Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Austin Paris v. Alexandra Paris
COA02
In Paris v. Paris, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree appointing the mother sole managing conservator and heavily restricting the father’s possession and access after evidence showed a history or pattern of family violence against the mother and alcohol or substance abuse. The father argued Section 153.004 should not apply because the violence was not directed at the children, but the court rejected that argument, explaining the statute protects both children and other victims of family violence and permits restrictions when credible evidence shows danger. Relying on the prior protective-order findings, the trial record, and the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support electronic-only contact, delayed in-person visitation, step-up conditions, reunification therapy, and testing requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
"Family-violence findings against the other parent—not just against the children—can justify sole managing conservatorship and major possession restrictions under Family Code § 153.004. For trial lawyers, the lesson is to build a detailed safety record and propose specific protective terms, because tailored restrictions tied to protective-order findings are hard to overturn on appeal."
John Martin Charles Bailey v. The State of Texas
COA10
In Bailey, the appellant challenged a revocation order based on an alleged due-process problem tied to testimony about one contested violation, but he did not challenge his pleas of true to five other alleged violations. The court applied the rule that any single independent ground can support revocation and that a plea of true alone is sufficient. Because Bailey’s admitted violations were independent of the complained-of testimony and unaffected by the alleged error, the court held the revocation order had to be affirmed. The court also noted that once supervision is revoked, the trial court may impose the original suspended sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a trial court’s ruling rests on multiple independent grounds, an appeal that attacks only one ground may fail even if that complaint has merit. In family law cases involving enforcement, modification, protective orders, or overlapping findings, lawyers must preserve error and challenge every independent basis that could support the order."
Ruben Gonzalez v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Ruben Gonzalez v. The State of Texas, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed Gonzalez’s injury-to-a-child conviction under a party-liability theory. The State did not need direct proof that Gonzalez personally inflicted every injury; instead, the court held circumstantial evidence was enough to show he intended to promote or assist the offense. The evidence showed Gonzalez lived in the home, exercised disciplinary authority over the child, used harsh punishment including food restriction, was aware of the child’s obvious physical decline, and failed to obtain medical care. Applying Texas Penal Code sections 7.01 and 7.02, the court concluded a rational jury could infer culpable participation from his authority in the household, proximity to the child, awareness of the worsening condition, omission in the face of obvious need, and minimizing statements after the fact. The court also rejected his Confrontation Clause complaint and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases, Gonzalez is a strong crossover authority for the idea that a live-in nonparent can be treated as a de facto caregiver based on actual household power, not formal legal status. If a parent’s partner or other resident adult disciplines the child, controls food, observes injuries or decline, and does nothing, that evidence can support endangerment, restrictions, supervised possession, or no-contact provisions even without formal caregiving records."
Tia Mashawn Palm Clark v. Quincy Deaz Clark
COA14
In Clark v. Clark, the wife tried to avoid enforcement of a divorce mediated settlement agreement by filing a last-minute motion to set it aside based on duress and coercion. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the issue was not preserved for appeal because the record did not show the motion was presented to the trial court, heard, or ruled on before the final judgment was signed, as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court also explained that, even if preservation were assumed, the trial court could still enforce the MSA because the wife’s declaration did not establish key duress elements such as lack of present means of protection or that her free agency was overcome. The judgment enforcing the MSA was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge an MSA in Texas family court, filing a motion is not enough. You must promptly serve it, set it for hearing, make sure it is actually presented to the judge, and obtain a ruling or a refusal to rule. Without a clear record, an appellate court will likely treat duress, coercion, or fraud complaints as waived."
Jean Michel Szabuniewicz, Individually and in His Capacity as Former Trustee of the Oak Lawn Investment Trust; Oak Lawn General, Inc.; Oak Lawn Holdings I, L.P.; Texas Urban Properties, Ltd.; Texas Urban GP, Inc.; Oak Lawn Medical Properties, L.P.; Willow Park Construction, Inc.; and Guaranty Finance Company v. Todd May, in His Capacity as Trustee of the Beverly Trust
COA02
In this restricted appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed a no-answer default judgment because the face of the record showed multiple service defects under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 99 and 107. The plaintiff obtained default relief against an individual and several entities, but the returns of service were never separately filed with the clerk before judgment and appeared only as attachments to the default motion. The court also found strict-compliance problems because the petition, citations, and returns did not match as to the registered agent, the person actually served, and the service addresses. Applying the rule that no presumptions favor valid service in a restricted appeal and that actual notice does not cure defective service, the court held the record did not affirmatively establish proper service. The default judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you plan to take a default judgment, build the service record for appellate review. In Texas family cases, even small mismatches in names, capacities, agents, or addresses—or a return that is not actually filed with the clerk—can undo a default on restricted appeal, regardless of actual notice."
