Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
In the Interest of E.K.Y.O.
COA04
In a SAPCR modification proceeding, the trial court ordered a father to pay $20,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. The father appealed, contending that his previously filed Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs—which was uncontested—exempted him from such an award under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. However, the father had filed the Statement in a separate cause number involving the registration of a foreign judgment, rather than the specific modification case. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed Rule 145, concluding that indigency protections are case-specific and do not automatically follow a party into separate, even if related, litigation. The court held that because the father failed to file the Statement in the correct cause number, he was not shielded from the fee award and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Indigency status under Rule 145 is case-specific; to protect a client from fee awards or court costs, you must file a Statement of Inability in every individual cause number, as a filing in a related or precursor case will not provide protection in a separate proceeding."
Salinas v. Tovar
COA13
In a civil suit alleging invasion of privacy, a defendant challenged a trial court's temporary injunction that compelled him to turn over his cell phone and iCloud data to a court-appointed forensic examiner. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether this compelled production violated the Fifth Amendment's act-of-production doctrine. The court reasoned that by forcing the defendant to produce the specific device used on the date of the alleged incident, the act would implicitly communicate and authenticate the device's existence, the defendant's possession of it, and its link to the allegations. The court held that the turnover requirement constituted a testimonial communication protected by the privilege against self-incrimination and reversed that portion of the trial court's order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Compelling a party to produce a specific digital device for forensic imaging may violate the Fifth Amendment act-of-production privilege because the act of production itself can be an incriminating testimonial communication regarding the device's existence, possession, and authenticity."
Davis v. State
COA09
In Davis v. State, a defendant challenged the warrantless seizure of his cell phone during a child sexual assault investigation, arguing the evidence obtained from a subsequent search warrant should be suppressed. The Ninth Court of Appeals analyzed the seizure under the Fourth Amendment's exigent circumstances exception, which allows warrantless action to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. The court found that because the defendant admitted to using the phone to communicate with the victim and had already deleted messages and blocked her, officers had both probable cause and a reasonable belief that evidence faced immediate destruction. The court held the warrantless seizure was permissible to preserve the status quo until a warrant could be obtained, affirming the denial of the motion to suppress.
Litigation Takeaway
"To secure immediate preservation of digital evidence in family violence or abuse cases, litigators should build a record of specific "deletion risk"—such as prior deletions or admissions of blocking contacts—to justify emergency relief or turnover orders under an exigent circumstances framework."
In re PVF Industrial Supply, Inc.
COA06
In a personal injury case with broad implications for family law tort and business disputes, the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant can designate a responsible third party (RTP) after the statute of limitations has expired. The trial court had denied the designation because the defendant did not identify the RTP in its initial disclosures. The appellate court conditionally granted mandamus relief, reasoning that Section 33.004(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code only bars late designations if a defendant fails to comply with a 'timely disclosure' obligation. Because the defendant’s Rule 194 disclosure deadline fell after the limitations period had already passed, there was no breach of duty. The court held that an erroneous denial of an RTP designation 'skews' the comparative-responsibility framework of the trial, making mandamus the appropriate remedy as the error cannot be adequately cured on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A defendant's duty to disclose responsible third parties is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, not the expiration of the statute of limitations; if your disclosure deadline falls after limitations expires, you are not barred from designating an RTP, and a trial court's refusal to allow that designation is a 'skewing' error that justifies immediate mandamus relief."
Strickland v. State
COA07
In Strickland v. State, a trial court attempted to stack a defendant's sentences by 'judicially noticing' prior convictions from a different term of court. The Seventh Court of Appeals held that judicial notice cannot be used as a shortcut to prove matters outside the operative record or term of court. Instead, the proponent must introduce competent evidence and establish a link between the party and the records. Although the trial court erred in its method, the appellate court affirmed the sentence because the State introduced the actual judgments containing matching identifiers (such as SID and Social Security numbers), which provided sufficient proof of the prior convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not rely on a judge 'knowing the file' or taking judicial notice of records from other cases or prior terms; to survive appeal, you must formally introduce certified records and provide specific testimony or identifiers that link those documents to the party."
