Opinion Library

Divorce

Chase Allen Curtis v. Gabrielle Analisa Laplante

COA04

In a bifurcated divorce proceeding, the trial court found an informal marriage existed between Curtis and Laplante beginning in January 2014 under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2), then entered a divorce decree and divided property as community. On appeal, Curtis challenged the sufficiency of the informal-marriage finding. The Fourth Court of Appeals applied § 2.401(a)(2), which requires proof that the parties (1) agreed to be married, and after that agreement (2) lived together in Texas as spouses and (3) represented to others in Texas that they were married—concurrently. The court emphasized that the “agreement” element requires a present, mutual decision to be married, not merely engagement or plans for a future ceremony, and that occasional “husband/wife” references do not, by themselves, establish a present agreement. Reviewing the evidence against the specific date found (January 2014), the court held the proof was factually insufficient to establish the required concurrence of the statutory elements as of that time. Because the divorce decree and property division depended on the existence of a marriage, the court reversed and remanded. The court also held the absence of additional findings of fact and conclusions of law was not reversible because it did not prevent Curtis from presenting his sufficiency challenge; any inconsistency between the decree and findings was resolved under Rule 299a by giving controlling effect to the findings for appellate review.

Litigation Takeaway

"Informal marriage is a make-or-break issue: the proponent must prove a present, mutual agreement to be married plus Texas cohabitation and Texas holding out, all occurring together on a defensible inception date—not just a long relationship, engagement, or sporadic “husband/wife” talk. Build (or attack) the case with date-specific, corroborated evidence (documents and third-party testimony), because factual-sufficiency review can overturn an informal-marriage finding and collapse the divorce/property-division framework."

Paternity

In re Jesus Ybarra

COA07

In an adult parentage suit, the trial court ordered the alleged father (relator) to submit to genetic testing. Although he sought a stay and obtained a written order plus findings and conclusions, he did not file for mandamus until almost a year later—after the court issued a renewed testing deadline and warned noncompliance could lead to contempt. The Seventh Court of Appeals treated mandamus as an equity-governed remedy and held the unexplained delay was unreasonable and barred relief; a later contempt warning did not “restart the clock” or create new mandamus issues because the relator’s statutory/constitutional complaints (retroactivity, privacy, due process) were the same when the original testing order was issued. The court also rejected the relator’s request to prospectively prohibit a future contempt proceeding on double-jeopardy grounds as unripe and an impermissible advisory opinion. Mandamus was denied without reaching the merits of the challenges to the testing order.

Litigation Takeaway

"If you plan to challenge a genetic-testing (or other intrusive, effectively unreviewable) family-law order by mandamus, act fast—equity favors the diligent, and waiting until enforcement ramps up or contempt is threatened is often too late. Contempt warnings usually don’t reset mandamus deadlines, and appellate courts won’t pre-approve defenses to hypothetical future contempt proceedings."

Andy Jerome Williams v. The State of Texas

COA09

In a drug-trafficking prosecution arising from cocaine found in a concealed “trap” in a truck the defendant was driving, the defendant sought to shift blame to a third party (the truck’s insured) by offering evidence that the third party was arrested about ten months later for a similar, high-quantity cocaine offense with sophisticated concealment. The trial court excluded the third party’s later arrest under Texas Rule of Evidence 403, finding the time gap and attenuated connection created only marginal probative value while inviting juror confusion and a distracting “mini-trial” about the unrelated arrest. The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding alternative-perpetrator evidence must have a sufficiently direct nexus to the charged event; thematic similarity and a loose association to the vehicle were not enough. The court further held the exclusion did not violate the constitutional right to present a complete defense because standard evidentiary limits, applied neutrally, may bar speculative third-party culpability theories.

Litigation Takeaway

"“Someone else did it” evidence is admissible only if you can show a concrete, case-specific connection to the incident at issue. Remote-in-time arrests or similar bad acts of a third person—without direct nexus (access, control, presence, digital/financial connectors, etc.)—are prime candidates for exclusion under Rule 403 as confusing, time-consuming, and minimally probative, and their exclusion generally will not amount to a constitutional denial of a defense."

