Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Erique Howard v. The State of Texas
COA14
After a jury convicted Erique Howard of multiple felonies, he elected judge-assessed punishment. Before the punishment hearing, the trial judge discussed Howard’s punishment exposure, referenced prior plea positions, and suggested a post-verdict negotiation range. After a recess, the court imposed a 50-year sentence, stating it was “in accordance with the plea agreement,” and no one objected or filed a motion for new trial claiming coercion or vindictiveness. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not a resentencing after retrial, so Howard had to prove actual judicial vindictiveness from the record. The judge’s forceful comments and settlement-range discussion—paired with repeated disclaimers and a sentence matching the announced agreement—did not establish retaliation for exercising the right to trial. The court also held that complaints that the post-verdict sentencing agreement was involuntary, or that the trial court had to conduct an on-the-record voluntariness inquiry, were waived because Howard raised neither a contemporaneous objection nor a post-judgment motion developing those issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a judge “pushes a number” after a merits ruling, appellate courts often treat it as hard bargaining unless the record proves retaliation—and you still must preserve coercion/vindictiveness complaints immediately. If you believe a post-ruling agreement (Rule 11, parenting plan, property blueprint) was coerced, object on the record and follow up with a motion for new trial/to set aside that specifically pleads involuntariness and identifies the coercive statements; otherwise, the issue will likely be deemed waived."
Diana Reismann Sexton v. Gilbert Sexton
COA14
In a consolidated Fort Bend County divorce/SAPCR and interspousal personal-injury action, the wife (pro se) appealed numerous rulings after the trial court granted summary judgment on her tort claims, adopted a jury verdict naming the husband sole managing conservator, entered a property division, and included a Chapter 11 vexatious-litigant finding against her. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals first analyzed whether each complaint was reviewable: it refused to revisit the indigency determination because it had already been finally reviewed under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(g); held challenges to temporary orders were moot because the final decree superseded them; and held possession/access issues were moot because the child turned 18 during the appeal. Because no reporter’s record was filed, the court could not evaluate preservation and was required to presume missing evidence supported the jury findings and discretionary rulings, making the wife’s attacks on the jury verdict and property division unreviewable. On the issues that could be decided on the clerk’s record, the court affirmed the summary judgment on the wife’s personal-injury claims as effectively a no-evidence disposition on essential elements (including causation and damages). But it held the appellate record did not affirmatively support the statutory predicates for a Chapter 11 vexatious-litigant designation, and therefore modified the final decree to delete that finding while otherwise affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appeals in divorce/SAPCR cases often turn on procedure, not merits: preserve error, secure a reporter’s record, and watch for mootness as children near 18. If you seek (or oppose) a vexatious-litigant finding, treat it like a record-driven statutory remedy—without evidence in the record establishing Chapter 11 predicates, an appellate court may strike the designation even while affirming the rest of the decree."
Johnny Ined Gonzalez v. The State of Texas
COA14
In a prosecution for continuous sexual abuse of a child, the State introduced still photos from a CAC forensic interview and had a CAC supervisor (who observed but did not conduct the interview) testify—over hearsay objections—about what the child’s gestures in the photos “meant,” describing specific sexual acts and sensory details. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the “gesture interpretation” testimony was inadmissible hearsay, but analyzed harm under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) and held any error was harmless because substantially the same evidence came in elsewhere without objection, most importantly through the child’s own later testimony explaining the same photos and through CAC medical records admitted without objection. The court affirmed the conviction, but reversed and remanded the $570 “reimbursement fees” portion of court costs because the record did not necessarily support all subpoena/service-related fees as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning the objection isn’t enough—winning the harm analysis is. If you want appellate relief from CAC/forensic-interview “interpretation” testimony, you must also object (or otherwise prevent) the same substantive details from coming in through other witnesses or records; otherwise the error will likely be deemed harmless as cumulative. Conversely, to defend a ruling, build redundancy by getting the key facts admitted through at least one clean, admissible pathway. Also, scrutinize and challenge service/subpoena cost line-items that aren’t tied to proof the service was actually performed."
