Opinion Library

Rickye Henderson v. Ali Arabzadegan

COA03

In a quiet-title/deed-fraud lawsuit, the defendant repeatedly obstructed discovery—producing no responsive documents, asserting meritless objections, giving inconsistent explanations about missing devices/accounts, and refusing to comply with a court-ordered forensic imaging protocol designed to obtain electronically stored information (ESI) and test suspected fabrication. After incremental discovery orders and express findings of intentional concealment and repeated noncompliance, the trial court imposed “death-penalty” sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215 by striking pleadings/defaulting the defendant on liability, leaving only damages for a bench prove-up. The defendant then failed to appear for the damages trial, and the court rendered judgment quieting title, declaring the deed void, and awarding damages and attorneys’ fees. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held the sanctions were “just,” directly related to the discovery abuse, and consistent with due process; it also rejected complaints that excluded evidence (including purported newly discovered racially offensive emails) required reversal in a post-default posture, and affirmed an interlocutory summary judgment disposing of the defendant’s breach-of-contract counterclaim.

Litigation Takeaway

"Texas courts can and will strike pleadings and default a party who games ESI discovery—especially when a tailored forensic imaging order (with privilege safeguards) is ignored. Build a careful record of repeated noncompliance, prejudice, and the ineffectiveness of lesser measures; on appeal, due-process and “critical evidence” arguments are unlikely to resurrect liability after a sanctions default, and the case may proceed only on damages (if the sanctioned party even shows up)."

Termination of Parental Rights

In the Interest of A.C. and E.C., Jr., Children

COA06

In a termination-of-parental-rights appeal from Gregg County, Mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s predicate findings and best-interest determination. The Sixth Court of Appeals (Texarkana) applied the clear-and-convincing evidence standard and the Supreme Court’s modern sufficiency framework, emphasizing deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations and reasonable inferences while reviewing the entire record “holistically.” Because endangerment findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) have collateral consequences in future cases, the court conducted mandatory review of those challenged grounds and held the evidence legally and factually sufficient to prove (D) (endangering conditions/surroundings) and (E) (endangering conduct/course of conduct). The court also evaluated best interest under § 161.001(b)(2) using the Holley factors as nonexclusive guideposts and held the record supported the best-interest finding as to both parents (including Father, who challenged only best interest). The termination order was affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"Endangerment is proved—and sustained on appeal—through the cumulative story, not a single “bad fact.” If you’re pursuing or defending a termination (or litigating custody restrictions with endangerment themes), build and attack a record that ties specific unsafe conditions and a parent’s course of conduct to the child’s exposure to risk. Also, preserve and litigate grounds (D) and (E) directly: appellate courts must review challenged D/E findings, and those findings can follow a parent into future cases."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Thomas Joseph Radford, Jr. v. The State of Texas

COA01

In Radford, the complainant testified she ingested Xanax supplied by the defendant, lost consciousness, and woke to find the defendant penetrating her while her clothing was displaced. The defendant immediately stopped and acted as if nothing had happened when she opened her eyes. On appeal from a sexual-assault conviction, the Houston First Court of Appeals applied the legal-sufficiency standard (viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict) and focused on Texas Penal Code § 22.011(b)(3) and (5), which define “without consent” to include situations where the actor knows the complainant is unconscious/physically unable to resist or unaware the assault is occurring. The court rejected the argument that the complainant’s inability to describe the precise start of intercourse created an evidentiary gap; unconsciousness at the outset is itself affirmative proof of nonconsent under the statute. The court further held the jury could infer the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent from circumstantial evidence and consciousness-of-guilt conduct, including that intercourse began while she was unconscious (after drugs he provided) and that he abruptly stopped and normalized the situation upon her awakening. The court affirmed, holding the evidence legally sufficient to prove both lack of consent and the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent.

Litigation Takeaway

"When the evidence shows a person was unconscious or unaware at the outset, Texas law treats that incapacity as affirmative proof of “without consent”—the case does not fail just because the complainant cannot testify to what happened during unconsciousness. Knowledge/intent is commonly proven circumstantially; abrupt stopping, concealment, minimization, or “acting like nothing happened” can support an inference the actor knew the other person could not consent. In family-violence/SAPCR disputes, build the record around impairment, waking-condition details, and post-incident conduct to support findings even where memory is partial."

