Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
In Re Gregory Lynn Allison
COA06
In In re Gregory Lynn Allison, a relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to rule on motions filed less than three weeks earlier. The relator failed to provide a certified or sworn record, submitting only handwritten copies of his motions. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed whether a nineteen-day delay constituted an "unreasonable" period of time for a court to rule and whether the relator's pro se status excused procedural deficiencies under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that a delay of less than three weeks is insufficient to establish a failure to perform a ministerial duty and denied the petition, noting that strict compliance with record requirements (TRAP 52.3 and 52.7) is mandatory regardless of a party's indigency.
Litigation Takeaway
"Patience and procedural precision are mandatory for mandamus relief; a three-week delay in a trial court's ruling is legally insufficient to justify appellate intervention, and failure to provide a certified or sworn record will result in summary denial."
In re Steven Broomfield and Lisa Broomfield
COA06
Relators moved a child to Smith County in violation of a geographic restriction issued in a Panola County SAPCR order. After six months, they moved for a mandatory venue transfer to Smith County under Texas Family Code Section 155.201. The court analyzed whether a county where residency is established via a violation of a court order constitutes a 'proper county' for transfer. The court held that the mandatory transfer provision is not triggered by unauthorized residency, and the trial court of continuing exclusive jurisdiction retains authority to deny the transfer and enforce its orders through contempt.
Litigation Takeaway
"Violating a geographic restriction to establish residency in a new county will not trigger a mandatory venue transfer; a court will not reward 'venue shopping' or 'self-help' that occurs in direct defiance of a standing court order."
In re the Commitment of Rufino Coronado
COA05
The State sought the civil commitment of Rufino Coronado as a sexually violent predator. At trial, the State's expert psychologist testified that Coronado had a behavioral abnormality, basing her opinion in part on a prior evaluation conducted by a non-testifying psychologist. Coronado objected, arguing the prior evaluator's findings were inadmissible hearsay. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, which permit experts to rely on and disclose inadmissible facts or data if they are of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the specific field. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony because the expert performed her own independent evaluation and used the prior report as a standard clinical "building block" rather than offering the report itself as substantive evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"To introduce influential third-party data or prior evaluations without calling the original source, have your testifying expert integrate those materials into their own independent assessment. By establishing that such records are 'reasonably relied upon' in the expert's field under TRE 703, you can disclose the basis of the opinion to the factfinder, though you should be prepared for a Rule 705(d) limiting instruction to prevent the hearsay from being treated as substantive truth."
Magdaleno-Garcia v. State
COA07
The Appellant challenged twenty-five convictions for sexual assault and prohibited sexual conduct, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient because the victims provided generalized testimony about a high volume of abuse—hundreds of instances over two years—rather than identifying specific dates for each individual count. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict by distinguishing between evidentiary sufficiency and jury unanimity requirements. The court applied a 'mathematical' approach, determining that if the described frequency (e.g., 'once or twice a week') within a specific timeframe establishes that the conduct occurred at least as many times as there are counts, the evidence is legally sufficient. The court held that the inability to distinguish which specific act supports which specific count is a jury charge issue, not a sufficiency issue, and affirmed the convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
"To establish a history of family violence or abuse, you do not need to prove the exact date of every incident; establishing a 'mathematical' pattern through a clear start date, end date, and consistent frequency is legally sufficient to support multiple findings of fact."
Riley v. State
COA13
In Riley v. State, an ex-husband was convicted of "interception" under the Texas wiretap statute for accessing his ex-wife's stored voicemails using a known passcode without her consent. On appeal, the defendant argued that an "interception" can only occur if the communication is captured contemporaneously during transmission, rather than after it has been stored. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals rejected this narrow construction, analyzing Texas Penal Code § 16.02 and concluding that the statute does not require contemporaneous acquisition. The court held that unauthorized access to stored electronic or wire communications, including voicemails, constitutes a criminal interception.
Litigation Takeaway
""Snooping" into an ex-spouse's digital life is more than a credibility issue—it is a potential felony. Accessing stored voicemails or accounts without permission constitutes criminal "interception" in Texas, providing family law litigants with powerful leverage to secure protective orders, exclusive use of devices, and evidence of coercive control."
S&B Engineers & Constructors, Ltd. and Zurich American Insurance Company v. Scallon Controls, Inc.
