Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Roy Jones, III v. Sheryl Harris
COA14
After a 1976 divorce decree provided that each spouse would receive half the equity upon sale of the marital home, the house was never sold and the ex-husband remained in possession for decades. After his death, his son claimed 100% ownership based on a recorded 1976 quitclaim deed purportedly signed by the ex-wife and, alternatively, adverse possession. The ex-wife filed a partition/title action in Brazoria County district court seeking to cancel the deed and confirm her undivided interest. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the suit was properly treated as a present title/partition dispute—not an impermissible modification or enforcement action confined to the divorce court’s continuing jurisdiction under Family Code Chapter 9—so the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction. On the merits, the court affirmed the rejection of adverse possession because long-term exclusive possession and payment of expenses did not establish hostile repudiation against a co-owner, especially in light of evidence that the decedent continued to acknowledge the ex-wife’s ownership. The court also upheld the jury’s forgery finding and the trial court’s evidentiary rulings admitting the decedent’s out-of-court ownership statements (and related probate inventory language) under applicable hearsay doctrines, and affirmed denial of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel.
Litigation Takeaway
"Decades after divorce, “zombie property” disputes may be litigated as partition/title cases in district court even when the property division originated in a divorce decree. And don’t assume possession equals ownership: to win adverse possession against an ex-spouse/co-tenant, you need clear, communicated repudiation—while the other side can defeat limitations with admissions (family statements, probate filings) showing continued recognition of shared ownership and can use those same facts to attack a late-produced deed as forged or unreliable."
In the Interest of A.C. and N.C., Children
COA07
In a Texas parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appellate counsel moved to withdraw after briefing was complete, citing a new employment-based, “irreconcilable” conflict. Because termination appeals are accelerated and parents have a protected right to counsel, the Seventh Court of Appeals declined to proceed on an unclear record regarding counsel’s conflict and the parent’s continued representation. The court abated the appeal and remanded to the trial court to (1) rule on the withdrawal motion, (2) determine whether replacement appellate counsel must be appointed, and (3) create an appellate-ready supplemental record—including findings of fact and conclusions of law and any reporter’s record of the hearing—by a firm, expedited deadline (March 31, 2026).
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law appeals (especially termination), a withdrawal or conflict motion is not “paperwork”—it can stop the appeal. Get a prompt trial-court ruling, make a record (hearing + reporter), and secure written findings and a supplemental clerk’s record quickly, or the court of appeals will abate and impose strict deadlines that can compress briefing and jeopardize client rights."
Rhonda Williams v. Javier Alessandro Madrid Urquia and Jhonny Javier Madrid Urquia
COA14
In this case, plaintiffs sued the City of Houston and its employee, Rhonda Williams, after a motor vehicle collision. After nonsuiting that initial case, the plaintiffs filed a second suit against Williams individually. Williams moved for summary judgment, arguing that under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 101.106(a), the initial suit against the City constituted an irrevocable election of remedies that barred any future claims against her individually. The trial court denied the motion, but the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed. The appellate court analyzed the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), concluding that the act of filing suit against a governmental unit immediately and permanently bars claims against the employee regarding the same subject matter, and a subsequent nonsuit cannot 'reset' this election.
Litigation Takeaway
"Be extremely cautious when naming a governmental unit in a lawsuit; under the Texas Tort Claims Act, once you sue a city or county for an incident involving an employee, you are 'immediately and forever' barred from suing that employee individually. This election of remedies is irrevocable, meaning a nonsuit or an amendment to your pleadings cannot undo the bar and restore your ability to pursue the individual defendant."
