Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In re Lillian Gonzalez
COA14
In In re Lillian Gonzalez, the relator asked the Fourteenth Court of Appeals to order the Texas Office of the Attorney General, Child Support Division, to release child-support funds. The court did not reach the merits of whether she was entitled to the money. Instead, it analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and held that courts of appeals may issue mandamus against certain judges and associate judges, but not against the OAG Child Support Division. The court also held that Gonzalez did not show the writ was necessary to protect or enforce the court’s appellate jurisdiction under section 22.221(a). Because neither basis for mandamus jurisdiction applied, the court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing mandamus in a child-support payment dispute, identify the correct respondent and the source of the complained-of conduct. Even a strong complaint about withheld support funds will be dismissed if the petition is directed at a non-judicial actor like the OAG and does not show why extraordinary relief is necessary to protect the court of appeals’ jurisdiction."
In the Interest of K.D.M. and S.I.L.
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights to two children after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and 161.003, as well as on best interest and conservatorship. The court focused on evidence of endangering surroundings and conditions, including domestic violence, unstable care arrangements, and the prior death of an infant sibling in Mother’s care that the Department linked to medical neglect. It also relied on Mother’s significant cognitive limitations and her inability to present a coherent, realistic plan for housing, childcare, schooling, therapies, supervision, and emergency response. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard, the court held that Mother’s limitations were not merely abstract diagnoses but functionally prevented her from meeting the children’s present and future needs, and that termination and appointment of the Department as sole managing conservator were in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, courts look beyond a parent’s good intentions and focus on functional parenting capacity: who will care for the child, where the child will live, how needs will be met, and how safety risks will be managed. Where cognitive limitations, domestic violence, instability, or poor safety planning affect day-to-day care, lawyers must build a concrete record with specific facts, corroboration, and workable caregiving plans."
Gurrola v. State
COA03
In Gurrola v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the defendant waived any appellate complaint that a trauma therapist’s guilt-innocence testimony was improper victim-impact evidence. Although defense counsel objected at the outset to the witness generally on relevance, prejudice, bolstering, and victimization grounds, counsel did not obtain a running objection and did not renew those objections when the specific testimony about therapy, PTSD, trauma symptoms, and emotional effects was actually elicited. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and preservation cases such as Martinez and Fuller, the court concluded that an initial global objection and a granted motion in limine were not enough to preserve error. Because the complaint was not preserved, the court did not reach the admissibility merits and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law trials, one opening objection to a therapist, counselor, or expert is not enough. If damaging testimony keeps coming in, you must keep objecting or secure a clear running objection; and a motion in limine never substitutes for a trial objection. Appellate issues are often lost on preservation, not merit."
Ortego v. State
COA01
After the defendant’s wife found incriminating sexual communications with their daughter in his cell phone’s trash folder, he sought to suppress the messages as the product of an unlawful search and unauthorized computer access. The First Court of Appeals held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because the wife acted as a private individual, not as a government agent. It further concluded that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23 did not require exclusion because a written reconciliation agreement authorized the wife to inspect the phone “for any reasons,” the permission had not been revoked, and the parties’ history confirmed routine access. The court also found no material factual dispute requiring an article 38.23 jury instruction and no abuse of discretion in denying remote testimony from two defense witnesses. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Digital evidence obtained by a spouse may be admissible when prior consent, shared passwords, written transparency agreements, or an established course of access shows authorization. Lawyers seeking to use phone evidence should preserve proof of consent, authenticity, and chain of custody; lawyers challenging it should establish an express revocation, limited scope, technological circumvention, or government involvement. If remote testimony is necessary, counsel should also create a specific record showing necessity rather than mere convenience."
Martinez v. State
COA07
In Martinez v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant on community supervision could refuse a treatment-required instant-offense polygraph by invoking the Fifth Amendment after his conviction for indecency with a child was already final on direct appeal. The court focused on the narrow scope of the polygraph, which was limited to the adjudicated offense and did not reach other potentially chargeable conduct. Relying on Fifth Amendment principles discussed in Ex parte Dangelo and In re Medina, the court held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to questioning about an offense that can no longer expose the defendant to future criminal liability because direct appeals are exhausted. On that basis, the court concluded the refusal to participate supported revocation of community supervision. The court also modified the judgment and bill of costs to remove language suggesting future appointed-attorney’s fees could be assessed despite an indigency finding and no evidence of changed financial circumstances.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Fifth Amendment objection is not a blanket shield when the questioning is tightly limited to a finalized criminal offense. In family-law cases, lawyers should frame discovery, evaluations, and examinations with precision: if the inquiry concerns only an adjudicated offense with no remaining criminal exposure, a broad privilege claim may fail and noncooperation can carry real litigation consequences."
In the Interest of W.R.I.F.
