Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Carlos v. State
COA07
In Carlos v. State, a defendant on community supervision for family violence and injury to a child had his probation conditions administratively modified (requiring time in an Intermediate Sanction Facility) after violating his terms. Later, the State filed a formal motion to revoke his probation based on the exact same violations. The defendant argued that this violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because he had already been "punished" for that conduct. The Seventh Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that probation modifications are not constitutional "punishment" and that administrative adjustments without a formal hearing do not constitute a final adjudication. The court held that the State is not barred from later seeking formal revocation or adjudication based on conduct that was previously addressed through administrative means.
Litigation Takeaway
"An opposing party’s "administrative" probation modification—such as being sent to a treatment or sanction facility—does not legally resolve their underlying misconduct. In family law litigation, this means a party who has committed domestic violence remains at risk of imminent incarceration for those acts even if they were already "dealt with" by a probation officer, providing powerful evidence of instability in custody and access disputes."
El Paso V Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Reyes
COA08
In El Paso V Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Reyes, a healthcare facility challenged the qualifications of a nurse and a family physician who provided expert reports regarding a patient's pressure wounds. The defendants argued the experts lacked specific nursing home experience. The court analyzed the requirements under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74, applying a 'lenient standard' that prioritizes the 'type of care' (wound management) over the specific title or facility setting. The court held that the experts' general experience in long-term care and medicine was sufficient to satisfy the threshold requirements, affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don't assume you need a hyper-specialized expert to survive a Chapter 74 challenge; focus on qualifying general practitioners or nurses by linking their experience to the specific 'type of care' or medical protocols at issue rather than the specific facility type."
Howell Sand Company, Inc. v. Triple L Utilities, Inc.
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit for want of prosecution (DWOP) following two distinct six-year periods of inactivity. The plaintiff attempted to avoid dismissal by announcing 'ready' for trial after receiving a notice of intent to dismiss and offered excuses of financial hardship and a mistaken belief that a defendant was in bankruptcy. The court analyzed the case using the 'entire history' test, determining that a trial court’s inherent power to dismiss is not curtailed by a last-minute announcement of readiness if the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence throughout the life of the suit. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case or denying reinstatement, as the plaintiff's excuses were insufficient to prove the delay was not the result of conscious indifference.
Litigation Takeaway
"A last-minute 'announcement of ready' or a request for a trial setting will not save a stale case from dismissal for want of prosecution if there is a historical lack of diligence; furthermore, 'lack of funds' is not a legal justification for letting a family law modification or enforcement action languish for years."
In re Jay W. Colvin III
COA01
In a dispute involving an arbitrator's subpoena for 'accountings' of real property transactions, the First Court of Appeals addressed whether such a request could force a party to create new financial records. The Relator argued that the order improperly required him to perform a forensic accounting service rather than simply produce documents. The court analyzed the language of the enforcement order, determining that 'accounting' was used as a noun referring to existing records already in the party’s possession and control. Ultimately, the court denied mandamus relief, holding that because discovery is limited to items already in existence, the order did not compel the creation of new work product, but rather the turnover of existing financial data.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot use a subpoena to force an opposing party to perform forensic work or create new financial reports for you. An 'accounting' request only compels the production of existing records; if you need a complex summary or tracing of assets for your divorce, you must obtain the raw data and have your own expert perform the analysis."
In the Interest of A.C., a Child
COA02
In this case, a mother attempted to appeal an order terminating her parental rights while the claims against the child's presumed father remained pending and unadjudicated. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the order under the finality standard established in Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., determining that because the trial court explicitly recessed the father's portion of the case, the litigation had not concluded as to all parties. Despite the trial court's inclusion of "Mother Hubbard" language and statutory warnings regarding accelerated appeals, the court held that the order remained interlocutory and unappealable without a severance, resulting in a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on boilerplate 'finality' language or Mother Hubbard clauses to create an appealable order in multi-party litigation. If any party's rights—such as an alleged or presumed father—remain unadjudicated, you must affirmatively move for a severance to trigger the appellate clock for a terminated parent, or your appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile
COA10
In this juvenile law case, a minor (C.C.) challenged a court's jurisdiction to transfer his case to criminal court. He argued that his summons was not served at least two days before the hearing date listed on the document, violating Texas Family Code § 53.07(a). The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory language and determined that the 'two-day' requirement refers to the date the hearing actually occurs, rather than the date originally printed on the summons. Because C.C. was served in June and the hearing did not take place until August, the court held the service was timely. The court also ruled that once jurisdiction is established through initial service, subsequent postponements do not require new summons and that appearing for a hearing without objection waives minor clerical errors.
