Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Renove Medical Spa, PLLC & Afia Naqvi, M.D. v. Charlotte Elizondo
COA14
Charlotte Elizondo sued Renove Medical Spa and Dr. Afia Naqvi for negligence after a facial injection led to a life-threatening infection. Under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA), Elizondo served an expert report from a nurse practitioner. The defendants waited over a year to object, arguing the nurse was unqualified to opine on a doctor's standard of care and that the report was therefore legally nonexistent (a "no report" scenario). The court analyzed whether a report by an unqualified expert is a jurisdictional nullity or a "deficient" report subject to waiver. Applying Texas Supreme Court precedent, the court held that qualification challenges are sufficiency objections that must be raised within the TMLA’s 21-day statutory window. Because the defendants missed this deadline, they waived their challenge, and the denial of their motion to dismiss was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas litigation, "unqualified" does not mean "nonexistent." If an opponent serves an expert report—whether in a medical malpractice case or a child custody dispute—any challenge to that expert's credentials must be made promptly. Failing to object within statutory or procedural deadlines (like the TMLA’s 21-day window) waives the objection, potentially allowing a "deficient" expert to remain the anchor of the case."
In the Interest of Z.P., a Child
COA05
In a child-support enforcement action, the mother sought confirmation of arrears and a cumulative money judgment “plus interest,” along with attorney’s fees. Before the enforcement hearing, the father paid the arrearage principal ($25,420) through the OAG, and the trial court confirmed the arrears as paid and awarded $8,766.65 in attorney’s fees/costs but omitted any interest from the cumulative money judgment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 157.263 makes interest on confirmed child-support arrearages mandatory when a money judgment is requested; the trial court’s role is essentially mechanical once arrears are confirmed, and a pretrial payment of principal does not eliminate accrued statutory interest. The court reversed and remanded for the limited purpose of adding interest on the previously accrued $25,420 arrearage amount, while affirming the reduced attorney’s-fee award because reasonableness remains a fact issue within the trial court’s discretion even when the fee evidence is uncontroverted.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas child-support enforcement, don’t let a last-minute payment of arrears principal lull you into thinking the case is over—if you plead for a money judgment, interest under Family Code § 157.263 is mandatory and an order that omits it is reversible. Also, even strong, uncontroverted fee proof doesn’t guarantee the full amount requested; position “reasonableness” and tie the work to enforcement necessity if you want the court to award all fees."
Andrew Thomas Vidal v. The State of Texas
COA08
In a continuous child sexual abuse prosecution, the defendant argued on appeal that a visiting judge’s voir dire comments about the difficulty and prevalence of child-sex-abuse cases improperly “set an unfavorable tone,” conveyed an opinion of guilt in violation of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.05, and undermined due process and the presumption of innocence—despite no trial objection. The El Paso Court of Appeals reviewed the remarks in context and treated them as permissible “process” comments aimed at screening jurors for suitability in an emotionally charged case, emphasizing that the judge repeatedly redirected the panel to the presumption of innocence. The court held the comments did not communicate that the judge believed the State’s evidence, disbelieved the defense, or had predetermined the outcome. And even assuming the remarks approached the line, the appellant failed to demonstrate reversible harm. The court affirmed the conviction and concurrent sentences.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-allegation trials (including SAPCRs and protective-order cases), appellate courts distinguish between neutral, case-management/voir dire comments acknowledging difficult subject matter and improper comments that signal credibility or merits. If a judge’s remarks start drifting from “process” to “proof,” object and build a harm record immediately (request curative instructions, get rulings, and tie the comment to concrete prejudice); without a specific harm narrative, “tone-setting” complaints rarely win on appeal."
