Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Crayton v. State
COA03
After being convicted of intoxication manslaughter, John Edgar Crayton, Jr. was assessed court costs without the trial court conducting the mandatory 'ability-to-pay' inquiry required by Article 42.15(a-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Crayton appealed, arguing the omission was reversible error. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory scheme alongside recent precedent, determining that the inquiry is a procedural right rather than a fundamental one. The court held that because Crayton failed to object to the omission during sentencing when given the opportunity, he forfeited the error on appeal. Furthermore, the court held the error was not reversible because the law provides a post-judgment mechanism for defendants to seek relief due to financial hardship at any time.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on a trial court to perform a 'mandatory' statutory inquiry regarding a client's ability to pay fees or costs; counsel must proactively object to any omission on the record or risk waiving the issue for appeal. In the event of a waiver, practitioners should utilize post-judgment hardship statutes to seek relief rather than pursuing a likely-to-fail appeal."
In the Interest of A.R. and C.R., Children
COA10
In this parental termination case, a mother’s court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, asserting that the appeal was frivolous, and simultaneously moved to withdraw from the case. The Tenth Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record and agreed that there were no arguable grounds for reversal, affirming the termination decree. However, the court denied the attorney’s motion to withdraw. Relying on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in In re P.M., the court concluded that a parent’s statutory right to counsel persists through the exhaustion of all appellate remedies, including the filing of a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. Therefore, an attorney cannot withdraw simply because the appeal is deemed meritless at the intermediate stage.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas parental termination cases, the right to court-appointed counsel is a "long-tail" obligation; even if an attorney believes an appeal is meritless, they must generally remain on the case until the client has had the opportunity to seek review from the Texas Supreme Court."
Raven Robert Rodriguez v. State
COA11
Raven Robert Rodriguez was convicted of capital murder following the stabbing death of his long-term partner. On appeal, Rodriguez argued that the trial court erred by failing to limit the definitions of 'intentionally' and 'knowingly' in the jury charge and by admitting evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence against the victim. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that while the jury charge was technically erroneous, it did not result in egregious harm given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the defendant's admission and surveillance footage. Crucially, the court upheld the admission of prior domestic violence incidents, finding them relevant to establishing the nature of the relationship and the defendant's pattern of conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"To successfully prove a pattern of domestic violence in family law cases, practitioners should prioritize objective corroboration—such as surveillance video, medical records, and photos—to supplement testimony. When prior acts of violence against the same partner are well-documented, they are highly admissible to establish context and risk, and appellate courts are unlikely to reverse such findings even if technical instructional errors occur at trial."
In re K.M.R., a Child
COA14
In this parental termination case, a mother appealed the loss of her parental rights after her child tested positive for cocaine at birth. She argued that the trial court violated her due process by denying a request to delay the trial while she was in a behavioral hospital, and that her prenatal drug use did not constitute an endangering 'environment' because the child was removed immediately after birth. The 14th Court of Appeals affirmed the termination, holding that the mother failed to follow mandatory procedures by not including a sworn affidavit with her request for a delay. The court also clarified that under Texas law, the 'environment' of a child includes the womb, meaning drug use during pregnancy is sufficient evidence of endangerment to support termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Always adhere to the technical requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251 when seeking a trial delay; failing to include a sworn verification or affidavit can prevent you from challenging the denial on appeal. Furthermore, be aware that Texas courts consider prenatal drug use as creating an endangering environment, effectively neutralizing the defense that a parent never had post-birth custody of the child."
In the Interest of M.B., a Child
COA02
In a private termination suit brought by grandparents, the trial court failed to appoint an amicus attorney or attorney ad litem for the child. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code Section 107.021(a-1), which states that a court 'shall' appoint a representative unless it specifically finds the child’s interests are adequately represented by a non-conflicted party. Because the trial court made no such finding and acknowledged the child's interests were unrepresented, the appellate court held that the failure to appoint a representative was a mandatory statutory error. The court concluded this constitutes reversible error that is not subject to a harmless error analysis, necessitating a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"In private termination and adoption proceedings, the appointment of a representative for the child is a non-discretionary statutory duty; trial counsel must ensure an amicus or ad litem is appointed or obtain an express 'no-conflict' finding on the record to prevent the judgment from being automatically reversed on appeal."
KSW Rail Group, LLC v. SLI, Inc.
