Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Gray v. Beck
COA03
In Gray v. Beck, an heirship dispute turned on whether Jane Gray was Robert Beck’s informal spouse under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2). Gray offered evidence that they lived together in Texas and may have privately considered themselves married, but Matthew Beck moved for no-evidence summary judgment arguing there was insufficient proof of the required elements. The Third Court of Appeals held that an informal-marriage claim requires legally sufficient evidence of agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others in Texas as married. The court concluded the record lacked more than a scintilla of evidence on the key holding-out element, and it also rejected Gray’s notice complaint because the amended summary-judgment motion merely clarified existing grounds rather than adding new ones. The court affirmed summary judgment and the heirship judgment declaring Robert unmarried at death.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your case depends on proving an informal marriage, evidence of living together and a private commitment is not enough. You need concrete proof that the couple publicly represented themselves in Texas as married—through witnesses, documents, or consistent public conduct—or the claim may be defeated on no-evidence summary judgment."
In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt
COA05
In this original proceeding, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are final, appealable orders when they dispose of all parties and all issues in the protective-order case. The relators tried to attack the orders by mandamus, but the court applied ordinary mandamus principles, relied on Cooke’s finality analysis for protective orders, and extended that reasoning to Chapter 7B proceedings because they are civil in nature and procedurally governed through Title 4 of the Family Code. Because the relators had an adequate remedy by direct appeal, and did not show the orders were void, mandamus was unavailable even though they missed the appellate deadline. The court denied mandamus relief and denied the requested stays as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat every final protective order—including Chapter 7B stalking orders—as immediately appealable. In family-law cases, do not assume mandamus can rescue a missed appeal; unless the order is truly void, direct appeal is the required path."
Crane v. Crane
SCOTX
In Crane v. Crane, the Texas Supreme Court held that a no-evidence summary-judgment motion under Rule 166a is sufficiently specific when it identifies the factual predicates of the pleaded claims in enough detail to put the nonmovant on notice of what evidence is required. Sasha Crane sought declaratory and injunctive relief alleging Robert Crane’s fence interfered with her easement and blocked access to her property. Robert moved for no-evidence summary judgment, asserting there was no evidence Sasha owned an easement crossing his property or that his fence crossed any such easement. The Court looked to the actual claims pleaded and concluded that fence interference was the sole factual basis for both the declaratory and injunctive claims, so the motion adequately challenged the essential elements even without using the precise phrase “interference with an easement.” Because Sasha produced evidence aimed mainly at proving the easement still existed, but no evidence that the fence actually crossed or interfered with the easement, the Court held take-nothing summary judgment was proper and reinstated the trial court’s judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law property and injunction disputes, courts will focus on the specific factual event that gives the claim life. A no-evidence motion does not need magic words if it clearly targets that operative fact. If you plead lockout, blocked access, gate changes, or interference with awarded property, you must have summary-judgment evidence proving the actual interference—not just the underlying right."
Moore v. State
COA05
In Moore v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old murder defendant for adult prosecution under Texas Family Code § 54.02. Moore argued the transfer was unsupported because the investigation was not “full,” given that some forensic and electronic-device testing was still pending, and because the evidence did not sufficiently show he could not be rehabilitated in the juvenile system. The court rejected those arguments, explaining that a § 54.02 transfer hearing is not a trial on the merits and does not require every investigative thread to be finished so long as the juvenile court had a sufficiently developed record to assess probable cause and community welfare. Because the juvenile court ordered and reviewed a diagnostic study, social evaluation, psychological material, and a full investigation, and because the record supported findings of probable cause, violent and willful conduct, use of a deadly weapon, and serious doubt about rehabilitation through juvenile services, the appellate court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient and that the transfer order was not an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a statute requires the trial court to consider specific factors and court-ordered evaluations, appellate courts usually focus on whether the existing record gave the judge a legally sufficient basis to make the required findings—not on whether every possible piece of evidence had been gathered. To challenge a discretionary ruling successfully, tie any missing evidence to a specific statutory finding and show why the current record cannot support that finding."
In the Interest of H.J.L. a/k/a H.J.H., a Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights after evidence showed he repeatedly sexually abused his child over several years. The court focused on Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), holding that the multi-year abuse constituted a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the child’s physical and emotional well-being. The court relied on the child’s outcry, therapist testimony about grooming, coercion, escalation, and trauma, and evidence of PTSD, depression, self-harm, and a suicide attempt. The same evidence, along with the child’s wish for no contact, progress in foster care, lack of safe family placement, and the ad litem’s recommendation, also supported the best-interest finding under section 161.001(b)(2).
Litigation Takeaway
"Sexual abuse evidence is powerful endangerment evidence in Texas family cases, not just CPS cases. When the record shows a sustained pattern of abuse, grooming, coercion, and resulting trauma, courts will support strong protective rulings—including termination, no-contact orders, supervised access, and sole conservatorship—even without a criminal conviction. Build the record through outcry, therapist, placement, and trauma evidence; noncooperation by the accused parent can further strengthen the endangerment and best-interest case."
