Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
In Re Alejandra Suarez Jaramillo
COA13
In this mandamus proceeding, Alejandra Suarez Jaramillo challenged a trial court's scheduling order that set a discovery supplementation deadline five weeks before the order was even signed. Jaramillo argued that this retroactive and "impossible" deadline effectively barred her from presenting a defense. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the claim under established mandamus standards, which require both a clear abuse of discretion and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court held that while the retroactive deadline was procedurally unusual, the relator failed to provide a record showing that her defense was 'severely compromised.' Specifically, because she did not identify which vital witnesses or documents were excluded or how they went to the 'very heart' of the litigation, she failed to demonstrate that the error could not be corrected through a normal appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court's procedural error—even one as logically absurd as a retroactive deadline—does not guarantee emergency relief unless you build a specific record proving that the error 'severely compromised' your ability to present your case."
Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Susana Lopez
COA08
In Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Susana Lopez, a state employee sued for retaliation, alleging she was fired for filing internal complaints and requesting FMLA leave. The HHSC argued she was terminated for chronic training delinquency and unauthorized cell phone use. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether Lopez's firing was a 'pretext' for retaliation. The court found that because Lopez admitted to the policy violations and failed to provide evidence of 'similarly situated' employees being treated differently, she could not overcome the agency's legitimate reasons. The court held that the agency retained its sovereign immunity and dismissed the case, emphasizing that subjective belief and timing are not enough to prove a retaliatory motive.
Litigation Takeaway
"To defeat a 'neutral' excuse in court—whether it is an employer's policy or a parent's justification for denying visitation—you must provide objective evidence that the reason is factually false or applied inconsistently. Suspicious timing or personal feelings of unfairness are legally insufficient to prove that an opponent’s stated reason is a mere pretext for retaliation."
In the Interest of K.K. and K.K., Children
COA12
In this parental termination case, the appellant (J.K.) filed a notice of appeal six days after the mandatory 20-day deadline for accelerated appeals. Although the notice was filed within the 15-day 'grace period' allowed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3, the Twelfth Court of Appeals notified J.K. that a 'reasonable explanation' for the delay was required to maintain jurisdiction. Because the appellant failed to respond to the court’s inquiry or provide any explanation for the late filing, the court held it was powerless to grant an extension. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, emphasizing that procedural rules apply equally to pro se litigants and licensed attorneys.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appellate deadlines in parental termination cases are extremely strict and accelerated; missing the 20-day filing window—and failing to provide a prompt, reasonable explanation for the delay—will result in the permanent loss of your right to appeal."
In the matter of D.P.
COA02
In this juvenile law matter, the Second Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old, D.P., to adult criminal court for prosecution of capital murder and aggravated robbery. D.P. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence establishing probable cause and argued that the trial court improperly weighed his maturity and sophistication. The appellate court affirmed the transfer, holding that the State met its burden through detective testimony and physical evidence. Furthermore, the court determined that the trial court acted within its discretion under Texas Family Code § 54.02 by identifying D.P.'s 'level of planning' and premeditation as clear indicators of adult-like sophistication, which outweighed his lack of a prior criminal record.
Litigation Takeaway
"When litigating a minor’s maturity or capacity—whether in juvenile transfer hearings or high-conflict custody disputes involving delinquent behavior—Texas courts prioritize evidence of 'planning' and 'organization' over a lack of prior history to determine if a child should be held to adult-level standards of accountability."
In the Matter of J.S.R., A Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether a juvenile’s voluntary motion to dismiss an appeal was valid when it involved a waiver of statutory rights. While typical civil dismissals require only a signature from an attorney, the Court emphasized that Texas Family Code Section 51.09 imposes stricter "belt and suspenders" requirements for minors. The Court analyzed the motion and found that it correctly included signatures from both the juvenile and his attorney, as required by law. Consequently, the Court held the waiver was effective and granted the dismissal, highlighting that specific statutory protections for children take precedence over general appellate procedural rules.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any legal proceeding involving a minor’s rights—whether in juvenile delinquency or high-stakes family litigation—a standard signature from counsel is insufficient for a waiver. Under Texas Family Code Section 51.09, any waiver of a child's constitutional or statutory rights must be signed by both the minor and their attorney. To ensure the finality of a dismissal or settlement involving a minor, practitioners must strictly adhere to this dual-signature requirement."