SCOTX
In S&B Engineers & Constructors v. Scallon Controls, the Supreme Court of Texas addressed whether a party who voluntarily settles a lawsuit loses their right to seek reimbursement (indemnity) from another party under a contract. The conflict arose when a contractor settled claims with injured workers and then sought to recover a proportional share of that settlement from a subcontractor based on their written agreement. The lower court ruled that the settlement extinguished the right to indemnity, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision. The Court analyzed that Texas public policy favors the freedom of contract and the allocation of risk. It held that a voluntary settlement does not bar a contractual indemnity claim, provided the settling party can prove the settlement was reasonable, made in good faith, and that the underlying liability was attributable to the other party.
Litigation Takeaway
"A voluntary settlement is not a 'get out of jail free' card for an indemnitor. If you settle a debt or lawsuit that your ex-spouse was contractually obligated to pay under a divorce decree or MSA, you do not waive your right to reimbursement. As long as your settlement was reasonable and the debt belonged to them, you can still enforce your right to be made whole."
In re Arianna Victoria Law
COA02
Relator Arianna Victoria Law sought habeas corpus relief after being jailed for failing to pay child support, following a motion to revoke her community supervision. She argued that the underlying motion was legally deficient and that her due process rights were violated because the trial court allegedly failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing or provide a reporter's record. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the petition and found that Law failed to provide a sufficient record—consisting only of the contempt and commitment orders—to prove her claims. The court clarified that a sworn petition is not evidence and that the Relator had misidentified the applicable sections of the Texas Family Code. Consequently, the court denied the petition, holding that Law failed to carry her burden of providing a record sufficient to establish a right to relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"In habeas corpus and other original proceedings, the "record is king." A sworn petition is not evidence; if you are alleging a denial of due process or a lack of an evidentiary hearing, you must provide a comprehensive record—including motions, all underlying orders, and a reporter’s record (or proof that one was requested and denied)—to enable appellate review."
Office of the Attorney General v. PFLAG, Inc.
SCOTX
In Office of the Attorney General v. PFLAG, Inc., the Supreme Court of Texas addressed whether a trial court could enjoin a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) based on the 'political sensitivity' of an investigation into gender-transition care providers. The Court analyzed the CID as a standard discovery tool governed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure rather than a matter for judicial second-guessing of executive branch motives. The Court held that the Attorney General has broad discretion to investigate potential statutory violations, and courts may only limit these demands based on established rules of relevance and privilege, not on the perceived wisdom or political nature of the investigation.
Litigation Takeaway
"The State’s power to investigate third-party records via Civil Investigative Demands is broad and treated like standard discovery; practitioners cannot rely on 'political harassment' defenses to shield sensitive client data. Instead, they must utilize rigorous discovery mechanics, such as privilege logs and redaction agreements, to protect information that could eventually be used as leverage in high-stakes custody or 'best interest' litigation."
Shamim v. Chaudhry
COA05
In Shamim v. Chaudhry, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed whether 'findings' included within the text of a final judgment are valid on appeal. The case involved a breach of contract claim over a promissory note and counterclaims regarding separate oral loans. Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendant, including three specific findings in the order itself. The Court of Appeals analyzed the procedural requirements of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 296 and 297 and the 'Casino Magic' rule, holding that findings recited within a judgment are procedurally meaningless and cannot substitute for formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Because no formal findings were requested, the court applied the 'implied findings' standard. It found that the defendant's counterclaims lacked more than a 'mere scintilla' of evidence, while the plaintiff conclusively established his claim. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on findings or recitals written directly into a Final Decree or Order; if you prevail at a bench trial, you must timely request formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to ensure your evidentiary wins are preserved and protected from 'no-evidence' challenges on appeal."
Bunch v. Goen
COA03
In Bunch v. Goen, a non-attorney acting as a court-appointed conservator attempted to file a pro se appeal on behalf of a ward. The Third Court of Appeals faced two primary issues: a non-final judgment and a jurisdictional defect regarding the appellant's representative capacity. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 7 and the Texas Government Code, concluding that the privilege to appear pro se is strictly personal and does not extend to fiduciaries representing the interests of others. The court held that appellate documents filed by a non-lawyer in a representative capacity are a legal nullity and ineffective to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court held that while it has the discretion to abate an appeal to allow a trial court to cure a finality defect, it cannot overlook the unauthorized practice of law.
Litigation Takeaway
"A non-lawyer—even one with legal status as a conservator, 'next friend,' or power of attorney—cannot represent another person in court; any pro se notice of appeal filed in such a representative capacity is a nullity that fails to protect the party's right to appeal."