Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
Lind v. M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC and The YoungESTone, LLC
COA10
In Lind v. M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a defendant who was properly served with the original petition but never answered did not have to be re-served with a later amended petition unless the amendment sought a more onerous judgment. Here, the amended petition made only corrective, non-substantive changes—such as fixing a name, counsel information, and service allegations—and did not change the claims, facts, or relief sought against Lind. Applying Texas default-judgment law and the restricted-appeal standard, the court concluded no service error appeared on the face of the record. The court also upheld the damages award, recognizing that default does not admit unliquidated damages or causation, but finding no reversible error in the proof presented.
Litigation Takeaway
"In default cases, the key question is not whether an amended petition became the live pleading, but whether it materially increased the responding party’s exposure. In family-law cases, re-service may be unnecessary for cleanup amendments, but if an amendment adds harsher conservatorship terms, broader property relief, fees, injunctions, or expanded enforcement remedies, failing to re-serve can jeopardize the default."
In the Interest of M.L.J.
COA14
In this termination appeal, a Fourteenth Court dissent concluded that a parent’s unsupported claim of “Indian heritage” did not trigger ICWA. The dissent focused on ICWA’s statutory definition of an “Indian child,” emphasizing that the record contained no evidence the child was a tribal member, eligible for membership, or the biological child of a tribal member. Because neither parent nor the child was registered with a tribe, no tribe-specific evidence was offered, and no documentation was produced despite repeated opportunities, the dissent reasoned the trial court had no “reason to know” ICWA applied under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). The dissent also criticized reliance on 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 to impose a broader inquiry duty based on mere suspicion, and would have held that ancestry alone is insufficient to trigger ICWA’s heightened protections.
Litigation Takeaway
"If ICWA is in play, vague statements about Native or Indian heritage are not enough. Family-law litigators should build a tribe-specific record on membership, eligibility, and parental tribal status early, because unsupported ancestry claims can create appellate risk, while a well-developed record can support the argument that ICWA was never triggered."
In the Matter of D.A.
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order modifying disposition and committing D.A. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department after D.A. repeatedly violated probation, absconded for months, and continued using marijuana. On appeal, D.A. argued the trial court effectively refused to consider the full range of available dispositions because a requested psychological evaluation had been denied. The appellate court rejected that argument, holding the due-process version of the complaint was not preserved and that the record did not show the judge had prejudged the outcome or refused to consider lesser options. The court emphasized that a psychological evaluation is not a statutory prerequisite to a non-TJJD placement, the judge questioned D.A. about continued probation, and the trial court made the required statutory findings under the Family Code. Because substantive and probative evidence supported those findings, the commitment order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to argue on appeal that a trial court failed to consider lesser alternatives, you need a clear record showing it. Preservation, statutory findings, and concrete evidence of failed supervision matter more than rhetoric. If a denied evaluation or assessment is central to your theory, make the legal basis and resulting prejudice explicit in the trial court or the complaint will likely go nowhere on appeal."
In re Marriage of Runyon
COA10
In In re Marriage of Runyon, a husband challenged a divorce decree that awarded his wife a $47,990 money judgment, allowed her to relocate their child to Florida, and ordered $1,840 in monthly child support. The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on all counts. The court analyzed the property division under the Murff factors, concluding that the husband's high income as an anesthesiologist compared to the wife's lower earnings justified an unequal division. Regarding the move to Florida, the court applied the Lenz factors and found relocation was in the child's best interest due to the presence of extended family. The court held that the trial court acted within its broad discretion and that the wife's legal pleadings were sufficient to support the remedies awarded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Trial courts have immense discretion in dividing property and determining a child's residence; if there is a significant income gap or a clear best-interest benefit to relocation (like family support), appellate courts are highly unlikely to reverse the decision."
In re Zermeno
COA07
In In re Zermeno, the Amarillo Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus after a trial court’s temporary orders named Father a joint managing conservator despite uncontroverted evidence that he had committed family violence against Mother within two years before the divorce was filed. The court focused on Texas Family Code section 153.004(b), explaining that the statute is not just a factor in the best-interest analysis; it prohibits appointment of joint managing conservators when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of physical abuse by one parent against the other. Because Father admitted multiple assaults, including one shortly before separation, and Mother and the parties’ adult children corroborated the violence, the trial court misapplied the law to essentially undisputed facts. The appellate court held that mandamus was the proper remedy for the unlawful temporary order and directed the trial court to vacate it.
Litigation Takeaway
"When credible evidence establishes a recent history or pattern of family violence, a Texas trial court cannot treat joint managing conservatorship as a compromise option. Family Code section 153.004(b) creates a hard statutory limit on the court’s discretion, and mandamus is available to correct temporary orders that ignore that limit."