Christopher Peoples v. The State of Texas

COA12

In a robbery‑based capital murder appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals held (1) the trial court properly refused a self‑defense jury instruction on capital murder alleged under Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2) while allowing self‑defense on the lesser‑included offense of murder, and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting text‑message chains over authenticity and “best evidence” objections. The State alleged Christopher Peoples killed the victim while in the course of committing/attempting robbery; Peoples admitted the killing but claimed self‑defense and the defense sought a self‑defense instruction on the capital charge. The court reasoned that, under Texas precedent and Penal Code § 9.31(b)(4), a robber has no right of self‑defense against the intended victim, so submitting self‑defense on the robbery‑capital theory would misstate the law; the jury could still consider self‑defense only if it rejected the robbery predicate and reached the murder lesser. On the evidentiary issue, the court applied Texas Rules of Evidence 901 and 1001–1002, emphasizing Rule 901’s low “support a finding” authentication threshold and that ESI “originals” include any accurate printout/output readable by sight. Missing or unrecoverable attachments in a forensic extraction did not make the message threads inadmissible; that limitation went to weight, not admissibility, so long as the proponent sufficiently linked the messages to the sender and showed the exhibit accurately reflected what was extracted.

Litigation Takeaway

"For Texas family‑law trials, *Peoples* is a practical blueprint for getting texts admitted (or keeping them out). Missing attachments or an imperfect extraction usually won’t defeat admissibility if you can authenticate the messages with circumstantial “linking” facts and lay that the exhibit accurately reflects the recovered data; argue gaps go to weight, not admissibility. If opposing, focus objections on weak authorship linkage and whether the proffered output reliably/accurately reflects the source (and consider Rule 403 for misleading excerpts), not merely that the thread is incomplete."

Property Division

In the Interest of M.Z. and M.C.Z., Children

COA05

In a Dallas County divorce after a 23-year marriage, the community estate included the husband’s executive deferred-compensation “performance units,” which would pay only upon future contingent events (e.g., IPO, dividend, sale) and could be forfeited. The only valuation evidence was uncontroverted expert CPA testimony that the units had no presently ascertainable fair market value as of trial, but were not worthless and could be divided in kind. The trial court nevertheless treated the units as 100% community property, awarded 100% of them to the husband, and assigned a $0 value in the just-and-right division. Applying the abuse-of-discretion framework with embedded legal-sufficiency review under Texas Family Code § 7.001, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that evidence showing “no current calculable FMV” does not support a finding of “no value,” and the record contained no affirmative evidence that the units were worthless. Because the performance units were a material portion of the community estate, the erroneous $0 valuation tainted the overall division. The court reversed the property division and remanded for a new, proper division of the community estate (affirming the divorce otherwise).

Litigation Takeaway

"Contingent does not mean worthless. If an asset can’t be reliably valued today (executive compensation, earnouts, carried interests, options), a court cannot simply assign $0 without evidence of actual worthlessness—especially if it awards the entire asset to one spouse. Build a record that either (1) proves worthlessness, or (2) supports a division-in-kind or other non-speculative mechanism, and tie any valuation error to overall “just and right” harm when the asset is material."

Daniel Kenneth Meek v. The State of Texas

COA09

In a family-violence assault prosecution, the State and its witnesses repeatedly referred to the complainant (and domestic violence complainants generally) as the “victim.” Defense counsel objected once—arguing the person was only a “complaining witness” because it had not been established she was a victim—but did not clearly invoke due process/presumption-of-innocence grounds and did not object again as the terminology continued throughout trial. On appeal, the defendant reframed the complaint as a constitutional due-process/fair-trial violation. The Ninth Court of Appeals analyzed the issue as an error-preservation question under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and the Marin/Clark/Broxton line of cases, explaining that even constitutional fair-trial complaints are generally forfeitable and must be preserved by timely, specific objections that comport with the theory urged on appeal, and renewed when the complained-of matter recurs (Fuentes). Because the single trial objection was not sufficiently specific/constitutional and was not renewed with each later use of “victim,” the court held the complaint was forfeited and affirmed the conviction.

Litigation Takeaway

"If opposing counsel or witnesses repeatedly label someone a “victim” before any finding of wrongdoing, you must preserve the issue with precision: object early, state the exact legal basis you intend to raise (due process/presumption of innocence, improper bolstering/opinion, Rule 403 unfair prejudice, etc.), get a ruling, and either secure a clear running objection or object each time the term is used. One vague objection will not preserve a later constitutional appellate complaint."

