Opinion Library

Appeal and Mandamus

Brys v. Cobb

COA01

In Brys v. Cobb, the First Court of Appeals held that when a properly authenticated California judgment was filed in Texas under the UEFJA on July 21, 2023, it immediately became a Texas judgment. The judgment debtor waited more than a year to file a motion for new trial and later asked the Texas court to declare the foreign judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court did not reach the underlying jurisdictional challenge to the California judgment because the dispositive issue was timing: under Chapter 35 and Texas Rules 306a and 329b, any attack on a domesticated foreign judgment must be brought through the same procedures and within the same deadlines that apply to Texas judgments. Because the trial court’s plenary power expired 30 days after domestication and no timely post-judgment motion was filed, the later orders granting a new trial and declaring the judgment void were themselves void. The court vacated those post-deadline orders and left the domesticated California judgment fully enforceable in Texas.

Litigation Takeaway

"Treat the UEFJA filing date like the signing date of a Texas final judgment. If you want to attack a domesticated foreign judgment, move immediately—waiting can forfeit even a personal-jurisdiction or voidness challenge. If you represent the creditor, a proper UEFJA filing can quickly become a powerful enforcement and settlement tool once the deadline passes."

In the Interest of A.A.C.C., a Child

COA10

In *In the Interest of A.A.C.C., a Child*, the Tenth Court of Appeals held that a father’s bill of review attacking a termination order was barred by Texas Family Code section 161.211(a) because it was filed more than six months after the order was signed. The father argued he had already been adjudicated the child’s father in a separate parentage case and therefore should not have been terminated as merely an alleged father under section 161.002(b). But the court focused on procedure and finality: the termination order expressly relied on section 161.002(b), and the father filed his collateral attack well outside the six-month statutory deadline. The court also held that because he filed no written response to the Department’s summary-judgment motion, he failed to preserve arguments about misclassification, evidentiary insufficiency, lack of counsel, and invalid waiver of service. The Department’s summary-judgment evidence conclusively established the statutory basis for termination and the untimeliness of the bill of review, so summary judgment was proper.

Litigation Takeaway

"Deadlines and preservation can decide a family-law case before the merits are ever reached. If a termination order is signed under Family Code section 161.002(b), any direct or collateral attack must be pursued within the six-month window in section 161.211(a), and any reason the statute supposedly does not apply must be raised in a written trial-court response—not for the first time on appeal."

Evidence

Travarius Leon Dent v. The State of Texas

COA13

In Dent, the court affirmed admission of the father’s prior injury-to-a-child deferred-adjudication evidence after he testified that he was a strict but not physically abusive parent and suggested the child fabricated sexual-abuse allegations in retaliation for discipline. The court held that this testimony opened the door by creating a false impression about his parenting and made the prior child-injury evidence relevant for non-propensity purposes: rebutting that impression and undermining his retaliation/fabrication defense. The court also held that the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403, because the State had a real need for rebuttal evidence tailored to the defense theme, and the limiting instruction properly restricted the jury’s use of the evidence without commenting on the weight of the evidence.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases, a parent who claims to be merely “strict” and blames allegations on retaliation or coaching may open the door to prior abuse evidence. Frame the evidence as rebuttal of a false parenting narrative and fabrication defense—not just bad-character proof—and seek a careful limiting instruction."

Divorce

Morales v. Morales

COA01

In this Harris County divorce, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a property division that included confirmation of the husband’s Raspberry Lane property as separate property, a reimbursement award to the community for mortgage principal paid on that separate property, and allocation of a six-figure SBA loan tied to the wife’s LLC. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard governing just-and-right divisions, with sufficiency review folded into that analysis, and noted that implied findings supported the decree because no past-due notice for findings was filed. Even so, implied findings could not replace evidence. The court held the record supported treating Raspberry Lane as separate property and did not reject the reimbursement framework or equitable lien securing that award. But it concluded the trial court lacked sufficient evidentiary support to assign the SBA debt as the wife’s personal liability where the evidence showed the loan belonged to Action Ready Mix, LLC and there was no adequate proof of personal liability. Because that unsupported debt allocation could have distorted the overall just-and-right division, the court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

Litigation Takeaway

"In divorce cases, debt allocation must be proved as carefully as asset characterization. If a liability belongs to an LLC or corporation, do not assume the court can assign it personally to a spouse without loan documents, guaranties, or another legal basis. And when pursuing reimbursement for community funds used on separate property, prove the separate character, trace the payments, and tie the remedy clearly to the overall property division."

In the Interest of K.L.G., K.L.G., K.A.R.G., and K.L.G., Children

COA13

The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights and refused to delete the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). Father did not challenge the separate subsection (N) predicate ground or the best-interest finding, so termination stood regardless, but the court still reviewed the challenged endangerment findings because of their collateral consequences. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because the record showed severe abuse and neglect of the children, and Father’s own statements showed he knew for months that Mother and her boyfriend were abusing and neglecting the children yet failed to take effective protective action. That knowledge-plus-inaction supported both environmental endangerment under subsection (D) and endangering conduct under subsection (E).

