Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Interest of C.F., a Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights, concluding legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence that the parents used methamphetamine while caring for the infant, the child himself tested positive for methamphetamine, there were domestic-violence concerns, the home environment was unstable and unsafe, and the father later violated community supervision, was incarcerated, failed to complete services, and offered only a speculative post-release plan. Applying the Holley best-interest framework and sufficiency standards, the court held the trial court could reasonably infer ongoing danger and lack of stability from the father’s past and present conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts give heavy weight to concrete evidence of child endangerment—especially drug exposure, domestic violence, criminal instability, unsafe housing, and failure to complete services—and they may use past conduct to predict future risk. In any custody or termination case, promises of future improvement usually will not overcome a documented record of recent instability unless backed by credible, verifiable proof of rehabilitation, housing, employment, and safety."
Khandria v. Al-Muslim
COA14
In Khandria v. Al-Muslim, the father sought to modify a prior SAPCR/divorce decree that gave him no specific possession or access, arguing the original decree effectively gave the mother unchecked control and that circumstances had materially changed because she was now somewhat open to reunification. The Fourteenth Court first held that this argument was an improper collateral attack on the original decree: any defect in the decree was non-jurisdictional, making the decree at most voidable and subject to direct appeal, not later repair through modification. On the merits, the court held the evidence did not require findings of a material and substantial change or present best interest under Family Code section 156.101. The mother’s testimony showed only cautious, therapy-based openness while continuing to express concerns about the child’s loss of trust, and the father’s reluctance to commit to therapeutic recommendations undercut his request for immediate access. The court also affirmed denial of the father’s request to reduce child support because the record showed assets and earning capacity despite his claimed setbacks.
Litigation Takeaway
"A modification case is not a do-over for errors in the original decree. If the real complaint is that the prior order was legally defective, that issue usually must be raised by direct appeal. And in access-modification cases, vague evidence that a parent’s attitude has softened is not enough—lawyers need concrete proof of post-decree change and a child-centered reunification plan, especially when the relationship has been fractured for years."
In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B.
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights after an independent Anders review found no nonfrivolous appellate issues. The court nevertheless specifically analyzed Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) under In re N.G., relying on evidence of severe abuse in the home, the father’s failure to accept responsibility, unresolved safety concerns despite service completion, and the absence of any therapeutic support for reunification. The court also held that appointed counsel in a parental-rights appeal may not withdraw merely because an Anders brief was filed; under In re P.M., counsel must show independent good cause to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas termination appeals, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) will get specific appellate review even in an Anders case, so trial counsel must build a record on abuse, exposure, accountability, and actual remediation—not just service completion. Appointed appellate counsel should also expect to remain on the case through any petition-for-review stage unless they can show good cause beyond filing an Anders brief."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Jesus Gregorio Lopez and Isela Flores Richardson
COA13
In this divorce appeal, the wife argued she lacked notice that a May 7 hearing would serve as the final trial and complained that the court ruled on disputed property issues without live testimony, based instead on attorney proffer and documents. The Thirteenth Court rejected those arguments because the record showed the case was orally set for trial on May 7, wife’s counsel acknowledged that understanding at the hearing, and the parties expressly agreed to proceed by proffer with documentary review. The court also found no reversible error regarding alleged post-hearing exhibits, a late-filed amended pleading, relief awarded in the decree, or findings and conclusions, and it affirmed the divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you agree on the record to try a divorce case by proffer, stipulation, and documents, you usually cannot wait until the judge seems unconvinced and then demand a full evidentiary hearing. Family-law lawyers should clarify whether a setting is final, object clearly to any late amendments or procedure they oppose, and preserve the record before agreeing to an informal trial format."
In the Interest of D.J., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to D.J. As to Mother, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), a prior endangerment-based termination finding under subsection (M), and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on a pattern of evidence, including Mother’s prior endangerment termination history, the child’s positive drug test, Mother’s own positive hair-follicle test, missed testing, instability in housing and supervision, failure to know the child’s whereabouts, and inconsistent visitation. The court also rejected Mother’s argument that an earlier letter ruling controlled over the final judgment, reiterating that the signed order governs. As to Father, the court accepted appointed counsel’s Anders brief, conducted an independent review, found no nonfrivolous appellate issue, and affirmed termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Family courts decide endangerment and best-interest disputes by looking at the whole pattern, not isolated recent improvements. Positive drug tests, missed tests, instability, prior CPS history, and inconsistent contact can combine to support severe relief, while informal letter rulings or oral pronouncements do not override the signed order."
