Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Lopez v. Lengyel
COA03
In a dispute between two professional online streamers, the Austin Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's dismissal of an informal marriage claim. The trial court had granted a no-evidence summary judgment, finding there was insufficient proof of an agreement to be married or a public 'holding out' as spouses. However, the appellate court analyzed the 'mosaic' of evidence provided by the claimant—including testimony about an agreement made to facilitate international travel during COVID-19, representations made to family and household staff, and the use of the partner's surname. The court held that even though the parties used inconsistent labels online (such as 'boyfriend') for professional branding purposes, the accumulated evidence was enough to create a factual dispute that must be decided at trial rather than dismissed early.
Litigation Takeaway
"Proving a common-law marriage depends on the 'cumulative force' of evidence, such as statements to family, household staff, and government officials. Inconsistent public messaging—especially when motivated by privacy or professional branding—does not automatically defeat a marriage claim; instead, it creates a credibility issue that should be resolved at trial."
In re Adeel Zaidi, A.K. Chagla and Prestige Consulting d/b/a Turnaround Management Group
SCOTX
In an original mandamus proceeding, relators challenged a trial court order disqualifying their lawyer after his legal assistant—who previously worked for opposing counsel on the same case and had access to privileged strategy and work product—later performed services on the matter at the relators’ firm without any evidence she was admonished or screened before touching the file. The Texas Supreme Court applied the Phoenix Founders bright-line rule governing side-switching nonlawyer staff: when a nonlawyer worked on the same matter for the other side, the nonlawyer is conclusively presumed to have obtained confidences, and the hiring firm can avoid disqualification only by timely prophylactic measures, including admonishing the employee before the employee begins work on the conflicted matter. Because the record showed the assistant performed work on the case multiple times and there was no evidence of any pre-work admonition or timely screen, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in disqualifying counsel. The Court also rejected the argument that e-filing service notices listing the assistant as the “filer” conclusively established waiver; such notices do not, as a matter of law, prove the opposing party had actual knowledge of the disqualifying facts and then unreasonably delayed. Mandamus relief was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your firm hires (or shares) a paralegal/legal assistant who previously worked on the other side of the same case, you must admonish and screen that employee before they do anything on the file—even “ministerial” tasks like e-filing—or you risk automatic disqualification under the Phoenix Founders bright-line rule. And if you’re seeking disqualification, don’t assume routine e-filing notices will defeat you on waiver; waiver requires proof of actual knowledge plus unreasonable delay, not just metadata."
In the Interest of J.K.C.
COA08
In In the Interest of J.K.C., the Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no non-frivolous issues for appeal. The court independently reviewed the full record, including the endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), the constructive-abandonment finding under subsection (N), and the best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). After that review, the court concluded there was no arguable basis to challenge the trial court’s ruling and affirmed the termination order. The court also denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding that appointed counsel in termination cases must continue representation through the petition-for-review stage under In re P.M. and Family Code § 107.016(2)(B).
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination appeals are won or lost on the trial record. If trial counsel does not preserve error, develop evidence against endangerment and best interest, and create a meaningful appellate record, the court of appeals may find no arguable issue at all—even under its own independent Anders review. The case also reminds appointed counsel that representation in termination cases continues beyond the court of appeals."
In the Interest of A.C. and E.C., Jr., Children
COA06
In a termination-of-parental-rights appeal from Gregg County, Mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s predicate findings and best-interest determination. The Sixth Court of Appeals (Texarkana) applied the clear-and-convincing evidence standard and the Supreme Court’s modern sufficiency framework, emphasizing deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations and reasonable inferences while reviewing the entire record “holistically.” Because endangerment findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) have collateral consequences in future cases, the court conducted mandatory review of those challenged grounds and held the evidence legally and factually sufficient to prove (D) (endangering conditions/surroundings) and (E) (endangering conduct/course of conduct). The court also evaluated best interest under § 161.001(b)(2) using the Holley factors as nonexclusive guideposts and held the record supported the best-interest finding as to both parents (including Father, who challenged only best interest). The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment is proved—and sustained on appeal—through the cumulative story, not a single “bad fact.” If you’re pursuing or defending a termination (or litigating custody restrictions with endangerment themes), build and attack a record that ties specific unsafe conditions and a parent’s course of conduct to the child’s exposure to risk. Also, preserve and litigate grounds (D) and (E) directly: appellate courts must review challenged D/E findings, and those findings can follow a parent into future cases."