In the Interest of I.H., A Child
COA02
A father challenged the termination of his parental rights, arguing that he was denied due process because he was not transported from jail for his trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support the termination. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the father's history of substance abuse and his repeated refusal to submit to court-ordered drug testing, concluding that such refusals create a legal inference of ongoing drug use. The court held that this "presumption of use," combined with the child's drug exposure at birth, supported an endangerment finding. Additionally, the court held that because the father's attorney did not explicitly raise a constitutional objection to the father's absence during the trial, those due process claims were waived for appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Refusing a court-ordered drug test is not a neutral act; Texas courts treat a refusal as substantive evidence of illegal drug use and child endangerment. Furthermore, if a parent is unable to attend a hearing, counsel must explicitly cite constitutional due process grounds on the record to preserve the right to appeal that absence."
In re Hector Hernandez
COA08
After obtaining a writ of execution to recover property, Hector Hernandez filed a petition for writ of mandamus directly with the El Paso Court of Appeals because the County Sheriff refused to enforce the writ. The Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Government Code § 22.221(b), which limits its original mandamus jurisdiction to actions against specific judges, not executive officials like sheriffs. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to compel a sheriff to act unless such an order was necessary to protect the court's own jurisdiction. Because Hernandez had not first filed a mandamus action against the sheriff in a district court, the appellate court dismissed the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot "leapfrog" the trial court when a sheriff or constable refuses to execute a writ. To compel a county official to perform a ministerial duty, you must first file a petition for writ of mandamus in the district court; filing directly in the court of appeals will result in a jurisdictional dismissal."
In the Interest of M.L.L., A.M.L., and B.F.L., Children
COA07
In a parental termination proceeding, a mother sought to introduce evidence of events occurring prior to a 2018 divorce decree. The trial court excluded this evidence, citing res judicata. On appeal, the mother argued this exclusion was improper. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a), which require a party to preserve error by making an "offer of proof" when evidence is excluded. The court held that because the mother failed to make an offer of proof regarding what the excluded testimony would have shown, the appellate court could not conduct a harm analysis. Consequently, the mother waived her right to challenge the exclusion, and the termination of her parental rights was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a trial court excludes evidence, simply objecting is not enough; you must make a formal or informal 'offer of proof' for the record to show the appellate court exactly what that evidence would have been and why its exclusion was harmful."
Opinion by Justice Triana
COA03
In this case, a grandfather sought sole managing conservatorship of his three grandchildren following the death of their father, citing the mother's extreme and abusive disciplinary measures. The mother argued that her 'strict' parenting was protected by the legal 'parental presumption,' which usually favors keeping children with their parents. However, the court analyzed evidence showing the mother forced the children to stay outdoors overnight in freezing temperatures and neglected their medical and psychological needs, leading to fainting spells and suicidal ideation. The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that the grandfather successfully rebutted the parental presumption because the mother’s conduct posed a significant threat to the children’s physical health and emotional development.
Litigation Takeaway
"The 'parental presumption' is not absolute; a non-parent can win custody by documenting a clear pattern of extreme disciplinary tactics, medical neglect, and the resulting psychological trauma to the children."
RANCHO DE LOS ARBOLES LLC AND ELLEN EAKIN v. TOWN OF CROSS ROADS, TX
COA02
Rancho De Los Arboles LLC and its principal sued the Town of Cross Roads after the Town began enforcing zoning ordinances to shut down their long-running short‑term rental use. Rancho sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging Texas-constitutional property violations (including takings/due course of law theories) and asserting ultra vires conduct. The Town filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity, and the trial court dismissed all claims with prejudice. Applying the Miranda plea-to-the-jurisdiction framework, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals explained that a dismissal with prejudice is proper only when the pleadings or record affirmatively negate jurisdiction as a matter of law (i.e., the defect is incurable). Where the problem is merely insufficient pleading of jurisdictional facts that could be cured by amendment—such as failing to plead takings elements with specificity or failing to name the proper officials for an ultra vires claim—the plaintiff must be given a chance to replead. The court affirmed dismissal of those claims that were jurisdictionally barred on the record, but held the trial court reversibly erred by dismissing the remainder with prejudice without allowing Rancho an opportunity to amend. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the potentially curable constitutional and ultra vires theories.
Litigation Takeaway
"A plea to the jurisdiction is not automatically a “case killer.” If governmental immunity is raised and your petition is merely thin—not incurably barred—push hard for the right to amend. Preserve error by requesting leave to replead and objecting to any “with prejudice” dismissal, especially when asserting constitutional property/takings or ultra vires claims tied to real estate value in a divorce-related crossover dispute."