Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
Daniel Matthew Bible v. The State of Texas
COA03
In this criminal appeal with family-law crossover implications, the defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an indecency-with-a-child-by-contact conviction as to alleged “breast” touching. Although the complainant initially answered “No” when asked directly whether her breast was touched and described the contact as stopping at the “bra line,” the court reviewed the entire record under the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the jury’s role as factfinder. The jury saw the complainant demonstrate the hand movement across her chest and reviewed an admitted body diagram she highlighted to show the area touched. A forensic interviewer testified that the complainant’s “bra line” demonstration included the breast, and a forensic nurse explained that young children have breast tissue and that the highlighted area encompassed the breasts. Considering the demonstrations, diagram, and corroborating contextual evidence, the Third Court of Appeals held a rational juror could find breast contact beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don’t assume a witness’s damaging sound-bite answer (e.g., “No, he didn’t touch my breast”) defeats an abuse allegation when the testimony includes location descriptors (“bra line”), in-court demonstrations, and marked diagrams. Courts can treat demonstrative evidence—especially when supported by CAC/forensic interviewer and medical testimony—as enough to prove anatomically specific contact, and factfinders may credit that totality over semantic inconsistencies. In custody/protective-order litigation, build (or attack) the foundation and clarity of diagrams/gestures and the “translator” testimony that links imprecise language to legally significant anatomy."
In the Interest of C.R., a Child
COA04
In a Guadalupe County divorce, the mother alleged a history or pattern of family violence/abuse/neglect and sought to be appointed sole managing conservator with the father denied possession and access (or, alternatively, supervised access). A jury trial on conservatorship resulted in findings (under a preponderance standard in the charge) that the mother should be sole managing conservator and that the father should not be appointed a possessory conservator. At the charge conference, the father affirmatively stated he had “no objections.” The trial court then rendered a decree appointing the mother sole managing conservator and denying the father any possession or access, with findings that access would endanger the child and was not in the child’s best interest. On appeal, the father argued the preponderance instruction was unconstitutional because a no-access decree is “tantamount to termination” and should require clear-and-convincing evidence, and also contended the submission improperly asked the jury to decide an impermissible “term or condition” of possession/access under Tex. Fam. Code § 105.002(c)(2)(B). The Fourth Court treated both arguments as unpreserved jury-charge complaints: by stating “no objections,” the father waived charge error, and the court declined to apply fundamental-error review, noting that even in actual termination cases the Supreme Court requires preservation and that conservatorship orders—unlike termination—remain modifiable (distinguishing cases like *Stary* tied to protective orders). The court further concluded the jury was asked to decide conservatorship status (permissible), and because the jury refused to place the father in any conservatorship role, the trial court properly denied possession and access as a consequence of that status determination. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a conservatorship submission sets up a potential “no access” outcome, you must preserve error at the charge conference—object to the burden of proof and the form of the questions and obtain rulings. Saying “no objections” will almost certainly waive appellate review, and courts will not rescue the issue by rebranding it as fundamental error or “de facto termination.”"
In re E.R.F.
COA04
In a parentage action, the alleged father nonsuited his petition and the trial court signed an order granting the nonsuit. Because the mother had not filed any counterclaim or other pleading seeking affirmative relief at the time of the nonsuit, the nonsuit extinguished the case. Under Rule 329b, the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction expired 30 days after the signed nonsuit order. The mother later filed a motion for temporary orders and the trial court held a hearing and orally announced temporary possession-and-access rulings, later reducing them to a written temporary order. The Fourth Court of Appeals held the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue any substantive temporary possession/access orders after plenary power expired; both the oral pronouncements and the later written temporary orders were void. The court granted mandamus relief and ordered the void temporary orders set aside.
Litigation Takeaway
"A nonsuit is a hard jurisdictional stop: if the opposing party has not already filed a live claim for affirmative relief, the case is over and the court cannot issue post-dismissal temporary custody/possession orders once plenary power runs. To preserve (or obtain) temporary relief, get an affirmative counterclaim on file before the nonsuit—or file a new SAPCR/parentage case. Void post-plenary orders are immediately mandamusable without proving an inadequate appellate remedy."
