Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Rideout v. Rideout
COA02
In Rideout v. Rideout, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a Chapter 7B protective order after finding sufficient evidence that a former husband engaged in stalking of his ex-wife in the post-divorce co-parenting context. The evidence showed a continuing course of conduct: repeated unwanted appearances at her church, child activities, gym, restaurants, and stores; hostile and excessive AppClose messages; apparent monitoring of her vehicle and location; and disregard of prior communication limits and a 30-foot stay-away restriction. Applying Chapter 7B and Penal Code sections 42.072 and 42.07, the court treated the case as a pattern-based stalking record rather than isolated incidents, giving weight to both Hallie’s testimony that she felt scared and alarmed and the objective reasonable-person standard. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support reasonable grounds that Colby committed stalking and affirmed the two-year protective order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases, stalking can be proven through a pattern of unwanted surveillance, repeated proximity, hostile co-parenting messages, and violations of prior boundaries—even when the conduct happens around children’s events or other ordinary shared spaces. Build the case as a chronology, preserve app messages and location-monitoring evidence, and use prior Rule 11 agreements or injunctions to show notice, intent, and a continuing course of conduct."
In the Interest of G.S.S. and S.D.S., Children
COA11
In a Department-filed termination case, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 107.013(a)(1) required the trial court to appoint counsel for an indigent incarcerated father who appeared in opposition to termination. Although the record contained significant evidence of domestic violence, substance abuse, incarceration, and danger to the children, the appellate court focused on the threshold procedural issue: the father requested appointed counsel, was indigent, and opposed the suit, so the statute was triggered. Because the trial court denied counsel without a hearing, the court held that the father’s statutory right to counsel was violated and reversed the termination order as to him, remanding for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas termination cases, appointed-counsel issues are not housekeeping—they can undo an otherwise strong judgment. If an indigent parent appears in opposition to a government-filed termination suit, counsel must be appointed under Family Code § 107.013, including for incarcerated parents, and failure to do so is a reversal trap."
In the Interest of R.A., a Child
COA02
Father appealed after a Texas trial court dismissed a UCCJEA temporary emergency-jurisdiction case involving a child already subject to a Washington custody order. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals did not reach whether the Texas dismissal was correct when entered. Instead, it focused on mootness and the provisional nature of Texas Family Code § 152.204. After the appeal was filed, Washington—the state with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction—entered temporary custody orders addressing the child’s safety, care, therapy, and Father’s access. Because those later Washington orders superseded the emergency relief Father sought to preserve in Texas, the court held there was no longer any effective appellate relief available and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is only a short-term bridge, not a way to convert Texas into the permanent custody forum. In interstate custody disputes, if the decree state continues exercising jurisdiction and enters operative custody orders, any Texas appeal tied to emergency jurisdiction may become moot fast."
Cylear v. Johnson-Cylear
COA03
In Cylear v. Johnson-Cylear, the husband argued the trial court had to order the marital home sold based on an alleged agreement incident to divorce. The court rejected that claim because the appellate record contained neither a signed written agreement nor a reporter’s record of any enforceable open-court Rule 11 agreement. It also held that temporary orders requiring the house to be listed for sale were only interim directives and did not amount to a Family Code section 7.006(b) finding that an agreement was just and right. Even if some prior agreement existed, the parties repudiated any nonbinding deal by later trying the property division as a contested issue. The court therefore affirmed the decree awarding the home to the wife.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a divorce property agreement to control the final decree, make it provable and make it binding: get it signed and filed, or recite it in open court on the record, and obtain an express just-and-right finding if needed. Temporary orders about listing or managing property are not a substitute, and trying the issue on the merits can amount to repudiation of any earlier nonbinding agreement."
Hartley v. State
COA13
In Hartley v. State, the appellant argued that the written community-supervision order incorrectly gave him 116 days of jail-time credit instead of the 120 days orally pronounced by the trial court. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because, while the appeal was pending, Hartley was discharged from community supervision. Applying Texas mootness principles and Ex parte Canada, the court held that once Hartley was no longer confined, under supervision, or otherwise restrained by the challenged order, there was no live controversy and no meaningful relief the court could grant. Because no mootness exception was shown, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Timing can be everything. In family-law enforcement and contempt matters, complaints about jail credit, short-term confinement, temporary restrictions, or expiring compliance orders can become moot before an appeal is decided. If the challenged restraint may end quickly, lawyers should consider faster vehicles like mandamus, habeas, emergency relief, or immediate correction in the trial court, and build a record of any ongoing collateral consequences."
