Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Lalita R. Morey v. Oaks of Devonshire Homeowners Association, Inc.
COA01
After a July 14, 2025 final judgment, the appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 23, 2025—outside the 30-day deadline in TRAP 26.1 and also outside the 15-day grace period in TRAP 26.3—and filed no post-judgment motions that would have extended the timetable to 90 days. The First Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction over a standard appeal because an untimely notice of appeal does not invoke appellate jurisdiction under TRAP 25.1(c). The appellant then asked the court to treat the late notice as a restricted appeal, but the court refused because a restricted appeal has its own jurisdictional prerequisites and the notice must strictly include the statements required by TRAP 25.1(d)(7) (including non-participation in the hearing and no timely post-judgment filings). Because the notice did not contain those mandatory declarations, the court could not construe it as a restricted appeal and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appellate deadlines are unforgiving: if you miss the 30-day notice-of-appeal deadline (and the 15-day extension window), you’re out—unless you properly perfect a restricted appeal. If you need a restricted appeal, your notice must expressly track TRAP 25.1(d)(7)’s required statements; a generic notice of appeal cannot be “converted” later by briefing or argument."
Cove Funding, LP and its Subsidiary HPS Admin, LLC v. Marcy Barba and Jorge Barba
COA03
In a post-judgment enforcement proceeding, a third-party lender intervened in a receivership, asserting a priority security interest and requesting the turnover of assets. The trial court denied the turnover motion but did not issue specific findings regarding the validity of the lender's lien. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order met the 'discrete issue' finality standard for receiverships or qualified as a mandatory injunction. The court held that because the order was a simple denial that did not conclusively adjudicate the underlying ownership rights or substantial interests of the third party, it was an interlocutory order over which the appellate court lacked jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"To prevent third-party claimants from disrupting a receivership through interlocutory appeals, practitioners should seek a simple denial of turnover requests rather than a formal adjudication of the claim's merits. Conversely, third parties seeking to appeal a denial must ensure the order contains specific findings that finally adjudicate their substantial rights or act as a mandatory injunction."
Shelton v. Flores
COA14
In Shelton v. Flores, a government employee (Shelton) attempted to dismiss claims against himself by filing a Rule 91a motion under the Texas Tort Claims Act's (TTCA) election-of-remedies provision after both he and his employer, the City of Houston, were sued. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.106(e), which states that an employee shall be dismissed 'on the motion of the governmental unit.' The court held that because the City did not join or file the motion to dismiss Shelton, the statutory condition precedent was not met. The court concluded that individual employees lack standing to 'self-dismiss' under this provision without the employer’s active participation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Government employees, such as CPS caseworkers or law enforcement officers, cannot unilaterally exit a lawsuit under the TTCA election-of-remedies provision unless the government agency they work for formally moves for their dismissal. This provides family law litigants with strategic leverage to keep individual defendants in a case for discovery purposes, especially when an agency is reluctant to admit the employee was acting within the scope of their employment."
Brown v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Brown v. State, police returned to an apartment for a second search after an initial search warrant had expired. Rather than seek a new warrant, officers relied on consent from the apartment manager and the victim’s family (who were clearing out the unit) and on the defendant’s own statement during an interview that he did not live there and had not lived there for 18 months. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the suppression issue under Fourth Amendment standing principles, applying Texas’s abandonment doctrine (disclaimer of a possessory/privacy interest defeats a reasonable expectation of privacy) and the apparent-authority consent doctrine (a warrantless search is valid if officers reasonably believe the consenting third party has authority). Under the totality of circumstances—primary tenant deceased, unit being vacated by the family, manager’s consent, and Brown’s explicit disavowal of residency—the court held Brown lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search; the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. The court also rejected claims of judicial bias, charge error, and ineffective assistance, and affirmed the murder conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Move-out disclaimers can become legal waivers: if a party tells police, a landlord, or a court “I don’t live there,” that statement can be used to establish abandonment and defeat privacy/standing arguments—making warrantless entry/search more defensible based on third-party consent. In family-law crossovers (protective orders, divorce/custody disputes), counsel should carefully manage residency/possession statements and build evidence of continuing ties (keys, utilities, mail, property left behind) if privacy or possessory rights will matter."
Angela Bass v. Mercedes Benz Financial Services USA LLC
COA01
Mercedes Benz Financial Services obtained a writ of sequestration against Angela Bass, effectively seizing or “freezing” specific personal property while the underlying case remained pending. Bass attempted to take an immediate (interlocutory) appeal from the trial court’s order granting the writ. The First Court of Appeals analyzed its own jurisdiction and reiterated that Texas appellate courts generally may review only final judgments unless the Legislature has expressly authorized an interlocutory appeal. Looking to Chapter 62 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (sequestration) and the interlocutory-appeal statute, the court concluded that an order granting a writ of sequestration is an interlocutory preservation remedy and is not among the categories made appealable by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014. While the appeal was pending, the trial court voided the sequestration order; the court further held that this eliminated any live controversy and rendered the appeal moot. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A sequestration order can quickly take property out of a party’s hands during litigation, but you generally cannot appeal it immediately. If you need relief, act in the trial court (motion to dissolve/attack bond/affidavit) and consider mandamus; otherwise, by the time a final judgment is entered—or the order is voided—the issue may be moot."
