Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
In the Interest of O.E.S., a Child
COA05
In a child support dispute under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a father appealed a trial court's refusal to vacate a support order issued following a previous remand. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that the father waived most of his appellate points by failing to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). His brief lacked specific citations to the record and coherent legal analysis, which the court held is fatal to an appeal regardless of whether a party is represented by an attorney. Additionally, the court applied the 'law of the case' doctrine to reject his jurisdictional challenge, as the issue of personal jurisdiction had already been settled in a prior appeal of the same litigation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural rules are just as important as the facts of your case; failing to properly cite the record or provide a clear legal argument in an appellate brief will result in a waiver of your claims. Furthermore, once a legal issue like jurisdiction is decided by an appellate court, the 'law of the case' doctrine typically prevents you from re-litigating that same issue later in the same proceeding."
In the Interest of S.S.F.R. and S.J.F.R., Children
COA05
In this Collin County divorce case, a husband appealed the final decree regarding property division and child possession orders. However, acting without an attorney, the husband filed an appellate brief that failed to identify specific legal errors or provide citations to the trial record and legal authorities as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. The Dallas Court of Appeals gave the husband an opportunity to fix these issues, but his amended brief remained noncompliant. The court analyzed the case by emphasizing that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and that the court cannot act as an advocate or search the record for errors not clearly presented. Consequently, the court held that the husband waived his right to review and affirmed the trial court's divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Success on appeal requires more than just being unhappy with a trial court's decision; you must follow strict briefing rules. Whether represented by counsel or appearing pro se, an appellant must clearly tie their complaints to the trial record and specific legal authorities, or they risk having their appeal dismissed without the court ever considering the actual merits of their case."
Texas A&M University–Commerce and Texas A&M University System v. Chandler Donaway
COA05
A student-athlete sued university entities and others for alleged negligent athletic training and delayed/improper medical treatment after an ankle injury, asserting health care liability claims that required a Texas Chapter 74 expert report. The trial court overruled the universities’ objections and denied their partial motion to dismiss, but on interlocutory appeal the Dallas Court of Appeals strictly applied § 74.351 and the Palacios/Bowie/Jelinek line, emphasizing the “four corners” rule and that “good faith” is an objective sufficiency test. Because the plaintiff’s expert report did not state defendant-specific standards of care, identify what each university entity did or failed to do that breached those standards, or provide a nonconclusory causal chain linking those breaches to the complained-of injuries, it was not an “objective good-faith effort.” The court reversed the order overruling objections/denying dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Conclusory medical-causation narratives don’t survive early gatekeeping: whether you’re attacking or offering expert proof, make it actor-specific and element-by-element—(1) the applicable standard/benchmark, (2) the specific deviation by that party, and (3) a reasoned, non-inferential causal chain. If the court has to “fill gaps” to connect the dots, the report (or letter/affidavit) is vulnerable to being struck or dismissed."
Mosser v. Flagstar Bank, FSB; Select Portfolio Servicing Inc.; First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
COA05
In a Texas homestead lending/foreclosure dispute, the borrower challenged a home-equity (“cash-out”) lien as constitutionally noncompliant and void and sought discovery from multiple entities in the loan/servicing chain. Defendants moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. The borrower filed a properly supported Rule 166a(g) motion for continuance explaining he needed basic, targeted discovery—foundational documents and testimony necessary to respond to the dispositive motions—especially after later-joined parties and procedural events effectively limited meaningful discovery time. The trial court denied the continuance and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals first rejected a post-submission jurisdiction/standing attack tied to a later-recorded “corrective” assignment, holding it still had appellate jurisdiction and that any assignment/standing issues could be addressed on remand. Turning to the merits, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 166a(g) continuance where the record showed the requested discovery was essential—not a fishing expedition—to oppose summary judgment. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court can’t force a party to lose on summary judgment while blocking the minimum discovery needed to respond. If you face early dispositive motions in a property-heavy case, preserve error with a verified, nonconclusory Rule 166a(g) continuance request that ties specific discovery to specific summary-judgment elements and demonstrates diligence—especially when key parties were added late or discovery time was functionally curtailed."