Gary P. Joseph v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this criminal appeal with frequent spillover into Texas family-law cases alleging sexual abuse, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of alleged sexual assaults and sexualized conduct beyond the charged time period—including acts occurring after the complainant turned 18—and whether those evidentiary rulings required reversal of a conviction for the lesser-included offense of sexual assault of a child (age 14–17). The court applied a plain-text construction of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37 and held that the statute’s “gateway” requirement turns on the offense being prosecuted (a qualifying sexual offense committed against a child under 17), not on the complainant’s age at the time of the extraneous acts. Because the prosecution alleged a qualifying Chapter 22 offense committed when the complainant was under 17, article 38.37, §1(b) permitted evidence of other acts against the same victim to show relevant matters, including the “previous and subsequent relationship” between the defendant and the child-victim, even if some acts occurred after the complainant reached adulthood. The court further concluded the challenged admission/exclusion rulings (including embedded Rule 403 unfair-prejudice arguments) did not amount to reversible error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and the jury’s lesser-included conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When sexual-abuse allegations involve a long-running pattern, courts may allow “relationship narrative” evidence that extends beyond the child’s minority—so an “they were over 18 then” objection, standing alone, is often weak. In family cases (SAPCR, modifications, protective orders), build or attack the case on relevance, specificity, corroboration (outcry chronology, travel/records), and prejudice/mini-trial concerns, and treat SANE/DNA-type proof as potentially decisive at early hearings unless met with competent expert analysis."
In re Praveen Venkateswara Pinnamaneni
COA01
In an original habeas corpus proceeding arising from a Harris County divorce case, the relator sought release from a civil contempt commitment order jailing him for six violations of agreed temporary orders requiring spousal support payments. The First Court of Appeals emphasized that habeas relief from a contempt confinement is available only when the relator affirmatively shows the commitment is void or the confinement otherwise unlawful, and the relator bears the burden to supply a record demonstrating that defect. Even though no respondent filed a response and the court had temporarily released the relator on a $500 bond while it reviewed the petition, the court concluded the relator did not carry his burden to show any jurisdictional, due-process, specificity, or other facial defect rendering the contempt/commitment order void. The court therefore denied habeas relief, lifted the temporary bond-release order, and dismissed pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Contempt habeas is narrow and record-driven: to get a client out of jail, you must bring a complete record showing a facial/jurisdictional or due-process defect that makes the commitment order void; a temporary bond release or the other side’s nonresponse will not win the case for you."
Hirut Assefa Desta v. Abraham Ayalew Wassihun
COA14
In a Fort Bend County divorce, the husband took a default final decree after the pro se wife never filed a formal answer but had sent an email to court staff (addressed to the district clerk, identifying the case and her status as respondent, requesting more time before any default, and providing contact information). About a year later the husband proceeded to a prove-up/final trial without giving her notice; the court signed a default decree with significant property consequences. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court held the wife’s email was an “appearance”/informal answer under Texas law, even though it was not file-stamped or included in the clerk’s record, because it was tendered into the court’s administrative channels and objectively showed intent to participate. Once a respondent has appeared, due process and Texas default-judgment law require notice of the dispositive setting; because the husband obtained the default decree without notice to an appearing party, the decree violated due process and the trial court abused its discretion by letting it stand. The court also held appellate deadlines were preserved via Rule 306a based on the wife’s late notice of the judgment. The default divorce decree was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"“Default-ready” means more than “no answer on file.” Any informal written communication by a pro se spouse that identifies the case and shows intent to participate (emails to coordinators/clerks, letters, faxes) can constitute an appearance and trigger mandatory notice of the final/prove-up setting. If you take a default without provable notice after such an appearance, the decree is vulnerable to reversal for a due-process violation—often without having to satisfy the full Craddock new-trial showing."
Rhonda Williams v. Javier Alessandro Madrid Urquia and Jhonny Javier Madrid Urquia
COA14
In this case, plaintiffs sued the City of Houston and its employee, Rhonda Williams, after a motor vehicle collision. After nonsuiting that initial case, the plaintiffs filed a second suit against Williams individually. Williams moved for summary judgment, arguing that under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 101.106(a), the initial suit against the City constituted an irrevocable election of remedies that barred any future claims against her individually. The trial court denied the motion, but the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed. The appellate court analyzed the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), concluding that the act of filing suit against a governmental unit immediately and permanently bars claims against the employee regarding the same subject matter, and a subsequent nonsuit cannot 'reset' this election.
