Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Sergio Adrian Contreras v. The State of Texas
COA13
In a criminal appeal arising from a continuous sexual abuse of a child conviction under Texas Penal Code § 21.02, the defendant challenged (1) alleged jury-charge error, (2) legal sufficiency on the statute’s “continuous period of 30 or more days”/multiple-acts element, (3) limits the trial court placed on voir dire of venire members with sexual-assault experiences, and (4) claimed prosecutorial misconduct. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the charge complaints under Texas jury-charge harm standards (including the egregious-harm framework for unpreserved error), reviewed sufficiency under the Jackson v. Virginia rational-juror standard, and deferred to the trial court’s broad discretion to control voir dire absent a showing that limits prevented meaningful bias exploration and caused harm. On the evidence, the court treated the State’s proof as a corroborative disclosure pathway—school counselor/wellness disclosure leading to CAC forensic interviews and a child-abuse pediatric evaluation—and held that delayed outcry, developmental “fuzziness,” and qualifying language (“I think,” “I’m not sure”) did not render the children’s accounts legally insufficient. The court also found no reversible prosecutorial-misconduct error due to context, lack of preservation, curative measures, or lack of prejudice. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence/child-sex-abuse custody and protective-order cases, courts can credit a “disclosure pathway” (school disclosure → CAC interview → medical/clinical testimony) even when the child reports late and is imprecise on details; don’t assume “I’m not sure” impeachment will defeat safety findings. If you’re defending, focus on challenging the reliability of the disclosure process (suggestibility/contamination, anchoring, leading questions) and preserve a clean record—especially for voir dire and evidentiary limits—because appellate courts give wide deference without specific offers of proof."
Murray Lobb, PLLC v. Brandy Liss, Executor for the Estate of Mary James
COA14
In an estate dispute, the executor sued a former law firm for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the firm “switched sides” and harmed the estate by filing and prosecuting litigation for the former joint client and by taking litigation positions attacking an assignment the firm had drafted. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals looked past the fiduciary-duty label and focused on the conduct actually pleaded: court filings, pleadings, and other litigation communications in related judicial proceedings. Because those litigation communications were a “fundamental part/main ingredient” of the alleged wrongdoing, the claims were “based on or in response to” the firm’s exercise of the TCPA-protected right to petition under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(4). The court reversed the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motion (affirming only the sanctions denial), rendered judgment dismissing the claims with prejudice, and remanded for a mandatory award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under TCPA § 27.009(a)(1).
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party repackages complaints about what a lawyer filed, argued, served, or said in a case into a tort claim like “breach of fiduciary duty,” the TCPA may require early dismissal when the litigation communications are a core part of the claim—and dismissal triggers mandatory fee-and-cost shifting. Plead (or attack) the case based on what the petition actually alleges, not the cause-of-action label."
Geoffrey Quinn v. Kimberly A. Sergeant
COA01
After a trial court rendered a divorce judgment, the parties reached a settlement through mediation while an appeal was pending. The appellant requested that the appellate court set aside the trial court's original judgment and remand the case for the entry of a new judgment based on the Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA). The appellee argued for a simple dismissal of the appeal. Analyzing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2)(B), the First Court of Appeals determined that it had the authority to vacate the trial court's judgment without reaching the merits to facilitate a settlement. The court held that setting aside the judgment and remanding for rendition was appropriate, ensuring that the parties would not be stuck with an outdated and enforceable decree that conflicted with their new agreement.
Litigation Takeaway
"When settling a case on appeal, parties should request that the appellate court set aside the trial court's judgment and remand for a new judgment under TRAP 42.1(a)(2)(B). Simply dismissing the appeal leaves the original judgment intact and enforceable, which can create significant legal friction if the settlement terms differ from the original court order."
Dr. Robert Corwin, Richard B. Brualdi, and The Brualdi Law Firm, P.C. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation
COA01
In a suit seeking emergency injunctive relief to stop a scheduled shareholder vote on the Exxon/Pioneer merger, the trial court denied the temporary injunction and the plaintiff nonsuited shortly thereafter. Exxon pursued sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel and law firm, and the trial court found the emergency temporary-injunction request was groundless and pursued in bad faith/for an improper purpose, awarding $69,861.19 in sanctions (primarily attorney’s fees) and related relief. The First Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Chapter 10 and Rule 13 sanctions were available even though the sanctioned lawyer/firm argued they did not sign the challenged petition/motion, because the evidence supported that they were responsible for and pursued the filings and strategy. The court also rejected the argument that the trial court improperly “circumvented” Chapter 10/Rule 13 by referencing inherent authority; the order was supported under the statutory/rule frameworks, and the record supported the trial court’s factual findings that the injunction request lacked viable legal/factual support and was used as leverage tied to timing and a broader pattern of similar litigation. Nonsuit did not eliminate the court’s power to decide the collateral sanctions issue based on pre-dismissal conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"Emergency TRO/temporary-injunction practice is sanctions-sensitive: a voluntary nonsuit after a failed temp hearing does not erase exposure, courts may look past “who signed” to who directed and pursued the filing, and timing/pattern evidence can support a finding that an emergency request was filed for improper settlement leverage—leading to significant fee-shifting sanctions under Chapter 10 and Rule 13."