Cory Cornell Parker v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Cory Cornell Parker v. State, the defendant attended jury selection and the State’s case-in-chief but failed to return when trial resumed for the defense case, claiming by text that he was being taken by ambulance to a hospital. Despite hours of opportunity and repeated requests, neither Parker nor counsel provided basic, verifiable information (hospital name/location, provider contact, admission/discharge details, documentation), and counsel’s continuance requests were oral and unsupported. The trial court denied a continuance, declined to conduct an unverified phone call, found Parker’s mid-trial absence voluntary, and proceeded; Parker returned after deliberations began. On appeal, the First Court of Appeals held the record supported the trial court’s discretionary finding that Parker voluntarily absented himself and that denying the unsupported oral continuance requests was not an abuse of discretion. The court also rejected Parker’s ineffective-assistance claims based on counsel’s failure to file a written continuance motion or seek a writ of attachment because Parker did not show deficient performance and, critically, failed to show prejudice (a reasonable probability of a different result). The court further found no reversible error regarding assessed costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the other side claims a last-minute “emergency” to stop a hearing or trial, frame it as a proof-and-diligence issue: insist on real-time, verifiable details and competent documentation, make the timeline record, and push for express findings. Unsupported, oral continuance requests—especially timed to derail an evidentiary turning point—can properly be denied, and a party who withholds readily confirmable information risks a finding that the absence is voluntary/strategic."
Christopher Joe Bradshaw, Sr. v. The State of Texas
COA03
In this Austin Court of Appeals criminal case, a father convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a young child argued the State failed to prove the statutory “30-or-more-days” duration element because the child’s testimony about being “ten” could be read to confine the abuse to a narrow, four-day window between the father’s arrival and the child’s 11th birthday. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and deference to jury inferences under Hooper, the court held the jury was not required to adopt that restrictive reading. The jury could reasonably interpret the age-based exchange as referring to only one type of conduct and could rely on frequency testimony (weekly/nightly conduct), CAC interview corroboration (“basically every night”), living-arrangement context, and digital forensic evidence showing pornography/child-pornography-related activity across multiple months to infer a course of abuse lasting at least 30 days. The court also rejected challenges to the mandatory life sentence, the jury charge on duration, and the admission of extraneous-offense evidence (including a prior Oklahoma lewd-molestation conviction used for enhancement), but it modified the judgment to correct a clerical miscitation to the enhancement subsection and affirmed as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-safety litigation, don’t let the case turn on a child’s imperfect “timing” testimony. Courts allow factfinders to reconcile age-based or vague time references with pattern/frequency testimony and objective corroboration (CAC interview details, device timelines, household routines) to establish a longer course of conduct and defeat “it could only have happened during a short window” defenses. Also, preserve evidentiary and charge complaints precisely, and double-check statutory citations in orders/judgments—miscitations may be corrected but can create avoidable appellate issues."
Thomas Joseph Radford, Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Radford, the complainant testified she ingested Xanax supplied by the defendant, lost consciousness, and woke to find the defendant penetrating her while her clothing was displaced. The defendant immediately stopped and acted as if nothing had happened when she opened her eyes. On appeal from a sexual-assault conviction, the Houston First Court of Appeals applied the legal-sufficiency standard (viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict) and focused on Texas Penal Code § 22.011(b)(3) and (5), which define “without consent” to include situations where the actor knows the complainant is unconscious/physically unable to resist or unaware the assault is occurring. The court rejected the argument that the complainant’s inability to describe the precise start of intercourse created an evidentiary gap; unconsciousness at the outset is itself affirmative proof of nonconsent under the statute. The court further held the jury could infer the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent from circumstantial evidence and consciousness-of-guilt conduct, including that intercourse began while she was unconscious (after drugs he provided) and that he abruptly stopped and normalized the situation upon her awakening. The court affirmed, holding the evidence legally sufficient to prove both lack of consent and the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the evidence shows a person was unconscious or unaware at the outset, Texas law treats that incapacity as affirmative proof of “without consent”—the case does not fail just because the complainant cannot testify to what happened during unconsciousness. Knowledge/intent is commonly proven circumstantially; abrupt stopping, concealment, minimization, or “acting like nothing happened” can support an inference the actor knew the other person could not consent. In family-violence/SAPCR disputes, build the record around impairment, waking-condition details, and post-incident conduct to support findings even where memory is partial."