Melvin Orlando Guevara Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA12
In this capital murder appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant's self-serving statements during a police interview were admissible under hearsay exceptions. The defendant, who killed a man after breaking into a home to confront an ex-girlfriend, attempted to introduce his own custodial statements—claiming he was intoxicated, remorseful, and didn't mean to hurt anyone—under the 'excited utterance' and 'mental state' exceptions. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that these statements were inadmissible hearsay. The court also ruled that defense counsel’s decision not to cross-examine a key witness could be a valid trial strategy and that a lesser-included offense instruction was not required because there was no evidence the defendant was guilty only of murder rather than capital murder.
Litigation Takeaway
"You generally cannot use your own out-of-court statements (like police interviews or body-cam footage) to prove your innocence or 'state of mind' in court; to get your side of the story into evidence, you must typically testify live and face cross-examination."
In re Miranda Fredenberg
COA12
In a SAPCR modification case, the mother sought mandamus/prohibition arguing a retired visiting judge lost authority to act once the trial court’s plenary power expired because the assignment order carried forward only “until plenary power has expired.” After the modification order was signed, the visiting judge signed an income withholding order (IWO) after plenary power expired and scheduled/reset hearings on other post‑judgment motions. The Tyler Court of Appeals applied the mandamus standard (clear abuse of discretion and no adequate appellate remedy) and analyzed (1) the distinction between plenary power over the merits and the court’s continuing enforcement jurisdiction, and (2) the scope of the visiting judge’s assignment. The court held the post‑plenary IWO was not void because it functioned as an enforcement tool contemplated by the modification order and authorized by Texas Family Code § 158.102, which allows withholding to issue until support/arrearages are paid. As to other post‑judgment matters, the record did not show the visiting judge ruled on them outside his authority before the presiding administrative judge issued an amended assignment expressly granting authority to handle post‑judgment proceedings going forward. Mandamus and prohibition were denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"Plenary power expiring does not necessarily end a court’s ability to issue support-enforcement instruments like an income withholding order—especially when the final SAPCR order anticipates withholding and the Family Code authorizes it. If you plan to attack a visiting judge’s post‑judgment authority, you must build a precise record of what was signed and when, and move quickly because an amended assignment can prospectively cure assignment-scope problems."
In the Interest of J.E.H., a Child
COA07
In a Department of Family and Protective Services termination suit involving a fifteen-year-old, Mother appealed only the trial court’s best-interest finding. The Amarillo Court of Appeals applied the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest framework, noting that unchallenged predicate findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1) (endangering conditions/endangerment/constructive abandonment) were binding on appeal and could be considered as best-interest evidence. The record showed Mother provided unsafe and unstable housing with inconsistent utilities and unsanitary conditions, failed to ensure the child’s medical and educational needs were met, had minimal visitation and support during the year-long case, and did not complete key service-plan requirements (including parenting classes and counseling). By contrast, the child was thriving in a stable placement, expressed discomfort with visits, and wanted to remain with the caregiver. Rejecting Mother’s argument that termination punished poverty/disability, the court focused on concrete safety and caregiving deficiencies and affirmed that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest under § 161.001(b)(2).
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won with specific, child-centered proof of safety, stability, and follow-through over time—not generalized hardship arguments. Service-plan noncompliance, minimal contact/support, and unsafe or unstable housing can carry the best-interest finding, especially when contrasted with a child’s documented progress and stated preference for a stable placement; and on appeal, unchallenged predicate grounds will be treated as established and can powerfully support best interest."
In the Interest of M.Z. and M.C.Z., Children
COA05
In a divorce case, the trial court’s final decree required the wife to sell a New Mexico residence for “fair market value.” The husband later sought enforcement and a receiver; the trial court found the decree too indefinite for contempt but issued a post-judgment “clarification order” defining “fair market value” and awarding the husband attorney’s fees and costs. While that clarification-order appeal was pending, the Dallas Court of Appeals in a separate appeal partially reversed and remanded the community-property division of the same divorce decree due to a valuation error involving performance units. Because the clarification order was tethered to the now-reversed/remanded property-division framework, any decision about the decree’s ambiguity or the propriety of the clarification would not affect the parties’ rights going forward, making the appeal moot. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and vacated the clarification order in full, including the fee and cost award.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you pursue (or defend) clarification/enforcement orders while the property division is on appeal, a later partial reversal/remand of the decree can render those post-judgment orders moot and wipe out associated attorney’s-fee awards. Manage parallel proceedings carefully, consider sequencing/abatement, and preserve independent bases for fees and relief that can survive changes to the underlying decree."
