Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
Kian Motors, Inc. v. VBI Group, Inc.
COA05
In this restricted appeal from a no-answer default judgment, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that service through the Texas Secretary of State was defective because the record showed process was forwarded to the wrong address. VBI’s filings identified Kian Motors’ address as 1212 Commerce Drive, but the Whitney certificate showed the Secretary mailed citation to 1213 Commerce Drive. Applying Texas’s strict-compliance rules for default judgments and statutory service under Business Organizations Code §§ 5.251 and 5.253, the court rejected any presumption that the Whitney certificate cured the problem and concluded the face of the record affirmatively showed lack of proper service. Because personal jurisdiction was absent, the default judgment was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Default judgments live or die on exact service compliance. In family cases, even a one-digit address mismatch in substitute or statutory service can destroy a default on restricted appeal, so lawyers should audit the clerk’s record line by line before prove-up and immediately after any default is entered."
Schubiner v. Julis
COA05
In Schubiner v. Julis, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a five-year Chapter 7B protective order after finding legally and factually sufficient evidence that the respondent engaged in stalking through a coordinated campaign of doxxing, mass emails and texts, social-media harassment, and use of third parties to confront the applicants in person. The court analyzed the conduct cumulatively rather than as isolated speech acts, emphasizing that publishing home addresses and family photos, urging public confrontations, contacting relatives and associates, and arranging in-person disruptions could reasonably be viewed as threatening, harassing, alarming, tormenting, or embarrassing conduct under Texas stalking law. The court also rejected vagueness, overbreadth, and prior-restraint challenges, holding in effect that an order tailored to proven, threat-facilitating harassment would stand.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts can treat digital harassment as stalking when the evidence shows a repeated, targeted campaign—not just offensive speech. For family-law cases, doxxing, mass messaging, posting locations, and using third parties to pressure or confront a spouse, co-parent, or family members can support protective relief if you build a record showing repetition, escalation, targeting, and real-world safety concerns."
Branch v. State
COA06
In Branch v. State, the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court improperly allowed a child witness’s father to remain in the courtroom as a support person without making the findings required by Article 38.074. But at trial, counsel objected only under Rule 614 sequestration grounds and never specifically complained that Article 38.074 required predicate findings or asked the court to make them. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the appellate complaint did not comport with the trial objection, so the issue was waived under Rule 33.1(a). The court also held that complaints about the State’s references to other support persons were unpreserved because no contemporaneous objection was made.
Litigation Takeaway
"Specificity preserves error. In family cases involving child testimony, courtroom accommodations, sequestration exceptions, or trauma-informed procedures, a general objection will not preserve a narrower complaint that the court failed to follow a particular statute or make required findings. If you want appellate review, identify the exact authority, state the precise defect, request findings on the record, and obtain a ruling."
Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas v. The City of Austin and Austin Transit Partnership Local Government Corporation
SCOTX
In Paxton v. City of Austin, the Texas Supreme Court addressed a trial court’s refusal to rule on the Attorney General’s plea to the jurisdiction after the opposing parties openly urged the court to withhold a ruling so they could avoid an interlocutory appeal and automatic stay under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8). The Court held that because no written order granted or denied the plea, the court of appeals correctly concluded it lacked interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. But the Court also held that a trial court cannot defeat a governmental unit’s statutory appellate rights by deliberately refusing to rule on a properly presented jurisdictional plea. Mandamus was therefore appropriate to compel the trial court to rule, and appellate courts may either treat a premature appeal as a mandamus petition or abate the appeal and direct the trial court to issue a ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court cannot use a non-ruling to block appellate review of a threshold jurisdictional challenge. If the court refuses to rule on a properly presented plea to the jurisdiction—especially to avoid an interlocutory appeal or stay—build a clear record and seek mandamus to force a ruling."
Gopalan v. Marsh
SCOTX
In Gopalan v. Marsh, a jury found that the father had the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence, but the trial court’s decree awarded the mother about 57% of the possession time. The Texas Supreme Court analyzed Family Code section 105.002, the broader conservatorship statutes, and the ordinary meaning of “primary residence,” concluding that the term means the place where the child lives most of the time. Because the decree gave majority possession to the non-designating parent, it contravened the binding jury verdict. The Court reversed and remanded the possession order, related best-interest determinations on parental rights and duties, and the appellate attorney’s fee award, while otherwise affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a jury awards your client the exclusive right to designate a child’s primary residence, the final decree cannot give the other parent the majority of possession time. In Texas jury-tried conservatorship cases, lawyers must align the possession schedule with the primary-residence finding, preserve objections to any inconsistent decree, and recognize that possession errors can unravel related rulings on support, parental rights, and fees."
