Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
In the Interest of N.A.G.A., a Child
COA05
Foster parents sought a family-violence protective order on behalf of a child against the child’s permanent managing conservator, relying on evidence of a prior intoxication-based endangerment incident, a criminal plea, a USCIS T-visa approval, and allegations of abuse and trafficking. The Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court, as factfinder, was entitled to conclude that this record did not prove the statutory predicates for a protective order, including trafficking, abuse, and the required family or household relationship under the Family Code. Because the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the denial, the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A compelling story is not enough in a protective-order case. Family-law practitioners must prove each statutory element with admissible, case-specific evidence—especially the qualifying relationship or household nexus—and cannot assume CPS history, criminal pleas, immigration findings, or a respondent’s default will carry the application."
In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. d/b/a Chase Bank
COA13
In this original proceeding, the court held that a trial court overreached when it sanctioned and held Chase Bank in contempt for alleged failure to produce subpoenaed records, release trust assets, and honor a successor trustee appointment order, even though Chase was a nonparty and had not been properly brought within the court’s personal jurisdiction for that relief. The appellate court focused on procedural due process rather than the underlying trust dispute, explaining that a subpoena, appointment order, or generalized motion in the main case does not automatically authorize contempt-style remedies or Rule 215 sanctions against a nonparty financial institution. Because the necessary procedural and jurisdictional predicates were not established on the record, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief in part and vacated the challenged contempt and sanctions relief to that extent.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want enforceable relief against a bank or other nonparty in a family-law case, build the procedural runway first. You cannot turn a subpoena dispute or third-party compliance problem into contempt or major sanctions unless service, jurisdiction, notice, and the specific rule-based remedy are all properly established."
Armando Jesus Pedraza v. The State of Texas
COA01
In *Armando Jesus Pedraza v. The State of Texas*, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a 30-year punishment judgment after Pedraza argued his lawyer was ineffective during punishment. He claimed counsel should have objected to hearsay testimony about an online article describing prior violent conduct and wrongly advised him that he could testify while still invoking the Fifth Amendment about pending charges. The court applied *Strickland* and held the record was too undeveloped to show deficient performance or prejudice. Because counsel had no opportunity to explain the reasons for not objecting or for calling Pedraza to testify, the court would not speculate on a silent record, especially given the already extensive punishment evidence of prior violence, convictions, bond violations, and pending charges. The court therefore affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case overlaps with criminal exposure, lawyers must prepare clients carefully before they testify because taking the stand may waive any ability to refuse related cross-examination. The case also shows that appellate complaints about bad evidence or bad strategy usually fail without a well-developed record explaining counsel’s choices, so trial lawyers should preserve objections, seek limiting rulings when appropriate, and build a record if strategy may later be challenged."
Estrada v. State
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed Estrada’s conviction for repeated protective-order violations. The State proved two violations within twelve months: Estrada’s contact with the protected person at the airport despite a no-contact order, and a later incident in which the complainant called 911 reporting that he came to her home and strangled her. Although the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution, the court held the trial court properly admitted the 911 call and EMS records because they were created during an ongoing emergency and for medical-response purposes, making them admissible under hearsay principles and non-testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excusing a juror for cause and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence cases, a later recantation usually does not erase strong contemporaneous evidence. 911 audio, EMS records, photos, neighbor testimony, and other emergency-response evidence can outweigh a complainant’s later change of story and may strongly affect protective-order, custody, and divorce litigation. Also, reconciliation does not suspend a protective order—only a court can modify it."
Rademacher v. Rademacher
COA03
In Rademacher v. Rademacher, a wife sought to set aside a Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) during a divorce, claiming she signed it under duress. She argued that her various medical conditions, anxiety, and pressure from her attorney and the mediator—who warned her that trial would be expensive and risky—rendered her signature involuntary. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the agreement under Texas Family Code § 6.602, which provides that a properly formatted MSA is immediately binding and non-revocable. The court held that 'reality-testing' by counsel regarding litigation costs and outcomes does not constitute legal duress, and because the wife failed to prove that her free agency was destroyed, the MSA remained enforceable.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas divorce law, a signed Mediated Settlement Agreement is nearly impossible to undo; feelings of pressure, anxiety, or being told that trial is a bad financial move do not constitute 'duress' that would allow a party to back out of the deal."
