Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
A. M. and J. D. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In this DFPS parental-rights appeal, the parent argued the trial court improperly revisited indigence on its own and orally discharged appointed appellate counsel under Family Code § 107.013(e) without any authorized motion. The Third Court did not decide whether the discharge was unlawful because the appellate record lacked both a signed discharge order and the reporter’s record from the hearing. Instead, relying on the parent’s continuing right to counsel through appeal and ordinary record-preservation requirements, the court held that merits relief was premature and abated the appeal so the trial court could sign an order, include any supporting findings or conclusions, and supplement the record.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even strong statutory error arguments can fail temporarily if the record is incomplete. If a trial court orally changes indigence status, discharges appointed counsel, or enters any ruling affecting appellate rights, family lawyers should immediately secure a signed written order, obtain the hearing transcript, and seek abatement and record supplementation before asking the appellate court for substantive relief."
Payne v. Cocoroiu
COA14
In Payne v. Cocoroiu, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR modification order after the father challenged personal jurisdiction, service, venue, and the evidentiary basis for the judgment. The court held that by filing a pro se answer before filing a Rule 120a special appearance, the father made a general appearance and waived any objection to personal jurisdiction; that same appearance also cured any service defects under Rules 120 and 124. The court further held that Harris County had continuing exclusive jurisdiction because of the earlier final parentage order, defeating the venue challenge. Finally, because the father failed to provide the reporter’s record, the appellate court presumed the missing evidence supported the modification findings and rejected unpreserved complaints.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, a respondent who files an answer before a special appearance likely waives personal-jurisdiction and service complaints. Family litigators should assess jurisdiction immediately, carefully sequence pleadings, and make sure the appellate record is complete—especially in modification cases where most complaints depend on the hearing evidence."
Bernadette Cagney-Reeves v. Eric Michael Reeves
COA14
In Cagney-Reeves v. Reeves, the ex-wife asked the court to “enforce” a divorce decree by voiding a deed from a completed post-divorce home sale and putting title back in her name, claiming forgery, coercion, incapacity, and broker noncompliance. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code Chapter 9 allows only implementation or clarification of the property division actually made in the decree, not a new division of property. Because the decree required the home to be sold and the proceeds divided 60/40, an order undoing the sale and revesting title in one spouse would impermissibly alter the decree under section 9.007. The court also noted the movant failed to present competent evidence supporting forgery or any unmet decree term requiring enforcement, and it held her evidentiary and discovery complaints were not preserved for appeal. The denial of the enforcement motion was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Post-divorce enforcement is remedy-driven: if the relief sought would unwind a sale, restore title, or otherwise change the decree’s economic outcome, Chapter 9 is likely the wrong vehicle. Family-law litigants must tie enforcement requests to a specific unperformed decree obligation and support serious allegations like forgery or coercion with competent, preserved evidence."
Sam Alam v. Randy Reimer, CPA and RMH CPA, PLLC
COA14
In Alam v. Reimer, the plaintiff amended his petition before the Rule 91a hearing to add several new causes of action after the defendants had already filed a Rule 91a motion attacking only the original claims. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Rule 91a is claim-specific: a motion may dismiss only the causes of action it actually identifies and challenges. Applying Rules 91a.1, 91a.2, and 91a.5, the court concluded that the original motion still reached the claims first pleaded in the original petition and re-alleged in the amended petition, but it did not automatically expand to newly added claims simply because the defendants chose to stand on it. The trial court therefore erred by dismissing the new, unchallenged claims, requiring reversal and remand as to those claims, while affirming dismissal of the previously challenged claims against Reimer individually.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a live amended petition adds new claims, an earlier Rule 91a motion does not automatically knock them out. In family-law cases where pleadings change quickly, the movant must amend the Rule 91a motion to specifically identify each new cause of action, and the non-movant should object to any blanket dismissal that goes beyond the claims actually challenged."
Tremayne Edward Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Johnson v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether admitting a child complainant’s CAC forensic interview required reversal after the defendant was convicted of sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. The court held that although defense counsel initially said “no objection,” a later objection made before the video was published to the jury was timely enough to preserve some complaint because the trial court could still stop the jury from seeing it. But the court limited preservation to the specific trial objections actually made—bolstering and prejudice—not broader hearsay or Rule 403 theories raised on appeal. Assuming without deciding that admitting the CAC video was error, the court found the error harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) because the same abuse allegations had already come in through the forensic interviewer’s testimony and through the child’s own live testimony in greater detail. Since the video was cumulative and there was no showing it substantially influenced the verdict, the convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, preserving an objection is only half the battle—counsel must also build a record showing why a CAC interview or child recording is uniquely harmful and not just cumulative of other testimony. If the same allegations are already before the factfinder through the child, an outcry witness, or a counselor, an appellate court may treat any error in admitting an additional recording as harmless."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Danielle Lauren Henry & Johnathon Hall
COA12
In this divorce appeal, the wife argued that her due-process rights were violated because she was not admitted into a January 3, 2025 Zoom hearing where the court granted a continuance and the parties agreed that the husband would not pay February spousal support. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of that constitutional complaint because the wife waited until the May 7, 2025 judgment hearing—after the final trial had already occurred—to raise it. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, the court held that even constitutional due-process complaints must be raised through a timely, specific objection, motion, or request at a point when the trial court can still cure the problem. Because the complaint was raised months too late, the issue was not preserved for appellate review.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume calling something a due-process violation preserves it automatically. In family-law cases—especially Zoom hearings, temporary-orders settings, and continuance hearings—counsel must object immediately, request a concrete cure, and make a record while the trial court can still fix the problem, or the complaint will likely be waived on appeal."
