Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
Ting Fang Chen v. Evan H. Suzuki and Oladipo A. Dada
COA14
In this medical-negligence appeal, the plaintiff sued two physicians over her husband’s ICU death and argued that a generic docket control order extended the deadline to serve a Chapter 74 expert report. The court rejected that argument, holding that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351’s 120-day deadline runs from the date each defendant files an original answer and is not displaced by later expert-designation or discovery deadlines in a standard scheduling order. Looking to the substance of the pleadings rather than the plaintiff’s labels, the court concluded the claims were health care liability claims because they arose from medical treatment and required expert testimony. Because no expert report was served within 120 days, dismissal with prejudice and attorney’s fees were mandatory; the court also rejected the plaintiff’s notice and default-judgment complaints.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a generic scheduling order extends a statutory deadline. When a claim is substantively a health care liability claim, Chapter 74’s expert-report deadline is a hard trigger, and missing it can lead to mandatory dismissal with prejudice. More broadly, in family-law crossover litigation, courts will enforce specific statutory deadlines over broad docket-control language, and they will look past emotional labels to the true nature of the claim."
In re Eureka Holdings, Inc., et al.
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a trial court overreached by imposing merits-preclusive discovery sanctions after defense counsel instructed a corporate representative not to answer deposition questions about security-budget allocations. Applying Rule 215 and the TransAmerican/Chrysler line of cases, the court explained that sanctions must bear a direct nexus to the specific discovery abuse and cannot resolve core merits issues unless the misconduct justifies that result. Because deeming foreseeability and reasonableness established, and barring contrary evidence, effectively decided essential liability elements without the required connection to the withheld discovery, the sanctions were improper. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief in part and struck the overbroad evidentiary sanctions.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts cannot use a discovery fight to hand one side a merits win. In family-law cases, even serious discovery obstruction does not justify sanctions that effectively decide conservatorship, property characterization, reimbursement, or other core issues unless the movant shows a tight, issue-specific nexus between the withheld discovery and the proposed sanction."
Eboni Lunsford Calbow v. Shawn Phillip Calbow
COA03
In this Texas divorce appeal, the wife sought to set aside a post-answer default divorce decree after she failed to appear for final trial. The Third Court of Appeals held that she had actual notice of the April 17, 2024 trial setting because her own verified motion for continuance expressly identified that date as the final hearing. Applying Craddock, the court concluded she did not satisfy the first element because her explanation—that she assumed the court would address or grant her continuance request without her attendance—did not negate conscious indifference. Because she knew of the trial setting, did not obtain a continuance, did not set the motion for hearing, and still failed to appear, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying her motion to set aside the default decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"A filed continuance motion does not pause trial. If you have notice of a final family-law setting, you must appear unless you have a signed continuance order or clear court authorization excusing attendance. For lawyers, Calbow is a reminder to build a clean record of notice and the absence of any continuance order; for parties, it is a warning that assuming the court will handle a continuance administratively can lead to a binding default judgment."
In the Interest of Z.R.Q., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of Z.R.Q., the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a trial court could not retroactively wipe out child support, medical support, and related arrearages back to the date of the original order after later DNA testing excluded the adjudicated father and the court terminated his parental rights. The court analyzed the case by separating a true direct attack on the original judgment from a modification proceeding. Although Cuevas pleaded bill-of-review relief in the alternative, the final order did not vacate the 2022 support order or set aside the paternity adjudication, so the appellate court treated it as a modification order. Because Family Code § 156.401(b) bars retroactive modification of support before service or appearance in the modification suit, the trial court lacked authority to cancel support that had already accrued under the still-valid 2022 order. The court reversed the portions of the order cancelling past support and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your client wants to erase a prior paternity-based support order, modification is usually not enough. Later DNA exclusion or termination of parental rights may justify prospective relief, but they do not automatically cancel accrued support under an existing order. To unwind the original judgment and its arrearage consequences, counsel must pursue and obtain a true direct attack, such as a bill of review that actually vacates the prior order."
Yeddula v. Yeddula
COA07
In Yeddula v. Yeddula, the husband tried to set aside a divorce decree through a bill of review after enforcement began, arguing the property division was fraudulently inflated by a double-counting of mortgage debt. The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that bill-of-review relief was unavailable because, although he complained of fraud in the decree’s math, he had notice of the divorce, received the signed decree, retained counsel, and had time to pursue a motion for new trial or appeal. The court applied the traditional bill-of-review elements and focused on the diligence requirement, concluding his failure to seek timely post-judgment relief was not unmixed with his own negligence. The court affirmed denial of the bill of review and left the enforcement orders, including appointment of a receiver to sell the homestead, in place.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bill of review is not a do-over for missed post-judgment deadlines. If a party has notice of the decree, hires counsel, and could have challenged the ruling through a motion for new trial or appeal, later claims of fraud in the property division will usually fail for lack of diligence."