Litigation Takeaway
"Service of process defects regarding hearing dates are often cured by time. If you are served late for an initial date but the hearing is postponed, the statutory window is measured against the actual hearing date. Critically, if you appear and announce 'ready' at a hearing, you waive the right to challenge these types of clerical or timing defects in the summons."
Gonzales v. State
COA04
In Gonzales v. State, a defendant sought to suppress drug evidence discovered in his bag following a warrantless arrest, arguing that the police lacked probable cause because they could not establish an 'affirmative link' between him and drug paraphernalia found nearby on the ground. The San Antonio Court of Appeals analyzed the procedural role of the 'affirmative link' doctrine, determining it is a standard used to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence for a conviction at trial, rather than a basis for pretrial suppression. The court held that the presence of drug paraphernalia in plain view and within arm’s reach provides sufficient probable cause for a warrantless arrest under the totality of the circumstances, making the subsequent search of the defendant's personal effects a valid search incident to arrest.
Litigation Takeaway
"The 'affirmative link' doctrine is a trial defense regarding the sufficiency of evidence, not a pretrial tool to suppress contraband; therefore, evidence of drugs found in proximity to a party remains admissible and relevant in family law proceedings regardless of whether the party 'owned' the substances."
In the Interest of B.H.
COA04
In this interstate custody dispute, a Father filed a motion to modify the parent-child relationship in a Texas court that had previously issued orders regarding the child. Despite the Father's filing, the trial court initiated a conference with a Louisiana court and determined—on its own motion—that Texas was an 'inconvenient forum' because the child had lived in Louisiana for two years. The Father appealed, arguing the court lacked the authority to move the case without a formal request from a party or a full evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Texas law explicitly allows judges to relinquish jurisdiction 'sua sponte' (on their own) and that the law only requires parties be given an opportunity to submit information rather than requiring a formal hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never assume that jurisdiction is safe just because the other parent hasn't challenged it. In interstate cases, Texas judges act as 'gatekeepers' and can move your case to another state on their own initiative if the child has a stronger connection elsewhere. If your child lives out of state, you must be prepared to immediately provide evidence regarding their school, healthcare, and support network to defend your choice of forum."
Navarro v. State
COA04
In Navarro v. State, Alan Angelo Navarro appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting testimony from his ex-wife regarding his history of domestic violence. While Navarro had a 'running objection' to evidence regarding his relationship with the current complainant, the court analyzed the shift in the trial's legal context. Because Navarro presented witnesses to testify that he was a 'changed' and 'non-violent' man, he 'opened the door' to character rebuttal. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that the original running objection did not preserve the error for this new category of character evidence involving a third party, and therefore affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a party attempts to portray themselves as a 'changed person' or 'non-violent' in court, they effectively waive protections against their past history being introduced. Furthermore, litigators must remember that a 'running objection' to evidence about the current relationship will not protect the record if the other side introduces evidence about a former spouse; a new, specific objection is required to preserve the issue for appeal."
In the Interest of C.R., a Child
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's order terminating a mother's parental rights to her two-year-old child, who suffered from end-stage liver failure. The conflict centered on the mother's persistent failure to maintain a sterile environment and adhere to clinical protocols necessary for the child's survival before and after a life-saving transplant. The court analyzed the evidence under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), determining that the mother’s refusal to remediate horrific living conditions—including mold, maggots, and animal waste—despite receiving specialized education and free medical housing, constituted a conscious course of conduct that endangered the child. The court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination under both environmental and conduct-based grounds and that termination was in the child's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In cases involving medically fragile children, 'endangerment' is a relative standard; a parent's failure to maintain sterile conditions or follow clinical hygiene protocols can elevate ordinary housekeeping issues to a termination-level 'conscious course of conduct.'"