Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Interest of J.M.V.V., a Child
COA10
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no non-frivolous grounds for appeal after the trial court terminated the father’s rights under Family Code section 161.001 and appointed DFPS as managing conservator. The Waco Court of Appeals reviewed whether counsel’s Anders filing was adequate, confirmed counsel had summarized the facts, procedural history, and governing law, and then independently examined the full record, the father’s pro se response, and the State’s response. Finding no arguable basis for reversal, the court affirmed the termination order. The court also denied counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature, holding that appointed counsel remains obligated through potential Texas Supreme Court proceedings unless formally relieved.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas termination appeals, an Anders brief is not a shortcut out of the case: counsel must fully review the record, explain why no arguable issue exists, and continue representing the client through the petition-for-review stage unless relieved. For trial lawyers, the case is another reminder that appellate outcomes usually turn on preservation and a well-developed record."
In the Interest of A.W., N.W., N.W., P.W., Children
COA13
After a jury terminated Mother’s parental rights to four children, she appealed claiming the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support constructive abandonment and best interest, and also complained the order lacked required statutory findings. The court did not reach the merits because Texas preservation rules apply in termination jury trials just as in other civil jury cases. Mother filed none of the recognized preservation vehicles for legal sufficiency and no motion for new trial, which is required to preserve factual-sufficiency complaints. The court also noted that Mother challenged only subsection (N) while the jury also found unchallenged predicate grounds under subsections (D), (E), and (O), any one of which could support termination with a best-interest finding. The court held all complained-of issues were waived or would not afford relief and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any jury-tried family case, appellate sufficiency complaints must be preserved in the trial court or they are likely gone forever. If you may challenge a jury finding on appeal, use a recognized preservation motion, and for factual sufficiency always file a motion for new trial. In termination cases especially, challenge every predicate ground necessary for meaningful relief and promptly object to missing statutory findings in the final order."
Loria v. Loria
COA03
In Loria v. Loria, the Third Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s order modifying conservatorship rights after a bench trial. The father sought to change the prior joint-managing-conservatorship structure by obtaining the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence and greater medical and tie-breaking authority, arguing that circumstances had materially and substantially changed and that the existing arrangement had become unworkable. The appellate court, applying the abuse-of-discretion standard and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations, held that evidence of persistent coparenting conflict, interference with communication, disputes over vaccinations and therapy, lack of follow-through on the children’s developmental needs, and the father’s more stable household was sufficient to support findings of material and substantial change and best interest. The court therefore upheld the reallocation of primary-residence and decision-making rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Modification cases are rarely won by one dramatic fact; they are won by proving a pattern of specific, child-centered problems showing the current order no longer works. If you want to modify conservatorship, build a record with concrete evidence of communication breakdowns, medical and educational conflict, parenting instability, and why a clearer allocation of rights will better serve the child."
In the Interest of L.D.M.W.
COA09
The Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights to his child after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient on multiple predicate grounds and on best interest. The court emphasized Father’s prior termination order containing endangerment findings, his decision to continue a relationship with Mother despite prior CPS history and similar risks, his incarceration before the child’s birth and throughout the case, and his resulting inability to care for the child or meaningfully complete services. The court also held that an approved relative home study did not outweigh evidence of parental unfitness and the child’s successful, stable foster placement with a family ready to adopt.
Litigation Takeaway
"Past endangerment findings, repeated exposure of a child to known risky relationships, and incarceration-related inability to parent can strongly support termination—especially when the child is thriving in a stable adoptive placement. An approved relative placement is helpful but does not, by itself, defeat termination or overcome a strong best-interest record."
In the Interest of H.P. Jr. and H.P. III, Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (b)(2). The court viewed the evidence cumulatively, not incident by incident, and held that the parents’ repeated domestic violence, incarceration, criminal conduct, instability, missed medical care for the children, substance-abuse and mental-health concerns, failure to complete services, and inability to provide safe care showed a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children. The same evidence, along with the children’s improvement in foster care, supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts can infer endangerment and best interest from a parent’s overall pattern of violence, criminality, instability, untreated substance-abuse or mental-health issues, missed medical care, and service-plan noncompliance. In family cases, a party who wants to prove or defeat risk-based restrictions should build or attack the full course-of-conduct narrative, not just isolated events."
