Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
In the Interest of A.T.G., A.G.G., A.G.G. II, A.G.G., and A.G.G., Children
COA07
In In re A.T.G., the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s rights to two children after the record showed a long-running pattern of domestic violence against the mother, excessive corporal punishment of the children, and a home environment dominated by fear and aggression. Although sexual-abuse allegations that triggered the case became uncertain by trial, the court held that the remaining evidence independently satisfied Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court analyzed subsection (D) as addressing the children’s endangering conditions and surroundings and subsection (E) as addressing the father’s endangering conduct, concluding that repeated assaults, abusive discipline with objects, intimidation, and the children’s persistent fear were legally and factually sufficient under both grounds. The court therefore upheld termination and the related no-contact relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domestic violence is not collateral to custody or termination litigation—it is direct evidence of child endangerment. Even if one major allegation weakens, a well-developed record showing a pattern of violence, abusive discipline, intimidation, and child fear can still support severe restrictions or termination."
Michael Eugene Dreelan v. Martha Estupian Dreelan
COA05
In Dreelan v. Dreelan, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree finding that the husband committed both actual and constructive fraud on the community estate. The evidence showed he used his superior control over marital finances, along with a power of attorney signed by the wife, to sell the parties’ Forney home, divert the proceeds, and position the Terrell house as his separate property without the wife’s informed consent. The record also included evidence of transfers to a paramour, gifts to third parties, unaccounted cash withdrawals, and diverted business distributions. Applying Texas Family Code section 7.009 and established fraud-on-the-community principles, the court held that a spouse’s formal participation in a transaction does not defeat a fraud claim when that spouse did not knowingly consent to the ultimate disposition of community assets, and that fiduciary duties between spouses—and under a power of attorney—support relief. The court upheld reconstitution of the community estate and the $133,979.16 money judgment as part of a just-and-right division, rejecting the husband’s one-satisfaction challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
"Informed consent matters more than signatures. If one spouse uses control over finances, title, or a power of attorney to redirect community assets without full disclosure, Texas courts can find fraud on the community, reconstitute the estate, and award a money judgment. For trial lawyers, detailed tracing, fiduciary-duty evidence, and findings of fact can make or break these claims."
In the Interest of J.E.F. and J.J.F., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court held that, even on a thin record, legally and factually sufficient evidence showed the father knowingly exposed the children to endangering conditions and engaged in an endangering course of conduct. Key facts included an incident where the children were left alone and the father returned intoxicated, his resulting abandonment and child-endangerment conviction, domestic-violence concerns, a protective-order violation, and instability caused by incarceration. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the deferential sufficiency review required in termination cases, the court concluded those facts supported both the environmental endangerment finding under subsection (D) and the conduct-based endangerment finding under subsection (E), and affirmed under In re N.G.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment findings are often built from a pattern, not a single event. In both termination and private custody litigation, facts like unsafe supervision, intoxication, family violence, protective-order violations, criminal conduct, and incarceration can support major restrictions on parental rights. Lawyers should build a detailed record tying each fact to either the child’s environment, the parent’s course of conduct, or both—because appellate courts will closely review subsection (D) and (E) findings and those findings can have lasting consequences."
Mack v. State
COA04
In Mack v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals rejected a legal-sufficiency challenge to child-sexual-assault convictions where the child did not visually observe the perpetrator during the assaults. The court applied Jackson v. Virginia and article 38.07, emphasizing that identity may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence and that a child complainant’s testimony alone can support conviction. Here, the child testified she recognized the defendant by his distinctive smell, cigarette odor, breath, bodily presence, and the surrounding household circumstances, and she later identified him in court. The court held that the cumulative force of that testimony, along with corroborating outcry context, was enough for a rational jury to find identity beyond a reasonable doubt despite the absence of physical evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child’s abuse allegation is not weak just because the child did not see the alleged abuser or there is no forensic proof. In family-law cases, courts may give significant weight to sensory-based identification, household context, and outcry testimony when assessing safety, credibility, and possession restrictions. If you are advancing the claim, build the full context carefully; if you are defending it, attack the reliability of the identification itself—not merely the lack of corroboration."
Brigham v. State
COA05
In Brigham v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defendant challenging an Article 38.072 outcry ruling must preserve the exact complaint made on appeal. The defense broadly objected to the forensic interviewer being designated as the outcry witness "in this case," but on appeal argued a narrower theory: that the interviewer may have been proper for some incidents, yet the child’s mother was the proper outcry witness for one specific alleged event. The court emphasized that outcry analysis is event-specific in multi-incident abuse cases, that the objecting party must distinctly identify the incident and the earlier qualifying disclosure, and that trial courts are not required to parse an undeveloped theory. Because the defense did not make that event-specific argument in the trial court, the complaint was not preserved under Rule 33.1(a), and the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your evidentiary objection is event-specific, your record must be event-specific too. In abuse-related family cases, broad objections to CAC, therapist, parent, or forensic-interviewer testimony will not preserve a narrower appellate complaint unless counsel clearly identifies the particular incident, the competing witness, and why that earlier disclosure legally qualifies."
