Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Angel Serna v. The State of Texas
COA07
In an aggravated-assault “family member” prosecution, the defense sought to impeach the complainant with alleged methamphetamine use to support the defendant’s fear/state-of-mind theory. The trial court excluded the drug-use impeachment evidence. On appeal, the defendant reframed the exclusion as violating the constitutional right to confrontation and to present a complete defense, but the court of appeals treated the issue as one of preservation: trial counsel argued only relevance/state of mind at trial and did not clearly invoke confrontation/due-process/complete-defense grounds or obtain a ruling on those constitutional theories as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court therefore held the constitutional complaint was waived and did not reach the merits. The court also rejected an ineffective-assistance claim at punishment based on failure to call additional mitigation witnesses because the record did not overcome the presumption of reasonable trial strategy and the proposed testimony was largely cumulative, with no showing of a reasonable probability of a different punishment outcome.
Litigation Takeaway
"Preservation is theory-specific: if excluded evidence (like drug use) is critical to impeach credibility or support a “complete defense,” you must expressly state the constitutional grounds and secure a ruling—relevance/state-of-mind arguments won’t preserve confrontation/due-process complaints for appeal. Also, “we should have called more witnesses” claims are difficult to win on appeal without a developed record showing counsel’s reasons were unreasonable and the omitted evidence likely would have changed the result."
Burns Surveying LLC v. Robert H. Burns and Jacob G. Pleasant
COA06
In this professional liability dispute, the plaintiffs sued a registered land surveyor for negligence but failed to attach the mandatory Chapter 150 certificate of merit to their original petition. After the trial court dismissed the claims without prejudice, the plaintiffs attempted to cure the defect by filing an amended petition with the required certificate in the same cause number. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 150.002 and Texas Supreme Court precedent, concluding that the 'first-filed' requirement applies to the very first petition asserting the claim in a specific case. The court held that a dismissal without prejudice requires the claimant to initiate an entirely new lawsuit to satisfy the contemporaneous filing requirement, and an amended petition cannot cure the initial failure to file.
Litigation Takeaway
"When suing a licensed professional like a surveyor, the certificate of merit must be attached to the very first petition filed. If the case is dismissed without prejudice for failing to do so, you cannot fix the error by amending the existing lawsuit; you must file a brand-new suit with a new cause number to satisfy the 'first-filed' rule."
In re Quintilya Thomas
COA08
In an original proceeding arising from family-law temporary orders, the relator asked the El Paso Court of Appeals for an emergency stay of “default temporary orders” but filed only a Rule 52.10 motion and no petition for writ of mandamus. The court treated the defect as jurisdictional: under Tex. R. App. P. 52.1 an original proceeding is commenced only by filing a mandamus petition, and Rule 52.10 temporary relief is merely ancillary and is available only after a petition invokes the court’s original jurisdiction. Because no petition was on file, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to grant any temporary relief or stay and dismissed the motion for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice to refiling after a mandamus petition is filed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you need an emergency stay from a court of appeals in a family case, you cannot file a standalone “emergency stay pending mandamus” motion. File the mandamus petition first (or simultaneously) to invoke original jurisdiction; only then can Rule 52.10 temporary relief be considered—otherwise the motion will be dismissed and valuable time will be lost while temporary orders remain enforceable."
Crayton v. State
COA03
In Crayton v. State, a defendant challenged the assessment of court costs because the trial court failed to conduct a mandatory inquiry into his 'ability to pay' as required by Article 42.15(a-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether this statutory 'shall' requirement created an absolute right or a forfeitable one. Applying Court of Criminal Appeals precedent, the court determined that the inquiry is not a fundamental systemic requirement. Therefore, because the defendant failed to object at sentencing, he forfeited the error under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court further held that the omission was not reversible error because the defendant retained a statutory right to seek post-judgment relief for financial hardship at any time.
Litigation Takeaway
"In quasi-criminal enforcement matters, 'mandatory' statutory duties are not self-executing for purposes of appeal. If a trial court fails to conduct a required financial inquiry or make a specific finding, you must interpose a timely objection on the record to preserve the error. If you miss the opportunity to object, look to post-judgment statutory remedies for financial hardship rather than relying on an appeal for reversal."
R.F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In this case, a mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence regarding child endangerment and claiming she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her lawyer did not request a trial recess for her to testify. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the "endangerment" ground under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), noting that prenatal drug use followed by continued instability and a failure to complete court-ordered rehabilitation constitutes a voluntary course of endangering conduct. The court also reviewed the ineffective assistance claim under the Strickland standard, finding that without a developed record explaining trial counsel's motives, it must presume the lawyer's decisions were strategic. The court affirmed the trial court's order terminating the mother's parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Prenatal drug use combined with a failure to maintain sobriety and stability after a child's removal provides strong grounds for termination based on endangerment. Additionally, parties seeking to appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel must develop a record—often through a motion for new trial—to prove that their attorney's actions were not part of a reasonable trial strategy."
