Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
Shepard v. Shepard
COA05
In this divorce appeal, the wife, acting without a lawyer, challenged numerous rulings including recusal decisions, due-process concerns, evidentiary limits, ADA accommodation issues, temporary orders, and the trial court’s confirmation of the marital residence as the husband’s separate property. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach those merits because, even after being notified of defects and given a chance to amend, her brief still failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. Applying the rule that pro se litigants must follow the same appellate briefing standards as attorneys, the court held that the amended brief lacked clear argument, meaningful record citations, and supporting legal authority. Because nothing was properly presented for appellate review, the court dismissed the appeal under Rule 42.3(c).
Litigation Takeaway
"A family-law appeal can be lost before the court ever considers the merits if the brief does not clearly connect preserved complaints to the record, legal authority, and the applicable standard of review. Even serious complaints about recusal, temporary orders, property characterization, or trial fairness will not be reviewed if the appellant does not comply with Rule 38.1—and pro se parties get no special exemption."
Gomez v. Richard
COA06
In Gomez v. Richard, the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could render summary judgment after a defendant died but before any estate representative or heir was substituted into the case. After a suggestion of death was filed, the trial court still granted no-evidence summary judgment for the deceased driver and his employer. The appellate court held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 152, once a party dies, the suit cannot proceed against that person unless a proper substitute—such as an executor, administrator, or heir—is brought in through scire facias or an equivalent substitution procedure. Because no substitute was joined for Richard, he became a legal non-entity for purposes of the litigation, and the judgment as to him was void. The court vacated that portion of the judgment and dismissed that part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As to the surviving employer, however, the court held the no-evidence motion was sufficiently specific and that the plaintiffs failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence, so the summary judgment for the employer was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party dies before judgment, stop and fix the parties before the court does anything else. In Texas, failing to substitute a proper representative under Rule 152 can make a later order void, not merely erroneous. In family cases, that gives lawyers a powerful basis to challenge or prevent rulings entered after a spouse, conservator, or other key litigant dies."
In re Ja’Dawn Lee-Ann Harrison
COA14
In In re Ja’Dawn Lee-Ann Harrison, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a parent could not directly appeal the trial court’s dismissal of a contempt-based motion to enforce a possession order. Because no confinement was imposed, the court treated the attempted appeal as a mandamus proceeding. On the merits, the court found no clear abuse of discretion because the movant failed to identify specific dates or instances showing violations of the possession order, and the order had expired once the child reached adulthood and graduated from high school. The court therefore denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Contempt-based enforcement of possession orders requires precision: plead and prove specific violations of an order that is still in effect. If the trial court denies contempt relief and no one is jailed, the remedy is mandamus—not a direct appeal."
In the Interest of N.A.G.A., a Child
COA05
Foster parents sought a family-violence protective order on behalf of a child against the child’s permanent managing conservator, relying on evidence of a prior intoxication-based endangerment incident, a criminal plea, a USCIS T-visa approval, and allegations of abuse and trafficking. The Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court, as factfinder, was entitled to conclude that this record did not prove the statutory predicates for a protective order, including trafficking, abuse, and the required family or household relationship under the Family Code. Because the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the denial, the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A compelling story is not enough in a protective-order case. Family-law practitioners must prove each statutory element with admissible, case-specific evidence—especially the qualifying relationship or household nexus—and cannot assume CPS history, criminal pleas, immigration findings, or a respondent’s default will carry the application."
In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. d/b/a Chase Bank
COA13
In this original proceeding, the court held that a trial court overreached when it sanctioned and held Chase Bank in contempt for alleged failure to produce subpoenaed records, release trust assets, and honor a successor trustee appointment order, even though Chase was a nonparty and had not been properly brought within the court’s personal jurisdiction for that relief. The appellate court focused on procedural due process rather than the underlying trust dispute, explaining that a subpoena, appointment order, or generalized motion in the main case does not automatically authorize contempt-style remedies or Rule 215 sanctions against a nonparty financial institution. Because the necessary procedural and jurisdictional predicates were not established on the record, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief in part and vacated the challenged contempt and sanctions relief to that extent.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want enforceable relief against a bank or other nonparty in a family-law case, build the procedural runway first. You cannot turn a subpoena dispute or third-party compliance problem into contempt or major sanctions unless service, jurisdiction, notice, and the specific rule-based remedy are all properly established."
