Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
Sheehan v. Sheehan
COA11
In Sheehan v. Sheehan, the divorce decree awarded the wife $64,661.44 from a BB&T account in the husband’s name, but he later depleted the account and failed to deliver the funds. On enforcement, the husband argued that a money judgment would improperly modify the decree because the specific account no longer contained the money. The Eleventh Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that Texas Family Code §§ 9.002, 9.006, and especially 9.010 allow a trial court to enforce an existing property award through a money judgment when direct delivery of the awarded property is no longer an adequate remedy. Because the decree had already awarded the wife that sum, reducing the undelivered award to a money judgment did not change the substantive property division; it simply implemented it. The court also affirmed attorney’s fees under § 9.014.
Litigation Takeaway
"A spouse cannot defeat a divorce decree’s property award by draining the account or liquidating the asset from which payment was supposed to come. If the decree already awarded a sum certain, the court can enforce that award with a money judgment—and attorney’s fees—without impermissibly modifying the decree."
In the Matter of D.A.
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order modifying disposition and committing D.A. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department after D.A. repeatedly violated probation, absconded for months, and continued using marijuana. On appeal, D.A. argued the trial court effectively refused to consider the full range of available dispositions because a requested psychological evaluation had been denied. The appellate court rejected that argument, holding the due-process version of the complaint was not preserved and that the record did not show the judge had prejudged the outcome or refused to consider lesser options. The court emphasized that a psychological evaluation is not a statutory prerequisite to a non-TJJD placement, the judge questioned D.A. about continued probation, and the trial court made the required statutory findings under the Family Code. Because substantive and probative evidence supported those findings, the commitment order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to argue on appeal that a trial court failed to consider lesser alternatives, you need a clear record showing it. Preservation, statutory findings, and concrete evidence of failed supervision matter more than rhetoric. If a denied evaluation or assessment is central to your theory, make the legal basis and resulting prejudice explicit in the trial court or the complaint will likely go nowhere on appeal."
In the Interest of A.S., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) and § 161.001(b)(2). Mother sought termination after Father failed to pay support, had no in-person contact following a Rule 11 agreement suspending access pending a mental-health evaluation, and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on both the predicate ground and best interest. The court emphasized that a failure-to-support termination requires proof of the parent’s actual ability to support the child during each month of the relevant twelve-month period; a prior support order or arrearage evidence alone is not enough. Applying deferential legal- and factual-sufficiency review, the court held the trial judge could disbelieve Father’s testimony minimizing his income and infer from the broader financial record that he had some ability to pay but failed to support the child in accordance with that ability. The same evidence, together with Father’s prolonged absence and instability in the parent-child relationship, supported the best-interest finding. The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a § 161.001(b)(1)(F) case, the winning record is a month-by-month ability-to-pay record, not just proof of arrearages. Petitioners should build concrete evidence of income, resources, and spending during the statutory twelve-month window, while respondents need disciplined documentary proof of genuine inability to pay because unsupported excuses and credibility problems can be fatal."
Schrotel v. State
COA10
In Schrotel v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to uphold a family-violence assault conviction arising from a dispute between spouses. The complainant testified that her husband hit her with an exercise ball, put his hand on her throat, pushed her down, and kicked or stomped on her leg, causing pain. The responding officer did not witness the assault but observed that the complainant was upset and crying, saw a heel-shaped red mark on her leg, and photographed it. On appeal, the appellant argued the complainant was not credible and that inconsistencies between her testimony, the officer’s testimony, and his denial made the evidence insufficient. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court deferred to the jury’s role in resolving credibility and conflicts in the evidence, considered the cumulative force of the testimony and corroboration, and concluded that the complainant’s testimony plus modest contemporaneous corroboration was enough for a rational jury to find bodily injury to a family member beyond a reasonable doubt.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, a factfinder can credit one party’s detailed testimony even when the other party flatly denies it. You do not need perfect corroboration; modest supporting proof like photographs, officer observations, distress, or a prompt outcry may be enough to support findings affecting protective orders, conservatorship, possession, and related divorce issues."
In the Interest of S.M.T. and S.J.T., Children
COA14
In a pending SAPCR, the appellant tried to immediately appeal trial-court orders denying motions to correct the reporter’s record and clerk’s record. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the final-judgment rule, noted that interlocutory orders are appealable only when a statute expressly authorizes it, and found no statute permitting an interlocutory appeal from record-correction rulings. Because the challenged orders were purely interlocutory and did not dispose of all parties and claims, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot create appellate jurisdiction by appealing a procedural ruling about the contents of the record. In family-law cases, record-correction disputes usually must be handled through the proper correction procedures, preserved for review after a final judgment, or—if truly extraordinary—addressed by mandamus rather than a stand-alone interlocutory appeal."
