and METRO) for negligence after a bus door allegedly closed on her arm while she was boarding. The City sought dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing the pleadings showed no Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) motor‑vehicle waiver because the bus was operated by METRO, a separate entity, not a City employee. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied Rule 91a’s pleading-only framework—accepting the petition’s facts as true, liberally construing them, and drawing reasonable inferences—and held the live petition plausibly alleged the TTCA motor‑vehicle waiver in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021(1) by alleging the injury arose from the operation/use of a motor vehicle and, alternatively, that the bus was owned/operated/maintained and/or driven by the City (or METRO), permitting an inference at the pleading stage that a City employee acting within scope could have operated the bus. The court also refused the City’s request to render judgment based on its pending traditional summary-judgment motion because the trial court had not ruled and Rule 91a does not allow evidence-based, “backdoor summary judgment” review. The denial of the Rule 91a motion was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 91a is not a shortcut to win an immunity or “wrong entity” fight on disputed facts. If the petition pleads a concrete motor-vehicle injury mechanism and plausibly ties operation of the vehicle to a governmental unit—even in the alternative—the case will usually survive early dismissal and move into discovery; defendants should use evidence-based tools (plea to the jurisdiction/summary judgment) rather than a pleading-only Rule 91a attack."
Lonis v. Kinzie
COA02
In a Denton County family-law enforcement case, the trial court signed an order revoking a previously suspended commitment and enforcing support obligations, including contempt/commitment provisions and an arrearage money judgment. The pro se appellant attempted to appeal the December 8, 2025 enforcement order but filed the notice of appeal on February 2, 2026—after the 30-day jurisdictional deadline—and did not file any postjudgment motion extending the timetable or any timely motion for extension under the appellate rules. Applying Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b), 26.1, and 26.3 and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Verburgt, the Fort Worth court held it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the notice was untimely and no extension was sought; the appellant’s pro se status did not excuse noncompliance. The court also reiterated that contempt rulings are not reviewable by direct appeal, so the contempt/commitment portions were independently nonappealable, and any attack on the arrearage judgment likewise failed due to the untimely notice. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law enforcement, deadlines and remedies are everything: calendar the notice-of-appeal deadline immediately for any arrearage money judgment, and don’t try to “appeal the contempt” (contempt is typically reviewable only by habeas if confined or, in limited cases, mandamus). A late notice of appeal without a timely extension request is jurisdictional and will get the entire appeal dismissed—even for pro se litigants."
Corey Morrell v. Burton Baker, Individually and in his Professional Capacity; Lummus, Hallman, Pritchard & Baker, P.C.; and Mercer Transportation Co., Inc.
COA02
In a multi‑defendant, multi‑claim lawsuit, the trial court granted a combined Rule 91a and TCPA motion, dismissing several causes of action “with prejudice,” but the same order stated that the plaintiff’s “only remaining claims” were certain numbered counts in a referenced “Third Amended Petition.” The record did not contain that pleading, and the plaintiff pointed out the order’s internal inconsistency (dismissed claim titles versus allegedly surviving numbered counts). The trial court denied a motion to clarify and later signed a separate order awarding attorney’s fees under Rule 91a.7 and TCPA § 27.009(a)(1), including a Mother Hubbard clause and enforcement language, and it restricted discovery as to one defendant until fees were paid. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed finality under Lehmann/Elizondo by looking first to the face of the orders and then the record. Because the dismissal order itself indicated claims remained pending and was ambiguous/internally inconsistent about what survived, and because the fee order contemplated ongoing litigation and did not supply unmistakable finality language, the court held there was no final judgment disposing of all claims and parties. With no applicable statute authorizing an interlocutory appeal in this posture, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 91a/TCPA win plus a fee award is not automatically appealable. Before noticing appeal, confirm the order unmistakably disposes of all claims and all parties (or obtain a severance). Do not rely on a Mother Hubbard clause or enforcement language to create finality—any “remaining claims” language, references to the wrong live pleading, or other internal inconsistencies can trigger a jurisdictional dismissal and waste months while the trial court case keeps moving."