Appeal and Mandamus

In the Matter of X.M., a Juvenile

COA12

In a Texas juvenile determinate-sentence case, X.M. attempted to appeal a December 2, 2019 adjudication and disposition order committing the juvenile to TJJD by filing a pro se notice of appeal on February 24, 2026—more than six years late. The Twelfth Court of Appeals analyzed the mandatory appellate timetables under TRAP 26.1 (deadline to file notice of appeal) and TRAP 26.3 (15-day grace period requiring both a notice of appeal and a timely motion for extension). Because neither a timely notice nor a timely extension request was filed within the rule-based windows, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction. The court also rejected any request to “fix” the problem by suspending the rules, holding TRAP 2 cannot be used to alter the time to perfect an appeal in a civil case. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction under TRAP 42.3(a) and overruled pending motions as moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"Appellate deadlines are jurisdictional: if you miss the TRAP 26.1 notice-of-appeal deadline (and the narrow TRAP 26.3 grace period), the court of appeals cannot reach the merits—no matter how compelling the circumstances. In family-law cases with accelerated timetables, calendar the signing date immediately, file the notice early when in doubt, and do a “jurisdiction audit” before evaluating appellate issues."

Child Support

In the Interest of I.R.R., a Child

COA05

In a restricted appeal from a default SAPCR, Father argued the judgment was void for defective service and, alternatively, unsupported by evidence. The Dallas Court of Appeals first examined the face of the record for strict compliance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 106 and 107 and held the return of service adequately identified Father and what was served; Rule 107 did not require the served petition/exhibits to be attached to the return in the clerk’s file, so the trial court had personal jurisdiction. The court then reviewed the default prove-up evidence and concluded it was legally insufficient to establish Father’s net resources, making both the guideline-based current support order and the retroactive support judgment unsustainable. Finally, the court held the record was factually insufficient to overcome the Family Code presumption that joint managing conservatorship is in the child’s best interest; the prove-up lacked substantive best-interest evidence justifying Mother as sole managing conservator with Father as possessory conservator. The court reversed the SAPCR order and remanded for a new trial.

Litigation Takeaway

"Even in a default SAPCR with airtight service, you still must build a real evidentiary record: prove net resources (and show the guideline math) for current and retroactive support, and present concrete best-interest facts to rebut the joint-managing presumption if seeking a sole-managing conservatorship. For respondents, restricted appeals often succeed on sufficiency problems in thin prove-ups rather than on service defects."

General trial issues

Payne v. Boyd

COA04

In Payne v. Boyd, a nonlawyer brother (Donald) attempted to prosecute a lawsuit for the named plaintiff (Darrell) based on a power of attorney arising from Darrell’s pending criminal matter. Defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction asserting Donald lacked capacity and standing. The Fourth Court of Appeals distinguished capacity (a procedural defect that must be raised by verified pleading under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93) from standing (a jurisdictional requirement that can be raised by plea to the jurisdiction and is not waivable). Because defendants did not file a Rule 93 verified pleading, any capacity challenge was waived. But Donald still lacked standing because he pleaded no personal injury to himself and could not manufacture standing by claiming agency under a POA to assert Darrell’s constitutional/statutory claims. The standing defect deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction, and dismissal was proper without leave to replead because the defect was incurable as to Donald.

Litigation Takeaway

"A power of attorney is not a license to litigate. Even if the other side fails to preserve a Rule 93 verified “capacity” objection, you can still knock out proxy-driven filings by attacking standing with a plea to the jurisdiction—standing is nonwaivable and requires the filer to allege their own concrete injury. Preserve both: verified Rule 93 capacity challenge + plea to the jurisdiction on standing."

Jose Guevara-Molina v. The State of Texas

COA04

In this Texas criminal appeal, the defendant challenged six convictions for knowing possession of child pornography found on his cell phone, arguing the State failed to prove he knowingly possessed the images and separately complaining about admission of message screenshots. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and Texas Penal Code § 43.26’s “care, custody, control, or management + knowledge” concept, the Fourth Court of Appeals treated the proof as a combined-force, circumstantial-evidence case: (1) the phone was seized from the defendant’s person and he admitted it was his (including the number and length of ownership), supporting control of the device; (2) a forensic extraction located the images in multiple locations on the phone, including a user-restricted “private folder,” supporting an inference of knowing retention rather than accidental presence; and (3) the defendant’s admissions (including identifying the child depicted) and related message traffic supported knowledge of the images’ existence and character. The court rejected the argument that the State had to prove he created, saved, moved, or viewed the files. On the evidentiary issue, the court held the complaint was waived because trial counsel objected on hearsay grounds, but on appeal argued lack of authentication; the appellate theory did not comport with the trial objection under Texas preservation rules. The convictions were affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"In any case turning on “digital possession” (including SAPCR and protective-order hearings), you can prove control and knowledge without a smoking-gun admission by stacking: device nexus (seized from person/owned), forensic artifacts in multiple locations (especially secure/private folders), and contextual admissions/messages. And if you want appellate leverage, object on the right ground—mislabeling an authentication problem as “hearsay” can waive your best issue."