Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
Maria Martinez v. Mario Antonio Perez Batres
COA03
Maria Martinez filed a restricted appeal to challenge a default divorce decree. However, the appellate court discovered that all twelve exhibits admitted during the initial hearing were missing from the record because the trial judge had released the originals to the husband’s lawyer, who never filed them with the district clerk. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and determined that this created a significant 'record-integrity problem' that could not be fixed by simple supplementation. The court held that the appeal must be abated and remanded to the trial court, ordering the trial judge to 'settle the record' by either securing an agreement between the parties or holding a hearing to reconstruct the missing evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning your hearing is only the first step; you must ensure your evidence is officially filed and preserved with the court clerk. If exhibits are 'released' to an attorney rather than filed, it can lead to expensive delays and secondary 'record reconstruction' hearings if the case is ever challenged on appeal."
In re L.C.
COA12
In a DFPS SAPCR, the adoptive parent sought mandamus relief attacking the trial court’s temporary/permanency orders—complaining of alleged Chapter 263 noncompliance, continued DFPS possession after an adversary hearing, and a sua sponte “aggravated circumstances” finding that waived reasonable-efforts and service-plan requirements. While the mandamus was pending, the court of appeals in an earlier original proceeding ordered the trial court to vacate its temporary order and return the children; the trial court complied. DFPS then moved to dismiss the underlying SAPCR and the trial court signed a dismissal order. The parent argued the mandamus was not moot because the aggravated-circumstances finding could cause collateral consequences in future DFPS cases, foster-care licensing/employment, and related criminal proceedings. The Tyler Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because intervening events eliminated any live controversy: the children had been returned and the DFPS case was dismissed, so no effectual mandamus relief remained. The court also rejected the collateral-consequences exception, reasoning that the challenged aggravated-circumstances language appeared only in nonfinal temporary/permanency orders, which do not preserve a justiciable controversy once the case is dismissed. The court dismissed the mandamus petition as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus jurisdiction can disappear fast in DFPS cases: once possession is restored and the underlying SAPCR is dismissed, appellate courts will usually treat challenges to temporary/permanency findings as moot. If you need to undo damaging interim language (like “aggravated circumstances”), press for immediate trial-court correction or expedited appellate relief while the case is still live; reputational or speculative future harms from nonfinal temporary orders typically won’t satisfy the narrow collateral-consequences exception."
Erique Howard v. The State of Texas
COA14
After a jury convicted Erique Howard of multiple felonies, he elected judge sentencing. In a post-verdict discussion, the judge referenced the broad punishment range and encouraged the parties to confer and, if they wanted more control over the number, attempt to reach an agreement before the court assessed punishment. After a recess, the court imposed a 50-year sentence “in accordance with the plea agreement,” and the record contained no contemporaneous objection claiming coercion/retaliation and no motion for new trial or other post-judgment motion raising involuntariness or lack of judicial inquiry. On appeal, Howard argued the sentence reflected judicial vindictiveness for exercising the right to a jury trial and that the post-verdict sentencing agreement was involuntary (and the judge should have inquired into voluntariness). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not an increased sentence after a retrial, so Howard had to show actual vindictiveness from the record; the judge’s repeated statements disclaiming predetermination and the negotiated posture did not establish actual vindictiveness. The court further held the voluntariness and “duty to inquire” complaints were waived for lack of preservation because Howard did not object at the time and did not file a post-judgment motion to develop the issue. The judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you think a judge’s settlement/sentencing “range talk” crossed into coercion or retaliation, you must preserve it immediately. Make a record (objection/clarification/offer of proof), and if needed file timely post-judgment motions to develop involuntariness claims—otherwise the “the judge pressured me” narrative is usually unreviewable, and the agreement will be treated as voluntary."
Daniel Cisneros Leyva v. The State of Texas
COA14
In a capital-murder/robbery appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether the State sufficiently corroborated an accomplice co-defendant’s testimony under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.14, and whether the jury should have been instructed that other witnesses were accomplices. Applying the required method—disregarding the accomplice’s testimony and examining the remaining record—the court held the corroboration threshold is modest: non-accomplice evidence need only “tend to connect” the accused to the offense, not independently prove every element. Here, the non-accomplice evidence included (1) witnesses placing the group together shortly before the offense, (2) the defendant’s own statements putting him at the scene, (3) descriptions of the shooter’s clothing and a laser-equipped gun consistent with the defendant’s admissions, (4) cell-phone location/communication evidence showing coordination and post-incident calls, and (5) inconsistencies/falsehoods in the defendant’s accounts. The court also affirmed the refusal to give accomplice-witness instructions for other witnesses because the record contained no evidence they participated in the charged capital murder/robbery; mere association, presence, or tangential benefit is not enough to make someone an accomplice for charge purposes.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case turns on one “insider” witness, don’t argue each corroborating fact must independently prove the whole story. Instead, focus the judge (or jury) on whether there are multiple independent circumstances that collectively *tend to connect* the accused to the alleged conduct (texts/calls, location data, third-party records, injuries/clothing/timeline congruence, and inconsistent denials). Conversely, resist attempts to discredit every supporting witness as “complicit” unless there is concrete evidence the witness participated in the *act alleged*, not just relationship drama or proximity."
Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm v. Michael A. Pohl and The Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
COA01
A Texas lawyer obtained another lawyer’s vendor-held files—attorney–client fee contracts and extensive client lists—through a marketing vendor involved in a prior dispute and used the information to target those individuals with notices that triggered hundreds of responses and follow-on barratry-related litigation and grievances. A Harris County jury found the contracts and lists were protectable trade secrets under the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) and that the defendant misappropriated them, awarding multiple damages categories plus exemplary damages and fees. The First Court of Appeals agreed that client fee contracts and client lists can qualify as TUTSA trade secrets when they have independent economic value from secrecy and the owner takes reasonable confidentiality measures (including instructions and agreements with vendors and controlled access), and that evidence of acquiring the materials from a third party and then using them to conduct targeted outreach supported misappropriation. However, the court partially reversed the judgment because parts of the damages package and related relief were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and/or did not fit TUTSA’s permitted damages frameworks, and it remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Litigation Takeaway
"Client lists, intake/CRM exports, and even signed fee agreements can be trade secrets in Texas—especially in “client poaching” fights involving vendors or departing lawyers—but winning liability is only half the battle. To survive appeal, the firm must prove (1) real secrecy measures (including vendor confidentiality controls) and (2) a damages model that matches TUTSA (actual loss, unjust enrichment, or reasonable royalty) without double-counting; otherwise, even a strong verdict can be pared back or sent back for a do-over."
Brisby Ray Brown v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Brisby Ray Brown v. State, the defendant challenged his aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction, arguing the jury charge improperly allowed a non-unanimous verdict by submitting, in the disjunctive, two distinct aggravated-assault offenses: (1) aggravated assault predicated on bodily-injury assault and (2) aggravated assault predicated on threat-by-assault, tied to different alleged deadly weapons. Applying the two-step jury-charge framework, the First Court of Appeals assumed/recognized charge error under Landrian because those are separate statutory aggravated-assault crimes requiring jury unanimity as to which offense was committed. However, because Brown did not object on unanimity grounds, the court reviewed only for Almanza egregious harm, considering the entire charge (including a general unanimity instruction), the evidence, closing arguments, and the record as a whole. On this record, the court concluded any error did not egregiously affect the fairness of the trial or the basis of the verdict and therefore affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case is submitted on multiple alternative legal/factual predicates that carry different consequences, you must preserve error by forcing clarity at trial—object, request separate submissions/findings, and get a ruling. Otherwise, even a real “unanimity/ambiguity” problem will likely be upheld under a highly deferential harm standard, a lesson that translates directly to broad, multi-theory “family violence” findings in Texas family-law cases."
Geoffrey Quinn v. Kimberly A. Sergeant
COA01
After a trial court rendered a divorce judgment, the parties reached a settlement through mediation while an appeal was pending. The appellant requested that the appellate court set aside the trial court's original judgment and remand the case for the entry of a new judgment based on the Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA). The appellee argued for a simple dismissal of the appeal. Analyzing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2)(B), the First Court of Appeals determined that it had the authority to vacate the trial court's judgment without reaching the merits to facilitate a settlement. The court held that setting aside the judgment and remanding for rendition was appropriate, ensuring that the parties would not be stuck with an outdated and enforceable decree that conflicted with their new agreement.
Litigation Takeaway
"When settling a case on appeal, parties should request that the appellate court set aside the trial court's judgment and remand for a new judgment under TRAP 42.1(a)(2)(B). Simply dismissing the appeal leaves the original judgment intact and enforceable, which can create significant legal friction if the settlement terms differ from the original court order."