In the Interest of J.G., J.G., and A.J.S., Children
COA13
In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant challenged a February 3, 2026 final order appointing a sole managing conservator, but the trial court later vacated that same order on February 19, 2026. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals treated the case as a pure jurisdictional question, explaining that once the underlying final order was vacated, there was no longer a live, final appealable order for the court to review. Relying on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), the court granted the appellant’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the appeal as moot without reaching any substantive conservatorship or child-related issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law appeals, always confirm that the order named in the notice of appeal is still in effect. If the trial court vacates the order after the appeal is filed, the appeal may become moot immediately, appellate deadlines may shift, and counsel may need to dismiss, abate, or perfect a new appeal from any replacement order."
In re Diamond
COA05
In this original proceeding, the Dallas Court of Appeals denied a relator's petition for writ of mandamus challenging temporary orders and a related income withholding order issued during a SAPCR modification case. The court applied the standard set forth in In re Prudential, determining that the relator failed to prove the trial court clearly abused its discretion or that there was no adequate remedy by ordinary appeal. Beyond the merits, the court took the significant procedural step of striking the relator's petition and appendix for containing unredacted sensitive information, such as minor children's identifying data, in violation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9.
Litigation Takeaway
"Urgency in family law modification cases does not automatically entitle a party to mandamus relief; you must still provide a record that proves a clear abuse of discretion and the inadequacy of a standard appeal. Additionally, always double-check your redactions, as a violation of Rule 9.9 regarding sensitive data can lead the court to strike your entire filing."
In the Interest of M.L.J.
COA14
In this termination appeal, a Fourteenth Court dissent concluded that a parent’s unsupported claim of “Indian heritage” did not trigger ICWA. The dissent focused on ICWA’s statutory definition of an “Indian child,” emphasizing that the record contained no evidence the child was a tribal member, eligible for membership, or the biological child of a tribal member. Because neither parent nor the child was registered with a tribe, no tribe-specific evidence was offered, and no documentation was produced despite repeated opportunities, the dissent reasoned the trial court had no “reason to know” ICWA applied under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). The dissent also criticized reliance on 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 to impose a broader inquiry duty based on mere suspicion, and would have held that ancestry alone is insufficient to trigger ICWA’s heightened protections.
Litigation Takeaway
"If ICWA is in play, vague statements about Native or Indian heritage are not enough. Family-law litigators should build a tribe-specific record on membership, eligibility, and parental tribal status early, because unsupported ancestry claims can create appellate risk, while a well-developed record can support the argument that ICWA was never triggered."
In re R.H. and E.H.
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to newborn twins after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on the mother’s methamphetamine use throughout pregnancy, the twins’ positive drug tests at birth, ongoing domestic violence involving the father, the mother’s repeated decision to allow the father back into her life despite assaults, inconsistent NICU visitation, unsafe attempts to breastfeed despite hospital warnings, and refusal to cooperate with the Department’s testing, safety-planning, and service efforts. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest factors, the court held the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the mother’s instability, poor judgment, and inability to protect the children would continue, making termination in the twins’ best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug use during pregnancy, continued exposure to a violent partner, and resistance to services can collectively support a best-interest finding even when a parent offers sympathetic explanations. In both CPS and private conservatorship cases, courts look for concrete protective change—not promises—and will treat past endangering conduct as strong evidence of future risk."
Pettigrew v. State
COA10
In Pettigrew v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals upheld admission of a roughly twenty-year-old extraneous child-sex-abuse allegation under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37. The defendant argued the statute was unconstitutional as applied because the prior allegation was stale, uncorroborated, never reported to police, and previously deemed “unsubstantiated” by CPS. The court rejected that argument, emphasizing that the trial court followed the statute’s safeguards by holding the required hearing, finding a reasonable juror could believe the extraneous act beyond a reasonable doubt, and conducting Rule 403 balancing. On the evidentiary issue, the court held the prior allegation was highly probative because it closely resembled the charged conduct, and the State had significant need for the evidence in a credibility-driven case. The court therefore held the statute was not unconstitutional as applied and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
"Old, uncorroborated, or previously “unsubstantiated” sexual-abuse allegations may still carry significant evidentiary weight when they closely resemble current accusations and credibility is central. For family-law litigants, that means you cannot rely on remoteness or an agency’s non-substantiation label alone; you must either build a strong similarity-and-risk argument or attack the allegation’s reliability, dissimilarity, and prejudicial effect in a focused way."