Armando Jesus Pedraza v. The State of Texas
COA01
In *Armando Jesus Pedraza v. The State of Texas*, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a 30-year punishment judgment after Pedraza argued his lawyer was ineffective during punishment. He claimed counsel should have objected to hearsay testimony about an online article describing prior violent conduct and wrongly advised him that he could testify while still invoking the Fifth Amendment about pending charges. The court applied *Strickland* and held the record was too undeveloped to show deficient performance or prejudice. Because counsel had no opportunity to explain the reasons for not objecting or for calling Pedraza to testify, the court would not speculate on a silent record, especially given the already extensive punishment evidence of prior violence, convictions, bond violations, and pending charges. The court therefore affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case overlaps with criminal exposure, lawyers must prepare clients carefully before they testify because taking the stand may waive any ability to refuse related cross-examination. The case also shows that appellate complaints about bad evidence or bad strategy usually fail without a well-developed record explaining counsel’s choices, so trial lawyers should preserve objections, seek limiting rulings when appropriate, and build a record if strategy may later be challenged."
Estrada v. State
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed Estrada’s conviction for repeated protective-order violations. The State proved two violations within twelve months: Estrada’s contact with the protected person at the airport despite a no-contact order, and a later incident in which the complainant called 911 reporting that he came to her home and strangled her. Although the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution, the court held the trial court properly admitted the 911 call and EMS records because they were created during an ongoing emergency and for medical-response purposes, making them admissible under hearsay principles and non-testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excusing a juror for cause and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence cases, a later recantation usually does not erase strong contemporaneous evidence. 911 audio, EMS records, photos, neighbor testimony, and other emergency-response evidence can outweigh a complainant’s later change of story and may strongly affect protective-order, custody, and divorce litigation. Also, reconciliation does not suspend a protective order—only a court can modify it."
Fuhrman v. Fuhrman
COA09
In Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, the Ninth Court of Appeals held that detailed tax-allocation provisions in an agreed divorce decree could be enforced as a contract in a separate post-divorce civil suit. The decree required Deloitte to prepare the parties’ 2020 returns, made Douglas responsible for the first $270,000 of 2020 federal income tax, and required the parties to split any excess equally. After Douglas paid his tax liability and demanded reimbursement, Nancy refused, arguing in part that Douglas had not fully performed because he did not provide a K-1. The court rejected that argument, concluding the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Douglas performed, tendered performance, or was excused, and that Nancy breached by failing to pay her allocated share. Because Douglas supported his calculation with returns, testimony, and a spreadsheet, the court affirmed a $187,244 damages award and $30,782.58 in attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If an agreed divorce decree allocates a financial obligation with commercial-contract precision, a former spouse may be able to enforce it later through a straightforward breach-of-contract suit and recover fees. For litigators, the lesson is to draft tax, indemnity, reimbursement, and equalization clauses with clear formulas, deadlines, and document-sharing duties—and to prove or defend those claims with actual evidence, not generalized complaints."
Bradford v. State
COA10
In Bradford v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a six-year-old child’s three out-of-court identifications of her assailant were admissible as excited utterances under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(2), even though the trial court declined to admit them under Article 38.072. The court focused on whether the child remained dominated by fear, pain, and emotional shock from the assault, and concluded that the record showed continuous stress from the immediate porch disclosure through later hospital statements. The court also rejected the Confrontation Clause challenge, reasoning that the statements were spontaneous, made to the child’s mother during crisis and treatment, and were non-testimonial rather than formal accusations for prosecution. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a child’s abuse disclosure does not fit a specialized hearsay statute, do not assume admissibility is lost. Build a Rule 803(2) record showing spontaneity, timing, visible distress, injuries, and continuing trauma; in family court, that can support admission of immediate child disclosures in emergency custody, protective-order, and supervised-possession disputes. To defeat admission, focus on reflection, prompting, intervening calm, and litigation-driven questioning."
Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger v. Deere Credit, Inc.
COA11
The Eastland Court of Appeals reversed a restricted-appeal default judgment entered against an individual defendant and a limited partnership. The court held that Shelia Unger’s signed pro se letter, which denied liability, asserted that payments had been made and the equipment returned, and asked the court to dismiss the suit, was sufficient to constitute an answer on her own behalf because Texas courts liberally construe informal pro se filings that give fair notice of a defensive position. The same letter could not serve as a valid appearance for the limited partnership because a non-attorney cannot represent an entity. Even so, the court held the trial court erred by treating the record as though no response existed and by signing a default judgment the same day the motion was filed, without notice or an opportunity for the entity to cure the representation defect. The judgment was reversed and remanded as to both defendants.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law-adjacent default practice, any timely pro se filing by an individual that disputes the claims may defeat a no-answer default, even if informal. And if a business entity attempts to respond through a non-lawyer, the safer course is to force counsel to appear and give notice and a chance to cure—not rush to default—because due-process defects can unravel the judgment on restricted appeal."