Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
VKA Investments, LLC v. Anthony Baiamonte, III
COA01
After the parties mediated a settlement while an appeal was abated, they filed an agreed joint motion asking the First Court of Appeals to reinstate the appeal solely to dismiss it, tax costs per their agreement, and—critically—issue the mandate immediately. Applying TRAP 42.1(a)(1) (dismissal by agreement), TRAP 42.1(d) (costs by agreement), and TRAP 18.1(c) (mandate may issue with the judgment by agreement), the court treated the settlement as controlling and found no reason to keep the merits alive. The court reinstated the case on its docket, dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits, ordered each side to bear its own appellate costs, and directed the clerk to issue the mandate concurrently with the opinion and judgment, eliminating the usual post-judgment waiting period and making the trial-court judgment immediately final for practical purposes.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an appeal settles—especially in divorce or custody cases where delay can be leverage—don’t just dismiss the appeal. File an agreed joint motion that (1) dismisses under TRAP 42.1 and (2) expressly requests an immediate mandate under TRAP 18.1(c). That single request can collapse the normal rehearing/petition timeline, accelerate finality, and help lock in settlement performance (QDROs, property transfers, schedule changes) before “buyer’s remorse” or appellate gamesmanship sets in."
AOC TX, LLC d/b/a Angels of Care Pediatric Home Health v. Naomi Landeros and Carlos Silva, Individually and as Next Friend of O.S., Deceased Minor
COA08
In this medical liability case involving the tragic death of a medically fragile infant, the parents sued a home health provider. The defendant challenged the qualifications of the parents' nurse and physician experts, arguing they were not 'practicing' at the time required by law. The El Paso Court of Appeals strictly interpreted Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 74.402, finding that because the nurse had not practiced since 2021 and the doctor retired in 2019—while the claim arose in 2023—they failed the mandatory temporal requirements for experts. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in accepting the reports and reversed the ruling, though it remanded the case to allow the parents an opportunity to cure the technical deficiencies.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expert experience alone is insufficient if it is not contemporaneous with the case; to survive a motion to strike, an expert must be in active clinical practice or teaching at an accredited institution at the time the claim arose or when testimony is given. In family law cases involving medically fragile children or specialized needs, practitioners must scrutinize the 'active' status of experts to ensure their testimony is not disqualified for being out-of-date."
Ronald Adams a/k/a Ron Adams v. Gary Upshaw
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s refusal to dismiss a defamation lawsuit under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). The dispute arose after the president of a youth sports organization sent communications regarding the failure to conduct background checks on a sex offender, identifying the plaintiff as the organization's representative during the relevant period. The court analyzed the case under the TCPA framework, determining that child safety in sports is a "matter of public concern," which shifted the burden to the plaintiff to prove his case with "clear and specific evidence." Because the plaintiff failed to meet this heightened evidentiary threshold for all elements of defamation, the court held the suit must be dismissed and remanded the case for an award of attorney's fees to the defendant.
Litigation Takeaway
"In 'crossover' defamation suits involving child safety or parental fitness, the TCPA is a powerful defensive shield. Plaintiffs cannot rely on vague allegations; they must provide specific, high-quality evidence at the very start of the case or face mandatory dismissal and the obligation to pay the defendant’s legal fees."
Jennifer Jo Stricker v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Stricker v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed a trial court's exclusion of a public spectator during jury selection due to a large venire panel filling the courtroom. The appellate court analyzed the closure under the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, applying the four-prong Waller v. Georgia test. Because the trial court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to accommodate the spectator or make specific findings on the record justifying the closure, the court held that the exclusion constituted a structural error. Consequently, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial without the need for a showing of actual harm.
Litigation Takeaway
"Limited seating or a crowded gallery is not a valid legal reason to exclude public spectators from a jury trial; doing so without specific constitutional findings creates a 'structural error' that can automatically void your entire case on appeal regardless of the evidence."
Cristy West v. Jimmie Ward
COA09
In West v. Ward, Cristy West filed for divorce claiming an informal (common law) marriage to professional football player Jimmie Ward. Ward denied the marriage existed, asserting they were only engaged. The court analyzed the case under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2), focusing on whether there was a "present agreement" to be married. Despite social media posts where the parties used terms like 'wifey,' the court found that West's own private text messages—where she referred to herself as 'single' and discussed a 'future' wedding—contradicted the claim of a present marriage. The appellate court affirmed the jury's verdict that no marriage existed, holding that a future intent to marry is not a substitute for a current agreement to be married.
