Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the matter of D.P.
COA02
In this juvenile law matter, the Second Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old, D.P., to adult criminal court for prosecution of capital murder and aggravated robbery. D.P. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence establishing probable cause and argued that the trial court improperly weighed his maturity and sophistication. The appellate court affirmed the transfer, holding that the State met its burden through detective testimony and physical evidence. Furthermore, the court determined that the trial court acted within its discretion under Texas Family Code § 54.02 by identifying D.P.'s 'level of planning' and premeditation as clear indicators of adult-like sophistication, which outweighed his lack of a prior criminal record.
Litigation Takeaway
"When litigating a minor’s maturity or capacity—whether in juvenile transfer hearings or high-conflict custody disputes involving delinquent behavior—Texas courts prioritize evidence of 'planning' and 'organization' over a lack of prior history to determine if a child should be held to adult-level standards of accountability."
Brandon Keith Anderson v. The State of Texas
COA12
In this case, a witness provided surprise testimony during a hearing involving prejudicial information that had not been disclosed during discovery. Although the defendant successfully moved the trial court to disregard the testimony, he did not specifically move for a mistrial. On appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and the 'preservation ladder,' which generally requires a party to object, request an instruction to disregard, and move for a mistrial to preserve error. The court held that because the appellant received the exact relief he requested (disregarding the testimony) and failed to seek a mistrial or obtain an adverse ruling, the complaint was waived.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning a motion to strike or disregard surprise testimony is a 'trap' if the evidence is truly 'incurable.' In Texas courts, if a witness drops a 'bombshell' that poisons the well, you must move for a mistrial and secure an adverse ruling to preserve the issue for appeal. Merely asking the judge to disregard the statement is considered a 'win' at trial that results in a procedural default on appeal, leaving you with no recourse if the judge is ultimately influenced by the excluded evidence."
Hallas v. Hallas
COA03
In this divorce appeal, the Third Court of Appeals addressed a trial court's failure to provide mandatory Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding property division and attorney's fees. The appellant, Janice Hallas, had strictly followed procedural rules by filing both an initial request and a notice of past due findings. The appellate court analyzed the "presumed harm" doctrine, noting that missing findings force an appellant to challenge every conceivable basis for a ruling rather than narrowing the issues. Because the trial court’s silence prevented the appellant from properly presenting her case, the court held the error was harmful, abated the appeal, and remanded the case for the entry of findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Success on appeal often depends on procedural discipline. If a trial court ignores a request for Findings of Fact, you must file a "Notice of Past Due Findings" within the strict 30-day window to preserve your rights. Without these findings, the appellate court will presume the trial judge found every fact necessary to support the original ruling, making it nearly impossible to overturn a discretionary property division."
In the Interest of I.H., A Child
COA02
A father challenged the termination of his parental rights, arguing that he was denied due process because he was not transported from jail for his trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support the termination. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the father's history of substance abuse and his repeated refusal to submit to court-ordered drug testing, concluding that such refusals create a legal inference of ongoing drug use. The court held that this "presumption of use," combined with the child's drug exposure at birth, supported an endangerment finding. Additionally, the court held that because the father's attorney did not explicitly raise a constitutional objection to the father's absence during the trial, those due process claims were waived for appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Refusing a court-ordered drug test is not a neutral act; Texas courts treat a refusal as substantive evidence of illegal drug use and child endangerment. Furthermore, if a parent is unable to attend a hearing, counsel must explicitly cite constitutional due process grounds on the record to preserve the right to appeal that absence."
In the Matter of J.S.R., A Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether a juvenile’s voluntary motion to dismiss an appeal was valid when it involved a waiver of statutory rights. While typical civil dismissals require only a signature from an attorney, the Court emphasized that Texas Family Code Section 51.09 imposes stricter "belt and suspenders" requirements for minors. The Court analyzed the motion and found that it correctly included signatures from both the juvenile and his attorney, as required by law. Consequently, the Court held the waiver was effective and granted the dismissal, highlighting that specific statutory protections for children take precedence over general appellate procedural rules.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any legal proceeding involving a minor’s rights—whether in juvenile delinquency or high-stakes family litigation—a standard signature from counsel is insufficient for a waiver. Under Texas Family Code Section 51.09, any waiver of a child's constitutional or statutory rights must be signed by both the minor and their attorney. To ensure the finality of a dismissal or settlement involving a minor, practitioners must strictly adhere to this dual-signature requirement."