Bradford v. State
COA10
In Bradford v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a six-year-old child’s three out-of-court identifications of her assailant were admissible as excited utterances under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(2), even though the trial court declined to admit them under Article 38.072. The court focused on whether the child remained dominated by fear, pain, and emotional shock from the assault, and concluded that the record showed continuous stress from the immediate porch disclosure through later hospital statements. The court also rejected the Confrontation Clause challenge, reasoning that the statements were spontaneous, made to the child’s mother during crisis and treatment, and were non-testimonial rather than formal accusations for prosecution. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a child’s abuse disclosure does not fit a specialized hearsay statute, do not assume admissibility is lost. Build a Rule 803(2) record showing spontaneity, timing, visible distress, injuries, and continuing trauma; in family court, that can support admission of immediate child disclosures in emergency custody, protective-order, and supervised-possession disputes. To defeat admission, focus on reflection, prompting, intervening calm, and litigation-driven questioning."
Pettigrew v. State
COA10
In Pettigrew v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals upheld admission of a roughly twenty-year-old extraneous child-sex-abuse allegation under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37. The defendant argued the statute was unconstitutional as applied because the prior allegation was stale, uncorroborated, never reported to police, and previously deemed “unsubstantiated” by CPS. The court rejected that argument, emphasizing that the trial court followed the statute’s safeguards by holding the required hearing, finding a reasonable juror could believe the extraneous act beyond a reasonable doubt, and conducting Rule 403 balancing. On the evidentiary issue, the court held the prior allegation was highly probative because it closely resembled the charged conduct, and the State had significant need for the evidence in a credibility-driven case. The court therefore held the statute was not unconstitutional as applied and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
"Old, uncorroborated, or previously “unsubstantiated” sexual-abuse allegations may still carry significant evidentiary weight when they closely resemble current accusations and credibility is central. For family-law litigants, that means you cannot rely on remoteness or an agency’s non-substantiation label alone; you must either build a strong similarity-and-risk argument or attack the allegation’s reliability, dissimilarity, and prejudicial effect in a focused way."
In the Interest of A.S., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) and § 161.001(b)(2). Mother sought termination after Father failed to pay support, had no in-person contact following a Rule 11 agreement suspending access pending a mental-health evaluation, and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on both the predicate ground and best interest. The court emphasized that a failure-to-support termination requires proof of the parent’s actual ability to support the child during each month of the relevant twelve-month period; a prior support order or arrearage evidence alone is not enough. Applying deferential legal- and factual-sufficiency review, the court held the trial judge could disbelieve Father’s testimony minimizing his income and infer from the broader financial record that he had some ability to pay but failed to support the child in accordance with that ability. The same evidence, together with Father’s prolonged absence and instability in the parent-child relationship, supported the best-interest finding. The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a § 161.001(b)(1)(F) case, the winning record is a month-by-month ability-to-pay record, not just proof of arrearages. Petitioners should build concrete evidence of income, resources, and spending during the statutory twelve-month window, while respondents need disciplined documentary proof of genuine inability to pay because unsupported excuses and credibility problems can be fatal."
Sheehan v. Sheehan
COA11
In Sheehan v. Sheehan, the divorce decree awarded the wife $64,661.44 from a BB&T account in the husband’s name, but he later depleted the account and failed to deliver the funds. On enforcement, the husband argued that a money judgment would improperly modify the decree because the specific account no longer contained the money. The Eleventh Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that Texas Family Code §§ 9.002, 9.006, and especially 9.010 allow a trial court to enforce an existing property award through a money judgment when direct delivery of the awarded property is no longer an adequate remedy. Because the decree had already awarded the wife that sum, reducing the undelivered award to a money judgment did not change the substantive property division; it simply implemented it. The court also affirmed attorney’s fees under § 9.014.
Litigation Takeaway
"A spouse cannot defeat a divorce decree’s property award by draining the account or liquidating the asset from which payment was supposed to come. If the decree already awarded a sum certain, the court can enforce that award with a money judgment—and attorney’s fees—without impermissibly modifying the decree."
Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger v. Deere Credit, Inc.
COA11
The Eastland Court of Appeals reversed a restricted-appeal default judgment entered against an individual defendant and a limited partnership. The court held that Shelia Unger’s signed pro se letter, which denied liability, asserted that payments had been made and the equipment returned, and asked the court to dismiss the suit, was sufficient to constitute an answer on her own behalf because Texas courts liberally construe informal pro se filings that give fair notice of a defensive position. The same letter could not serve as a valid appearance for the limited partnership because a non-attorney cannot represent an entity. Even so, the court held the trial court erred by treating the record as though no response existed and by signing a default judgment the same day the motion was filed, without notice or an opportunity for the entity to cure the representation defect. The judgment was reversed and remanded as to both defendants.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law-adjacent default practice, any timely pro se filing by an individual that disputes the claims may defeat a no-answer default, even if informal. And if a business entity attempts to respond through a non-lawyer, the safer course is to force counsel to appear and give notice and a chance to cure—not rush to default—because due-process defects can unravel the judgment on restricted appeal."