Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
Tatum v. Noble
COA14
In Tatum v. Noble, a respondent failed to appear for a protective order hearing in the 280th District Court. Following the presiding judge's sua sponte recusal, the case was immediately transferred to the 245th District Court within the same county, where the judge issued a default protective order. The respondent challenged the order, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction due to missing administrative forms and that her due process rights were violated because she was not served with new notice for the second courtroom. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the order, holding that administrative "Registry" forms are not jurisdictional requirements. Furthermore, under Texas 'exchange of benches' statutes, a respondent who has already defaulted by failing to appear at the originally noticed time and place is not entitled to new formal notice when the matter is moved to another district court in the same county.
Litigation Takeaway
"Failing to show up for a scheduled hearing is a major risk; a judge recusing themselves or a case being moved to a different courtroom in the same building does not require the other party to re-serve you with notice before a default order is signed."
Rolling Dough, Ltd. d/b/a Panera Bread v. Anyadike
COA14
A customer sued Panera Bread for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) after a manager accused her of theft and summoned the police during a dispute over a pre-paid order. Panera moved to dismiss the claim under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA), arguing the report was a matter of public concern. The Court of Appeals analyzed whether reporting criminal activity falls under the TCPA and whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case for IIED. The court held that reporting a crime is an exercise of free speech on a matter of public concern and that the plaintiff failed to provide clear and specific evidence of "extreme and outrageous" conduct, as false accusations of theft and summoning police do not meet the high legal threshold for IIED. The court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded for the assessment of attorney's fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"Reporting suspected criminal activity to law enforcement is a protected matter of public concern under the TCPA; consequently, the TCPA serves as a powerful defensive shield to quickly dismiss retaliatory IIED claims and recover attorney’s fees in high-conflict disputes where the police are called."
Obadagbonyi v. State
COA14
In Obadagbonyi v. State, a defendant appealed his DWI conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his 'refusal' to provide a specimen when the officer failed to provide the mandatory statutory warnings. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals performed a harmless error analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), assuming the trial court erred but concluding that the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. The court held that because the record contained 'overwhelming' evidence of intoxication—including a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.206 and clear physical impairment—the procedural misstep was immaterial to the final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Technical procedural errors or exclusionary rules in a criminal DWI case often provide a false sense of security in parallel family law litigation; if substantive evidence like a high BAC exists, the court will likely treat procedural mistakes as 'harmless' when determining the best interest of the child."
Gallardo v. State
COA07
In Gallardo v. State, the Seventh Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant could be convicted of two counts of aggravated assault for a single, continuous encounter with one victim. The defendant drove a vehicle with the victim on the hood across several hundred yards before crashing into a house. The court analyzed the 'unit of prosecution' for assaultive offenses, determining that multiple punishments are permissible if the evidence shows discrete criminal acts separated by time or location. The court held that because the first assault ended before the second began—marked by the distance traveled and the change in residential locations—the convictions did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domestic violence incidents that move from room to room or occur in stages should be pleaded as multiple discrete acts of family violence rather than a single event. By establishing that one act ended before another began (due to a change in location, weapon, or a brief pause), practitioners can 'stack' findings of violence to overcome conservatorship presumptions under Texas Family Code § 153.004 and argue for a disproportionate share of the community estate based on cruelty."
In re BD Trucking and Basil Odigie
COA14
In a negligence lawsuit arising from a workplace accident, the defendants moved to designate the plaintiff's employer as a Responsible Third Party (RTP). The plaintiff objected, arguing that the employer's worker's compensation immunity barred the designation and that the defendants failed to plead sufficient facts. The trial court denied the motion. On mandamus review, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 33 and the 'fair notice' pleading standard. The court held that because the motion was timely filed (more than 60 days before trial) and provided sufficient notice of the allegations, the trial court had a ministerial duty to grant it. The court further clarified that statutory immunity does not prevent a party from being included in a proportionate responsibility jury charge.
Litigation Takeaway
"In litigation involving interspousal torts or fraud on the community, always look to designate responsible third parties (like paramours or financial advisors) to dilute your client's percentage of fault. Trial courts have almost no discretion to deny these motions if they are filed 60 days before trial and meet the minimal 'fair notice' pleading standard, even if the third party has a statutory immunity against being sued directly."