In the Interest of B.H. and L.H.
COA09
In this Beaumont divorce appeal, the wife challenged a final decree requiring sale of the marital residence and setting guideline child support. The court held the property complaint was not preserved because the decree tracked the parties’ mediated agreement, the trial court found the division just and right, and the wife made no objection or developed any record of coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation at the prove-up or in a post-judgment motion. The child-support complaint likewise failed because the trial court based support on testimony and admitted financial information about the husband’s self-employment income, disallowed some claimed deductions, and the wife did not object or offer contrary evidence in the trial court. The court also refused to consider documents attached only to the appellate brief because matters outside the appellate record are not evidence. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge a mediated divorce decree or a child-support calculation, do it in the trial court and make a record. Silence at prove-up, especially when the decree follows a mediated agreement, usually waives appellate complaints, and you cannot fix a bad record by attaching new documents to an appellate brief."
In re Guardianship of Stewart
COA10
In In re Guardianship of Stewart, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a guardianship order appointing Father as permanent guardian of the parties’ adult son was void because the proposed ward was never personally served with Father’s guardianship application as required by Texas Estates Code § 1051.103(a)(1). Although the son was later personally served with Mother’s separate competing application and an attorney ad litem answered and appeared, the court treated the problem as a complete lack of service—not a mere technical defect. Relying on the Estates Code and In re Guardianship of Fairley, the court explained that personal service must correspond to the specific pleading on which the court grants relief, and neither actual notice nor ad litem participation can waive or cure the absence of service on the proposed ward. Because Father’s application was never personally served on the proposed ward, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to appoint Father, so the appellate court vacated the order and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a statute makes personal service jurisdictional, each pleading seeking affirmative relief must stand on its own. Service of one party’s petition does not authorize judgment on another party’s competing petition, and actual notice, attorney participation, or ad litem involvement will not save an order entered on an unserved pleading."
In re Ganga Thapa
COA03
In In re Ganga Thapa, the Third Court of Appeals held that a grandmother had standing under Texas Family Code section 102.004(a)(2) to seek managing conservatorship because the Department, which had been appointed managing conservator after termination of the parents’ rights, expressly consented to her suit. The trial court had sua sponte found she lacked standing and struck her intervention in the pending SAPCR. The appellate court treated the issue as a pure standing question, applied the rule that an intervenor in a SAPCR generally needs only the same standing required to file the claim as an original suit, and concluded that Thapa’s original-suit standing carried over to intervention. Because the trial court’s contrary legal conclusion was an abuse of discretion and denial of intervention in a SAPCR lacks an adequate appellate remedy, the court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its standing ruling and order striking the intervention.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a grandparent’s standing depends on Family Code section 102.004(a)(2), get the managing conservator’s consent clearly into the record—preferably in a filed written consent tied expressly to the statute. Once that statutory gateway is satisfied, a trial court cannot deny intervention based on generalized discretion; the fight shifts from standing to the merits."
In the Interest of N.P., a Child
COA12
In In re N.P., the Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court analyzed whether the child’s environment and the father’s course of conduct endangered the child, focusing on the mother’s methamphetamine use during pregnancy, the newborn’s positive drug test, the parents’ homelessness, the father’s repeated domestic violence against the mother during pregnancy, and his resulting incarceration. The court held this evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show both endangering conditions or surroundings under subsection (D) and a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious endangering course of conduct under subsection (E), so it affirmed the termination judgment without reaching subsection (P).
Litigation Takeaway
"Prenatal violence, drug exposure at birth, homelessness, and criminal instability can combine to prove endangerment under both Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a unified safety narrative tying domestic violence, substance abuse, and instability directly to risk to the child."
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez
COA04
In Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, the trial court ordered the father to pay $1,417.23 in monthly child support even though the decree referenced lower guideline amounts and stated only that he was underemployed and that above-guideline support was in the children’s best interest. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that because the award varied from the guideline calculation, Texas Family Code § 154.130 required written findings stating the parties’ net resources, the percentage applied, whether guideline support would be unjust or inappropriate, and the specific reasons for the variance. The appellate court concluded the decree’s conclusory recitals were insufficient because they left the father and the court to guess whether the trial court had imputed income, varied upward from a guideline figure, or both. The omission was harmful and reversible, so the court abated the appeal and remanded for entry of the required findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a Texas court orders child support above or below the guideline amount, the decree must do more than say 'underemployed' and 'best interest.' Lawyers should make sure the order spells out the guideline calculation, net resources, percentage used, and the specific reasons guideline support would be unjust or inappropriate, or an otherwise defensible support award may be sent back on appeal."