In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child
COA13
In *In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child*, the mother challenged only one part of the termination judgment: whether the trial court used the correct version of Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O). The suit was filed in 2023, but the Legislature amended § 161.001 effective September 1, 2025, repealing the old service-plan ground in subsection (O) and renumbering the substance-abuse ground into subsection (O). The Thirteenth Court focused on the amendment’s express transition clause, which made the new law apply to SAPCRs pending in the trial court on the effective date. Because this case was still pending on September 1, 2025 and was tried afterward, the amended statute controlled. The court held the trial court correctly applied amended subsection (O) and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family case stays pending across a legislative change, do not assume the filing date controls. Always check the session law’s effective-date and transition provisions, because amended Family Code sections can apply to pending SAPCRs and change pleadings, proof, jury charge, judgment language, and appellate strategy."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Sini Ann Mathews and Wesley Mon Mathews
COA13
In this divorce case, the appellant tried to use a restricted appeal to challenge the final divorce decree after already filing a timely motion for new trial. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a restricted appeal is available only if the appellant did not timely file any post-judgment motion, and that requirement is jurisdictional under the appellate rules and Ex parte E.H. Because the motion for new trial was filed within thirty days of the decree, the appellant could not satisfy a required element of restricted appeal. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction and held that later efforts to obtain the appellate record could not cure the defect.
Litigation Takeaway
"Choose your post-judgment remedy carefully. In Texas family cases, a timely motion for new trial and a restricted appeal are not interchangeable fallback options—filing the motion for new trial destroys restricted-appeal jurisdiction."
In re Claudia Jacobs
COA05
In this post-divorce enforcement dispute, the relator sought mandamus relief and an emergency stay to block an order to appear and an upcoming enforcement hearing. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the mandamus filing was procedurally defective: the petition lacked the certification required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52, the record did not contain sworn or certified copies of material documents, and the appendix included unredacted sensitive information in violation of Rule 9.9. The court held that these threshold defects defeated mandamus relief, denied the stay as moot, and struck the petition and appendix for the redaction violation.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law mandamus practice, procedure is substance. If your petition lacks a Rule 52 certification, your record is not sworn or certified, or your filing contains unredacted sensitive data, the court may deny relief without ever reaching the underlying enforcement issue."
In re Rebel Hayz Breaux
COA09
After completing his sentence for misdemeanor assault family violence, Breaux filed an article 11.09 habeas application alleging ongoing restraints from the conviction, including the lifetime federal firearm ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and a final protective order. The trial court denied relief solely because his sentence had expired and it concluded he was no longer restrained. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the pleaded federal firearm disability is a sufficient present restraint to support article 11.09 habeas jurisdiction, so the trial court erred in denying the application on that categorical ground. But the court also held that this did not automatically require issuance of the writ, an evidentiary hearing, merits rulings, or appointment of counsel, because the applicant still had to satisfy article 11.14’s procedural and verification requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
"A family-violence conviction does not become legally irrelevant once the sentence ends: the federal firearm ban can be enough continuing restraint to keep post-conviction habeas relief alive. For family-law litigators, that means old assault-family-violence convictions can still carry real leverage in custody, safety, and firearm-related disputes—but any collateral attack on the conviction must be pleaded and verified with precision."
Griffith v. Barrett
COA14
In Griffith v. Barrett, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a temporary injunction was void because the order did not set the case for trial on the merits as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. The injunction stated only that it would remain in effect until final judgment or further order, which the court found was not a substitute for an affirmative merits trial setting. Applying the strict-compliance rule from InterFirst Bank and Qwest, the court treated the omission as a facial defect that rendered the injunction void, reversed the order, dissolved the injunction, and remanded without reaching other issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want temporary injunctive relief in a family-law-adjacent case, draft the order like a real Rule 683 injunction. An order that says it lasts until final judgment is not enough; the injunction itself must set the case for trial on the merits. For the responding party, this is a strong procedural attack point that can dissolve an overbroad injunction before litigating the underlying facts."