In Re Jim S. Adler & Associates, Frank W. Robertson, Michael Gomez, David J. Sacks, Jr., and Marco Antonio Rodriguez
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus and vacated a trial court’s order disqualifying one law firm from jointly representing a client and a second law firm sued in the same case. The plaintiff argued joint representation created a Rule 1.06 conflict because it sued one defendant for breach of an alleged fee contract and the other for tortious interference with that contract. The appellate court held disqualification was improper because both represented parties took the same present position: the alleged contract never existed or was invalid and unenforceable. The court emphasized that Rule 1.06 does not mandate disqualification based on a theoretical conflict created by an opponent’s pleadings; the movant must show a real, current, material adversity and resulting prejudice. Because no actual present conflict was shown, the trial court abused its discretion, and mandamus was the proper remedy.
Litigation Takeaway
"A disqualification motion cannot succeed just because opposing pleadings imagine a future conflict between jointly represented parties. In Texas litigation—including family cases—the movant must prove a real, present, material conflict and prejudice, not merely speculative adversity. If aligned clients are advancing the same defense, Rule 1.06 alone does not force separate counsel."
Israel Villalobos v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Villalobos v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to sentencing without a presentence investigation report and without a separate punishment hearing after adjudication, and whether the written judgment accurately reflected the trial court’s oral true findings on the motion to adjudicate. The court held the ineffective-assistance claims failed because Villalobos had already waived a PSI and Texas law permits a unitary adjudication-and-punishment proceeding, so counsel’s conduct was not shown to be deficient on this record. But because the written judgment misstated which allegations were found true, and the State conceded the errors, the court reformed the judgment under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) to match the actual oral findings and affirmed the judgment as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a written judgment is accurate just because the court’s oral ruling was clear. If a judgment overstates or misstates the findings actually made, that error can distort later family-law litigation involving custody, protective orders, enforcement, or credibility. Verify the criminal record against the oral pronouncement and seek correction or appellate reformation before the judgment is used as shorthand proof in family court."
In the Interest of A.M.K., A Child
COA14
In In re A.M.K., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held Texas lacked initial child-custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because the child had not lived in Texas for six consecutive months immediately before Father filed his SAPCR. The court measured residence from the commencement date, assumed in Father’s favor that the child’s departure to Georgia was only a temporary absence, and still found the child’s maximum Texas residence was only 5 months and 20 days. Because the six-month home-state requirement in Texas Family Code §§ 152.102(7) and 152.201(a)(1) was not met, Texas could not exercise home-state jurisdiction. The court also upheld the trial court’s decision that, even aside from Father’s significant-connection argument, Georgia was the more appropriate forum under § 152.207.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not file a Texas custody case on a rough six-month estimate. Under the UCCJEA, the home-state clock is exact, temporary absence cannot cure a mathematical shortfall, and even a possible significant-connection argument may fail if another state is the more appropriate forum."
In the Matter of J.H.M.
COA01
In In the Matter of J.H.M., the First Court of Appeals considered whether a juvenile determinate sentencing judgment had to be reversed because it did not expressly state the reasons for committing the child outside the home as required by Texas Family Code section 54.04(i). The court held that this omission was not fundamental error. Because J.H.M. did not preserve the complaint in the juvenile court, the issue was forfeited. The court also found no showing of harm and concluded that the record otherwise supported the disposition. Reviewing the evidence of the murder offense, firearm use, gang-related evidence, supervision problems, and the juvenile court’s findings on best interest, reasonable efforts, and inability to provide adequate home supervision, the court affirmed both the TJJD commitment and the later transfer to TDCJ.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a missing statutory finding or recitation automatically wins an appeal. If an order omits required language, preserve the complaint in the trial court, seek correction, and explain the harm. If the record otherwise supports the ruling, an appellate court may treat the omission as a forfeitable drafting defect rather than reversible error."
Huskey v. White
COA14
In Huskey v. White, the father sought to terminate child support as his son reached adulthood, while the mother and the Office of the Attorney General asked the court to order indefinite support under Texas Family Code section 154.302 for an adult disabled child. After a bench trial, the trial court found the son’s developmental and language-related disabilities existed or were known before age eighteen, that he required substantial care and personal supervision, and that he would not be capable of self-support, then ordered the father to continue paying $1,420 per month indefinitely. On appeal, the court applied abuse-of-discretion review and held the record contained probative evidence supporting those findings, including the child’s diagnoses, special-education history, modified coursework, low literacy, inability to drive or live independently, dependence on his mother, and SSI benefits. The court also emphasized that because no findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested, it would imply all findings necessary to support the judgment if supported by the record. The support amount was likewise upheld, and the father’s complaint about an improper judicial comment was waived for lack of preservation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Adult-disabled-child support cases are won or lost on a functional record, not labels alone: build or attack evidence showing whether the child can actually live and work independently. And after a bench trial, always request findings of fact and conclusions of law, because failing to do so gives the appellee a major advantage on appeal."