Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
Cedillo v. State
COA01
In Cedillo v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that a party does not preserve an appellate complaint that a child’s outcry statements were unreliable under Article 38.072 by arguing only about which adult was the proper outcry witness. The trial dispute focused on witness designation—whether the mother, grandmother, counselor, or another adult was the first qualifying recipient of the child’s disclosure—not on the separate statutory reliability inquiry requiring analysis of the statement’s time, content, and circumstances. Because Cedillo did not specifically raise that reliability objection in the trial court, the court found the complaint waived. The court also held that any error would have been harmless because substantially similar abuse evidence came in through the children’s own testimony and unobjected-to medical records.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, do not lump together distinct evidentiary objections. If you want to challenge a child’s statement as unreliable, say so clearly and tie the objection to the governing reliability standard; arguing only that the wrong adult is serving as the messenger will not preserve the issue for appeal. And if similar testimony or records come in elsewhere without objection, any evidentiary complaint may still fail on harmless-error grounds."
In the Interest of S.V.H.F., A Child
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights after a three-month-old infant suffered severe non-accidental head trauma while in the father’s exclusive care. The court relied on medical records showing intracranial bleeding and retinal hemorrhages consistent with abusive acceleration/deceleration injury, and held the trial court was entitled to reject the father’s innocent explanation that the child merely choked or asphyxiated on milk. Applying the clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), and because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough, it did not need to reach subsection (D).
Litigation Takeaway
"When a very young child suffers serious unexplained injuries during one parent’s exclusive care, Texas courts may infer endangerment from circumstantial medical evidence alone—even without pinpoint testimony about the exact timing or mechanism of injury. For family-law litigators, the case highlights the importance of building or attacking the exclusivity timeline, medical-record causation, and witness credibility, because a factfinder may simply disbelieve a parent’s benign account and that can be enough to sustain major protective relief."
In the Matter of J.P., a Juvenile
COA05
In this juvenile appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed a written modification order that committed J.P. to TJJD but cited Family Code section 54.04(f), the original-disposition statute, instead of section 54.05(f), the statute governing modification proceedings. After conducting its Anders review, the court concluded the record clearly showed this was a modification case, that J.P. had pleaded true to the probation violation, and that the underlying felony adjudication made him eligible for TJJD commitment. Because the defect was a drafting error rather than a lack of authority or harmful substantive error, the court reformed the order to substitute section 54.05(f) for section 54.04(f) and affirmed the order as modified. The court also denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw because counsel’s duties continue through the petition-for-review stage absent good cause.
Litigation Takeaway
"Not every mistake in a written order justifies reversal. If the record clearly shows what the trial court intended and supports the relief granted, an appellate court may reform a mis-cited or internally inconsistent order rather than remand or reverse. For family-law litigators, that means two things: draft orders carefully, and on appeal focus on whether the defect is truly substantive and harmful or merely a correctable scrivener’s error."
Dillon Austin Venson v. The State of Texas
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly designated a forensic interviewer as the Article 38.072 outcry witness even though the child first told her mother that the defendant had 'messed with' her and put his hands down her pants. The court explained that the outcry witness is not automatically the first adult who hears any allegation of abuse, but the first adult who receives a statement that describes the alleged offense in a discernible way. Because the mother described the initial conversation as brief and lacking detail, while the later CAC interview provided specific facts about the sexual touching, the trial court acted within its discretion in selecting the forensic interviewer. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to support the indecency-with-a-child conviction and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-abuse-related family litigation, do not assume the first adult listener controls the evidentiary story. Courts will focus on the first sufficiently descriptive disclosure, not merely the first mention of abuse. For practitioners, the key is to build a precise disclosure timeline, compare the exact content of each statement, and frame arguments around specificity rather than chronology."
In the Interest of A.P.Z., a Child
COA05
In In re A.P.Z., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a custody-modification order after Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to give Father the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence. The court did not reach the merits of Mother’s evidentiary complaints because the appellate record was incomplete: it omitted the trial court’s in-camera interview of the 15-year-old child, a referenced child interview status report, and related proceedings. Applying settled Texas appellate rules, the court presumed the missing portions of the reporter’s record supported the judgment. Because Mother’s arguments depended on the state of the evidence, the court held those complaints were waived and treated the evidence as sufficient to support implied findings of material and substantial change and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you plan to challenge a custody or modification ruling on evidentiary grounds, you must bring up a complete appellate record—especially any in-camera child interview under Family Code § 153.009. In family cases, missing hearings, report-back settings, or child interviews will usually trigger a presumption that the omitted evidence supports the judgment, making sufficiency and abuse-of-discretion complaints effectively dead on arrival."