In re Praveen Venkateswara Pinnamaneni
COA01
In an original habeas corpus proceeding arising from a Harris County divorce case, the relator sought release from a civil contempt commitment order jailing him for six violations of agreed temporary orders requiring spousal support payments. The First Court of Appeals emphasized that habeas relief from a contempt confinement is available only when the relator affirmatively shows the commitment is void or the confinement otherwise unlawful, and the relator bears the burden to supply a record demonstrating that defect. Even though no respondent filed a response and the court had temporarily released the relator on a $500 bond while it reviewed the petition, the court concluded the relator did not carry his burden to show any jurisdictional, due-process, specificity, or other facial defect rendering the contempt/commitment order void. The court therefore denied habeas relief, lifted the temporary bond-release order, and dismissed pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Contempt habeas is narrow and record-driven: to get a client out of jail, you must bring a complete record showing a facial/jurisdictional or due-process defect that makes the commitment order void; a temporary bond release or the other side’s nonresponse will not win the case for you."
Townsen Memorial Hospital, Southeast Texas Medical Ventures LLC d/b/a Townsen Memorial Hospital, and Markus Baloney, RN v. Cedric Wheeler
COA01
In a Texas health-care-liability suit arising from post-operative spinal-surgery complications, the plaintiff served a Chapter 74 expert report from a board-certified neurosurgeon who criticized the hospital’s nursing care (monitoring, documentation, recognition of cauda equina red flags, and escalation/communication). The hospital challenged the physician’s qualifications to opine on nursing standards and argued the report was insufficient on standard of care, breach, and causation; the trial court allowed a cure and then overruled the objections. After a nurse was added as a defendant, he was served with the amended report but did not object within the statutory 21-day window; about 18 months later he sought dismissal by labeling the report “no report” as to him because it did not name him specifically. The First Court of Appeals applied the Chapter 74 “threshold screening” and abuse-of-discretion framework and, within the report’s four corners, held the trial court could reasonably find the neurosurgeon qualified because his training and experience showed familiarity with the same type of postoperative spinal/neurologic monitoring and escalation issues at the heart of the nursing allegations. The court also held the amended report was a good-faith effort that adequately summarized the nursing standard of care, alleged breaches, and a causal pathway sufficient for early-stage Chapter 74 purposes. Finally, the court treated the later-added nurse’s “no report” theory as a timeliness/waiver problem: because he was served and failed to object within 21 days, the late dismissal attack was waived. The denial of dismissal was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expert fights are won (or lost) on two points: (1) qualifications turn on whether the expert has concrete experience with the same type of task/analysis at issue—not just whether the expert shares the opponent’s job title; and (2) timing is everything—if you don’t challenge an expert promptly under the governing deadline, courts are likely to find waiver even if you repackage the argument as “this isn’t an expert opinion at all.”"
Blanca Concepcion Gutierrez-Morales v. Adrian Jesus G. Morales
COA08
After a mediated settlement in a Texas partition suit over a family home was reduced to a judgment requiring a $40,000 buyout, the appellant moved for new trial claiming “newly discovered evidence” (alleged incorrect ownership percentages based on adoption-related facts, an alleged attorney conflict from a separate probate matter, and newly learned information about the home’s condition supported by photos). The motion was overruled by operation of law, and the appellant appealed only the denial of the new-trial motion. The Eighth Court of Appeals treated preservation as the threshold issue under Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(b), explaining that an operation-of-law denial preserves complaints only when the issue can be properly presented without taking evidence. Because a newly-discovered-evidence new-trial ground requires competent, admissible proof of the required elements (post-trial discovery, diligence, non-cumulative nature, and materiality/probable effect on the result), the movant must request and obtain a hearing and introduce evidence into the record. Attachments to the motion (e.g., a birth certificate, docket sheet, and photos) were not a substitute for evidence introduced at a hearing. With no hearing and no evidentiary presentation, the complaint was waived, leaving nothing for appellate review; the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your motion for new trial depends on facts outside the trial record (like “newly discovered evidence”), you must timely request and obtain a hearing and put competent, admissible evidence into the record. Letting the motion die by operation of law—especially with only unauthenticated attachments—waives the issue on appeal and can turn a potentially strong argument into a complete preservation loss."
In re A.R.M.