Yeddula v. Yeddula
COA07
In Yeddula v. Yeddula, the husband tried to use a bill of review to reopen a final divorce decree, arguing the property division was based on fraudulent double-counting of mortgage debt that overstated his equalization obligation. The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that these complaints concerned the merits of the original property division—math, valuation, and debt-allocation issues shown in the divorce record or discoverable through ordinary diligence—so they amounted to intrinsic, not extrinsic, fraud. Because he had notice of trial, failed to appear, received the decree, retained counsel, and still did not pursue timely post-judgment relief, he also could not prove the required no-fault element. The court affirmed denial of the bill of review and the related enforcement orders, including appointment of a receiver to sell the homestead.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bill of review is not a second chance to relitigate property-division numbers. If the alleged error involves calculations, debt balances, or valuation issues that were presented or could have been challenged before the decree became final, Texas courts will treat the claim as intrinsic fraud and deny relief—especially when the complaining party had notice and skipped trial or abandoned post-judgment remedies."
Noyes v. State of Texas for the Protection of Samantha Jo Voges
SCOTX
In a protective-order case, the trial court entered a lifetime ban on Jonathan Noyes’s possession of firearms after finding reasonable grounds to believe he had engaged in criminal stalking. Noyes argued the firearm prohibition violated the Second Amendment and the Texas Constitution. The Supreme Court of Texas did not decide whether the lifetime ban was ultimately constitutional, but it held that Noyes had adequately preserved those constitutional complaints for appellate review. Because the court of appeals had decided the case before United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), clarified the governing framework for firearm restrictions tied to protective orders, the Court vacated the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded for reconsideration under Rahimi.
Litigation Takeaway
"Protective-order firearm restrictions are not boilerplate. If you want to challenge or defend a firearms ban—especially a lifetime ban—make a clear record on the constitutional basis, scope, and duration of the restriction. Noyes shows Texas courts will not impose an unduly technical preservation standard, but lawyers still need to expressly raise the issue and build a record that can survive review under Rahimi."
In the Interest of E.M.F., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR modification appeal, a pro se father challenged a post-jury modification order, but the court never reached the merits because his briefing was fatally inadequate. After the court notified him that his original brief violated Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 and gave him a chance to amend, his amended brief still failed to identify coherent appellate issues, cite the record, apply governing law, explain preservation, or show harm. Relying on Rules 38.1, 38.9, and 44.3, and cases such as Bertucci and Bolling, the court held that appellate courts may liberally construe briefs but cannot become advocates by searching the record and constructing arguments for a party. Because the amended brief still presented no reviewable issues, the court held the father waived his complaints and affirmed the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"On appeal, even a potentially valid family-law complaint is lost if it is not framed as a specific, preserved, rule-supported issue with governing authority, record citations, and harm analysis. A deficiency notice is a final chance to fix substance, not just formatting; if the amended brief still forces the court to guess, waiver and affirmance are likely."
In the Matter of J.H.M.
COA01
In In the Matter of J.H.M., the First Court of Appeals considered whether a juvenile determinate sentencing judgment had to be reversed because it did not expressly state the reasons for committing the child outside the home as required by Texas Family Code section 54.04(i). The court held that this omission was not fundamental error. Because J.H.M. did not preserve the complaint in the juvenile court, the issue was forfeited. The court also found no showing of harm and concluded that the record otherwise supported the disposition. Reviewing the evidence of the murder offense, firearm use, gang-related evidence, supervision problems, and the juvenile court’s findings on best interest, reasonable efforts, and inability to provide adequate home supervision, the court affirmed both the TJJD commitment and the later transfer to TDCJ.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a missing statutory finding or recitation automatically wins an appeal. If an order omits required language, preserve the complaint in the trial court, seek correction, and explain the harm. If the record otherwise supports the ruling, an appellate court may treat the omission as a forfeitable drafting defect rather than reversible error."
Huskey v. White
COA14
In Huskey v. White, the father sought to terminate child support as his son reached adulthood, while the mother and the Office of the Attorney General asked the court to order indefinite support under Texas Family Code section 154.302 for an adult disabled child. After a bench trial, the trial court found the son’s developmental and language-related disabilities existed or were known before age eighteen, that he required substantial care and personal supervision, and that he would not be capable of self-support, then ordered the father to continue paying $1,420 per month indefinitely. On appeal, the court applied abuse-of-discretion review and held the record contained probative evidence supporting those findings, including the child’s diagnoses, special-education history, modified coursework, low literacy, inability to drive or live independently, dependence on his mother, and SSI benefits. The court also emphasized that because no findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested, it would imply all findings necessary to support the judgment if supported by the record. The support amount was likewise upheld, and the father’s complaint about an improper judicial comment was waived for lack of preservation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Adult-disabled-child support cases are won or lost on a functional record, not labels alone: build or attack evidence showing whether the child can actually live and work independently. And after a bench trial, always request findings of fact and conclusions of law, because failing to do so gives the appellee a major advantage on appeal."