COA05
SLI, Inc. sued KSW Rail Group, LLC using its registered assumed name and obtained a default judgment via substituted service. KSW challenged the judgment, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the legal entity was not properly named in the citation and the return of service was technically deficient. The Dallas Court of Appeals applied the 'misnomer' doctrine, ruling that serving an entity under its registered d/b/a effectively invokes jurisdiction over the legal entity. Furthermore, the court held that Rule 118 allows for the post-judgment amendment of a return of service to reflect the truth of service and demonstrate strict compliance with a substituted service order. The court affirmed the default judgment, holding that technical clerical errors in a return do not void service if they can be cured by amendment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Technical errors in a process server's return of service aren't necessarily fatal to a default judgment; Rule 118 allows you to retroactively fix the record to reflect that proper service actually occurred. Additionally, if a party is using a registered assumed name (d/b/a), serving them under that name is legally sufficient to bind the actual legal entity."
City of Houston v. Pellott
COA14
In City of Houston v. Pellott, a plaintiff sued the city under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) but failed to specifically plead that timely statutory notice was provided to the governmental unit. The City moved for dismissal under Rule 91a, arguing the petition lacked a basis in law because it failed to allege this jurisdictional prerequisite. Although the plaintiff provided evidence in a response suggesting that notice had actually been sent and received, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused strictly on the pleadings. The court analyzed the case under the Harris County v. Sykes doctrine, which requires dismissal with prejudice when a party fails to cure a jurisdictional pleading defect after being given multiple opportunities to replead. The court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion and rendered a judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"When suing a governmental entity—whether for incidents involving CPS, school districts, or police during possession exchanges—pleading statutory notice in your petition is a jurisdictional requirement, not a suggestion. You cannot rely on external evidence or 'actual notice' to save a case if your formal pleadings are defective; if you fail to fix the petition after a challenge, the court can dismiss your claim permanently with prejudice."
Blevins v. Brown
COA07
In Blevins v. Brown, a plaintiff filed suit for slander and tortious interference but failed to include specific factual details regarding the alleged defamatory statements. After the defendant filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff attempted to file an amended petition on the day of the hearing to cure the defects. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict between the general amendment provisions of Rule 65 and the specific requirements of Rule 91a.5(c), determining that the specific three-day deadline for Rule 91a amendments is mandatory and supersedes general rules. The court held that the trial court properly refused to consider the late amendment and affirmed the dismissal, ruling that defamation claims lacking specific factual predicates constitute legally baseless 'threadbare recitals.'
Litigation Takeaway
"Precision is paramount when pleading 'crossover' torts like defamation in family law; you must provide specific facts—the who, what, when, and where—in your petition and remember that the Rule 91a amendment window closes strictly three days before the hearing."
Hyde v. Aero Valley Property Owners Association, Inc.
COA02
The Hyde Parties appealed a summary judgment regarding airport management authority but only targeted the primary appellee (POA), intentionally excluding twenty-five intervening property owners who had been awarded identical declaratory relief in the same judgment. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the 'doctrine of entangled interests' and the finality of unchallenged judgments, concluding that when a party fails to challenge a portion of a judgment granting the same relief to an intervenor as it does to the primary appellee, that portion remains binding. The court held that because the judgment in favor of the intervenors became final and could not be disturbed, the appeal against the POA was rendered moot, necessitating an affirmance of the entire judgment without reaching the underlying merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"In cases involving intervenors—such as grandparents in custody battles or business entities in property divisions—failing to specifically name and challenge the relief granted to those third parties in your appeal can result in a total waiver of your right to challenge the judgment as a whole."
Hutcherson v. Hutcherson
COA03
In a divorce involving a high-net-worth couple with a valid premarital agreement (PMA), the trial court awarded the wife a $900,000 money judgment and $5,000 per month in spousal maintenance. This award occurred despite the PMA limiting the community estate to approximately $83,000, with most assets characterized as the husband's separate property. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict between the trial court's equitable "just and right" division powers and the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA). The court held that because the PMA was valid, the trial court was strictly bound by its property characterizations. By awarding a judgment nearly eleven times the value of the community estate, the trial court effectively divested the husband of his separate property, which is prohibited under Texas law. The court reversed the money judgment and maintenance award, holding that a luxurious lifestyle during marriage does not allow a court to circumvent the contractual limitations of a PMA.
Litigation Takeaway
"A premarital agreement is a binding ceiling on property division. Trial courts cannot use large money judgments or "lifestyle-based" spousal maintenance to bypass a valid agreement that limits community assets. If the community estate is small due to a premarital contract, the court's award must stay within the value of those limited assets; otherwise, it is an unconstitutional divestiture of separate property."