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights to a medically vulnerable infant after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (M), and (R), and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The court emphasized Mother’s two-decade methamphetamine addiction, admitted drug use during pregnancy, prior endangerment-based terminations as to two other children, missed drug testing, unstable housing, and her failure during a monitored return to consistently meet the child’s significant medical needs, including therapy attendance and inhaler management. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard, the court treated these facts as a continuing course of endangering conduct rather than isolated lapses, and it held that the stable foster placement with the child’s sibling strongly supported best interest. The court also rejected Mother’s due-process complaint about a post-trial clarification hearing and her ineffective-assistance claim because she failed to show any substantive deprivation or prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, courts look at the whole pattern, not just recent improvement. Long-term drug use, prior endangerment findings, unstable housing, and a parent’s inability to handle a child’s actual medical needs can outweigh short-term compliance and strongly support findings of danger and best interest. If you are trying the case, build a timeline, tie the conduct to the child’s real-world needs, and make a concrete record of harm for any procedural complaint."
Pegram v. Pegram
COA05
In Pegram v. Pegram, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a county-court default judgment entered after the defendant failed to appear for a trial de novo from justice court. The court held the judgment was a post-answer default, not a no-answer default, because the defendant’s justice-court motion to dismiss functioned as an answer and carried forward into the county-court proceeding. Because a post-answer default requires the plaintiff to prove every element with evidence, and no reporter’s record existed, the court could not review the defendant’s legal-sufficiency challenge. The absence of a record required reversal and remand.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the opposing party has filed anything that counts as an answer, a later nonappearance does not create a no-answer default. In family cases, that means you must present admissible evidence on every element of requested relief and make a reporter’s record, or you risk reversal on appeal."
In the Interest of R.D., a Child
COA07
In this parental-termination appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the reporter’s record was overdue and the court reporter ignored the court’s status request. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 35.3(c) and 37.3(a)(2), the court held that it had to take action to avoid further delay and protect the parties’ rights in an accelerated appeal. The court abated the appeal and remanded for the trial court to determine what work remained on the record, why the delay occurred, how long completion would take, and whether the original reporter could timely finish it. The court also required the trial court to arrange a substitute reporter if the original reporter needed more than twenty additional days to complete, certify, and file the record.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family appeals, especially accelerated termination cases, lawyers cannot treat the reporter’s record as a back-office issue. Monitor record deadlines aggressively, document all communications, and raise delay problems early, because appellate courts may abate the case, remand for findings, and even require a substitute reporter to keep the appeal moving."
In re J.H., A.H., J.H., and Z.H.
COA01
In this parental termination case, parents challenged the trial court's jurisdiction, arguing that a trial recess made the initial start of the trial a 'sham' intended to circumvent the statutory dismissal deadline under Texas Family Code section 263.401. The parents also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding endangerment and the best interests of the children. The First Court of Appeals held that because the trial court had legitimately begun hearing the merits of the case before the deadline, it did not lose jurisdiction simply because the final decree was signed later. In reviewing the merits, the court found that the parents' history of substance abuse, criminal child endangerment, and ongoing incidents of physical injury to the children provided clear and convincing evidence to support termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"To preserve jurisdiction in CPS cases, the trial must meaningfully commence on the merits before the statutory dismissal deadline; appellate courts will reject 'sham' trial challenges if the record reflects genuine judicial activity. Furthermore, evidence of a parent's instability or misconduct during the pendency of the suit is often dispositive in endangerment and best-interest analyses."
In re Leo Lapuerta, M.D., F.A.C.S., and The Plastic Surgery Institute of Southeast Texas, P.A.
SCOTX
In an underlying medical-negligence case, a jury returned an 11–1 defense verdict finding no proximate cause and the trial court signed a take-nothing judgment. After the plaintiff moved for new trial—re-urging charge objections and submitting a lone dissenting juror’s post-verdict letter describing deliberations—the trial court granted a new trial and later issued an amended order listing seven reasons, largely framed as charge confusion tied to Texas “loss of chance”/medical-causation principles. The Texas Supreme Court held the new-trial order was an abuse of discretion because its stated reasons rested on a misapprehension of Texas causation law; a trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial on an incorrect legal premise. The Court also condemned the submission of juror-deliberation evidence as “flagrantly improper” and refused to discount the risk that such material influenced the new-trial ruling. The Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to render judgment on (reinstate) the jury’s take-nothing verdict.
Litigation Takeaway
"New-trial orders must rest on a legally correct, record-supported, and specifically articulated rationale—not a judge’s mistaken view of the law or post-verdict narratives about what jurors discussed. If the losing party tries to prove “jury confusion” with juror letters/affidavits about deliberations, object and move to strike; and if a new trial is granted anyway, mandamus is often the proper—and fast—remedy to reinstate the verdict and avoid a wasteful redo."