Landry v. Landry
SCOTX
In Landry v. Landry, the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court could properly characterize investment accounts as separate property when an expert's tracing analysis contained a minor four-month gap in personal review. The court of appeals had reversed the trial court's finding, speculating that the missing months could have changed the character of the funds. However, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the expert’s testimony—which established a consistent 16-year pattern of account activity—provided legally sufficient evidence under the clear and convincing standard. The Court emphasized that when records are in the trial record and expert testimony remains unrebutted, minor gaps in an expert's review do not invalidate the trial court's findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"When defending or asserting a separate property claim, a consistent long-term pattern established by an expert is a powerful tool that can overcome minor gaps in documentation. To successfully challenge such a claim, a party cannot rely solely on cross-examination or pointing out technical omissions; they must typically provide their own rebuttal expert to prove that those gaps are material to the account's characterization."
Musk v. Brody
COA03
In this defamation case, Benjamin Brody argued that Elon Musk's Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss was a nullity—and therefore untimely—because it was signed by out-of-state counsel before their pro hac vice admission was finalized. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed Texas's overarching policy of prioritizing the merits of a dispute over technical procedural "traps" and looked to persuasive authority regarding attorney signatures. The court held that if a trial court subsequently grants a pro hac vice motion, that admission cures the signature defect on earlier filings, meaning the TCPA motion was properly before the court and filed within the 60-day statutory window.
Litigation Takeaway
"A pending pro hac vice admission does not render a timely filed motion a "nullity"; provided the admission is eventually granted, the signature defect is cured, protecting parties from losing statutory rights like a TCPA dismissal due to technical filing deadlines."
Raggio-2204 Jesse Owens, LLC v. Morgan
COA03
After a trial court's plenary jurisdiction had expired, it entered a sanctions judgment and subsequent turnover orders authorizing a receiver to seize and sell property belonging to Stacey Hammer's LLC. After the Austin Court of Appeals declared these orders void, Hammer and the LLC sued the judgment creditor, his attorney, and the receiver for damages related to the lost property. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b regarding the limits of plenary power and the doctrine of derived judicial immunity. The court held that because the underlying orders were void ab initio, the judgment creditor and the receiver could not claim immunity and were liable for restitution of the value of the property sold under the void authority.
Litigation Takeaway
"A court order signed after plenary power has expired is a legal nullity; practitioners and receivers who move property or distribute funds under a void order are not protected by judicial immunity and are subject to claims for restitution and conversion."
David Aston v. James Whittington and Tara Whittington
COA05
In a contract dispute that went to trial in Hunt County, the trial court entered a post‑answer default judgment after defendant David Aston and his counsel failed to appear for the reset trial setting. Aston timely moved for new trial supported by affidavit evidence that he did not know of the trial date and relied on counsel to communicate settings; plaintiffs countered with proof that Aston’s counsel received and opened the court’s electronic notice and argued counsel’s inaction should be imputed to Aston. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the matter as a straightforward Craddock analysis for post‑answer default judgments and held the trial court abused its discretion by denying a new trial: (1) the failure to appear was shown to be the result of mistake/accident rather than intentional conduct or conscious indifference, and the court declined to import the summary‑judgment “imputation” framework into the Craddock default context; (2) Aston “set up” meritorious defenses by pleading legally cognizable defenses and offering prima facie support, which does not require proving the case at the new‑trial stage; and (3) once Aston alleged no delay or injury, plaintiffs failed to show concrete retrial prejudice beyond the inconvenience of trying the case. The court reversed the post‑answer default judgment and remanded for a merits trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Post‑answer defaults are disfavored in Texas, and a party who misses trial because of notice breakdowns or calendar‑conflict missteps can often win a new trial under Craddock—especially when the client swears they lacked actual knowledge of the setting, promptly sought relief, and sets up a real defense. On the flip side, to keep a default, the nonmovant must bring evidence of actual retrial prejudice (lost witnesses/evidence, time‑sensitive issues), not just “they opened the e‑notice” or “a new trial is inconvenient.”"
Crayton v. State
COA03
After being convicted of intoxication manslaughter, John Edgar Crayton, Jr. was assessed court costs without the trial court conducting the mandatory 'ability-to-pay' inquiry required by Article 42.15(a-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Crayton appealed, arguing the omission was reversible error. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory scheme alongside recent precedent, determining that the inquiry is a procedural right rather than a fundamental one. The court held that because Crayton failed to object to the omission during sentencing when given the opportunity, he forfeited the error on appeal. Furthermore, the court held the error was not reversible because the law provides a post-judgment mechanism for defendants to seek relief due to financial hardship at any time.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on a trial court to perform a 'mandatory' statutory inquiry regarding a client's ability to pay fees or costs; counsel must proactively object to any omission on the record or risk waiving the issue for appeal. In the event of a waiver, practitioners should utilize post-judgment hardship statutes to seek relief rather than pursuing a likely-to-fail appeal."