Mitchell Carter v. Administrator of the Estate of James M. Shumberg, Creg Thompson, Jon Papillon, Ryan Michael Shumberg, and InTown Builders, LLC
COA14
Mitchell Carter sought to establish ownership of four real estate lots in Harris County through claims of adverse possession and his status as a bona fide purchaser. Following a bench trial, the court entered a take-nothing judgment against Carter and quieted title in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals found that Carter waived his right to findings of fact and conclusions of law by failing to file a mandatory 'Notice of Past Due Findings' under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 297. Consequently, the court applied the 'implied findings' doctrine, assuming the trial court found all facts necessary to support the judgment. The court affirmed the take-nothing judgment, noting Carter's grantor lacked title to convey and Carter's occupancy was insufficient for adverse possession, though it modified the judgment to strike redundant declaratory relief that duplicated the quiet title action.
Litigation Takeaway
"To preserve an appeal following a bench trial, you must strictly follow the two-step process for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; failing to file a 'Notice of Past Due Findings' creates a presumption that the trial court found every fact against you, making a reversal nearly impossible."
National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company v. Payne & Keller Company, By and Through Its Duly-Appointed Receiver, Peter D. Protopapas
COA14
In this case, a receiver attempted to domesticate a South Carolina order in Texas under Chapter 35 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the Texas version of the UEFJA). Third-party insurers intervened and filed motions to vacate, then attempted to appeal the filing as a final judgment. The Court of Appeals analyzed whether domesticating a non-final foreign order "upgrades" its status to a final Texas judgment. The court held that because the underlying South Carolina order was interlocutory on its face, its domestication in Texas resulted only in an interlocutory order, not a final appealable judgment. Consequently, because the trial court had not ruled on the motions to vacate and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal for such a filing, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domesticating a foreign order in Texas under Chapter 35 only creates an appealable judgment if the original foreign order was final; if the out-of-state order is temporary or interlocutory, it remains unappealable in Texas, potentially freezing enforcement if a motion to vacate is pending."
William Delawrence Lewis v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Lewis, the First Court of Appeals considered whether evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for failure to stop and render aid when the defendant claimed he never collided with the crashed vehicle. Witnesses and reconstruction evidence showed Lewis drove a high-performance car at extreme speeds while “pacing” another car in apparent competitive driving for more than a mile; the other car then lost control, crashed, and caused a death and serious injury, and Lewis did not stop. Applying Tex. Transp. Code §§ 550.021 and 550.023 and precedent holding that “involved” is broader than “collision,” the court focused on whether Lewis’s conduct contributed to the accident. The court held that even without definitive proof of physical contact, a rational jury could find Lewis was “involved” because his high-speed, side-by-side driving was a contributing factor in the sequence of events, and credibility conflicts about contact were for the jury. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, you don’t always need proof of an actual impact to show someone was “involved” in a dangerous incident—participation in high-risk, competitive driving can be enough. In custody and divorce cases, that makes it easier to frame reckless behavior (and related criminal exposure) as endangering conduct for best-interest restrictions and as fault/waste considerations in a “just and right” property division."
Tavarius Williams v. Walden on Lake Houston Community Services Association, Inc.
COA01
After a default judgment was signed, the appellant filed a notice of appeal outside the normal deadlines and then tried to invoke Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a to restart appellate timetables based on late notice. The First Court of Appeals analyzed TRCP 306a(4)–(5) and TRAP 4.2, emphasizing that the “late notice” timetable change is not automatic: it requires a sworn Rule 306a(5) motion filed while the trial court still has plenary power, which is measured from the movant’s date of first notice/actual knowledge. Because the appellant’s own asserted knowledge date started a new 30-day plenary window that expired before he filed his sworn 306a(5) motion, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant Rule 306a relief and the appellate deadlines remained tied to the original signing date. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 306a is a short, strict lifeline for default decrees: once your client learns of the judgment, you generally have 30 days to file a sworn Rule 306a(5) motion (and get an order) in the trial court—waiting for the court of appeals to flag a jurisdiction problem is too late, and a late-filed notice of appeal cannot be cured."
Venisha Arnold v. Google LLC, YouTube LLC, Alphabet, Inc, Reddit, Inc, Felixlightner-Reddit Thread Starter, Rechlin-Reddit Admin, Boshau-Reddit Admin, Munx1er-Reddit Admin, Swhitt-Reddit Admin, and Texlex-Reddit Admin.
COA01
In Arnold, the appellant attempted to immediately appeal an order granting one defendant’s Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss. The trial court’s order dismissed only Reddit, left other defendants in the case, and expressly reserved the mandatory award of attorney’s fees/costs and potential sanctions for later determination—making the order interlocutory rather than final. The First Court of Appeals analyzed its jurisdiction under the final-judgment rule and the limited statutory authorizations for interlocutory appeals, focusing on Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(12), which allows an interlocutory appeal only from an order that denies a TCPA motion to dismiss. Because the Legislature did not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a TCPA motion, and the order was not otherwise final, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"TCPA asymmetry matters: if you win a TCPA motion to dismiss (including in divorce/SAPCR “family tort” skirmishes), your opponent generally cannot take an immediate appeal and must wait until a final judgment—unless the case is severed and made final. Conversely, if your TCPA motion is denied, you can appeal immediately. Plan orders and severance strategy with finality and fee issues in mind."