Litigation Takeaway
"Private communications often carry more weight than social media 'holding out.' Even if you represent yourselves as married on Instagram, private texts referring to each other as 'fiancé' or identifying as 'single' can be fatal to a common law marriage claim."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Brittany Lea Lannen and Clint Douglas Lannen
COA10
Years after her divorce, Brittany Lannen sought a declaratory judgment to determine if her ex-husband's 'right to purchase' specific real estate—a provision included in their 2014 divorce decree—was still valid or had been waived. The trial court dismissed her suit, agreeing with the husband's argument that the lawsuit was an impermissible 'collateral attack' on a final judgment. On appeal, the Waco Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. The court analyzed the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) and concluded that because the decree incorporated a settlement agreement 'enforceable as a contract,' the UDJA was the proper procedural tool to interpret the parties' legal rights. The court held that seeking to construe the meaning or validity of a contract within a decree is not an attempt to overturn the judgment, but rather a request for the court to define the current legal status of those provisions.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your divorce decree incorporates a settlement agreement as an enforceable contract, you can use the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to clarify or interpret its terms years later. This allows parties to resolve disputes over property rights—like purchase options or rights of first refusal—without being barred by rules that usually prevent people from 'attacking' final judgments."
Opinion by Justice Rivas-Molloy
COA01
A former law-firm associate sued his prior employer for post-termination wages, arguing that because he remained “attorney of record” in a pending federal case until the court signed an order allowing withdrawal, the employment relationship (and his right to salary) necessarily continued through the withdrawal date. The Houston First Court of Appeals analyzed the claim under Texas contract principles and at-will employment, distinguishing ethical/professional duties owed to a tribunal during the withdrawal process from the private contractual terms governing compensation. The court held that an attorney’s continued “of record” status does not, as a matter of law, extend an employment contract or create an entitlement to wages after the firm has clearly terminated the employment relationship; it also rejected challenges to the trial court’s evidentiary/discovery rulings and refusal to judicially notice California law as not showing reversible error. The take-nothing judgment for the firm was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Being “attorney of record” after termination creates ethical obligations, not a paycheck: firms can defeat “withdrawal gap” wage claims by documenting a clear, unequivocal termination date (access shutoff, keys/credentials returned) and promptly moving to withdraw, while employment agreements should expressly state compensation ends upon termination regardless of withdrawal timing."
Owens v. Johnson
COA01
In Owens v. Johnson, a military service member sought to reduce his child support payments, claiming his income had decreased due to changes in his service status and a significant increase in insurance costs. Despite his testimony, he failed to provide official financial documentation, such as Leave and Earnings Statements (LES), to support his claims. The trial court chose to credit the mother's testimony and disbelieve the father's uncorroborated assertions, setting a higher support amount and confirming child support arrears. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, emphasizing that trial judges are the sole judges of witness credibility and that a party's self-serving testimony can be disregarded if it lacks objective corroboration.
Litigation Takeaway
"When seeking to modify child support, testimony is not a substitute for a paper trail. If you claim a decrease in income but fail to produce readily available financial records like pay stubs or tax returns, the court has the discretion to completely disregard your testimony and maintain your current support obligations."
Yuqian Gan v. Arnoldus Mathijssen
COA03
During a divorce between Yuqian Gan and Arnoldus Mathijssen, the trial court awarded the husband a disproportionate share of the community property because the wife had unilaterally depleted joint bank accounts and paid family members post-separation. The court also lowered the husband's child support payments to account for his significant travel expenses for visitation. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals upheld the property division, ruling that the wife's "financial self-help" constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. However, the court reversed the child support award, holding that the trial court's failure to include specific, mandatory written findings required by Texas law when deviating from support guidelines was a reversible error.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even if there is a valid reason to deviate from standard child support amounts—such as high travel costs for visitation—the court must include specific statutory 'math' and findings in the order, or the ruling will be overturned. Furthermore, using community funds for personal benefit after a separation can be legally classified as a breach of fiduciary duty, justifying an unequal division of property."
In the Matter of Marriage of Melissa Ramirez and Silvestre Fermin Torres and In the Interest of R.S.T. and A.D.T, Children
COA13
In a family law dispute, Melissa Ramirez filed a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. Despite this, the trial court ordered her to pay half of the mediation fees without first holding an evidentiary hearing or issuing detailed findings as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f). Ramirez challenged the order using Rule 145(g)'s expedited review process. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals dismissed the challenge for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that because the trial court failed to follow the mandatory procedural steps of Rule 145(f), the resulting order was not technically issued 'under this rule,' making the expedited appellate process unavailable.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a trial court orders an indigent party to pay costs (such as mediation or amicus attorney fees) without first holding a formal hearing or providing detailed factual findings, you cannot use the expedited motion process in Rule 145(g) to challenge the order; instead, you must file a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the court to follow proper procedure."