In the Interest of B.W., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of B.W., the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a child could not appeal an order terminating his father’s parental rights when the child, through counsel, had only filed a general denial and opposed termination at trial but had not pleaded any affirmative claim for relief or identified any Family Code provision authorizing the appeal. The court analyzed the issue as a threshold question of appellate standing and subject-matter jurisdiction, explaining that participation in the trial court does not itself make someone an aggrieved party for appellate purposes. Because B.W. showed no legally recognized justiciable interest that was injuriously affected by the judgment, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the sufficiency challenge to the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume that trial participation preserves appellate rights in a family case. To appeal, the would-be appellant must have a statutory basis to do so and must be an aggrieved party whose own legally recognized interest was harmed by the judgment; a general denial and opposition at trial are not enough."
Fulton v. State
COA07
In Fulton v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a trial court could not assess $787.50 in court-appointed attorney’s fees against a defendant who had repeatedly been found indigent when the record contained no evidence of a material change in her financial circumstances or any present ability to pay. The court relied on article 26.05(g) and Mayer v. State, emphasizing that boilerplate recitals and an administrative order entered without a hearing do not substitute for evidence. The court also struck a $500 fine that was never orally pronounced, deleted a $443 reparation award unsupported by the record, and removed a premature $15 time-payment fee. The judgment, bill of costs, and withdrawal order were modified accordingly.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a court is going to impose attorney’s fees or other monetary obligations on a party previously found indigent, the record must affirmatively show present ability to pay and any material change in circumstances. For family-law litigants, Fulton is a strong analogy for attacking unsupported fee awards, reimbursement orders, and cost assessments that rest on assumptions rather than evidence."
In Re Jose Gilberto Perez
COA05
In this original proceeding, a father sought mandamus relief after the trial court denied his request to modify SAPCR temporary orders that apparently left the child with a nonparent. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of his parental-presumption arguments because his mandamus record was fatally incomplete: he omitted the operative January 2025 temporary order, the relevant motions, and properly authenticated transcripts and exhibits from the hearings that led to the ruling. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7 and standard mandamus principles, the court held he failed to show a clear abuse of discretion. The court also struck the petition and record for including unredacted sensitive data, and denied relief without prejudice to refiling with a compliant record.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus rises or falls on the record. Even strong family-law arguments about parental rights or improper nonparent conservatorship will go nowhere if the petition does not include the actual order being challenged, the key motions, and authenticated transcripts and exhibits from every material hearing. Also, do a final Rule 9.9 redaction check before filing."
In Re Kathryn Copeland
COA05
In In re Copeland, a pro se litigant already subject to a vexatious-litigant prefiling order sought mandamus after the local administrative judge denied her request under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 11.102(d). The Dallas Court of Appeals held that section 11.102(d) is only a gatekeeping mechanism for deciding whether a vexatious litigant may file new litigation; it does not authorize the local administrative judge to declare the underlying vexatious-litigant order void ab initio. Because Copeland’s motion primarily sought a collateral attack on the prior order rather than permission to file identified new litigation, and because she failed to show the judge had authority to grant the requested relief, mandamus was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not use a Chapter 11 permission request as a backdoor attack on an existing vexatious-litigant order. In family-law cases, be precise about whether you are seeking permission to file new litigation, filing in an existing case, or challenging the validity of the prior prefiling order—because those are different procedural paths, and mixing them can sink the request and any mandamus challenge."
The Bryant Law Firm and Deborah E. Bryant v. Robert Walker
SCOTX
In a fee-dispute case with family-law implications, the Texas Supreme Court held that a client’s claims against his former lawyer were barred by accord and satisfaction under Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 3.311. After the client demanded a refund and complained that the lawyer’s alleged mishandling of his child-support-termination matter caused additional losses, the lawyer sent a $3,300 refund check and a release. The check conspicuously stated that cashing it would be a full and final settlement and release of all claims. The Court concluded the statutory elements were satisfied because the refund was tendered in good faith, there was a bona fide dispute over the amount and scope of the client’s claims, and the client deposited the check with actual knowledge of the settlement condition. The client’s attempt to cross out the release language and refusal to sign a separate release did not matter because negotiating the check itself completed the accord and satisfaction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat any check marked as full settlement like a binding settlement offer, not routine payment. In family-law disputes over fees, reimbursements, equalization payments, or support-related expenses, depositing a conspicuously conditioned check can wipe out larger claims—even if you write "under protest," strike the language, or decline to sign a separate release."