Ivan Lopez-Lopez v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Ivan Lopez-Lopez v. State, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child where the defendant’s primary appellate argument was that the complainant was not credible because her disclosures became more detailed over time and because the alleged abuse was too frequent to believe. Applying the Jackson/Brooks legal-sufficiency standard, the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and refused to reweigh the jury’s credibility determinations. The court held the complainant’s testimony alone can be legally sufficient under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.07, and her testimony established the statutory elements of continuous sexual abuse under Texas Penal Code § 21.02(b) (child under 14, defendant 17 or older, two or more acts over a period of at least 30 days). The court rejected “evolving disclosure” and “too much abuse to be true” themes as credibility attacks for the jury, not grounds to overturn the verdict on appeal, and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Credibility-only challenges rarely win on appeal. A child’s incremental or “evolving” disclosure is treated as common—not inherently suspicious—and a factfinder may credit it. In family cases involving abuse allegations, expect appellate courts to defer to the trial court’s credibility calls; build (or attack) the case with objective, admissible proof and preserve legal-error issues (evidentiary rulings, due-process limits), not just arguments that the witness “wasn’t believable.”"
Maria Martinez v. Mario Antonio Perez Batres
COA03
Maria Martinez filed a restricted appeal to challenge a default divorce decree. However, the appellate court discovered that all twelve exhibits admitted during the initial hearing were missing from the record because the trial judge had released the originals to the husband’s lawyer, who never filed them with the district clerk. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and determined that this created a significant 'record-integrity problem' that could not be fixed by simple supplementation. The court held that the appeal must be abated and remanded to the trial court, ordering the trial judge to 'settle the record' by either securing an agreement between the parties or holding a hearing to reconstruct the missing evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning your hearing is only the first step; you must ensure your evidence is officially filed and preserved with the court clerk. If exhibits are 'released' to an attorney rather than filed, it can lead to expensive delays and secondary 'record reconstruction' hearings if the case is ever challenged on appeal."
Rickye Henderson v. Ali Arabzadegan
COA03
In a quiet-title/deed-fraud lawsuit, the defendant repeatedly obstructed discovery—producing no responsive documents, asserting meritless objections, giving inconsistent explanations about missing devices/accounts, and refusing to comply with a court-ordered forensic imaging protocol designed to obtain electronically stored information (ESI) and test suspected fabrication. After incremental discovery orders and express findings of intentional concealment and repeated noncompliance, the trial court imposed “death-penalty” sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215 by striking pleadings/defaulting the defendant on liability, leaving only damages for a bench prove-up. The defendant then failed to appear for the damages trial, and the court rendered judgment quieting title, declaring the deed void, and awarding damages and attorneys’ fees. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held the sanctions were “just,” directly related to the discovery abuse, and consistent with due process; it also rejected complaints that excluded evidence (including purported newly discovered racially offensive emails) required reversal in a post-default posture, and affirmed an interlocutory summary judgment disposing of the defendant’s breach-of-contract counterclaim.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts can and will strike pleadings and default a party who games ESI discovery—especially when a tailored forensic imaging order (with privilege safeguards) is ignored. Build a careful record of repeated noncompliance, prejudice, and the ineffectiveness of lesser measures; on appeal, due-process and “critical evidence” arguments are unlikely to resurrect liability after a sanctions default, and the case may proceed only on damages (if the sanctioned party even shows up)."
Harrell v. Brinson
COA01
In Harrell v. Brinson, an inmate repeatedly sued a former landlord over the same underlying 2004 salon lease/break‑in events that led to his 2005 criminal conviction, despite prior final adverse rulings (including summary judgment and an unsuccessful bill of review). In a new 2021 suit repackaged as fraud and conspiracy based on alleged false testimony and collusion with a prosecutor, the defendant moved under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 11 to have Harrell declared a vexatious litigant and to dismiss. Applying Chapter 11, the First Court of Appeals held the trial court acted within its discretion because the record supported the required findings: there was no reasonable probability Harrell would prevail and he was attempting to relitigate the same controversy against the same defendant after prior final determinations. The court also addressed appellate jurisdiction: an earlier appeal was premature because claims against another defendant remained, but a later severance created a final judgment in the severed cause, and Harrell’s notice of appeal was timely under the prisoner mailbox rule based on proof he delivered it to prison authorities within the deadline. The court affirmed the vexatious‑litigant order and the dismissal with prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"Chapter 11 is a powerful early tool to stop serial, pro se “relabeling” lawsuits that try to re-fight issues already finally decided; build a record of prior final determinations and show the new pleading is the same dispute in disguise, and the court can impose vexatious‑litigant restrictions and dismiss with prejudice. Procedurally, if an order isn’t final because other parties/claims remain, severance can create an appealable final judgment—and when the opposing party is incarcerated, plan for the prisoner mailbox rule to affect filing deadlines."
