Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Gonzalez v. Montalvo
COA14
In a dispute over the partition of several hundred acres of estate property, the appellant challenged the trial court's order to sell the land and its denial of a jury trial. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals first clarified that a "phase-one" partition order—which determines if property should be sold or divided in kind—is a final, appealable judgment. On the jury issue, the court held that a party cannot rely on a jury demand and fee payment made by another party who has since nonsuited their claims, as a nonsuit restores the parties to their pre-filing positions. Regarding the partition itself, the court found the trial court applied the wrong legal standard by focusing on whether individual tracts could be split equally rather than whether the aggregate estate could be fairly divided. The court affirmed the denial of the jury trial but reversed the order of sale.
Litigation Takeaway
"Always file your own jury demand and pay the fee; relying on an opponent’s request is a 'trap' because a nonsuit will immediately strip you of that jury right. Furthermore, in partition litigation, the 'phase one' order is not interlocutory—you must appeal the decision to sell versus divide immediately or lose the right to challenge it."
Fanous v. Allstate Insurance
COA02
In Fanous v. Allstate Insurance, the appellant filed a notice of appeal 21 days after the mandatory 90-day deadline triggered by a motion for new trial. The appellant argued the delay was a strategic decision to avoid 'alienating' the trial judge during a pending hearing. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 26.3, concluding that appellate deadlines are strictly jurisdictional. The court held that subjective tactical concerns or the desire to maintain a judge's favor do not constitute a reasonable explanation for missing filing windows, and subsequently dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never miss a jurisdictional appellate deadline for the sake of 'trial court optics'; the appellate clock does not pause for pending motions or a lawyer's fear of alienating the trial judge."
In the Interest of L.L., a Child
COA02
After a trial court terminated a Father's parental rights to his child, L.L., based on endangerment and best-interest findings, his appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous. The Second Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal existed. Finding no non-frivolous issues, the court affirmed the termination decree. However, the court clarified that under Texas Family Code § 107.016 and the Texas Supreme Court's precedent in In re P.M., appointed counsel’s obligations do not end at the intermediate court; the duty to represent the parent continues through potential proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court unless counsel is relieved for good cause.
Litigation Takeaway
"In parental termination cases, an appointed attorney's duty of representation is "sticky"—it persists through the exhaustion of all appeals, including a petition for review to the Texas Supreme Court, even if the intermediate court determines the appeal is frivolous."
In the Interest of T.M., a Child
COA11
In this parental termination case, the Department sought to terminate a mother's rights after her child, T.M., tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana. The mother contended the exposure was accidental due to her work as a hotel housekeeper, but the Department also cited her failure to keep the child away from a drug-using father. The Court of Appeals analyzed the endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b), determining that the mother's choice to bring the child to a high-risk workplace and allow unsupervised contact with the father supported endangerment. However, the Court also scrutinized the Department's compliance with Section 161.001(f), which requires clear and convincing evidence of reasonable efforts to return the child. Ultimately, the Court issued a partial reversal and remand, holding that the Department failed to satisfy its high evidentiary burden for every mandatory statutory finding required to support the irrevocable termination of parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug exposure is not a "universal solvent" that excuses the Department from its burden of proof; practitioners must ensure that every statutory element, particularly the requirement for reasonable reunification efforts under Section 161.001(f), is supported by clear and convincing evidence to avoid reversal on appeal."
In re Mark Warner
COA05
Relator Mark Warner filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a trial court's order for sanctions and turnover. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition on two procedural grounds without reaching the merits. First, the court found the relator failed to provide a properly 'sworn or certified' record because his unsworn declaration lacked the specific 'penalty of perjury' language required by Texas law. Second, the court held that because the relator was represented by counsel in the trial court, he was not permitted to file a pro se petition, as Texas law prohibits 'hybrid representation.'
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural precision is non-negotiable in mandamus proceedings. To avoid summary denial, ensure every document in the record is authenticated with a declaration specifically invoking the 'penalty of perjury' and remember that a represented party cannot 'go rogue' by filing pro se motions or petitions while still appearing through counsel."