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas family cases, a parent cannot avoid endangerment findings simply by saying, “I wasn’t the abuser.” If the evidence shows the parent knew the children were being abused or neglected and still left them in that environment without meaningful intervention, courts can uphold subsection (D) and (E) findings—with serious future consequences for custody, conservatorship, and later termination litigation."

In the Interest of A.M., a Child

COA06

The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to A.M. after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support Father’s predicate grounds under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (N) and the best-interest findings as to both parents. The court analyzed Father’s repeated incarcerations, criminal conduct, long-term absence, and inability to provide a stable home holistically rather than in isolation, holding that this pattern constituted endangering conduct and constructive abandonment. It also held that A.M.’s history of instability, trauma, failed placements, both parents’ continued incarceration, and evidence that she was moving toward acceptance of adoption supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in her best interest.

Litigation Takeaway

"In termination and other family-law cases, incarceration rarely stands alone—the winning record ties repeated criminal conduct and absence to a larger pattern of instability, lack of caregiving, and the child’s need for permanence. Trial lawyers should build a child-specific chronology showing how parental unavailability affected this child, because appellate courts will review endangerment holistically and defer heavily to credibility-based best-interest findings."

In the Interest of E.T., E.T., E.T., and E.D., Children

COA11

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s rights to four children and the father’s rights to one child, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support best-interest findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court analyzed the Holley best-interest factors through the parents’ history of endangering conduct, emphasizing that the mother’s partial service-plan compliance did not outweigh a failed monitored return and cocaine-positive tests for both her and one child, and that the father’s federal drug conviction and incarceration supported findings of continuing instability and inability to parent. Giving deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the court held the trial judge could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas best-interest litigation, partial compliance with services is not enough if the larger record shows relapse, criminal conduct, poor judgment, or instability. A failed monitored return, positive drug tests during reunification, and incarceration for serious drug offenses can outweigh favorable evidence and are powerful predictors of future risk."

Divorce

Jason Murray Davis and Davis & Santos, P.C. v. Graham Weston; Carowest Land Ltd.; Graham Weston as Trustee of Countyline Land Trust; and Kuehler Road, LLC f/k/a Kuehler Road, Ltd.

COA03

In this divorce-related crossover dispute, the Austin Court of Appeals held that former clients’ claims against their longtime lawyer and his firm for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud by nondisclosure could proceed despite a TCPA motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs alleged the lawyer had represented Graham Weston, related family entities, and other family interests over many years, then switched sides and represented Graham’s wife in the divorce while using trust and confidential information gained from those prior relationships. The court analyzed the case as a substantive conflict-and-loyalty dispute rather than merely an attack on protected petitioning or litigation conduct. Relying on the record, including prior disqualification findings that described the lawyer as effectively a family attorney with fiduciary duties to Graham, the court concluded the suit was not subject to TCPA dismissal on the record presented and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion.

Litigation Takeaway

"In entity-heavy divorces, a lawyer’s prior work for one spouse, family businesses, trusts, or the broader family enterprise can create fiduciary-duty exposure that survives early dismissal. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a strong record on the practical scope of prior representation and frame conflict claims as loyalty, confidentiality, and nondisclosure violations—not just complaints about litigation activity."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Michael Colbert v. State of Texas

COA12

In Colbert v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld an assault/family-violence conviction even though the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution. The defendant argued on appeal that trying the case the day after he elected to represent himself violated Article 1.051(e) and due process, but the court held that complaint was not preserved because he did not object, request a continuance, or otherwise raise the issue in the trial court; in fact, he stated he was ready to proceed. On the merits, the court applied the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, concluding that the complainant’s 911 statements, her similar statements to the responding officer, and the defendant’s own admission that he may have hit her with the television were sufficient to support the finding of bodily injury despite her later recantation.

Litigation Takeaway

"Recantation does not erase family-violence evidence, and preservation matters. In family-law cases, judges may credit contemporaneous 911 calls, officer testimony, and party admissions over a later walk-back, so lawyers should gather and present that evidence early. And if notice or due-process problems arise in a rushed hearing, counsel must object, request specific relief, and make a record immediately or the complaint may be lost on appeal."

Appeal and Mandamus

In re G.M.

COA02

In this mandamus proceeding, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code Section 156.102 is triggered by the date a modification petition is filed, not the date the hearing occurs. Father filed within one year of the prior order and sought to change the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence, so he was required to file a sufficient supporting affidavit. After the trial court found the affidavit insufficient, Section 156.102(c) required it to deny the requested relief and refuse to proceed. By nevertheless conducting an evidentiary hearing and entering temporary orders, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.

Litigation Takeaway

"If you seek to change primary residence within one year of the last order, the affidavit requirement is a hard gatekeeper. The key date is the filing date, and once a court finds the affidavit insufficient, it cannot simply go forward with a hearing anyway. For movants, draft a fact-specific affidavit that tracks the statute; for respondents, press for an early ruling and preserve error if the court proceeds despite an insufficiency finding."