Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Hutcherson v. Hutcherson
COA03
In a divorce involving a high-net-worth couple with a valid premarital agreement (PMA), the trial court awarded the wife a $900,000 money judgment and $5,000 per month in spousal maintenance. This award occurred despite the PMA limiting the community estate to approximately $83,000, with most assets characterized as the husband's separate property. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict between the trial court's equitable "just and right" division powers and the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA). The court held that because the PMA was valid, the trial court was strictly bound by its property characterizations. By awarding a judgment nearly eleven times the value of the community estate, the trial court effectively divested the husband of his separate property, which is prohibited under Texas law. The court reversed the money judgment and maintenance award, holding that a luxurious lifestyle during marriage does not allow a court to circumvent the contractual limitations of a PMA.
Litigation Takeaway
"A premarital agreement is a binding ceiling on property division. Trial courts cannot use large money judgments or "lifestyle-based" spousal maintenance to bypass a valid agreement that limits community assets. If the community estate is small due to a premarital contract, the court's award must stay within the value of those limited assets; otherwise, it is an unconstitutional divestiture of separate property."
DePriest v. DePriest
COA14
In this post-decree dispute, a husband sought amended Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDROs) after plan administrators rejected the originals. The wife filed counterclaims for fraud and breach of contract, attempting to relitigate the property division established in the final 2019 decree, which had already been affirmed on appeal. The trial court dismissed the wife's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, ruling that a trial court lacks the authority to substantively alter or "undo" a final property division once plenary power has expired and appellate remedies are exhausted. The court also held that the wife waived her right to 45-day trial notice under Rule 245 by participating in the hearing without objection.
Litigation Takeaway
"A final divorce decree affirmed on appeal is truly final; parties cannot use post-decree enforcement or QDRO proceedings as a vehicle to revive old disputes or launch collateral attacks on the original property division. Furthermore, procedural rights like trial notice are waived if you participate in a hearing without making a timely objection."
Ex Parte Giambi Boyd
COA01
Giambi Boyd was held in pretrial detention for over 500 days on $1.2 million bail for felony charges including murder. He filed for habeas corpus, arguing that under Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, he was entitled to release or a bail reduction because the State was not ready for trial within the mandatory 90-day window. The trial court denied the request, prioritizing the severity of the offenses and community safety. On appeal, the court analyzed Article 17.151 as a mandatory statutory directive that leaves no room for judicial discretion regarding safety or the nature of the crime once the 90-day readiness period expires. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order, holding that because the State admitted it was not ready for trial due to pending lab results, the trial court was required by law to either release Boyd on a personal bond or reduce his bail to an amount he could actually afford.
Litigation Takeaway
"In "crossover" cases where a family law client is detained on high bail for felony allegations, Article 17.151 is a mandatory tool to secure their release if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days. This rule allows practitioners to bypass judicial concerns about "community safety" and the "nature of the offense" to ensure the client can participate in civil proceedings like custody evaluations and final trials."
Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC
COA02
In Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, the Second Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se restricted appeal because the appellant had previously been declared a vexatious litigant and was subject to a Chapter 11 prefiling order. The court analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 11.101, 11.103, and 11.1035, which require a vexatious litigant to obtain permission from the appropriate local administrative judge before filing an appeal and mandate dismissal if that permission is not obtained. After the court gave Nicholson an opportunity to provide the required permission order, she instead produced materials showing that permission had been denied. Because no statutory exception applied, the court held that dismissal was mandatory.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a pro se appellant is subject to a Chapter 11 vexatious-litigant prefiling order, appellate review can be stopped at the threshold unless the appellant first gets written permission from the local administrative judge. For family law lawyers, that makes vexatious-litigant status and the existence of a permission order an early procedural checkpoint that may support dismissal without reaching the merits."
Mahasneh v. Mahasneh
COA02
A former wife sought a protective order against her ex-husband after he engaged in a persistent pattern of stalking, including placing a GPS tracker on her vehicle and surveilling her workplace. The trial court issued a 30-year protective order under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and awarded her attorney's fees. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals examined whether the evidence supported such a long duration and whether the attorney's fees were sufficiently proven. The court affirmed the 30-year protective order, ruling that Chapter 7B allows for long-term orders based on stalking without the "future family violence" findings required by the Family Code. However, the court reversed the attorney's fees award, holding that counsel's testimony was too conclusory and failed to meet the strict "lodestar" requirements—specifically failing to detail the hours worked, the hourly rate, and the specific tasks performed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning a protective order does not exempt you from strict evidentiary rules for attorney's fees; always provide a detailed "lodestar" breakdown—including specific tasks, hours, and rates—or risk losing the fee award on appeal. Additionally, consider utilizing Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure for stalking cases, as it can provide longer-term protection than the Family Code with different evidentiary requirements."