McCarver v. McCarver
COA12
After a husband failed to pay a $90,000 "financial security" judgment required by a divorce decree and premarital agreement, the wife sought a post-judgment turnover order and the appointment of a receiver. The husband attempted to block the order by asserting affirmative defenses such as waiver and release, arguing the premarital agreement's separate property protections shielded his assets. The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order, analyzing the doctrine of res judicata. The court held that because the premarital agreement's terms were already litigated (or could have been) during the divorce, the husband was barred from raising those contractual defenses to challenge an enforcement proceeding. Additionally, the court clarified that a turnover order is a final, appealable judgment, allowing for standard appellate timeline extensions.
Litigation Takeaway
"You only get "one bite at the apple" regarding premarital agreement defenses. If a party intends to use a prenuptial agreement to protect assets or waive liabilities, those arguments must be fully exhausted before the divorce decree becomes final; once a turnover proceeding begins, the court will only consider statutory exemptions, not contract-based defenses that were already adjudicated."
In the Interest of J.M., a Child
COA12
After the Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate a mother's parental rights due to substance abuse and family violence, the parties executed a statutory Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) appointing the mother as a possessory conservator. Despite the agreement, the mother appealed the final order. The Twelfth Court of Appeals performed an independent review of the record and found the appeal frivolous under Anders v. California. The court held that because the MSA complied with Texas Family Code § 153.0071—including the required non-revocation language and voluntary signatures—it was binding on the trial court. While the court affirmed the judgment, it denied appointed counsel's motion to withdraw, clarifying that the right to counsel in government-initiated suits persists through the exhaustion of proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court.
Litigation Takeaway
"A statutory Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) is nearly unassailable on appeal if it contains the proper non-revocation language and is signed by all parties; furthermore, appointed counsel in CPS cases must remain on the case through the Texas Supreme Court level even if they believe the appeal is frivolous."
In Re Sufian Khalaf
COA04
In a commercial motor vehicle accident case, an individual driver-defendant sought mandatory bifurcation of compensatory and exemplary damages under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 72.052. The plaintiff argued the statutory right to bifurcation applied only to employer-entities, a position the trial court adopted in denying the motion. On mandamus review, the San Antonio Court of Appeals analyzed the plain language of the statute, noting the mandatory directive 'shall' and the broad definition of 'a defendant' which includes vehicle operators. The court held that trial courts have no discretion to deny a timely bifurcation motion filed by an individual driver and granted mandamus relief to prevent the prejudice of 'tainted' jury deliberations.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family law cases involving interspousal torts or joined third-party claims, attorneys should move for mandatory bifurcation of punitive damages to prevent inflammatory 'bad act' evidence from unfairly influencing the jury's perception of the 'just and right' division of the community estate."
Sebastian Linke v. Kyle Folmer
COA04
In Sebastian Linke v. Kyle Folmer, the San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed whether a judgment is final for appeal purposes when it expressly reserves a ruling on a prevailing party’s attorney’s fees. Despite the judgment containing boilerplate language stating it was 'final and appealable,' the court analyzed the record under the Lehmann and Sealy Emergency Room standards. It determined that because the prevailing party had a mandatory contractual claim for fees that the trial court explicitly deferred for a later hearing, the judgment did not actually dispose of all claims. Consequently, the court held that the judgment was not final and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on 'final and appealable' boilerplate language if the trial court has reserved a ruling on mandatory attorney's fees. To avoid a jurisdictional trap or a dismissed appeal, ensure the final decree expressly grants, denies, or severs all pending fee claims."
F.M.H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
This case involved an appeal by a mother whose parental rights were terminated following a bench trial she failed to attend. The Department of Family and Protective Services sought termination based on neglectful supervision, drug use, and the mother's failure to engage in any court-ordered services, such as therapy and drug testing. After the trial court terminated her rights, her court-appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, asserting that the appeal was frivolous. The Third Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record, evaluating the evidence under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b) regarding endangerment and constructive abandonment. The court found that the mother's total lack of participation in services and the children's successful placement in stable, prospective adoptive homes provided legally and factually sufficient evidence for termination. The court held that no arguable grounds for appeal existed and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"A parent’s total failure to engage in court-ordered services and absence from trial creates an evidentiary record that is nearly impossible to challenge on appeal. For practitioners, meticulously documenting "referral fatigue"—the repeated offering and subsequent rejection of rehabilitative resources—and treating missed drug tests as evidence of endangerment are critical steps to ensuring a termination decree survives an Anders review and provides permanency for the children."