Appeal and Mandamus

Erique Howard v. The State of Texas

COA14

After a jury convicted Erique Howard of multiple felonies, he elected judge-assessed punishment. Before the punishment hearing, the trial judge discussed Howard’s punishment exposure, referenced prior plea positions, and suggested a post-verdict negotiation range. After a recess, the court imposed a 50-year sentence, stating it was “in accordance with the plea agreement,” and no one objected or filed a motion for new trial claiming coercion or vindictiveness. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not a resentencing after retrial, so Howard had to prove actual judicial vindictiveness from the record. The judge’s forceful comments and settlement-range discussion—paired with repeated disclaimers and a sentence matching the announced agreement—did not establish retaliation for exercising the right to trial. The court also held that complaints that the post-verdict sentencing agreement was involuntary, or that the trial court had to conduct an on-the-record voluntariness inquiry, were waived because Howard raised neither a contemporaneous objection nor a post-judgment motion developing those issues.

Litigation Takeaway

"When a judge “pushes a number” after a merits ruling, appellate courts often treat it as hard bargaining unless the record proves retaliation—and you still must preserve coercion/vindictiveness complaints immediately. If you believe a post-ruling agreement (Rule 11, parenting plan, property blueprint) was coerced, object on the record and follow up with a motion for new trial/to set aside that specifically pleads involuntariness and identifies the coercive statements; otherwise, the issue will likely be deemed waived."

General trial issues

Harrell v. Brinson

COA01

In Harrell v. Brinson, an inmate repeatedly sued a former landlord over the same underlying 2004 salon lease/break‑in events that led to his 2005 criminal conviction, despite prior final adverse rulings (including summary judgment and an unsuccessful bill of review). In a new 2021 suit repackaged as fraud and conspiracy based on alleged false testimony and collusion with a prosecutor, the defendant moved under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 11 to have Harrell declared a vexatious litigant and to dismiss. Applying Chapter 11, the First Court of Appeals held the trial court acted within its discretion because the record supported the required findings: there was no reasonable probability Harrell would prevail and he was attempting to relitigate the same controversy against the same defendant after prior final determinations. The court also addressed appellate jurisdiction: an earlier appeal was premature because claims against another defendant remained, but a later severance created a final judgment in the severed cause, and Harrell’s notice of appeal was timely under the prisoner mailbox rule based on proof he delivered it to prison authorities within the deadline. The court affirmed the vexatious‑litigant order and the dismissal with prejudice.

Litigation Takeaway

"Chapter 11 is a powerful early tool to stop serial, pro se “relabeling” lawsuits that try to re-fight issues already finally decided; build a record of prior final determinations and show the new pleading is the same dispute in disguise, and the court can impose vexatious‑litigant restrictions and dismiss with prejudice. Procedurally, if an order isn’t final because other parties/claims remain, severance can create an appealable final judgment—and when the opposing party is incarcerated, plan for the prisoner mailbox rule to affect filing deadlines."

Christopher Joe Bradshaw, Sr. v. The State of Texas

COA03

In this Austin Court of Appeals criminal case, a father convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a young child argued the State failed to prove the statutory “30-or-more-days” duration element because the child’s testimony about being “ten” could be read to confine the abuse to a narrow, four-day window between the father’s arrival and the child’s 11th birthday. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and deference to jury inferences under Hooper, the court held the jury was not required to adopt that restrictive reading. The jury could reasonably interpret the age-based exchange as referring to only one type of conduct and could rely on frequency testimony (weekly/nightly conduct), CAC interview corroboration (“basically every night”), living-arrangement context, and digital forensic evidence showing pornography/child-pornography-related activity across multiple months to infer a course of abuse lasting at least 30 days. The court also rejected challenges to the mandatory life sentence, the jury charge on duration, and the admission of extraneous-offense evidence (including a prior Oklahoma lewd-molestation conviction used for enhancement), but it modified the judgment to correct a clerical miscitation to the enhancement subsection and affirmed as modified.

Litigation Takeaway

"In child-safety litigation, don’t let the case turn on a child’s imperfect “timing” testimony. Courts allow factfinders to reconcile age-based or vague time references with pattern/frequency testimony and objective corroboration (CAC interview details, device timelines, household routines) to establish a longer course of conduct and defeat “it could only have happened during a short window” defenses. Also, preserve evidentiary and charge complaints precisely, and double-check statutory citations in orders/judgments—miscitations may be corrected but can create avoidable appellate issues."

Moises Galvan v. The State of Texas

COA08

In a bar‑shooting prosecution, Moises Galvan admitted shooting two men (killing one) but claimed self‑defense. After a mistrial in 2019, he was retried and convicted in 2023. On appeal, the El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed (1) claimed jury‑charge defects under Texas’s preservation‑dependent harm framework, (2) exclusion of a defense expert opinion under abuse‑of‑discretion gatekeeping and the need for a reliable, issue‑specific “fit” plus a proper offer of proof, (3) cumulative error, and (4) a Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial claim under the Barker v. Wingo balancing test. The court held Galvan failed to show reversible charge error or harm, the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding the defense expert (and any error was not shown harmful in light of the video/forensic and impeachment evidence), cumulative‑error relief was unavailable without multiple harmful errors, and the Barker factors did not warrant the drastic remedy of dismissal with prejudice despite the lengthy delay between indictment and retrial.