Bouknight v. Llanelly Enterprises
COA01
Bouknight, a judgment creditor, sued Llanelly Enterprises for declaratory relief to establish that debtor Wilmot held a legal or beneficial ownership interest in a Houston house titled in Llanelly’s name, so the asset could be reached through turnover-style relief. Although the evidence showed Wilmot initially contracted to buy the home and participated in the transaction before title was shifted to Llanelly, the jury charge submitted only one liability question: whether the deed was “ineffective” to convey the property to Llanelly. The jury answered yes, but the charge did not ask—and the jury did not find—who owned the property (legal title, equitable title, beneficial ownership, nominee status, resulting/constructive trust, etc.). Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301 and JNOV/legal-sufficiency principles, the Houston First Court of Appeals held that because the verdict failed to resolve the only live, controlling issue pleaded (ownership), the verdict could not support a judgment for Bouknight and the trial court properly granted JNOV and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The court also accepted Llanelly’s argument as an affirming cross-point because it would vitiate the verdict and independently support affirmance.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any case where the real fight is “Who owns the asset?” you must submit jury questions that directly obtain an ownership finding that supports the requested judgment. A win on a proxy question (e.g., “ineffective deed,” “sham transfer,” “invalid document”) can still lose at the judgment stage because it does not establish the dispositive ultimate issue. For divorce and enforcement cases involving third-party/LLC title or nominee ownership, charge planning is outcome-determinative: plead the ownership theory and get verdict-grade findings (legal/equitable/beneficial ownership, alter ego, resulting/constructive trust, characterization) or expect a JNOV vulnerability."
In re The Commitment of Raul Eliss Dominguez
COA03
In an SVP civil-commitment jury trial under Texas Health & Safety Code Chapter 841, the State’s expert psychologist referenced an unadjudicated allegation that Raul Eliss Dominguez sexually abused his four-year-old nephew. Although the issue was discussed outside the jury’s presence in a pretrial/limine setting, the trial court only cautioned counsel to object if testimony became inadmissible. When the expert mentioned the nephew allegation in front of the jury, Dominguez did not make a timely, specific objection, did not request a running objection, and did not obtain a ruling tied to the complained-of testimony. Applying TRAP 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103, the Third Court of Appeals held the complaint was not preserved and affirmed the commitment order. The court also held that, even assuming the expert’s testimony was admitted in error, any error was harmless (and effectively waived) because Dominguez later introduced the same or similar evidence through his own testimony without objection, triggering the “same evidence” rule.
Litigation Takeaway
"Motions in limine don’t preserve error. If an expert starts weaving unadjudicated “bad act” allegations into the basis for an opinion, you must object in real time, obtain a ruling (and a running objection if it will recur), and avoid later “opening the door” by eliciting the same facts yourself—otherwise you likely lose the issue both on preservation and on harmlessness under the same-evidence rule."
Howard v. State
COA14
After a jury convicted Howard of two aggravated sexual assaults and aggravated robbery, he elected judge sentencing. At the punishment setting the judge discussed the punishment range, commented the case carried high exposure, and encouraged counsel-client consultation and negotiation. After a recess the parties announced a post-verdict punishment agreement, and the court imposed a 50-year sentence “in accordance with the plea agreement.” On appeal Howard argued (1) due process “judicial vindictiveness” for having gone to trial and (2) that the punishment agreement was involuntary and the court failed to conduct a voluntariness inquiry. The Fourteenth Court held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not a retrial with an increased sentence after a successful appeal; therefore Howard had to prove actual vindictiveness. The record showed the judge’s remarks were facilitative/admonitory, repeatedly disclaiming any predetermined punishment, and the 50-year term matched the parties’ post-verdict agreement—so no actual vindictiveness was shown. The court also held voluntariness and “failure to inquire” complaints were forfeited because Howard made no contemporaneous objection when the agreement was adopted and filed no post-judgment motion raising involuntariness. Judgments affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you intend to later claim an on-the-record agreement (Rule 11/MBA/MSA or post-ruling deal) was coerced or involuntary, you must object immediately and/or file a timely post-judgment motion—otherwise the complaint is likely waived. And “judicial vindictiveness” is a narrow doctrine; absent a true Pearce posture, you must prove actual retaliation from the record, not just tough judicial commentary or settlement encouragement."