Pyrtle v. Fowler
COA14
In Pyrtle v. Fowler, a dispute arose between former cohabitants regarding the ownership and use of a home and a 2012 Lexus. The trial court granted a temporary injunction allowing the plaintiff to remain in the home and retain control of the vehicle pending trial. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether these assets met the requirements for equitable relief. The court held that while real property is considered unique and justifies an injunction to preserve the status quo, personal property like vehicles does not qualify because any harm can be adequately compensated through money damages (such as rental costs or loss-of-use value). Consequently, the court affirmed the injunction as to the residence but struck down the provisions regarding the motor vehicles.
Litigation Takeaway
"While courts will readily issue injunctions to protect your right to occupy a unique residence during a lawsuit, they generally will not do the same for vehicles or personal property because those losses can be fixed with a check for damages."
In the Interest of T.M., a Child
COA11
In this parental termination case, the Department sought to terminate a mother's rights after her child, T.M., tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana. The mother contended the exposure was accidental due to her work as a hotel housekeeper, but the Department also cited her failure to keep the child away from a drug-using father. The Court of Appeals analyzed the endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b), determining that the mother's choice to bring the child to a high-risk workplace and allow unsupervised contact with the father supported endangerment. However, the Court also scrutinized the Department's compliance with Section 161.001(f), which requires clear and convincing evidence of reasonable efforts to return the child. Ultimately, the Court issued a partial reversal and remand, holding that the Department failed to satisfy its high evidentiary burden for every mandatory statutory finding required to support the irrevocable termination of parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug exposure is not a "universal solvent" that excuses the Department from its burden of proof; practitioners must ensure that every statutory element, particularly the requirement for reasonable reunification efforts under Section 161.001(f), is supported by clear and convincing evidence to avoid reversal on appeal."
Childress v. Tradd
COA03
Following the death of Robert Caldwell, the executor of his estate sued Dione Childress for conversion after she removed estate property, claiming she was Caldwell's common-law wife. During litigation, Childress, acting pro se, failed to respond to discovery requests, including requests for admissions. The executor moved for summary judgment based on these 'deemed admissions.' Childress filed a response only four days before the hearing without seeking leave of court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment, holding that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c), a response filed less than seven days before a hearing is a nullity. Furthermore, under Rule 198.3, the failure to respond to admissions conclusively established the facts necessary for the estate to prevail. The court emphasized that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as licensed attorneys.
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural deadlines are absolute, and 'deemed admissions' are a litigation guillotine. In marriage and property disputes, failing to answer discovery requests can conclusively surrender your case, as courts will not grant leniency to pro se litigants who ignore the mandatory seven-day window for summary judgment responses or discovery deadlines."
In re Kirt McGhee
COA09
In a dispute over attorney’s fees, a trial court ordered a party to produce unredacted billing invoices and supplemental expert disclosures, despite a prior appellate ruling that the original disclosures were sufficient. The Ninth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that the 'law of the case' doctrine prevented the trial court from revisiting the adequacy of disclosures already validated on appeal. The court further clarified that seeking attorney's fees does not result in an automatic waiver of attorney-client privilege for billing descriptions and that a party cannot be compelled to produce records that are no longer in their possession or control.
Litigation Takeaway
"Requesting attorney’s fees does not waive your right to redact privileged strategy and communications from your billing records; additionally, once an appellate court confirms your expert disclosures are adequate, the trial court cannot force you to supplement them with more detail on remand."
In Re Estate of Wright
COA11
In a contested probate case transferred from a Throckmorton County court to a district court, a contestant challenged the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction, alleging the transfer order was procedurally defective. The court of appeals analyzed Texas Estates Code § 32.003, which mandates transfers of contested probate matters in counties without statutory probate courts. The court held that because the transfer was mandatory and the case had actually moved, any clerical or internal inconsistencies in the transfer order were non-jurisdictional procedural defects that the contestant waived by failing to object in the trial court. Additionally, the court found that testimony stating a will was never revoked 'to the best of [the witness's] knowledge' constituted probative evidence to support admitting the will to probate.
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural defects in a transfer order between courts are not 'jurisdictional silver bullets' and must be preserved by a timely objection in the trial court; otherwise, the complaint is waived. Furthermore, personal knowledge testimony framed as 'to the best of my knowledge' regarding the non-revocation of a document is sufficient probative evidence to support a trial court finding."