Moises Galvan v. The State of Texas
COA08
In a bar‑shooting prosecution, Moises Galvan admitted shooting two men (killing one) but claimed self‑defense. After a mistrial in 2019, he was retried and convicted in 2023. On appeal, the El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed (1) claimed jury‑charge defects under Texas’s preservation‑dependent harm framework, (2) exclusion of a defense expert opinion under abuse‑of‑discretion gatekeeping and the need for a reliable, issue‑specific “fit” plus a proper offer of proof, (3) cumulative error, and (4) a Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial claim under the Barker v. Wingo balancing test. The court held Galvan failed to show reversible charge error or harm, the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding the defense expert (and any error was not shown harmful in light of the video/forensic and impeachment evidence), cumulative‑error relief was unavailable without multiple harmful errors, and the Barker factors did not warrant the drastic remedy of dismissal with prejudice despite the lengthy delay between indictment and retrial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Crossover lesson for family‑violence dockets: (1) If you need an expert to support a self‑defense/“reasonable perception” narrative, you must build a tight admissibility foundation and preserve the excluded opinion with a detailed offer of proof—otherwise exclusion will usually stand on appeal. (2) Delay‑based fairness arguments require a record of assertion of the right and concrete prejudice (lost evidence/witnesses, impaired presentation, child‑focused harm), not generalized complaints. (3) “Cumulative error” rarely rescues a case when each individual ruling fails on preservation, error, or harm."
Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm v. Michael A. Pohl and The Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
COA01
A Texas lawyer obtained another lawyer’s vendor-held files—attorney–client fee contracts and extensive client lists—through a marketing vendor involved in a prior dispute and used the information to target those individuals with notices that triggered hundreds of responses and follow-on barratry-related litigation and grievances. A Harris County jury found the contracts and lists were protectable trade secrets under the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) and that the defendant misappropriated them, awarding multiple damages categories plus exemplary damages and fees. The First Court of Appeals agreed that client fee contracts and client lists can qualify as TUTSA trade secrets when they have independent economic value from secrecy and the owner takes reasonable confidentiality measures (including instructions and agreements with vendors and controlled access), and that evidence of acquiring the materials from a third party and then using them to conduct targeted outreach supported misappropriation. However, the court partially reversed the judgment because parts of the damages package and related relief were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and/or did not fit TUTSA’s permitted damages frameworks, and it remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Litigation Takeaway
"Client lists, intake/CRM exports, and even signed fee agreements can be trade secrets in Texas—especially in “client poaching” fights involving vendors or departing lawyers—but winning liability is only half the battle. To survive appeal, the firm must prove (1) real secrecy measures (including vendor confidentiality controls) and (2) a damages model that matches TUTSA (actual loss, unjust enrichment, or reasonable royalty) without double-counting; otherwise, even a strong verdict can be pared back or sent back for a do-over."
Mosser v. Flagstar Bank, FSB; Select Portfolio Servicing Inc.; First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
COA05
In a Texas homestead lending/foreclosure dispute, the borrower challenged a home-equity (“cash-out”) lien as constitutionally noncompliant and void and sought discovery from multiple entities in the loan/servicing chain. Defendants moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. The borrower filed a properly supported Rule 166a(g) motion for continuance explaining he needed basic, targeted discovery—foundational documents and testimony necessary to respond to the dispositive motions—especially after later-joined parties and procedural events effectively limited meaningful discovery time. The trial court denied the continuance and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals first rejected a post-submission jurisdiction/standing attack tied to a later-recorded “corrective” assignment, holding it still had appellate jurisdiction and that any assignment/standing issues could be addressed on remand. Turning to the merits, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 166a(g) continuance where the record showed the requested discovery was essential—not a fishing expedition—to oppose summary judgment. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court can’t force a party to lose on summary judgment while blocking the minimum discovery needed to respond. If you face early dispositive motions in a property-heavy case, preserve error with a verified, nonconclusory Rule 166a(g) continuance request that ties specific discovery to specific summary-judgment elements and demonstrates diligence—especially when key parties were added late or discovery time was functionally curtailed."