Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
The Great American Pool, L.L.C. d/b/a American Pools of Houston v. Mary J. Phenneger and Joedy Phenneger
COA01
In a dispute that the trial court sent to arbitration, The Great American Pool, L.L.C. attempted to appeal the trial court’s order granting Mary and Joedy Phenneger’s motion to compel arbitration. The First Court of Appeals analyzed its subject-matter jurisdiction, reiterating that Texas appellate courts generally may review only final judgments unless a statute expressly authorizes interlocutory review. Because an order compelling arbitration does not dispose of all parties and claims—it merely changes the forum and typically stays the case—and because the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides interlocutory appeal rights for orders denying arbitration (but not for orders granting arbitration), the court held the order was an unappealable interlocutory order. Lacking statutory authorization for interlocutory review, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction (granting appellant’s requested dismissal).
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat a hearing on a motion to compel arbitration as make-or-break: if the court compels arbitration, you usually cannot take an immediate interlocutory appeal. To challenge an erroneous order compelling arbitration, be prepared to pursue mandamus (and build a record), or you may be forced to arbitrate to the end before any ordinary appeal is possible."
AHMED OLAYIWOLA, Appellant V. FITNESS INTERNATIONAL LLC D/B/A LA FITNESS; FITNESS INTERNATIONAL GP, LLC; L.A. FITNESS INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P.; AND “L.A. FITNESS”
COA14
After appealing a trial court's dismissal of his claims, Ahmed Olayiwola filed a voluntary nonsuit of all underlying claims against all parties while the appeal was pending. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals examined whether the appeal could continue despite the absence of a live controversy at the trial level. Relying on the principle that appellate courts lack jurisdiction over moot disputes, the court determined that the nonsuit effectively extinguished the controversy. The court held that because there was no longer a justiciable issue for the court to resolve or a judgment that would have any practical legal effect, the appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction under Rule 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
"A voluntary nonsuit in the trial court acts as a 'tactical reset' that moots a pending appeal; this allows a party to effectively 'vacuum' the appellate court's jurisdiction to avoid an unfavorable precedent or a poorly developed record, provided the opposing party has not filed a counterclaim for affirmative relief."
In the Matter of the Estate of Henry Matthew Platt
COA09
In a dispute over the validity of a holographic will, the sister of the decedent attempted to disqualify the will through expert handwriting testimony. However, the expert's comparison samples (exemplars) did not consist of the decedent's own signature, but rather signatures the decedent allegedly made on behalf of his parents. The trial court excluded the expert's testimony, and the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed. The court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, concluding that because the expert lacked a 'control' sample of the decedent's actual name and signature, there was an unreliable foundation and an 'analytical gap' that rendered the opinion inadmissible.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expert testimony is only as reliable as the data supporting it; if your handwriting expert relies on representative or third-party signatures rather than authenticated personal signatures, the testimony is likely to be excluded for lack of foundation."
Reginald Donell Rice v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's dismissal of an inmate's lawsuit, holding that Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows for the immediate dismissal of claims supported by false affidavits of poverty. The court analyzed the conflict between the specific requirements of Chapter 14 and the general procedural protections of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. It concluded that because Chapter 14 is a specialized statute designed to curb frivolous inmate litigation, trial courts have the discretion to dismiss such suits without holding an evidentiary hearing or requiring service of process if the inmate's certified trust account statement contradicts their claimed income.
Litigation Takeaway
"When facing a family law filing from an incarcerated parent, immediately subpoena their certified inmate trust account statement; any discrepancy between their deposits and their affidavit of indigence allows for a dismissal under Chapter 14 without the need for a hearing or service of process."
In Re Benjamin Oshea Calhoun
COA01
Benjamin Oshea Calhoun (pro se) filed an original petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First Court of Appeals seeking a reduction of bail set in his pending Harris County criminal case. The court focused on subject-matter jurisdiction, contrasting (1) Texas Government Code § 22.221(d), which gives intermediate courts of appeals original habeas jurisdiction only when a person is restrained for violating an order, judgment, or decree in a civil case (i.e., civil-contempt-type restraints), with (2) Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 11.05, which vests original criminal habeas jurisdiction in the Court of Criminal Appeals, district courts, and county courts. Because Calhoun sought original habeas relief directed to a criminal bond issue—outside the narrow civil-order restraint contemplated by § 22.221(d)—the court held it had no original habeas jurisdiction to consider the request and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction (without reaching the merits, and noting the petition’s TRAP 52 defects were not the primary basis for disposition).
Litigation Takeaway
"Forum-check habeas relief. Texas courts of appeals can entertain original habeas only for restraints tied to violation of a civil-case order (common in family-law contempt); they cannot take original habeas to reduce criminal bail. If the restraint is criminal (even if factually related to a family dispute), file original habeas in the proper trial court under Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.05 and reach the court of appeals only through appellate review."