Bouknight v. Llanelly Enterprises
COA01
Bouknight, a judgment creditor, sued Llanelly Enterprises for declaratory relief to establish that debtor Wilmot held a legal or beneficial ownership interest in a Houston house titled in Llanelly’s name, so the asset could be reached through turnover-style relief. Although the evidence showed Wilmot initially contracted to buy the home and participated in the transaction before title was shifted to Llanelly, the jury charge submitted only one liability question: whether the deed was “ineffective” to convey the property to Llanelly. The jury answered yes, but the charge did not ask—and the jury did not find—who owned the property (legal title, equitable title, beneficial ownership, nominee status, resulting/constructive trust, etc.). Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301 and JNOV/legal-sufficiency principles, the Houston First Court of Appeals held that because the verdict failed to resolve the only live, controlling issue pleaded (ownership), the verdict could not support a judgment for Bouknight and the trial court properly granted JNOV and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The court also accepted Llanelly’s argument as an affirming cross-point because it would vitiate the verdict and independently support affirmance.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any case where the real fight is “Who owns the asset?” you must submit jury questions that directly obtain an ownership finding that supports the requested judgment. A win on a proxy question (e.g., “ineffective deed,” “sham transfer,” “invalid document”) can still lose at the judgment stage because it does not establish the dispositive ultimate issue. For divorce and enforcement cases involving third-party/LLC title or nominee ownership, charge planning is outcome-determinative: plead the ownership theory and get verdict-grade findings (legal/equitable/beneficial ownership, alter ego, resulting/constructive trust, characterization) or expect a JNOV vulnerability."
Norman v. Kahn Scheepvaart BV
COA14
In Norman v. Kahn Scheepvaart BV, a longshore worker appealed a take-nothing judgment after a jury found neither she nor the vessel owner’s negligence proximately caused her injury. On appeal, she attacked the jury charge as confusing and as improperly permitting certain theories/defenses and a “no one responsible” outcome, and she also sought a new trial based on alleged juror and bailiff misconduct. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused first on error preservation under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 272–278 and the State Dep’t of Highways v. Payne framework, holding that most complaints were waived because counsel did not make timely, specific objections at the charge conference, did not ensure any requested charge language was in the clerk’s record in substantially correct form, and did not obtain an express ruling or endorsed refusal. The court rejected “preservation-by-paperwork,” explaining that pretrial filings and an unrecorded “tender” did not alert the trial court at the charge conference or create an appellate record under Cruz. The court declined to treat the alleged defects as fundamental error. As to the few issues arguably preserved, the court found no reversible charge error (one was not error; any other assumed error was harmless). The court also held the alleged juror/bailiff misconduct did not justify a new trial and affirmed the denial of the motion for new trial. The take-nothing judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Jury-charge complaints live or die on preservation: object on the record before submission, state the defect plainly and specifically, tender substantially correct requested language, make sure it is file-stamped and included in the clerk’s record, and get a clear ruling/refusal. Pretrial proposed charges and vague “tenders” that don’t make it into the record won’t save an appeal, and misconduct/new-trial arguments require admissible proof tied to harm."
Sergio Adrian Contreras v. The State of Texas
COA13
In a criminal appeal arising from a continuous sexual abuse of a child conviction under Texas Penal Code § 21.02, the defendant challenged (1) alleged jury-charge error, (2) legal sufficiency on the statute’s “continuous period of 30 or more days”/multiple-acts element, (3) limits the trial court placed on voir dire of venire members with sexual-assault experiences, and (4) claimed prosecutorial misconduct. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the charge complaints under Texas jury-charge harm standards (including the egregious-harm framework for unpreserved error), reviewed sufficiency under the Jackson v. Virginia rational-juror standard, and deferred to the trial court’s broad discretion to control voir dire absent a showing that limits prevented meaningful bias exploration and caused harm. On the evidence, the court treated the State’s proof as a corroborative disclosure pathway—school counselor/wellness disclosure leading to CAC forensic interviews and a child-abuse pediatric evaluation—and held that delayed outcry, developmental “fuzziness,” and qualifying language (“I think,” “I’m not sure”) did not render the children’s accounts legally insufficient. The court also found no reversible prosecutorial-misconduct error due to context, lack of preservation, curative measures, or lack of prejudice. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence/child-sex-abuse custody and protective-order cases, courts can credit a “disclosure pathway” (school disclosure → CAC interview → medical/clinical testimony) even when the child reports late and is imprecise on details; don’t assume “I’m not sure” impeachment will defeat safety findings. If you’re defending, focus on challenging the reliability of the disclosure process (suggestibility/contamination, anchoring, leading questions) and preserve a clean record—especially for voir dire and evidentiary limits—because appellate courts give wide deference without specific offers of proof."