Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
In re Leo Lapuerta, M.D., F.A.C.S., and The Plastic Surgery Institute of Southeast Texas, P.A.
SCOTX
In an underlying medical-negligence case, a jury returned an 11–1 defense verdict finding no proximate cause and the trial court signed a take-nothing judgment. After the plaintiff moved for new trial—re-urging charge objections and submitting a lone dissenting juror’s post-verdict letter describing deliberations—the trial court granted a new trial and later issued an amended order listing seven reasons, largely framed as charge confusion tied to Texas “loss of chance”/medical-causation principles. The Texas Supreme Court held the new-trial order was an abuse of discretion because its stated reasons rested on a misapprehension of Texas causation law; a trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial on an incorrect legal premise. The Court also condemned the submission of juror-deliberation evidence as “flagrantly improper” and refused to discount the risk that such material influenced the new-trial ruling. The Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to render judgment on (reinstate) the jury’s take-nothing verdict.
Litigation Takeaway
"New-trial orders must rest on a legally correct, record-supported, and specifically articulated rationale—not a judge’s mistaken view of the law or post-verdict narratives about what jurors discussed. If the losing party tries to prove “jury confusion” with juror letters/affidavits about deliberations, object and move to strike; and if a new trial is granted anyway, mandamus is often the proper—and fast—remedy to reinstate the verdict and avoid a wasteful redo."
In re J.H., A.H., J.H., and Z.H.
COA01
In this parental termination case, parents challenged the trial court's jurisdiction, arguing that a trial recess made the initial start of the trial a 'sham' intended to circumvent the statutory dismissal deadline under Texas Family Code section 263.401. The parents also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding endangerment and the best interests of the children. The First Court of Appeals held that because the trial court had legitimately begun hearing the merits of the case before the deadline, it did not lose jurisdiction simply because the final decree was signed later. In reviewing the merits, the court found that the parents' history of substance abuse, criminal child endangerment, and ongoing incidents of physical injury to the children provided clear and convincing evidence to support termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"To preserve jurisdiction in CPS cases, the trial must meaningfully commence on the merits before the statutory dismissal deadline; appellate courts will reject 'sham' trial challenges if the record reflects genuine judicial activity. Furthermore, evidence of a parent's instability or misconduct during the pendency of the suit is often dispositive in endangerment and best-interest analyses."
In the Interest of J.K.C.
COA08
In In the Interest of J.K.C., the Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no non-frivolous issues for appeal. The court independently reviewed the full record, including the endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), the constructive-abandonment finding under subsection (N), and the best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). After that review, the court concluded there was no arguable basis to challenge the trial court’s ruling and affirmed the termination order. The court also denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding that appointed counsel in termination cases must continue representation through the petition-for-review stage under In re P.M. and Family Code § 107.016(2)(B).
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination appeals are won or lost on the trial record. If trial counsel does not preserve error, develop evidence against endangerment and best interest, and create a meaningful appellate record, the court of appeals may find no arguable issue at all—even under its own independent Anders review. The case also reminds appointed counsel that representation in termination cases continues beyond the court of appeals."
Lopez v. Lengyel
COA03
In a dispute between two professional online streamers, the Austin Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's dismissal of an informal marriage claim. The trial court had granted a no-evidence summary judgment, finding there was insufficient proof of an agreement to be married or a public 'holding out' as spouses. However, the appellate court analyzed the 'mosaic' of evidence provided by the claimant—including testimony about an agreement made to facilitate international travel during COVID-19, representations made to family and household staff, and the use of the partner's surname. The court held that even though the parties used inconsistent labels online (such as 'boyfriend') for professional branding purposes, the accumulated evidence was enough to create a factual dispute that must be decided at trial rather than dismissed early.
Litigation Takeaway
"Proving a common-law marriage depends on the 'cumulative force' of evidence, such as statements to family, household staff, and government officials. Inconsistent public messaging—especially when motivated by privacy or professional branding—does not automatically defeat a marriage claim; instead, it creates a credibility issue that should be resolved at trial."