Christopher Redin v. The State of Texas
COA06
In a criminal dating‑violence assault-by-occlusion trial, the defendant sought to keep out evidence that he had assaulted other dating partners in California and moved for mistrial when witnesses briefly referenced an “open case” and “similar charges” despite a motion in limine. The trial court held a pretrial hearing, deferred its final ruling, then—after the defense’s cross-examination created a misleading “false impression” about the defendant’s behavior and the nature of the incident—admitted the other-victim testimony as rebuttal evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), subject to Rule 403 balancing. The Sixth Court of Appeals held the trial court acted within its discretion: the extraneous assaults were admitted for a permissible non-character purpose (rebutting a false impression and providing context on disputed issues) and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court also affirmed denial of mistrial, concluding the brief references to an “open case”/“similar charges” were not so prejudicial as to be incurable and limine violations alone did not warrant the extraordinary remedy of mistrial.
Litigation Takeaway
"In protective-order and SAPCR trials, “character” themes can backfire. If your cross-examination suggests the violence was isolated, the applicant is exaggerating, or the respondent is “not that kind of person,” you may open the door to prior-partner abuse evidence under Rule 404(b) as rebuttal to a false impression—often surviving Rule 403. Also, a motion in limine is only a speed bump: be ready to object, move to strike, request an instruction, and build a record showing why any mention of other cases is incurable if you want a mistrial."
In the Interest of C.B., D.N.B., and J.B., Children
COA06
In a DFPS Chapter 262 removal case filed in Panola County involving three children, the trial court signed an agreed final SAPCR order that adjudicated conservatorship and attempted to redirect child support for one child (Jarod). But a prior Denton County parentage order (and later modification) had already vested the Denton County district court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (CEJ) over all SAPCR matters “in connection with” Jarod. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that while the Panola County Chapter 262 court had authority to enter emergency and temporary orders in the county where the child was found, it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to render a final order affecting Jarod absent a pre-rendition transfer under Family Code Chapter 155/262. Because jurisdiction cannot be created by agreement and a post-judgment transfer does not retroactively cure the defect, the appellate court vacated the final order as to Jarod, affirmed the final order as to the other children, and affirmed the denial of Mother’s motion for new trial attacking the voluntariness of the agreed order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Continuing exclusive jurisdiction is a non-negotiable, early-case triage issue: if any child is already subject to a prior paternity/support/SAPCR order in another Texas court, your current court may issue only Chapter 262 emergency/temporary relief until a proper transfer occurs. You cannot “agree” around CEJ, you cannot redirect or modify support tied to the CEJ court without transfer, and a post-judgment transfer will not save a final order—creating a real risk of partial vacatur in multi-child decrees."
Timothy Ross v. The State of Texas
COA05
In a civil bond-forfeiture case, the State obtained a judgment nisi after Timothy Ross failed to appear. Within days, Ross—acting pro se—filed a document titled “Motion to Void Judgment Nisi,” which identified the case, provided his contact information, and substantively challenged the State’s entitlement to forfeiture. Despite that filing, the trial court signed a no‑answer default judgment. The Dallas Court of Appeals applied Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 71’s substance-over-caption principle and the appearance standard from Smith v. Lippmann, holding that Ross’s pro se motion functioned as a timely answer/appearance because it showed an intent to contest the relief sought and provided identifying/contact information. Because an “answer” was on file, Rule 239 did not permit a no‑answer default. The court reversed the default judgment and remanded for proceedings on the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the respondent files anything timely that identifies the case and disputes the requested relief—even a mislabeled pro se “motion” or letter—Texas courts must often treat it as an answer/appearance. That closes the door on a no‑answer default and triggers notice and an opportunity to be heard (crucial in protective orders, SAPCR modifications, and termination cases). Petitioners should docket-audit for any such filing and proceed, at most, under post‑answer default with proper notice and proof."