Weger v. Bradley
COA06
In Weger v. Bradley, a post-divorce property dispute arose over whether a receiver’s sale transferred only the 0.59-acre tract at 202 Banks Drive or also a separate 0.49-acre tract at 0 Banks Drive. The appellees argued the receiver had authority to sell both parcels, relying on the enforcement order, a later nunc pro tunc order attaching legal descriptions, and a correction deed. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that even assuming the receiver had authority, the summary-judgment evidence created a genuine fact issue about what property was actually included in the sale. The original deed, contract, title documents, purchase price, and escrow evidence pointed only to 202 Banks Drive, so traditional summary judgment was improper. The court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In post-decree real-estate enforcement cases, proving authority to sell is not enough—you must also prove the disputed parcel was actually included in the transaction that closed. If the decree, receiver order, deed package, title file, and consideration do not all match, a fact issue can defeat summary judgment."
Downstream Investments, LLC v. Krcmar
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals reversed a traditional summary judgment that had voided a land-sale contract based on the seller’s alleged mental incapacity. The court held that contractual incapacity is judged at the time of execution, and although the guardian offered strong evidence of the seller’s stroke-related cognitive deficits, later medical evaluations, and later guardianship findings, that evidence did not conclusively prove she lacked capacity when she signed the contract. Because affidavit testimony from the realtor supported a reasonable inference that the seller understood the nature and effect of the transaction, a genuine fact issue remained and the case had to be remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you are attacking or defending a family-law agreement on incapacity grounds, the key evidence must be tied to the exact time the document was signed. Later guardianship orders, diagnoses, or generalized proof of cognitive decline may be persuasive, but they will not support traditional summary judgment if there is transaction-specific evidence that the person understood the deal when it was made."
L. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In L. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Austin Court of Appeals held that under the 2023 amendments to Texas Family Code § 161.001, a DFPS-filed termination case requires more than proof of a predicate ground and best interest: the trial court must also make a separate written finding, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent. The court examined the decree and the record, which showed DFPS created a tailored service plan, referred and paid for services, arranged individual and family therapy, maintained contact, provided visitation, and pursued relative placement with reunification in mind. Rejecting the mother’s argument that the efforts were not reasonable, the court emphasized that the statute requires reasonable efforts, not successful reunification, and deferred to the trial court’s adverse credibility finding against the mother. The court held the written findings were sufficiently specific and that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the reasonable-efforts finding, so it affirmed the termination decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If reunification efforts matter, build and document them with specificity. For DFPS and child’s counsel, L.G. shows that a detailed service plan, therapy referrals, payment for services, visitation, contact logs, and relative-placement efforts can satisfy § 161.001(f). For parent-side counsel, broad complaints about unfair services are not enough—challenge the fit, accessibility, timing, and execution of the services in real time and preserve those issues in the trial court."
In the Interest of K.A.B., a Child
COA05
In this SAPCR modification appeal, the mother argued the trial court violated due process by enforcing equal one-hour time limits that prevented her from fully testifying and offering additional exhibits. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that trial courts have broad discretion to impose reasonable, evenhanded trial limits, and the record showed the limits were applied equally, the mother was warned as her time expired, and she chose to spend her allotted time on cross-examination rather than her own affirmative proof. The court also emphasized preservation: the mother did not timely object to the time limits, did not make an offer of proof showing what excluded testimony or exhibits would have established, and did not preserve hearsay complaints by contemporaneous objection. Because the complaints were waived or inadequately briefed, and no abuse of discretion appeared on the record, the court affirmed the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family court imposes trial time limits, object early, explain specifically why more time is needed, and make an offer of proof for any excluded testimony or exhibits. On appeal, preservation usually matters more than generalized fairness complaints."
In the Interest of G.M.M., a Child
COA07
In In re G.M.M., the father asked to reduce his child support based on reduced income, travel expenses, and responsibility for another child, but the record contained no evidence comparing his financial circumstances at the time of the prior order with his circumstances at the modification hearing and no evidence allowing the trial court to recalculate support under current guidelines. The Amarillo Court of Appeals applied Texas Family Code section 156.401 and abuse-of-discretion review, emphasizing that attorney argument, opening statements, and unsupported assertions are not evidence. Because the father failed to prove either a material and substantial change or a guideline-based 20%/$100 variance, and the record also reflected no objection when counsel stated child support would not be modified, the court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by leaving support unchanged.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to modify child support, prove it with admissible financial evidence. A movant must show either a material and substantial change since the last order or enough current financial data for a guideline recalculation under Family Code 156.401; fairness arguments, travel-cost complaints, and unsworn claims about lower income or other children will not carry the issue."