Dr. Robert Corwin, Richard B. Brualdi, and The Brualdi Law Firm, P.C. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation
COA01
In a suit seeking emergency injunctive relief to stop a scheduled shareholder vote on the Exxon/Pioneer merger, the trial court denied the temporary injunction and the plaintiff nonsuited shortly thereafter. Exxon pursued sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel and law firm, and the trial court found the emergency temporary-injunction request was groundless and pursued in bad faith/for an improper purpose, awarding $69,861.19 in sanctions (primarily attorney’s fees) and related relief. The First Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Chapter 10 and Rule 13 sanctions were available even though the sanctioned lawyer/firm argued they did not sign the challenged petition/motion, because the evidence supported that they were responsible for and pursued the filings and strategy. The court also rejected the argument that the trial court improperly “circumvented” Chapter 10/Rule 13 by referencing inherent authority; the order was supported under the statutory/rule frameworks, and the record supported the trial court’s factual findings that the injunction request lacked viable legal/factual support and was used as leverage tied to timing and a broader pattern of similar litigation. Nonsuit did not eliminate the court’s power to decide the collateral sanctions issue based on pre-dismissal conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"Emergency TRO/temporary-injunction practice is sanctions-sensitive: a voluntary nonsuit after a failed temp hearing does not erase exposure, courts may look past “who signed” to who directed and pursued the filing, and timing/pattern evidence can support a finding that an emergency request was filed for improper settlement leverage—leading to significant fee-shifting sanctions under Chapter 10 and Rule 13."
Howard v. State
COA14
After a jury convicted Howard of two aggravated sexual assaults and aggravated robbery, he elected judge sentencing. At the punishment setting the judge discussed the punishment range, commented the case carried high exposure, and encouraged counsel-client consultation and negotiation. After a recess the parties announced a post-verdict punishment agreement, and the court imposed a 50-year sentence “in accordance with the plea agreement.” On appeal Howard argued (1) due process “judicial vindictiveness” for having gone to trial and (2) that the punishment agreement was involuntary and the court failed to conduct a voluntariness inquiry. The Fourteenth Court held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not a retrial with an increased sentence after a successful appeal; therefore Howard had to prove actual vindictiveness. The record showed the judge’s remarks were facilitative/admonitory, repeatedly disclaiming any predetermined punishment, and the 50-year term matched the parties’ post-verdict agreement—so no actual vindictiveness was shown. The court also held voluntariness and “failure to inquire” complaints were forfeited because Howard made no contemporaneous objection when the agreement was adopted and filed no post-judgment motion raising involuntariness. Judgments affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you intend to later claim an on-the-record agreement (Rule 11/MBA/MSA or post-ruling deal) was coerced or involuntary, you must object immediately and/or file a timely post-judgment motion—otherwise the complaint is likely waived. And “judicial vindictiveness” is a narrow doctrine; absent a true Pearce posture, you must prove actual retaliation from the record, not just tough judicial commentary or settlement encouragement."
In re The Commitment of Raul Eliss Dominguez
COA03
In an SVP civil-commitment jury trial under Texas Health & Safety Code Chapter 841, the State’s expert psychologist referenced an unadjudicated allegation that Raul Eliss Dominguez sexually abused his four-year-old nephew. Although the issue was discussed outside the jury’s presence in a pretrial/limine setting, the trial court only cautioned counsel to object if testimony became inadmissible. When the expert mentioned the nephew allegation in front of the jury, Dominguez did not make a timely, specific objection, did not request a running objection, and did not obtain a ruling tied to the complained-of testimony. Applying TRAP 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103, the Third Court of Appeals held the complaint was not preserved and affirmed the commitment order. The court also held that, even assuming the expert’s testimony was admitted in error, any error was harmless (and effectively waived) because Dominguez later introduced the same or similar evidence through his own testimony without objection, triggering the “same evidence” rule.