In the Matter of B.F.
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring a 15-year-old charged with capital murder to criminal district court. The court rejected the argument that Family Code § 54.02(a)(3) required findings on both the seriousness of the offense and the child’s background because the statute is disjunctive: transfer may be based on either ground. It also held that the State’s conjunctive pleading did not increase its burden, and that the evidence on the § 54.02(f) factors—including the double homicide, evidence of planning and concealment, B.F.’s sophistication and maturity, and expert testimony that rehabilitation within the juvenile system was unlikely before age nineteen—supported the transfer decision.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a Family Code statute is written in the disjunctive, proving one statutory ground may be enough even if the pleading alleges multiple grounds. For family lawyers, this case is a reminder to track statutory text closely, frame appeals around required statutory elements rather than pleading form, and build a record supporting at least one independently sufficient basis for a discretionary ruling—especially in expert-driven cases where appellate courts defer heavily to the trial court’s credibility calls."
In re José Garza
COA03
In In re José Garza, the Austin Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code section 264.408(d-1) required the trial court to deny a criminal defendant’s request to have CAC forensic interview videos transcribed once the State had already made the recordings reasonably available for review under Code of Criminal Procedure article 39.15(d). Relying on its prior decision in Tharp, the court concluded that a verbatim transcript is a prohibited copy or reproduction of the recording, regardless of protective-order limits or neutral court-reporter procedures. Because the statute left the trial court with no discretion, the order authorizing transcription exceeded the court’s authority, and mandamus relief was conditionally granted.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a statute tightly limits access to CAC forensic interviews, lawyers cannot get around that limit by asking for a transcript or other derivative version of the recording. In family cases involving abuse allegations, build your strategy around lawful review access, note-taking, and expert inspection protocols—not reproduction requests that invite statutory objections and possible mandamus."
Mary G. Mauldin and Carl Adams v. James C. Nix, III, as Co-Trustee and on Behalf of the Nix Family Trust
COA05
In Mauldin v. Nix, a trust beneficiary sued his sister over alleged mismanagement of a family trust after years of discovery disputes that began in a Rule 202 presuit proceeding and continued after merits claims were filed. The trial court repeatedly ordered discovery, found ongoing noncompliance and delayed disclosure that financial records had been shredded, and ultimately struck the sister’s pleadings as a sanction. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s procedural handling of the Rule 202-to-merits transition and sustained the severe discovery sanctions, concluding the record showed persistent discovery abuse rather than a mere scope dispute. But the court reversed the $125,000 breach-of-fiduciary-duty damages award because legally sufficient evidence did not connect the alleged fiduciary breach to a compensable loss. The court rendered a take-nothing judgment on that damages claim, remanded attorney’s fees tied to that recovery, and otherwise left the conversion and sanctions-related rulings intact.
Litigation Takeaway
"Bad conduct and bad optics are not enough to win money damages. In family-law crossover cases involving hidden assets, waste, reimbursement, or fiduciary-duty theories, you still need proof that the alleged misconduct caused a measurable loss. At the same time, parties who keep resisting discovery after repeated court orders risk pleadings-striking sanctions, and Rule 202 is not a shield once full merits litigation is underway."
McCulloch v. McCulloch
COA03
In McCulloch, the obligor sought to reduce child support and terminate or reduce spousal maintenance based on alleged disability, unemployment, and worsening finances after the divorce decree. The Austin Court of Appeals held that modification under Texas Family Code sections 156.401(a)(1) and 8.057(c) requires proof of a material and substantial change in circumstances since the prior order, and that the movant failed to meet that burden because much of his evidence predated the decree, had already been litigated in earlier proceedings, or did not conclusively prove a post-decree loss of earning capacity. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings and intentional-unemployment finding, the court affirmed the denial of modification, rejected the guideline-support complaint, upheld the denial of continuance, and affirmed the judgment in full.
Litigation Takeaway
"A modification case is not a retrial of the divorce. To change child support or spousal maintenance, the movant must present a clean before-and-after record proving a post-order material and substantial change, backed by objective evidence such as medical records and reliable financial proof. SSA disability findings, client testimony, and general financial strain will not carry the day if the same issues existed before the decree or the trial court doubts credibility."