In Re Constance Benavides a/k/a Constance Chamberlain
COA13
After an eviction judgment was entered following a property dispute, the Relator, Constance Benavides, attempted to stay her removal by filing a supersedeas bond. However, the trial court did not set the bond amount until over a month after the judgment, and Benavides filed the bond shortly thereafter. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Property Code § 24.007, which mandates that a bond must be filed within ten days of a judgment to stay an eviction 'under any circumstances.' The court held that the statutory deadline is absolute and contains no exceptions for judicial or administrative delays, ultimately denying mandamus relief and allowing the eviction to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In property crossover evictions, the ten-day deadline to post a supersedeas bond is a 'trap' that admits no excuses; you must aggressively move to set and file the bond within 240 hours of the judgment signature or face immediate removal from the premises, regardless of a pending appeal."
John C. Campbell v. Medical Imaging Consultants, LLP
COA12
John Campbell, a radiologist, sued his former employer for breaching a non-disparagement clause in their separation agreement after he was passed over for a job at a different medical group. Campbell alleged that a negative comment regarding his "personality issues" from a former partner caused him to lose the position. The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed a no-evidence summary judgment against Campbell, ruling that he failed to prove causation. The court found that Campbell's theory relied on "inference stacking"—the speculative assumption that he would have successfully completed a multi-step interview process and received a unanimous hiring vote but for the alleged disparagement.
Litigation Takeaway
"To recover damages for the breach of a non-disparagement clause, it is not enough to prove a negative comment was made; you must provide direct evidence that the disparagement was the 'but-for' cause of a lost job or contract, rather than relying on a chain of speculative inferences about a third party's hiring process."
Valerie Lauren Mata v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Mata v. State, the defendant pleaded guilty to improper relationship with a student and received a five-year sentence, then attempted to appeal despite having signed a waiver of appeal. The First Court of Appeals analyzed whether it had jurisdiction in light of that waiver where sentencing was left to the trial court (i.e., not a fixed-sentence plea bargain). Applying Ex parte Broadway and Carson, the court treated the waiver as a bargained-for exchange and held it is enforceable when supported by consideration—here, the State’s waiver of its right to a jury trial—even without an agreed sentence. Because the trial court’s certification correctly reflected that Mata had no right of appeal, the appellate court was required to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A properly documented criminal appellate waiver can make a conviction effectively “final” immediately, eliminating appellate-delay arguments in related family cases. In termination or custody litigation involving criminal conduct, obtain the clerk’s record and certification to confirm (1) a signed waiver, and (2) consideration (e.g., the State waived a jury). Then use the dismissal/waiver to oppose stays and to support termination grounds or evidentiary finality arguments."
Gutmann v. Hennig
COA13
In Gutmann v. Hennig, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals addressed a situation where a trial court's 'sua sponte' severance of a partial summary judgment created a 'two-front war,' forcing parties to litigate in both trial and appellate courts simultaneously. The Appellee, who had won the summary judgment, requested that the appellate court reverse his own victory and vacate the severance to save costs and promote judicial economy. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1(c), which allows an appellate court to grant an appellee more favorable relief than the trial court did for 'just cause.' Finding that the parties' mutual desire for efficiency and the Appellant's lack of opposition constituted just cause, the court reversed the summary judgment without reaching the merits and vacated the severance order, effectively reconsolidating the case for a single trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"A 'win' in the form of a partial summary judgment can become a liability if a severance forces you to defend that win on appeal while simultaneously litigating the rest of the case at the trial level. If the costs of fragmented litigation outweigh the benefit of the judgment, parties can use Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1(c) to seek a 'consensual remand'—reversing the summary judgment and vacating the severance to reconsolidate the estate's litigation into a single, more cost-effective proceeding."
Salmeron v. Atascocita Forest Community Association
COA01
Homeowners who had sued to stop an HOA foreclosure were electronically served with the HOA’s plea to the jurisdiction and notice of submission, but they did not respond by the submission date and the trial court granted the plea and dismissed the case. On motion for new trial, the homeowners argued Hurricane Beryl caused a power/internet “system outage” that prevented timely receipt of e-service and warranted relief under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(f)(6), along with a three-day extension under Rule 21a(c) and relief under the Craddock framework. The First Court of Appeals held that Rule 21(f)(6) does not provide automatic tolling based on a general disaster; the movant must present specific, evidence-backed facts showing when notice was actually received or when the outage ended and why they could not act (including seeking a continuance) once access was restored. Because the homeowners offered no concrete timeline for restoration of electricity/access or diligent efforts to monitor e-service—and their participation in a later hearing undercut the claim that they were unable to engage with the court—the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying new trial and letting the dismissal stand. The court also held the three-day rule for mail service does not apply to e-service, and the motion for new trial was too conclusory to satisfy Craddock’s “no conscious indifference” requirement.
Litigation Takeaway
"E-service deadlines start immediately and aren’t automatically extended by storms or outages. If you miss a deadline and claim a “technical failure,” you must prove it with a detailed outage timeline (when access returned/when notice was actually seen), show diligent efforts to check the case, and seek prompt relief (e.g., continuance/extension) as soon as you can—otherwise the judgment/dismissal is likely to stand."