Litigation Takeaway

"Crossover lesson for family‑violence dockets: (1) If you need an expert to support a self‑defense/“reasonable perception” narrative, you must build a tight admissibility foundation and preserve the excluded opinion with a detailed offer of proof—otherwise exclusion will usually stand on appeal. (2) Delay‑based fairness arguments require a record of assertion of the right and concrete prejudice (lost evidence/witnesses, impaired presentation, child‑focused harm), not generalized complaints. (3) “Cumulative error” rarely rescues a case when each individual ruling fails on preservation, error, or harm."

Oscar Antonio Rodriguez v. The State of Texas

COA14

In a prosecution for continuous sexual abuse of a child, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the complainant had previously viewed pornography on a relative’s phone to support a fabrication theory. The State invoked former Texas Rule of Evidence 412 (rape-shield rule), and after a hearing outside the jury’s presence the trial court excluded the evidence, finding it did not fit any exception and did not show bias or motive to lie. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that pornography exposure, at most, provides an “alternative source of sexual knowledge,” which does not satisfy Rule 412’s motive/bias exception absent a logical nexus showing why the exposure would lead the complainant to falsely accuse this defendant. The court also held any constitutional “right to present a defense” complaint was waived because the defense did not expressly raise that constitutional ground in the trial court and obtain a ruling.

Litigation Takeaway

"Porn/sexual-content exposure is not automatically admissible to undermine a child-complainant; without a concrete, non-speculative link to a specific motive or bias to fabricate against the accused, it is simply an alternative-knowledge theory and can be excluded under rape-shield/Rule 403 principles. Also, if you intend to argue evidence is “constitutionally required” (due process/confrontation/right to present a defense), you must clearly assert that ground, make a full offer of proof, and obtain an express ruling—or the issue is waived on appeal."

Johnny Ined Gonzalez v. The State of Texas

COA14

In a prosecution for continuous sexual abuse of a child, the State introduced still photos from a CAC forensic interview and had a CAC supervisor (who observed but did not conduct the interview) testify—over hearsay objections—about what the child’s gestures in the photos “meant,” describing specific sexual acts and sensory details. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the “gesture interpretation” testimony was inadmissible hearsay, but analyzed harm under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) and held any error was harmless because substantially the same evidence came in elsewhere without objection, most importantly through the child’s own later testimony explaining the same photos and through CAC medical records admitted without objection. The court affirmed the conviction, but reversed and remanded the $570 “reimbursement fees” portion of court costs because the record did not necessarily support all subpoena/service-related fees as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Litigation Takeaway

"Winning the objection isn’t enough—winning the harm analysis is. If you want appellate relief from CAC/forensic-interview “interpretation” testimony, you must also object (or otherwise prevent) the same substantive details from coming in through other witnesses or records; otherwise the error will likely be deemed harmless as cumulative. Conversely, to defend a ruling, build redundancy by getting the key facts admitted through at least one clean, admissible pathway. Also, scrutinize and challenge service/subpoena cost line-items that aren’t tied to proof the service was actually performed."

General trial issues

Cory Cornell Parker v. The State of Texas

COA01

In Cory Cornell Parker v. State, the defendant attended jury selection and the State’s case-in-chief but failed to return when trial resumed for the defense case, claiming by text that he was being taken by ambulance to a hospital. Despite hours of opportunity and repeated requests, neither Parker nor counsel provided basic, verifiable information (hospital name/location, provider contact, admission/discharge details, documentation), and counsel’s continuance requests were oral and unsupported. The trial court denied a continuance, declined to conduct an unverified phone call, found Parker’s mid-trial absence voluntary, and proceeded; Parker returned after deliberations began. On appeal, the First Court of Appeals held the record supported the trial court’s discretionary finding that Parker voluntarily absented himself and that denying the unsupported oral continuance requests was not an abuse of discretion. The court also rejected Parker’s ineffective-assistance claims based on counsel’s failure to file a written continuance motion or seek a writ of attachment because Parker did not show deficient performance and, critically, failed to show prejudice (a reasonable probability of a different result). The court further found no reversible error regarding assessed costs.

Litigation Takeaway

"When the other side claims a last-minute “emergency” to stop a hearing or trial, frame it as a proof-and-diligence issue: insist on real-time, verifiable details and competent documentation, make the timeline record, and push for express findings. Unsupported, oral continuance requests—especially timed to derail an evidentiary turning point—can properly be denied, and a party who withholds readily confirmable information risks a finding that the absence is voluntary/strategic."