Litigation Takeaway
"Be extremely cautious when naming a governmental unit in a lawsuit; under the Texas Tort Claims Act, once you sue a city or county for an incident involving an employee, you are 'immediately and forever' barred from suing that employee individually. This election of remedies is irrevocable, meaning a nonsuit or an amendment to your pleadings cannot undo the bar and restore your ability to pursue the individual defendant."
In the Interest of A.C. and N.C., Children
COA07
In a Texas parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appellate counsel moved to withdraw after briefing was complete, citing a new employment-based, “irreconcilable” conflict. Because termination appeals are accelerated and parents have a protected right to counsel, the Seventh Court of Appeals declined to proceed on an unclear record regarding counsel’s conflict and the parent’s continued representation. The court abated the appeal and remanded to the trial court to (1) rule on the withdrawal motion, (2) determine whether replacement appellate counsel must be appointed, and (3) create an appellate-ready supplemental record—including findings of fact and conclusions of law and any reporter’s record of the hearing—by a firm, expedited deadline (March 31, 2026).
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law appeals (especially termination), a withdrawal or conflict motion is not “paperwork”—it can stop the appeal. Get a prompt trial-court ruling, make a record (hearing + reporter), and secure written findings and a supplemental clerk’s record quickly, or the court of appeals will abate and impose strict deadlines that can compress briefing and jeopardize client rights."
Members Choice Credit Union v. Juan Menjivar
COA14
Members Choice Credit Union (MCCU) sued Juan Menjivar for a deficiency balance following a vehicle repossession. Before trial, the court excluded MCCU's business records because they were not served 14 days in advance as required for self-authentication under Rule 902(10). Despite presenting a witness at trial, MCCU failed to re-offer the documents or make an 'offer of proof' on the record. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's take-nothing judgment, holding that without a reporter’s record or a formal bill of exception showing what the excluded evidence was, the appellate court must presume the trial court’s ruling was correct.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning on appeal requires more than just being right; it requires a complete record. If a judge excludes critical evidence like bank statements or medical records, you must immediately make an 'offer of proof' on the record or file a 'formal bill of exception.' Without these steps, the appellate court will assume the trial judge was right, even if the documents should have been admitted."
Townsen Memorial Hospital, Southeast Texas Medical Ventures LLC d/b/a Townsen Memorial Hospital, and Markus Baloney, RN v. Cedric Wheeler
COA01
In a Texas health-care-liability suit arising from post-operative spinal-surgery complications, the plaintiff served a Chapter 74 expert report from a board-certified neurosurgeon who criticized the hospital’s nursing care (monitoring, documentation, recognition of cauda equina red flags, and escalation/communication). The hospital challenged the physician’s qualifications to opine on nursing standards and argued the report was insufficient on standard of care, breach, and causation; the trial court allowed a cure and then overruled the objections. After a nurse was added as a defendant, he was served with the amended report but did not object within the statutory 21-day window; about 18 months later he sought dismissal by labeling the report “no report” as to him because it did not name him specifically. The First Court of Appeals applied the Chapter 74 “threshold screening” and abuse-of-discretion framework and, within the report’s four corners, held the trial court could reasonably find the neurosurgeon qualified because his training and experience showed familiarity with the same type of postoperative spinal/neurologic monitoring and escalation issues at the heart of the nursing allegations. The court also held the amended report was a good-faith effort that adequately summarized the nursing standard of care, alleged breaches, and a causal pathway sufficient for early-stage Chapter 74 purposes. Finally, the court treated the later-added nurse’s “no report” theory as a timeliness/waiver problem: because he was served and failed to object within 21 days, the late dismissal attack was waived. The denial of dismissal was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expert fights are won (or lost) on two points: (1) qualifications turn on whether the expert has concrete experience with the same type of task/analysis at issue—not just whether the expert shares the opponent’s job title; and (2) timing is everything—if you don’t challenge an expert promptly under the governing deadline, courts are likely to find waiver even if you repackage the argument as “this isn’t an expert opinion at all.”"