In the Interest of B.C., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals largely upheld a post-answer default SAPCR order against a pro se father. The court concluded the record showed he had actual notice of the trial setting, his eve-of-trial email continuance request was not verified or supported by affidavit as Rule 251 requires, and his post-judgment effort to set aside the default did not establish reversible error under the standards governing post-answer defaults. The court also rejected his other complaints as unpreserved, inadequately briefed, or contradicted by the record. But it modified the final order to strike the child’s surname change because the mother never pleaded for that relief, and a court may not grant affirmative relief not supported by the live pleadings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Two family-law lessons stand out: post-answer defaults are hard to undo without a properly supported Craddock record, and even in SAPCR cases a final order cannot include affirmative relief that was never pleaded. Plead every item of requested relief, and if you seek to set aside a default, use a properly signed, sworn, and fully developed motion."
Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger v. Deere Credit, Inc.
COA11
The Eastland Court of Appeals reversed a restricted-appeal default judgment entered against an individual defendant and a limited partnership. The court held that Shelia Unger’s signed pro se letter, which denied liability, asserted that payments had been made and the equipment returned, and asked the court to dismiss the suit, was sufficient to constitute an answer on her own behalf because Texas courts liberally construe informal pro se filings that give fair notice of a defensive position. The same letter could not serve as a valid appearance for the limited partnership because a non-attorney cannot represent an entity. Even so, the court held the trial court erred by treating the record as though no response existed and by signing a default judgment the same day the motion was filed, without notice or an opportunity for the entity to cure the representation defect. The judgment was reversed and remanded as to both defendants.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law-adjacent default practice, any timely pro se filing by an individual that disputes the claims may defeat a no-answer default, even if informal. And if a business entity attempts to respond through a non-lawyer, the safer course is to force counsel to appear and give notice and a chance to cure—not rush to default—because due-process defects can unravel the judgment on restricted appeal."
Peele v. State
COA04
In *Peele v. State*, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for indecency with a child and, in doing so, offered a useful evidence lesson for family-law cases built around a child’s disclosure. The key dispute was whether the child’s mother could repeat the child’s accusation even though the State initially invoked hearsay theories that did not cleanly fit the record and conceded the mother was not the Article 38.072 outcry witness. The court still affirmed because the complainant herself testified directly to the touching, the defense’s hearsay complaint did not produce reversible harm, and the record otherwise supported the verdict. The opinion underscores that appellate courts focus not just on whether “outcry” procedures were followed, but on specificity of objections, alternative admissibility theories, preservation, and whether any evidentiary error likely affected the outcome.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-disclosure cases, hearsay fights are won on precision and preservation, not labels. If you object, force the court to identify the exact basis for admission, raise all applicable grounds, and preserve harm each time the same statement comes in. If you offer the evidence, do not rely on vague “outcry” language—build a specific evidentiary path and corroborate the disclosure so any error is harmless."
In re Marriage of Bueso and Cruz
COA12
The Twelfth Court of Appeals dismissed this family-law appeal because the appellate record contained no signed final judgment and no statutorily appealable interlocutory order. Although the pro se appellant claimed a March 16, 2026 order was final, the district clerk reported that the matter was still under advisement and that no order had been filed. The only document the appellant supplied was an unsigned, un-file-marked copy, which could not establish appellate jurisdiction. Applying Texas appellate-jurisdiction principles, including the rule that appeals generally lie only from signed final judgments or authorized interlocutory orders, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing a family-law appeal, confirm that a judge has actually signed the order and that it has been filed with the clerk. Oral rulings, draft orders, docket notes, and unsigned copies do not trigger appellate jurisdiction or deadlines, and filing too early can lead to dismissal."
Salinas v. State
COA09
In Salinas v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed a family-violence strangulation conviction after rejecting the defendant’s challenge to an unredacted 911 statement that he 'took off with a gun.' The court treated the gun reference as part of the immediate context of the reported assault, explaining the caller’s urgency and the circumstances facing dispatch and responding officers, and held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the statement’s probative contextual value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403. The court also refused to consider a separate evidentiary complaint raised later in an unauthorized supplemental merits brief, holding that distinct appellate issues must be presented in the opening brief or properly added by amendment with leave under Rule 38.7.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence-related litigation, courts will often admit damaging details from 911 calls and other emergency evidence when those details help explain the event’s context, fear level, and response. If you want exclusion, a generic prejudice objection is usually not enough—you must show the detail is severable, minimally probative, cumulative, or being used for improper character leverage. And on appeal, each separate evidentiary complaint must be raised in the opening brief."