In the Interest of J.Z.A., a Child
SCOTX
In In re J.Z.A., the Supreme Court of Texas held that former Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(O) allowed termination only for violating a court order that specifically stated the actions required for reunification. The Department relied on service-plan language requiring Mother to “follow through with all recommendations” from providers and to “actively participate” and “utilize learned skills” during visits. The Court concluded those directives were too vague and open-ended to satisfy the statute, especially where the later recommendation to take antipsychotic medication was never incorporated into an amended court order. Because the evidence showed, at most, noncompliance with generalized expectations rather than a specific court-ordered act, the Court reversed and vacated the termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party’s rights depend on compliance with an order, the order must say exactly what must be done. Vague directives like “follow recommendations” or “actively participate” are poor enforcement language and may not support termination, sanctions, or other serious consequences without specific, court-ordered terms."
In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt
COA05
In re Schmidt held that stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are civil protective-order judgments and are final and appealable when they dispose of all parties and issues in the application. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed Chapter 7B’s incorporation of Title 4 Family Code procedures, relied on Texas authority treating these proceedings as civil, and applied ordinary mandamus principles requiring no adequate appellate remedy. Because the relators could have challenged the orders by direct appeal, and because a missed appellate deadline does not make mandamus available absent true voidness, the court denied mandamus relief and denied the requested stays as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat every completed protective-order case—including a Chapter 7B stalking order—as a stand-alone final judgment. Calendar appellate deadlines immediately, build and preserve the record at the hearing, and do not assume mandamus can rescue a missed appeal unless the order is truly void."
In re Coby Todd Bausch
COA08
In re Coby Todd Bausch arose from a trust-administration dispute after a trial court entered an order clarifying a successor trustee’s powers to wind up a family trust under Texas Property Code § 115.001. The relator sought mandamus, arguing the order was void because it was entered without notice and a hearing and because it impermissibly expanded the trustee’s authority beyond the trust instrument. The El Paso Court of Appeals denied relief, focusing on the threshold mandamus requirement that the relator show no adequate appellate remedy. The court explained that even if the relator disputed the merits of the trustee-powers order, those complaints were the kind ordinarily reviewed on direct appeal, and the relator never developed any argument showing why appeal after final judgment would be inadequate. The court also rejected the due-process theory as a basis for extraordinary relief because the trial court later held a reconsideration hearing, considered the parties’ positions, and reaffirmed its ruling. The petition for writ of mandamus and motion to stay were denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus is not a shortcut for challenging an aggressive interlocutory order. Even if a trial court acts without an initial hearing or grants broad fiduciary powers, the petition will likely fail unless you specifically show why a normal appeal cannot fix the harm. Preserve error, build a record, seek reconsideration, and separately prove irreparable harm before choosing mandamus."
Ruben Gonzalez v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Ruben Gonzalez v. The State of Texas, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed Gonzalez’s injury-to-a-child conviction under a party-liability theory. The State did not need direct proof that Gonzalez personally inflicted every injury; instead, the court held circumstantial evidence was enough to show he intended to promote or assist the offense. The evidence showed Gonzalez lived in the home, exercised disciplinary authority over the child, used harsh punishment including food restriction, was aware of the child’s obvious physical decline, and failed to obtain medical care. Applying Texas Penal Code sections 7.01 and 7.02, the court concluded a rational jury could infer culpable participation from his authority in the household, proximity to the child, awareness of the worsening condition, omission in the face of obvious need, and minimizing statements after the fact. The court also rejected his Confrontation Clause complaint and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases, Gonzalez is a strong crossover authority for the idea that a live-in nonparent can be treated as a de facto caregiver based on actual household power, not formal legal status. If a parent’s partner or other resident adult disciplines the child, controls food, observes injuries or decline, and does nothing, that evidence can support endangerment, restrictions, supervised possession, or no-contact provisions even without formal caregiving records."
In the Matter of J.J.
COA02
In *In the Matter of J.J.*, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order modifying disposition and committing J.J. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department after J.J. stipulated to multiple probation violations, including a new law violation for unlawfully carrying a handgun, alcohol possession, handgun possession, and gang association. The court analyzed Texas Family Code Section 54.05 under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard and held that the stipulations alone supported modification. It further concluded that the juvenile court reasonably relied on J.J.’s escalating gun-related conduct, substance-use concerns, detention infractions, inconsistent parental follow-through, and the failure of prior community-based interventions in deciding that TJJD commitment was more appropriate than continued probation or an undeveloped relative placement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Trial courts get broad discretion when the record shows escalating dangerous behavior and failed lesser interventions. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a cumulative record on supervision failures, safety risks, prior services, and the weakness or strength of any proposed relative placement, because appellate courts will usually defer to a well-supported restrictive ruling."