Boswell v. State
COA02
In Boswell v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the State’s proof of an aggravated assault on a date different from the indictment’s “on or about” date did not make the evidence legally insufficient because, under Texas law, the State need only prove a date before indictment and within limitations unless time is a material element. The court rejected the defendant’s attempt to treat the date mismatch as a fatal variance or sufficiency defect. But the court agreed that double jeopardy barred punishing Boswell for both aggravated assault and continuous family violence when the aggravated assault was one of the predicate acts supporting the continuous-family-violence count. The court affirmed the aggravated-assault and assault/family-violence convictions, reversed the continuous-family-violence conviction, and rendered an acquittal on that count.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, a mismatch between a pleaded date and the proved date of a family-violence incident is usually better used as a credibility attack than as a dispositive legal argument. The bigger lesson is to carefully track how each abuse incident is being used across claims and requested relief so the same event is not carelessly double-counted as both a standalone act and part of a broader pattern."
Lorkovic v. Lorkovic
COA04
In Lorkovic v. Lorkovic, the Fourth Court of Appeals considered whether a final divorce decree improperly included permanent injunctions and a child-support amount that were not fully resolved at trial. The court held that most of the injunctions were valid because the wife had pleaded for harmful-contact relief and the trial evidence about abuse, safety concerns, communication problems, and interference with possession supported protective restrictions tied to the parent-child relationship. The court also concluded that the decree did not become reversible merely because its injunction language was more detailed than the trial court’s oral rendition. But the court reversed the child-support provision because the trial court never actually adjudicated the amount at trial; it only stated that the husband would owe support and later indicated the parties were expected to calculate the figure or return for a further hearing. Because the decree inserted $650 per month without a prior adjudication of that amount, the support award had to be reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Protective injunctions in a divorce decree can survive appeal if they are grounded in the pleadings, the evidence, and conservatorship-related concerns, even when the written decree is more detailed than the oral rendition. Child support is different: the exact amount must be actually decided by evidence, stipulation, or later hearing before it can appear in the final decree. Do not treat support numbers as decree-drafting details."
In the Interest of E.M.M. Jr., N.M.M., N.J.M., I.A.M., M.S.R., A.L.M., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b). Mother challenged only best interest, so the court accepted the unchallenged predicate grounds as true and evaluated the record under the Holley factors and Family Code section 263.307. The court relied on evidence that Mother and a newborn tested positive for marijuana, the children reported domestic violence, the family lived in unsafe housing without electricity, Mother refused or failed to engage in services, and she went about 175 days without contacting the Department or visiting the children. Considering that pattern of conduct, the court held a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief that termination was in the children’s best interest and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, courts can infer future risk from a parent’s pattern of past conduct—especially when drug use, domestic violence, unsafe housing, and noncompliance all appear together. On appeal, leaving predicate findings unchallenged can be outcome-determinative because those findings will reinforce the best-interest analysis."
Bryant Pearl v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Bryant Pearl v. State of Texas, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child where the child testified the abuse happened multiple times over more than thirty days, even though she could not give precise dates and the record included evidence that another person had also abused her. The court applied the usual sufficiency standard, deferred to the jury on credibility, and emphasized that exact dates are not required under Penal Code section 21.02 and that a child victim’s testimony alone can sustain the finding. The child’s account was further reinforced by SANE-history testimony describing repeated abuse and explaining why the absence of physical trauma did not negate abuse. The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving abuse allegations, Pearl underscores that a factfinder may still credit a child’s core abuse narrative despite memory gaps, imprecise timing, no physical findings, and evidence of another possible abuser. The practical lesson is to build or attack the case around repetition, duration, attribution, and consistency of the core allegations—not around the expectation of date-perfect testimony."
Curtis Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Curtis Johnson v. State, the Amarillo court held that a defendant complaining the State’s article 38.37 notice of extraneous sexual-offense evidence was too vague did not preserve error by objecting alone. The defense argued the notice lacked specifics about the number of incidents, precise conduct, and locations, but never requested a continuance, postponement, or other curative relief to address the claimed surprise. The court treated the complaint as a surprise-based notice issue, applied preservation rules requiring a request for time to prepare, and concluded the issue was waived. The court also found no harm because the defense had long-range notice of the general allegations, heard and cross-examined the witness at the pretrial hearing, and failed to show how more detail would have changed trial preparation or strategy.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your real complaint is trial surprise from vague or late notice of prejudicial conduct evidence, an objection is not enough—you must ask for a continuance, postponement, or other specific curative relief. In family-law cases, this preservation rule matters whenever abuse, bad acts, or misconduct evidence surfaces without enough detail to prepare."