Litigation Takeaway
"Motions in limine don’t preserve error. If an expert starts weaving unadjudicated “bad act” allegations into the basis for an opinion, you must object in real time, obtain a ruling (and a running objection if it will recur), and avoid later “opening the door” by eliciting the same facts yourself—otherwise you likely lose the issue both on preservation and on harmlessness under the same-evidence rule."
Ivan Lopez-Lopez v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Ivan Lopez-Lopez v. State, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child where the defendant’s primary appellate argument was that the complainant was not credible because her disclosures became more detailed over time and because the alleged abuse was too frequent to believe. Applying the Jackson/Brooks legal-sufficiency standard, the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and refused to reweigh the jury’s credibility determinations. The court held the complainant’s testimony alone can be legally sufficient under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.07, and her testimony established the statutory elements of continuous sexual abuse under Texas Penal Code § 21.02(b) (child under 14, defendant 17 or older, two or more acts over a period of at least 30 days). The court rejected “evolving disclosure” and “too much abuse to be true” themes as credibility attacks for the jury, not grounds to overturn the verdict on appeal, and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Credibility-only challenges rarely win on appeal. A child’s incremental or “evolving” disclosure is treated as common—not inherently suspicious—and a factfinder may credit it. In family cases involving abuse allegations, expect appellate courts to defer to the trial court’s credibility calls; build (or attack) the case with objective, admissible proof and preserve legal-error issues (evidentiary rulings, due-process limits), not just arguments that the witness “wasn’t believable.”"
Diana Reismann Sexton v. Gilbert Sexton
COA14
In a consolidated Fort Bend County divorce/SAPCR and interspousal personal-injury action, the wife (pro se) appealed numerous rulings after the trial court granted summary judgment on her tort claims, adopted a jury verdict naming the husband sole managing conservator, entered a property division, and included a Chapter 11 vexatious-litigant finding against her. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals first analyzed whether each complaint was reviewable: it refused to revisit the indigency determination because it had already been finally reviewed under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(g); held challenges to temporary orders were moot because the final decree superseded them; and held possession/access issues were moot because the child turned 18 during the appeal. Because no reporter’s record was filed, the court could not evaluate preservation and was required to presume missing evidence supported the jury findings and discretionary rulings, making the wife’s attacks on the jury verdict and property division unreviewable. On the issues that could be decided on the clerk’s record, the court affirmed the summary judgment on the wife’s personal-injury claims as effectively a no-evidence disposition on essential elements (including causation and damages). But it held the appellate record did not affirmatively support the statutory predicates for a Chapter 11 vexatious-litigant designation, and therefore modified the final decree to delete that finding while otherwise affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appeals in divorce/SAPCR cases often turn on procedure, not merits: preserve error, secure a reporter’s record, and watch for mootness as children near 18. If you seek (or oppose) a vexatious-litigant finding, treat it like a record-driven statutory remedy—without evidence in the record establishing Chapter 11 predicates, an appellate court may strike the designation even while affirming the rest of the decree."
Murray Lobb, PLLC v. Brandy Liss, Executor for the Estate of Mary James
COA14
In an estate dispute, the executor sued a former law firm for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the firm “switched sides” and harmed the estate by filing and prosecuting litigation for the former joint client and by taking litigation positions attacking an assignment the firm had drafted. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals looked past the fiduciary-duty label and focused on the conduct actually pleaded: court filings, pleadings, and other litigation communications in related judicial proceedings. Because those litigation communications were a “fundamental part/main ingredient” of the alleged wrongdoing, the claims were “based on or in response to” the firm’s exercise of the TCPA-protected right to petition under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(4). The court reversed the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motion (affirming only the sanctions denial), rendered judgment dismissing the claims with prejudice, and remanded for a mandatory award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under TCPA § 27.009(a)(1).
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party repackages complaints about what a lawyer filed, argued, served, or said in a case into a tort claim like “breach of fiduciary duty,” the TCPA may require early dismissal when the litigation communications are a core part of the claim—and dismissal triggers mandatory fee-and-cost shifting. Plead (or attack) the case based on what the petition actually alleges, not the cause-of-action label."