Osbaldo Gonzales v. The State of Texas
COA07
In a single-count aggravated sexual assault of a child case alleging digital penetration, the child and outcry witness testified the act happened “twice.” The defendant argued this created a material variance from the one-count indictment and raised double-jeopardy concerns because it was unclear which incident supported the conviction. The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected the variance framing, holding the proof matched the indictment’s elements (digital penetration) and the record did not clearly establish two distinct criminal episodes (the “twice” testimony could describe multiple penetrations within one encounter). The court explained that if the evidence could be read as multiple discrete acts, the proper doctrine is jury unanimity/state election—not variance—and that complaint must be preserved by requesting an election or a specific unanimity instruction. Because the defense requested neither, any election/unanimity complaint was waived. The court also noted that when no election is made and multiple incidents are tried under one count, double jeopardy can bar later prosecution of either incident placed in evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a child’s testimony suggests “more than once” conduct under a single-count sexual-assault indictment, don’t mislabel it as a “variance” argument. If you need the State pinned to one episode, you must timely demand an election or a tailored unanimity instruction; otherwise the issue is waived on appeal. Strategically, declining to force election may actually expand double-jeopardy protection and prevent later charges based on other incidents mentioned at trial—an important consideration in parallel family-law cases that rely on criminal-case records."
In the Interest of A.C. and N.C., Children
COA07
In a Texas parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appellate counsel moved to withdraw after briefing was complete, citing a new employment-based, “irreconcilable” conflict. Because termination appeals are accelerated and parents have a protected right to counsel, the Seventh Court of Appeals declined to proceed on an unclear record regarding counsel’s conflict and the parent’s continued representation. The court abated the appeal and remanded to the trial court to (1) rule on the withdrawal motion, (2) determine whether replacement appellate counsel must be appointed, and (3) create an appellate-ready supplemental record—including findings of fact and conclusions of law and any reporter’s record of the hearing—by a firm, expedited deadline (March 31, 2026).
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law appeals (especially termination), a withdrawal or conflict motion is not “paperwork”—it can stop the appeal. Get a prompt trial-court ruling, make a record (hearing + reporter), and secure written findings and a supplemental clerk’s record quickly, or the court of appeals will abate and impose strict deadlines that can compress briefing and jeopardize client rights."
Gary P. Joseph v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this criminal appeal with frequent spillover into Texas family-law cases alleging sexual abuse, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of alleged sexual assaults and sexualized conduct beyond the charged time period—including acts occurring after the complainant turned 18—and whether those evidentiary rulings required reversal of a conviction for the lesser-included offense of sexual assault of a child (age 14–17). The court applied a plain-text construction of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37 and held that the statute’s “gateway” requirement turns on the offense being prosecuted (a qualifying sexual offense committed against a child under 17), not on the complainant’s age at the time of the extraneous acts. Because the prosecution alleged a qualifying Chapter 22 offense committed when the complainant was under 17, article 38.37, §1(b) permitted evidence of other acts against the same victim to show relevant matters, including the “previous and subsequent relationship” between the defendant and the child-victim, even if some acts occurred after the complainant reached adulthood. The court further concluded the challenged admission/exclusion rulings (including embedded Rule 403 unfair-prejudice arguments) did not amount to reversible error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and the jury’s lesser-included conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When sexual-abuse allegations involve a long-running pattern, courts may allow “relationship narrative” evidence that extends beyond the child’s minority—so an “they were over 18 then” objection, standing alone, is often weak. In family cases (SAPCR, modifications, protective orders), build or attack the case on relevance, specificity, corroboration (outcry chronology, travel/records), and prejudice/mini-trial concerns, and treat SANE/DNA-type proof as potentially decisive at early hearings unless met with competent expert analysis."