Erique Howard v. The State of Texas
COA14
After a jury convicted Erique Howard of multiple felonies, he elected judge sentencing. In a post-verdict discussion, the judge referenced the broad punishment range and encouraged the parties to confer and, if they wanted more control over the number, attempt to reach an agreement before the court assessed punishment. After a recess, the court imposed a 50-year sentence “in accordance with the plea agreement,” and the record contained no contemporaneous objection claiming coercion/retaliation and no motion for new trial or other post-judgment motion raising involuntariness or lack of judicial inquiry. On appeal, Howard argued the sentence reflected judicial vindictiveness for exercising the right to a jury trial and that the post-verdict sentencing agreement was involuntary (and the judge should have inquired into voluntariness). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not an increased sentence after a retrial, so Howard had to show actual vindictiveness from the record; the judge’s repeated statements disclaiming predetermination and the negotiated posture did not establish actual vindictiveness. The court further held the voluntariness and “duty to inquire” complaints were waived for lack of preservation because Howard did not object at the time and did not file a post-judgment motion to develop the issue. The judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you think a judge’s settlement/sentencing “range talk” crossed into coercion or retaliation, you must preserve it immediately. Make a record (objection/clarification/offer of proof), and if needed file timely post-judgment motions to develop involuntariness claims—otherwise the “the judge pressured me” narrative is usually unreviewable, and the agreement will be treated as voluntary."
Brisby Ray Brown v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Brisby Ray Brown v. State, the defendant challenged his aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction, arguing the jury charge improperly allowed a non-unanimous verdict by submitting, in the disjunctive, two distinct aggravated-assault offenses: (1) aggravated assault predicated on bodily-injury assault and (2) aggravated assault predicated on threat-by-assault, tied to different alleged deadly weapons. Applying the two-step jury-charge framework, the First Court of Appeals assumed/recognized charge error under Landrian because those are separate statutory aggravated-assault crimes requiring jury unanimity as to which offense was committed. However, because Brown did not object on unanimity grounds, the court reviewed only for Almanza egregious harm, considering the entire charge (including a general unanimity instruction), the evidence, closing arguments, and the record as a whole. On this record, the court concluded any error did not egregiously affect the fairness of the trial or the basis of the verdict and therefore affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case is submitted on multiple alternative legal/factual predicates that carry different consequences, you must preserve error by forcing clarity at trial—object, request separate submissions/findings, and get a ruling. Otherwise, even a real “unanimity/ambiguity” problem will likely be upheld under a highly deferential harm standard, a lesson that translates directly to broad, multi-theory “family violence” findings in Texas family-law cases."
Norman v. Kahn Scheepvaart BV
COA14
In Norman v. Kahn Scheepvaart BV, a longshore worker appealed a take-nothing judgment after a jury found neither she nor the vessel owner’s negligence proximately caused her injury. On appeal, she attacked the jury charge as confusing and as improperly permitting certain theories/defenses and a “no one responsible” outcome, and she also sought a new trial based on alleged juror and bailiff misconduct. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused first on error preservation under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 272–278 and the State Dep’t of Highways v. Payne framework, holding that most complaints were waived because counsel did not make timely, specific objections at the charge conference, did not ensure any requested charge language was in the clerk’s record in substantially correct form, and did not obtain an express ruling or endorsed refusal. The court rejected “preservation-by-paperwork,” explaining that pretrial filings and an unrecorded “tender” did not alert the trial court at the charge conference or create an appellate record under Cruz. The court declined to treat the alleged defects as fundamental error. As to the few issues arguably preserved, the court found no reversible charge error (one was not error; any other assumed error was harmless). The court also held the alleged juror/bailiff misconduct did not justify a new trial and affirmed the denial of the motion for new trial. The take-nothing judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Jury-charge complaints live or die on preservation: object on the record before submission, state the defect plainly and specifically, tender substantially correct requested language, make sure it is file-stamped and included in the clerk’s record, and get a clear ruling/refusal. Pretrial proposed charges and vague “tenders” that don’t make it into the record won’t save an appeal, and misconduct/new-trial arguments require admissible proof tied to harm."