Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
In re EOG Resources, Inc.
COA04
In this Texas mandamus proceeding, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that EOG’s disclosure of a redacted legal memorandum and an internal email referencing counsel’s advice did not waive attorney-client privilege as to other withheld title opinions, memoranda, and communications in underlying probate litigation over mineral interests. The court found EOG established a prima facie privilege claim through its privilege log, affidavits, and in camera submission, then rejected waiver because Rule 511 requires disclosure of a significant part of the privileged matter itself—not merely documents on the same subject or evidence that a party received and acted on legal advice. The court also rejected offensive-use waiver because EOG was only defending against claims and was not seeking affirmative relief. Because compelled disclosure of privileged material has no adequate appellate remedy, the court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its production order.
Litigation Takeaway
"A partial disclosure does not open the whole lawyer file. In Texas family litigation, opposing counsel cannot prove waiver just by pointing to a redacted memo, an email mentioning legal advice, or testimony that a client acted after consulting counsel; they must show the disclosure revealed a significant part of the withheld communication itself. And offensive-use waiver remains narrow when your client is asserting defenses rather than affirmative claims."
Salinas v. State
COA09
In Salinas v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed a family-violence strangulation conviction after rejecting the defendant’s challenge to an unredacted 911 statement that he 'took off with a gun.' The court treated the gun reference as part of the immediate context of the reported assault, explaining the caller’s urgency and the circumstances facing dispatch and responding officers, and held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the statement’s probative contextual value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403. The court also refused to consider a separate evidentiary complaint raised later in an unauthorized supplemental merits brief, holding that distinct appellate issues must be presented in the opening brief or properly added by amendment with leave under Rule 38.7.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence-related litigation, courts will often admit damaging details from 911 calls and other emergency evidence when those details help explain the event’s context, fear level, and response. If you want exclusion, a generic prejudice objection is usually not enough—you must show the detail is severable, minimally probative, cumulative, or being used for improper character leverage. And on appeal, each separate evidentiary complaint must be raised in the opening brief."
In the Interest of I.J.W. and M.R.W., Children
COA08
In a suit to modify the parent-child relationship, the father tried to overturn a default modification order through a restricted appeal, arguing defects in substituted service, the return of service, default-related filings, and notice of judgment. The Eighth Court of Appeals first held that the father's separate bill of review did not disqualify him from pursuing a restricted appeal because a bill of review is an independent proceeding, not a Rule 329b post-judgment motion. But the court still affirmed because restricted appeals require error to appear on the face of the appellate record, and the key service and default documents father challenged were not included in the clerk's or reporter's record and appeared only in appellate appendices, which the court could not consider.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bill of review does not block a restricted appeal, so defaulted family-law litigants may be able to pursue both remedies. But restricted appeals live or die on the actual appellate record: if the service papers, military-status filing, last-known-address certificate, or notice documents are missing from the record, the appellate court will not consider defects shown only in brief appendices."
Leonard v. Wooten and Ellison
COA05
In Leonard v. Wooten and Ellison, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defamation suit based on statements in an affidavit filed to obtain a TRO in a child-custody proceeding arose from protected petitioning activity under the TCPA. The court focused on the plaintiffs’ own allegations, which showed the challenged statements were made in a sworn filing submitted to a court for judicial relief. It then held that the judicial-proceedings privilege independently barred the defamation claim because statements in affidavits and other court-filed papers that bear some relation to the proceeding are absolutely privileged, even if alleged to be false or malicious. Because Leonard established that defense as a matter of law, the court reversed the TCPA denial by operation of law and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases, allegations made in affidavits or other filings submitted to obtain court relief—especially emergency custody relief—may be both TCPA-protected petitioning activity and absolutely privileged against later defamation claims. The practical lesson is to challenge allegedly false statements inside the family case when possible, and to draft emergency affidavits carefully so they stay tied to the relief requested and the issues before the court."
White v. White
COA12
In White v. White, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that divorce-decree payments labeled as “spousal maintenance” were not true Chapter 8 maintenance because, in substance, they were installment payments for the wife’s equity in the marital home and community business interests. The court looked past the decree’s labels and contempt language and focused on the obligation’s actual purpose under the parties’ mediated settlement agreement. Because the $175,000 obligation functioned as a property-division buyout under Family Code section 7.006 rather than periodic support from future income under Chapter 8, the trial court properly refused contempt enforcement. The wife could still recover arrearages and a money judgment, but contempt was unavailable.
Litigation Takeaway
"Labels do not control enforcement. If a payment stream is really a deferred property buyout, calling it “spousal maintenance” will not make it contempt-enforceable. Texas family lawyers should clearly separate true Chapter 8 maintenance from property-equalization payments at the drafting stage and should evaluate the substance of the obligation before filing or resisting contempt."