Manka v. Acosta
COA04
In Manka v. Acosta, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a civil-assault verdict arising from a courthouse encounter during a family-law case. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because there was no bodily injury and the video did not clearly show the precise grabbing alleged. The court rejected that framing, holding that offensive-contact assault under Texas Penal Code section 22.01(a)(3) does not require bodily injury. Applying ordinary legal- and factual-sufficiency review, the court relied on the plaintiff’s testimony, corroborating witness testimony, security video showing escalating physical contact and invasion of personal space, the plaintiff’s immediate reaction and outcry, and surrounding circumstances to conclude the jury could infer both that the contact occurred and that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known it would be regarded as offensive or provocative. The court therefore held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support liability.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law-adjacent settings, intrusive touching does not become legally trivial just because it leaves no injury or is only partially captured on video. Lawyers should treat courthouse, mediation, and exchange-site conduct as potential tort and family-case evidence: immediate outcry, witness observations, partial surveillance footage, and contextual proof can be enough to prove offensive-contact assault and to shape credibility, protective-order, conservatorship, and trial-strategy issues."
In the Interest of S.M.M. and R.M.M., Minor Children
COA05
In a child-support modification case, the trial court signed a 2022 order awarding Mother $22,953.40 in attorney’s fees after taking fees under advisement at the hearing. After plenary power expired, the court later signed a nunc pro tunc judgment deleting that award and requiring each party to pay their own fees. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that because the court had not orally rendered a fee ruling at the hearing, the signed 2022 order was itself the rendition of judgment on fees. Deleting the fee award and replacing it with a take-nothing fees provision was a substantive change to the judgment actually rendered, not a clerical correction permitted by Rule 316. The nunc pro tunc judgment was therefore void, and the original fee award remained in place.
Litigation Takeaway
"Once plenary power expires, a court can fix clerical mistakes in a family-law order, but it cannot use nunc pro tunc to rewrite who owes attorney’s fees or other substantive obligations. If a signed order is the first actual rendition on an issue, any challenge to that ruling must be made through timely post-judgment motions or appeal—not later by calling the change a mere clerical correction."
In the Interest of N. L. S. and E. J. C., Children
COA01
After Mother’s parental rights were terminated, she filed a petition to reinstate them under Texas Family Code section 161.302 while the children had not yet been adopted and were not yet subject to adoption placement agreements. Before the reinstatement hearing, however, DFPS executed adoption placement agreements for the children. The First Court of Appeals applied a strict plain-language reading of sections 161.302 and 161.303, holding that section 161.302 governs only filing eligibility, while section 161.303 governs the merits at the hearing. Because section 161.303 requires proof that the child is not subject to an adoption placement agreement at the time relief is granted, and the children were subject to such agreements at the hearing, Mother could not obtain reinstatement. The court also rejected the argument that filing a reinstatement petition creates an implied stay barring DFPS from moving forward with adoptive placement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Filing eligibility is not the same as winning on the merits. In reinstatement and other family-law cases involving timing-sensitive statutes, lawyers must confirm whether the controlling facts are measured at filing or at the hearing. A petition that is valid when filed can still fail if key facts change before the court rules, and courts will not read an implied stay into the Family Code without express statutory language."
Cedillo v. State
COA01
In Cedillo v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that a party does not preserve an Article 38.072 reliability complaint by arguing only about who qualifies as the proper outcry witness. Cedillo challenged witness identity at the outcry hearing, but on appeal reframed the issue as whether the children’s statements to the mother, grandmother, and counselor were unreliable. The court applied Texas preservation rules and concluded that a generic or differently framed objection did not alert the trial court to a specific reliability challenge based on the statutory factors of time, content, and circumstances. The court also held that any assumed error was harmless because the complainants and CAC records provided substantially similar evidence without objection. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want appellate review of a child-disclosure reliability issue, say so specifically and build the record around reliability—not just hearsay, process, or who the proper witness is. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, separate each evidentiary objection, get a clear ruling, and object consistently to repeated similar evidence or harmless-error will likely defeat any appeal."
In re Matthiew Adrian Alirol
COA13
After a trial court granted a new trial and set aside an agreed divorce decree, the relator sought mandamus relief, arguing the ruling was improper. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals focused on the procedural posture: this was a nonjury divorce matter, not a case involving a jury verdict. Applying Texas mandamus standards, the court explained that mandamus generally requires both a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal, and that immediate mandamus review of new-trial orders is far more limited in bench or agreed-decree cases than in jury-verdict cases. Because the relator did not show the new-trial order was void or that extraordinary circumstances made ordinary appellate review inadequate, the court denied mandamus and allowed the case to proceed in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a trial court grants a new trial after an agreed or bench-tried divorce decree, mandamus is usually not the answer. Unless you can show the order is void or that truly exceptional circumstances make appeal inadequate, the practical path is to preserve error, retry the case, and challenge the ruling in a regular appeal after final judgment."