COA08
In an original proceeding arising from a divorce and SAPCR, the relator sought mandamus to vacate various trial-court orders and requested an emergency stay. The Eighth Court of Appeals denied relief because the petition and record did not strictly comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52: the petition omitted required sections and the Rule 52.3(j) certification, provided no meaningful citations to legal authority, and was supported by an appendix/record that was neither sworn nor certified. The court further held mandamus was improper because the relator asserted a final divorce decree had been signed and a direct appeal was pending, making appeal an adequate remedy for the decree and for interlocutory rulings that merged into the final judgment. Separately, the court struck the appendix and mandamus record for containing unredacted sensitive data about a minor in violation of TRAP 9.9 (authorized by TRAP 9.4(k)) and dismissed the stay motion as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus in Texas family cases is unforgiving: (1) strict TRAP 52 compliance is a threshold requirement—missing sections, lack of authority, or an unsworn/uncertified record can sink the case before the court reaches the merits; (2) if a final divorce/SAPCR judgment exists (or you allege finality), appeal is usually the adequate remedy and interlocutory complaints typically must be raised in that appeal; and (3) TRAP 9.9 redaction is mandatory—filing unredacted child identifiers can get your record struck and destroy your ability to obtain emergency relief."
In re the Commitment of George Dewey Stark
COA05
In this civil-commitment case, George Dewey Stark appealed a judgment declaring him a sexually violent predator, arguing that existing Texas Supreme Court precedent effectively eliminated a required statutory element, thereby violating his due process rights. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the substance of the argument and determined it was a constitutional challenge to the law as applied. The court held that under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, even constitutional and due-process complaints must be raised in the trial court to be preserved for appeal. Because Stark failed to object or raise this theory during the trial proceedings, the court found the issue waived and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Constitutional and due-process arguments are not "get out of jail free" cards for a failure to object at trial. To save an issue for appeal—even one involving fundamental rights—you must make a specific and timely objection in the trial court and obtain a ruling."
Vijayalakshmi Nadar v. Thinakar Nadar
COA05
In a post-divorce property-division enforcement fight, the ex-wife sought to compel delivery/transfer of property awarded to her in the 2017 decree (safe-deposit contents, stock, and compensation tied to a Mumbai flat), while the ex-husband countered that she had wrongfully remained in possession of the Plano residence awarded to him and sought reimbursement for payments he made on debt tied to a vehicle awarded to her. The trial court managed the matters together (hearing the enforcement the same day as a bill of review) under a previously agreed scheduling order and limited each side to one hour total; it denied all relief requested by the wife, held her delivery-type claims for the safe-deposit contents and stock time-barred, and awarded the husband money judgments for damages related to her continued occupancy of the residence and for vehicle-debt payments. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the wife failed to preserve any due-process/case-management complaint about consolidation or time limits, (2) the trial court did not err in applying limitations to the wife’s delayed enforcement requests for delivery/transfer relief, and (3) sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s discretionary enforcement remedies awarding the husband $195,000 for extended post-decree occupancy of the residence and $9,600 for vehicle-debt reimbursement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Post-divorce “enforcement” is time-sensitive and proof-driven: delay can bar your affirmative requests by limitations and simultaneously expose your client to large offsetting money judgments for ongoing noncompliance (like staying in a house the decree awarded to the other spouse). Preserve procedural objections (time limits/consolidation) with a timely objection, offer of proof, and ruling, and come to a short bench trial with clean, documented damages and payment histories."
Musk v. Brody
COA03
In this defamation case, Benjamin Brody argued that Elon Musk's Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss was a nullity—and therefore untimely—because it was signed by out-of-state counsel before their pro hac vice admission was finalized. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed Texas's overarching policy of prioritizing the merits of a dispute over technical procedural "traps" and looked to persuasive authority regarding attorney signatures. The court held that if a trial court subsequently grants a pro hac vice motion, that admission cures the signature defect on earlier filings, meaning the TCPA motion was properly before the court and filed within the 60-day statutory window.
Litigation Takeaway
"A pending pro hac vice admission does not render a timely filed motion a "nullity"; provided the admission is eventually granted, the signature defect is cured, protecting parties from losing statutory rights like a TCPA dismissal due to technical filing deadlines."