Arellano v. Arrellano
COA04
After a decedent’s children sued to void a lien on family property, the surviving spouse intervened claiming homestead rights. The trial court struck her intervention for lack of a justiciable interest, then later entered a final judgment declaring she had no homestead interest and assessed attorney’s fees against her. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the order striking the intervention was interlocutory, so it did not start plenary-power deadlines and instead merged into the final judgment, leaving the struck intervenor bound by and able to appeal the final judgment. But because the strike was based on a jurisdictional lack of justiciable interest, the trial court could not then adjudicate the merits of the intervenor’s homestead claim. The appellate court therefore vacated the homestead merits declaration, affirmed the interlocutory-jurisdiction/plenary-power ruling, and remanded for further proceedings on attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you successfully strike an intervention, do not overreach in the final judgment. A struck intervenor is still bound until final judgment and can appeal, but once the court rules the intervenor lacks a justiciable interest, it cannot also decide that person’s substantive property, homestead, custody, or possession claims without an independent jurisdictional basis."
In re Marriage of Bueso and Cruz
COA12
The Twelfth Court of Appeals dismissed this family-law appeal because the appellate record contained no signed final judgment and no statutorily appealable interlocutory order. Although the pro se appellant claimed a March 16, 2026 order was final, the district clerk reported that the matter was still under advisement and that no order had been filed. The only document the appellant supplied was an unsigned, un-file-marked copy, which could not establish appellate jurisdiction. Applying Texas appellate-jurisdiction principles, including the rule that appeals generally lie only from signed final judgments or authorized interlocutory orders, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing a family-law appeal, confirm that a judge has actually signed the order and that it has been filed with the clerk. Oral rulings, draft orders, docket notes, and unsigned copies do not trigger appellate jurisdiction or deadlines, and filing too early can lead to dismissal."
In re H.R.J., J.G.J., T.J.P., and L.P.
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and a best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on Mother’s ongoing illegal drug abuse, three prior removals tied to her addiction, and her decision to leave one child with that child’s father despite a protective order protecting the child from him. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations after a bench trial, the court held that this pattern showed both an endangering environment and a continuing course of endangering conduct, and that the same evidence supported termination as being in the children’s best interests. The court also emphasized that due process required review of both (D) and (E) findings because of their future collateral consequences under § 161.001(b)(1)(M).
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are built through pattern evidence, not just proof of a single injury. Repeated drug abuse, prior removals, instability, and exposing a child to a dangerous or court-restrained adult can together support both predicate termination grounds and best-interest findings. On appeal, lawyers must separately challenge or defend subsection (D) and (E) findings because those findings can affect future cases involving other children."
In re Cruz
COA12
In In re Cruz, the relator sought habeas relief from an alleged contempt and commitment order arising out of a family-law enforcement dispute. The Twelfth Court of Appeals focused first on whether there was a reviewable order in the record and concluded there was not: no signed, file-marked contempt order existed, the document supplied by the relator was unsigned, related appellate records reflected "no order filed," and the clerk confirmed that no signed order had been entered. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(l)(1)(B), the court held that habeas relief failed because the relator did not provide a certified or sworn copy of a signed order or any competent document showing the complained-of ruling. The court also noted the relator was not actually incarcerated, which further underscored that habeas was not supported by the procedural posture. The petition was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before seeking extraordinary relief in a contempt or enforcement case, make sure there is an actual signed, file-marked order and include a certified or sworn copy in the appellate record. Family-law appellate strategy starts with record existence: courts review signed orders, not oral rulings, draft orders, or assumptions about what the trial court meant to sign."
Nicholas Allen White v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Nicholas Allen White v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to prove lack of consent for indecent assault even though the complainant never verbally said “no” during the touching. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that indecent assault requires the force-based “without consent” definition from the sexual-assault statute, and instead applied the Penal Code’s general definition of consent as “assent in fact, whether express or implied.” Using that framework, the court concluded a rational jury could infer nonconsent from circumstantial evidence: the complainant had declined related advances, testified that White forced his hand down her pants, froze in fear, resisted being pulled into the men’s restroom, and immediately returned to friends crying and reported what happened. The conviction for indecent assault was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, the absence of a spoken “no” does not equal consent. White is useful authority for arguing that courts may infer nonconsent from context, trauma responses like freezing, physical resistance, immediate outcry, and surrounding circumstances, even when the parties were previously friendly or flirtatious. That makes the case especially helpful in custody, protective-order, and fault-based divorce litigation involving allegations of sexual coercion or boundary violations."