Gary D. Pickens v. City of Greenville, Texas
COA05
In Pickens v. City of Greenville, a plaintiff filed a mandamus action under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA) after a city failed to respond to multiple record requests. After the suit was filed, the parties entered into a Rule 11 settlement agreement where the City 'voluntarily' produced the records. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiff's request for mandatory attorney's fees and dismissed the case as moot. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that to 'substantially prevail' under Texas Government Code § 552.323(a), a plaintiff must obtain judicially sanctioned relief—such as a court order or judgment—that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties. Because the production was secured via a contract (Rule 11) rather than a judicial mandate, the plaintiff did not meet the prevailing party standard.
Litigation Takeaway
"To recover attorney's fees in a Public Information Act mandamus action, do not accept a 'voluntary' production via a Rule 11 agreement. You must secure a signed court order or an agreed final judgment that explicitly compels the production of documents to ensure your client qualifies as a 'prevailing party.'"
Benavidez v. State
COA04
In Benavidez v. State, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault and appealed his sentence on the grounds that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify by stating he 'couldn’t even take that stand' to take responsibility. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed the issue under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and the precedent set in Cockrell v. State, which requires a timely objection to preserve error for appellate review. The court held that because the defense failed to object during the closing argument, the complaint was forfeited. Furthermore, the court reaffirmed that Texas no longer recognizes an 'incurable argument' exception, meaning even egregious constitutional violations in jury arguments are waived without a contemporaneous objection.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on the 'incurable' nature of an opponent’s error to save you on appeal; if you do not object to an improper comment during closing arguments—such as a parent’s 'failure to take responsibility' or choice to remain silent—you waive that error entirely. To fully protect the record, you must object timely, request an instruction to disregard, and move for a mistrial."
Simon Rico, Jr. v. State
COA06
In Simon Rico, Jr. v. State, an appellant who was initially declared indigent and provided with court-appointed counsel substituted his representation for a private, retained attorney. When the retained attorney determined the appeal was frivolous, he attempted to follow the Anders v. California protocol by filing an Anders brief. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed whether these constitutional safeguards apply to non-indigent parties, concluding that the purpose of Anders is to provide indigent appellants with advocacy equal to those who can afford counsel. The court held that the substitution of retained counsel rebuts the presumption of continued indigency, meaning the attorney is not required to file an Anders brief and must instead follow the standard withdrawal procedures under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.5.
Litigation Takeaway
"In parental termination appeals, the rigorous Anders briefing requirement disappears the moment a party retains private counsel; hiring an attorney rebuts the presumption of indigency and shifts the procedural burden for withdrawing from a meritless appeal to the standard requirements of TRAP 6.5."
In re Brandon Charles Cole
COA05
In this original proceeding, Relator Brandon Charles Cole challenged the trial court's denial of his motions to recuse via a petition for writ of mandamus. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition, focusing on two primary issues: procedural non-compliance and the availability of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court found that Cole failed to provide a sworn or certified record as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7. Substantively, the court held that under Texas Supreme Court precedent, the erroneous denial of a recusal motion does not satisfy the requirements for mandamus relief because the issue can be fully addressed through a direct appeal following a final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas civil and family law litigation, mandamus is generally unavailable to challenge a trial court's refusal to recuse. Practitioners must focus on meticulously perfecting the appellate record and preserving the bias issue for a post-judgment appeal rather than seeking mid-stream intervention."
Ralston v. Ralston
COA07
Two family members, James and Anthony Ralston, were involved in a dispute over the ownership and possession of a residence. After a district court issued a partial summary judgment quieting title in Anthony’s favor and voiding James’s claims, Anthony initiated a forcible detainer (eviction) action in the county court at law. James argued that the county court lacked jurisdiction because the title dispute was still 'active' since the district court's judgment was only partial and not yet final. The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the eviction, holding that once a district court adjudicates title—even through an interlocutory or partial summary judgment—the jurisdictional bar for forcible detainer actions is removed. The court also held that a notice to vacate is not required to be signed to be valid under Texas Property Code § 24.005.
Litigation Takeaway
"In intra-family property disputes, you do not need a final, appealable judgment to begin eviction proceedings; an interlocutory or partial summary judgment from a district court quieting title is sufficient to establish jurisdiction for a forcible detainer action in a lower court."