Skorich v. The State of Texas; Woody v. The State of Texas
COA07
In a consolidated criminal appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals reviewed injury-to-a-child convictions against the child’s mother and her live-in boyfriend arising from omissions during an interstate 18‑wheeler trip that culminated with the seven-year-old arriving at a Hereford (Deaf Smith County) ER unresponsive, severely dehydrated, and bruised. The defendants challenged (1) subject-matter jurisdiction and venue in Deaf Smith County given the multistate travel, and (2) legal and factual sufficiency—especially whether the boyfriend could be liable by omission absent parent status. Applying Texas Penal Code § 22.04, the court treated the conduct as a continuing, omission-based course of conduct with a harmful result tied to Deaf Smith County, and held Texas courts had jurisdiction and venue was proper where key components of the omission and the resulting medical crisis manifested. On sufficiency, the court held the evidence supported that the boyfriend “assumed” care, custody, and control—shown by cohabitation, day-to-day authority and discipline, integrated household functioning, and participation in decisions about when to seek medical care—creating a legal duty to act and supporting omission liability. The court also held the evidence supported the mother’s knowing or reckless mental state and causation, relying heavily on medical testimony that the child’s dehydration was chronic and consistent with withholding fluids and delayed care. The court affirmed both defendants’ judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, a live-in boyfriend/girlfriend can become a duty-bearing “assumed caregiver” based on real-world control and decision-making—enough to support omission liability. For SAPCRs and protective orders, build (or attack) proof around functional caregiving facts (cohabitation, discipline, control of necessities, medical decision-making, admissions) and a clear timeline showing progressive deterioration and delayed intervention; courts will look past labels like “not the parent.”"
Skorich v. State; Woody v. State
COA07
During an interstate trucking trip, a seven-year-old arrived at a Hereford, Texas ER unresponsive, profoundly dehydrated, and covered in bruises. The mother and her non-parent boyfriend were convicted of injury to a child based on a course of conduct that included chronic water deprivation, corporal punishment, and delayed medical care. On appeal, they challenged Texas subject-matter jurisdiction and Deaf Smith County venue because much of the travel occurred outside Texas, and the boyfriend challenged the legal sufficiency of proof that he had a duty to act (required for omission liability under Penal Code § 22.04). The Seventh Court of Appeals treated the events as a continuing, mobile criminal episode and held Texas had jurisdiction because the State tied critical elements and the resulting serious bodily injury to Texas, including the child’s deterioration and medical crisis culminating in Texas. The court further held venue was proper in Deaf Smith County because the evidence connected the offense to that county, including the child’s emergent presentation and treatment in Hereford and supporting timeline/location proof. On the merits, the court held the evidence was legally sufficient that the boyfriend assumed “care, custody, and control” through cohabitation/household integration, discipline authority, shared finances, and influence over medical decisions—creating a legal duty supporting omission liability. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient that the mother knowingly or recklessly caused serious bodily injury and bodily injury by omission through chronic deprivation of water and failure to obtain timely medical care, and it affirmed both convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody and protective-order litigation, a parent’s live-in romantic partner can be treated as a de facto caregiver with enforceable duties when the facts show they functioned in the family unit (discipline, daily supervision, finances, medical decision-making). Also, “neglect” theories (withholding basic necessities and delaying medical care) can support endangerment and family-violence findings as an omission-based course of conduct—especially in mobile-family cases—so anchor proof to where the child’s decline manifested and where the crisis was discovered/treated to defeat jurisdiction/venue attacks."
In re M.S.
COA02
In a modification of a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) between a mother and a nonparent former partner, the trial court initially maintained the nonparent's joint managing conservatorship and possession rights over the mother’s objection. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, applying the "fit-parent presumption" established in In re C.J.C., held that a trial court cannot grant or continue a nonparent's possession or conservatorship rights over a fit parent's objection without evidence of extraordinary circumstances or parental unfitness. Finding that the record consisted primarily of interpersonal conflict rather than evidence of significant harm to the child, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"Temporary orders are a critical constitutional battleground in parent-vs-nonparent disputes. Litigators must treat the "fit-parent presumption" as the controlling standard from the outset; a nonparent cannot rely on the "status quo" or "best interest" alone to maintain rights, but must instead prove extraordinary circumstances to overcome a fit parent's objection."