In Re Jose Francisco Quintero and JQ Brick Repair & Restoration Services, LLC
COA14
In a mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether experts who author counteraffidavits under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 18.001 are protected from deposition by the consulting expert privilege. The trial court had ordered the depositions of four experts who provided counteraffidavits but were not designated as testifying witnesses. Analyzing Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 192.3(e) and 192.7, the appellate court determined that because the experts were not designated to testify and their work was not reviewed by any testifying experts, they remained privileged consultants. The court held that serving a counteraffidavit does not constitute a waiver of the consulting expert privilege, and thus the trial court abused its discretion by compelling the depositions.
Litigation Takeaway
"Attorneys can effectively challenge the reasonableness of medical or professional expenses by using Section 18.001 counteraffidavits from consulting experts who remain immune from deposition, so long as those experts are never designated to testify and their work product is not shared with testifying experts."
Moir Watershed Services, LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC and Spencer Hofmann
COA10
In Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC, a Texas-based company sued a New York law firm in a Texas court for legal malpractice and breach of contract. The New York firm challenged the lawsuit, arguing that Texas courts lacked personal jurisdiction over them since they were based in New York and the work was performed there. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the case, holding that merely entering into a contract with a Texas resident does not establish the 'purposeful availment' necessary for jurisdiction. The court concluded that because the legal services were performed outside of Texas and the defendants did not specifically target the Texas market, they lacked the minimum contacts required to be sued in a Texas forum.
Litigation Takeaway
"Hiring an out-of-state attorney or expert for your legal matter does not guarantee you can sue them in Texas if something goes wrong. If their work is performed in their home state and they haven't purposefully reached into Texas to conduct business, you may be forced to litigate any malpractice or fee disputes in their jurisdiction, significantly increasing your costs and risks."
In the Matter of M.A.R. Jr., A Child
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court's order committing a minor, M.A.R. Jr., to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD). The conflict centered on whether the State had satisfied the "reasonable efforts" requirement of the Texas Family Code before removing the child from his home environment. Despite the child's diagnoses of autism and ADHD and his father's willingness to take custody, the Court analyzed the extensive history of failed interventions—including community supervision, psychiatric services, and a residential facility placement where the minor accumulated hundreds of incident reports. The Court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that local resources were exhausted and that commitment was necessary for the child's rehabilitation and public safety.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a child's removal from the home is at stake due to behavioral issues, the 'paper trail' is everything; a documented history of 'graduated sanctions' and failed local interventions is often the deciding factor in satisfying the legal 'reasonable efforts' standard."
In The Interest of K.F.N., K.D.N., and K.N., Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s order terminating a mother's parental rights based on a history of physical abuse and unresolved substance dependency. Although the mother maintained a documented bond with her children and partially completed her court-ordered service plan, the court applied the Holley factors to determine that the children's needs for safety and stability outweighed the parental relationship. The court held that evidence of the mother’s prior criminal history involving injury to a child and her failure to remain sober during the proceedings was legally and factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding for termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"A parent-child bond does not act as a "veto" against the termination of parental rights; courts prioritize a child's need for a safe, drug-free environment over emotional ties when a parent has a history of endangerment or ongoing substance abuse."
Opinion by Justice Rivas-Molloy
COA01
In a delinquent-tax foreclosure case, Wanda Joyce Smith appeared at a trial setting and testified the judge postponed the matter to conduct a title search and told her a new hearing would be set, so she left expecting further notice. The court later signed a “final” judgment without notifying her of any new setting, leading to foreclosure and sale of the property; Smith learned of the judgment months later during eviction proceedings and filed a bill of review to set aside the judgment for lack of notice/due process. The trial court granted summary judgment against the bill of review and also disposed of Smith’s newly pleaded counterclaims and third-party claims. On appeal, the court applied the traditional bill-of-review elements (meritorious defense; prevented by fraud/accident/wrongful act or official mistake; unmixed with petitioner’s negligence) and the due-process framework of Caldwell v. Barnes for lack of service/notice. The court held Smith’s affidavit testimony that the trial court represented a future hearing would be set, yet later entered judgment without further notice, raised a genuine issue of material fact on “official mistake” and lack of negligence, making summary judgment improper on the bill of review. Separately, relying on the principle that a bill of review is a narrow, independent equitable proceeding limited to vacating or denying the challenged judgment, the court held the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate new counterclaims and third-party claims before the underlying judgment was set aside; those claims were dismissed as premature.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bill of review is a two-step, narrow remedy: first you must prove the prior judgment should be vacated (often by showing lack of notice tied to “official mistake”); only after vacatur can the court reach the underlying merits or any new claims. If the petitioner offers specific testimony that the court/court staff said the case was “reset” or a new setting would be provided, that evidence can defeat summary judgment. If the bill of review pleading tries to bundle in new tort/contract/property claims or add new parties, move to dismiss them—jurisdiction is limited until the judgment is actually set aside."