Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1236 opinions found
Lind v. M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC and The YoungESTone, LLC
COA10
In Lind v. M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a defendant who was properly served with the original petition but never answered did not have to be re-served with a later amended petition unless the amendment sought a more onerous judgment. Here, the amended petition made only corrective, non-substantive changes—such as fixing a name, counsel information, and service allegations—and did not change the claims, facts, or relief sought against Lind. Applying Texas default-judgment law and the restricted-appeal standard, the court concluded no service error appeared on the face of the record. The court also upheld the damages award, recognizing that default does not admit unliquidated damages or causation, but finding no reversible error in the proof presented.
Litigation Takeaway
"In default cases, the key question is not whether an amended petition became the live pleading, but whether it materially increased the responding party’s exposure. In family-law cases, re-service may be unnecessary for cleanup amendments, but if an amendment adds harsher conservatorship terms, broader property relief, fees, injunctions, or expanded enforcement remedies, failing to re-serve can jeopardize the default."
In the Interest of M.L.J.
COA14
In this termination appeal, a Fourteenth Court dissent concluded that a parent’s unsupported claim of “Indian heritage” did not trigger ICWA. The dissent focused on ICWA’s statutory definition of an “Indian child,” emphasizing that the record contained no evidence the child was a tribal member, eligible for membership, or the biological child of a tribal member. Because neither parent nor the child was registered with a tribe, no tribe-specific evidence was offered, and no documentation was produced despite repeated opportunities, the dissent reasoned the trial court had no “reason to know” ICWA applied under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). The dissent also criticized reliance on 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 to impose a broader inquiry duty based on mere suspicion, and would have held that ancestry alone is insufficient to trigger ICWA’s heightened protections.
Litigation Takeaway
"If ICWA is in play, vague statements about Native or Indian heritage are not enough. Family-law litigators should build a tribe-specific record on membership, eligibility, and parental tribal status early, because unsupported ancestry claims can create appellate risk, while a well-developed record can support the argument that ICWA was never triggered."
Pettigrew v. State
COA10
In Pettigrew v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals upheld admission of a roughly twenty-year-old extraneous child-sex-abuse allegation under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37. The defendant argued the statute was unconstitutional as applied because the prior allegation was stale, uncorroborated, never reported to police, and previously deemed “unsubstantiated” by CPS. The court rejected that argument, emphasizing that the trial court followed the statute’s safeguards by holding the required hearing, finding a reasonable juror could believe the extraneous act beyond a reasonable doubt, and conducting Rule 403 balancing. On the evidentiary issue, the court held the prior allegation was highly probative because it closely resembled the charged conduct, and the State had significant need for the evidence in a credibility-driven case. The court therefore held the statute was not unconstitutional as applied and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
"Old, uncorroborated, or previously “unsubstantiated” sexual-abuse allegations may still carry significant evidentiary weight when they closely resemble current accusations and credibility is central. For family-law litigants, that means you cannot rely on remoteness or an agency’s non-substantiation label alone; you must either build a strong similarity-and-risk argument or attack the allegation’s reliability, dissimilarity, and prejudicial effect in a focused way."
Schrotel v. State
COA10
In Schrotel v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to uphold a family-violence assault conviction arising from a dispute between spouses. The complainant testified that her husband hit her with an exercise ball, put his hand on her throat, pushed her down, and kicked or stomped on her leg, causing pain. The responding officer did not witness the assault but observed that the complainant was upset and crying, saw a heel-shaped red mark on her leg, and photographed it. On appeal, the appellant argued the complainant was not credible and that inconsistencies between her testimony, the officer’s testimony, and his denial made the evidence insufficient. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court deferred to the jury’s role in resolving credibility and conflicts in the evidence, considered the cumulative force of the testimony and corroboration, and concluded that the complainant’s testimony plus modest contemporaneous corroboration was enough for a rational jury to find bodily injury to a family member beyond a reasonable doubt.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, a factfinder can credit one party’s detailed testimony even when the other party flatly denies it. You do not need perfect corroboration; modest supporting proof like photographs, officer observations, distress, or a prompt outcry may be enough to support findings affecting protective orders, conservatorship, possession, and related divorce issues."
In re Marriage of Runyon
COA10
In In re Marriage of Runyon, a husband challenged a divorce decree that awarded his wife a $47,990 money judgment, allowed her to relocate their child to Florida, and ordered $1,840 in monthly child support. The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on all counts. The court analyzed the property division under the Murff factors, concluding that the husband's high income as an anesthesiologist compared to the wife's lower earnings justified an unequal division. Regarding the move to Florida, the court applied the Lenz factors and found relocation was in the child's best interest due to the presence of extended family. The court held that the trial court acted within its broad discretion and that the wife's legal pleadings were sufficient to support the remedies awarded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Trial courts have immense discretion in dividing property and determining a child's residence; if there is a significant income gap or a clear best-interest benefit to relocation (like family support), appellate courts are highly unlikely to reverse the decision."
Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger v. Deere Credit, Inc.
COA11
The Eastland Court of Appeals reversed a restricted-appeal default judgment entered against an individual defendant and a limited partnership. The court held that Shelia Unger’s signed pro se letter, which denied liability, asserted that payments had been made and the equipment returned, and asked the court to dismiss the suit, was sufficient to constitute an answer on her own behalf because Texas courts liberally construe informal pro se filings that give fair notice of a defensive position. The same letter could not serve as a valid appearance for the limited partnership because a non-attorney cannot represent an entity. Even so, the court held the trial court erred by treating the record as though no response existed and by signing a default judgment the same day the motion was filed, without notice or an opportunity for the entity to cure the representation defect. The judgment was reversed and remanded as to both defendants.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law-adjacent default practice, any timely pro se filing by an individual that disputes the claims may defeat a no-answer default, even if informal. And if a business entity attempts to respond through a non-lawyer, the safer course is to force counsel to appear and give notice and a chance to cure—not rush to default—because due-process defects can unravel the judgment on restricted appeal."
In re Zermeno
COA07
In In re Zermeno, the Amarillo Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus after a trial court’s temporary orders named Father a joint managing conservator despite uncontroverted evidence that he had committed family violence against Mother within two years before the divorce was filed. The court focused on Texas Family Code section 153.004(b), explaining that the statute is not just a factor in the best-interest analysis; it prohibits appointment of joint managing conservators when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of physical abuse by one parent against the other. Because Father admitted multiple assaults, including one shortly before separation, and Mother and the parties’ adult children corroborated the violence, the trial court misapplied the law to essentially undisputed facts. The appellate court held that mandamus was the proper remedy for the unlawful temporary order and directed the trial court to vacate it.
Litigation Takeaway
"When credible evidence establishes a recent history or pattern of family violence, a Texas trial court cannot treat joint managing conservatorship as a compromise option. Family Code section 153.004(b) creates a hard statutory limit on the court’s discretion, and mandamus is available to correct temporary orders that ignore that limit."
In re Diamond
COA05
In this original proceeding, the Dallas Court of Appeals denied a relator's petition for writ of mandamus challenging temporary orders and a related income withholding order issued during a SAPCR modification case. The court applied the standard set forth in In re Prudential, determining that the relator failed to prove the trial court clearly abused its discretion or that there was no adequate remedy by ordinary appeal. Beyond the merits, the court took the significant procedural step of striking the relator's petition and appendix for containing unredacted sensitive information, such as minor children's identifying data, in violation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9.
Litigation Takeaway
"Urgency in family law modification cases does not automatically entitle a party to mandamus relief; you must still provide a record that proves a clear abuse of discretion and the inadequacy of a standard appeal. Additionally, always double-check your redactions, as a violation of Rule 9.9 regarding sensitive data can lead the court to strike your entire filing."
In the Interest of B.C., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals largely upheld a post-answer default SAPCR order against a pro se father. The court concluded the record showed he had actual notice of the trial setting, his eve-of-trial email continuance request was not verified or supported by affidavit as Rule 251 requires, and his post-judgment effort to set aside the default did not establish reversible error under the standards governing post-answer defaults. The court also rejected his other complaints as unpreserved, inadequately briefed, or contradicted by the record. But it modified the final order to strike the child’s surname change because the mother never pleaded for that relief, and a court may not grant affirmative relief not supported by the live pleadings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Two family-law lessons stand out: post-answer defaults are hard to undo without a properly supported Craddock record, and even in SAPCR cases a final order cannot include affirmative relief that was never pleaded. Plead every item of requested relief, and if you seek to set aside a default, use a properly signed, sworn, and fully developed motion."
In the Matter of D.A.
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order modifying disposition and committing D.A. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department after D.A. repeatedly violated probation, absconded for months, and continued using marijuana. On appeal, D.A. argued the trial court effectively refused to consider the full range of available dispositions because a requested psychological evaluation had been denied. The appellate court rejected that argument, holding the due-process version of the complaint was not preserved and that the record did not show the judge had prejudged the outcome or refused to consider lesser options. The court emphasized that a psychological evaluation is not a statutory prerequisite to a non-TJJD placement, the judge questioned D.A. about continued probation, and the trial court made the required statutory findings under the Family Code. Because substantive and probative evidence supported those findings, the commitment order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to argue on appeal that a trial court failed to consider lesser alternatives, you need a clear record showing it. Preservation, statutory findings, and concrete evidence of failed supervision matter more than rhetoric. If a denied evaluation or assessment is central to your theory, make the legal basis and resulting prejudice explicit in the trial court or the complaint will likely go nowhere on appeal."