Daniel Cisneros Leyva v. The State of Texas
COA14
In a capital-murder/robbery appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether the State sufficiently corroborated an accomplice co-defendant’s testimony under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.14, and whether the jury should have been instructed that other witnesses were accomplices. Applying the required method—disregarding the accomplice’s testimony and examining the remaining record—the court held the corroboration threshold is modest: non-accomplice evidence need only “tend to connect” the accused to the offense, not independently prove every element. Here, the non-accomplice evidence included (1) witnesses placing the group together shortly before the offense, (2) the defendant’s own statements putting him at the scene, (3) descriptions of the shooter’s clothing and a laser-equipped gun consistent with the defendant’s admissions, (4) cell-phone location/communication evidence showing coordination and post-incident calls, and (5) inconsistencies/falsehoods in the defendant’s accounts. The court also affirmed the refusal to give accomplice-witness instructions for other witnesses because the record contained no evidence they participated in the charged capital murder/robbery; mere association, presence, or tangential benefit is not enough to make someone an accomplice for charge purposes.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case turns on one “insider” witness, don’t argue each corroborating fact must independently prove the whole story. Instead, focus the judge (or jury) on whether there are multiple independent circumstances that collectively *tend to connect* the accused to the alleged conduct (texts/calls, location data, third-party records, injuries/clothing/timeline congruence, and inconsistent denials). Conversely, resist attempts to discredit every supporting witness as “complicit” unless there is concrete evidence the witness participated in the *act alleged*, not just relationship drama or proximity."
Oscar Antonio Rodriguez v. The State of Texas
COA14
In a prosecution for continuous sexual abuse of a child, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the complainant had previously viewed pornography on a relative’s phone to support a fabrication theory. The State invoked former Texas Rule of Evidence 412 (rape-shield rule), and after a hearing outside the jury’s presence the trial court excluded the evidence, finding it did not fit any exception and did not show bias or motive to lie. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that pornography exposure, at most, provides an “alternative source of sexual knowledge,” which does not satisfy Rule 412’s motive/bias exception absent a logical nexus showing why the exposure would lead the complainant to falsely accuse this defendant. The court also held any constitutional “right to present a defense” complaint was waived because the defense did not expressly raise that constitutional ground in the trial court and obtain a ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"Porn/sexual-content exposure is not automatically admissible to undermine a child-complainant; without a concrete, non-speculative link to a specific motive or bias to fabricate against the accused, it is simply an alternative-knowledge theory and can be excluded under rape-shield/Rule 403 principles. Also, if you intend to argue evidence is “constitutionally required” (due process/confrontation/right to present a defense), you must clearly assert that ground, make a full offer of proof, and obtain an express ruling—or the issue is waived on appeal."
In re L.C.
COA12
In a DFPS SAPCR, the adoptive parent sought mandamus relief attacking the trial court’s temporary/permanency orders—complaining of alleged Chapter 263 noncompliance, continued DFPS possession after an adversary hearing, and a sua sponte “aggravated circumstances” finding that waived reasonable-efforts and service-plan requirements. While the mandamus was pending, the court of appeals in an earlier original proceeding ordered the trial court to vacate its temporary order and return the children; the trial court complied. DFPS then moved to dismiss the underlying SAPCR and the trial court signed a dismissal order. The parent argued the mandamus was not moot because the aggravated-circumstances finding could cause collateral consequences in future DFPS cases, foster-care licensing/employment, and related criminal proceedings. The Tyler Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because intervening events eliminated any live controversy: the children had been returned and the DFPS case was dismissed, so no effectual mandamus relief remained. The court also rejected the collateral-consequences exception, reasoning that the challenged aggravated-circumstances language appeared only in nonfinal temporary/permanency orders, which do not preserve a justiciable controversy once the case is dismissed. The court dismissed the mandamus petition as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus jurisdiction can disappear fast in DFPS cases: once possession is restored and the underlying SAPCR is dismissed, appellate courts will usually treat challenges to temporary/permanency findings as moot. If you need to undo damaging interim language (like “aggravated circumstances”), press for immediate trial-court correction or expedited appellate relief while the case is still live; reputational or speculative future harms from nonfinal temporary orders typically won’t satisfy the narrow collateral-consequences exception."