Martinez v. State
COA01
In Martinez v. State, a defendant appealed his 50-year sentence, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to appoint a Spanish-language interpreter despite a specific request for a "translation" during his adjudication hearing. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the "totality of the record," observing that the defendant had previously demonstrated functional English proficiency during his initial plea hearing, where he engaged in English colloquies and confirmed he could read and write the language "a little bit." Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held that a trial court is not required to provide the "best" interpretive services, but rather "constitutionally adequate" ones; because the record showed the defendant understood English "well enough" to participate in the proceedings and assist his counsel, no due process violation occurred.
Litigation Takeaway
"To defeat a tactical mid-trial request for an interpreter—or to preserve the right to one—practitioners must document a party's English proficiency early in the case through discovery of English-language texts, emails, and prior hearing transcripts, as Texas courts only require a litigant to understand English "well enough" to satisfy due process."
In re Tereza Kacerova
COA03
In this case, a mother filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking the return of her child after the father refused to allow her scheduled access. The father argued that the mother had violated "automatic suspension" clauses in their temporary order by discussing the ongoing litigation with the child and failing to speak English during supervised visits. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code § 157.372(a), which requires a child's return only if the person seeking it is currently entitled to possession. The court held that because there was evidence the mother violated the specific conduct requirements that triggered an automatic suspension of her rights, she was no longer "entitled to possession." Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the return of the child.
Litigation Takeaway
"Be aware that "self-executing" or "automatic suspension" clauses in a court order are powerful and enforceable. If your right to see your child is conditioned on specific behaviors—such as following language requirements or avoiding disparaging remarks—violating those terms can legally extinguish your right to possession before you even get to court, making it impossible to use emergency legal remedies like a writ of habeas corpus."
Palmer Enterprises, Inc. v. Kaplan Higher Education, LLC
COA13
In this case, a landlord sought to recover unpaid rent from a commercial guarantor following a lease extension. The guarantor argued they were not liable because they had not signed the second lease amendment, pointing to a clause in the original lease stating that all amendments must be signed by 'all parties' to be valid. The court analyzed the documents as a single integrated contract and applied the rule of 'strictissimi juris,' which requires a guarantor's obligations to be strictly construed. The court held that because the guarantor was a party to the agreement and did not sign the extension, the amendment was void as to them, and the 'continuing' nature of the guaranty did not override the lease's specific procedural requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
"A 'continuing guaranty' may not be enough to bind an ex-spouse to future business debts if the underlying contract requires all parties to sign modifications. If your client is a guarantor on an ex-spouse's business lease, the 'all parties' signature requirement in the original lease can serve as a powerful shield to avoid liability for post-divorce extensions they did not personally sign."
In re Jacob C. Luce and Lauren L. Gifford
COA05
Relators Jacob C. Luce and Lauren L. Gifford sought mandamus relief to compel a trial court to rule on a pending motion for default judgment. The Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas) did not address the merits of the case, focusing instead on a procedural defect in the petition's certification. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(k), the court analyzed whether the Relators' certification precisely matched the mandated language. Reaffirming its precedent of 'exceptionally strict' compliance, the court held that any deviation from the verbatim text of the rule is a fatal error. Because the Relators' certification failed to use the exact phraseology required by the 2026 rules, the court denied the petition without reaching the underlying legal issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"In the Dallas Court of Appeals, there is no 'substantial compliance' for mandamus certifications; attorneys must use a strict 'copy-paste' approach to the verbatim language in TRAP 52.3(k). Failing to update templates to the 2026 rule changes can result in an immediate procedural denial, which is especially dangerous in emergency family law matters where stays or custody are at stake."
In re Elizabeth Cavazos
COA05
Relator Elizabeth Cavazos sought a writ of mandamus and an emergency stay after a Dallas trial court struck her trial exhibits and related testimony on the eve of trial. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the petition under the newly amended Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(k), which updated certification requirements in December 2025, and the established 'Prudential' standard for extraordinary relief. The court denied the petition, holding that the Relator's failure to include the mandatory certification language was a fatal procedural defect and, substantively, that the Relator failed to demonstrate that the evidentiary ruling lacked an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"In mandamus practice, technical compliance is just as critical as substantive merit; using outdated templates that fail to incorporate the December 2025 TRAP 52.3(k) certification language will result in summary denial, even in emergency circumstances. Furthermore, remember that striking evidence is rarely a 'mandamus-able' event unless it effectively terminates a party's ability to present their case entirely."