Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Interest of C.R., a Child
COA04
In a Guadalupe County divorce, the mother alleged a history or pattern of family violence/abuse/neglect and sought to be appointed sole managing conservator with the father denied possession and access (or, alternatively, supervised access). A jury trial on conservatorship resulted in findings (under a preponderance standard in the charge) that the mother should be sole managing conservator and that the father should not be appointed a possessory conservator. At the charge conference, the father affirmatively stated he had “no objections.” The trial court then rendered a decree appointing the mother sole managing conservator and denying the father any possession or access, with findings that access would endanger the child and was not in the child’s best interest. On appeal, the father argued the preponderance instruction was unconstitutional because a no-access decree is “tantamount to termination” and should require clear-and-convincing evidence, and also contended the submission improperly asked the jury to decide an impermissible “term or condition” of possession/access under Tex. Fam. Code § 105.002(c)(2)(B). The Fourth Court treated both arguments as unpreserved jury-charge complaints: by stating “no objections,” the father waived charge error, and the court declined to apply fundamental-error review, noting that even in actual termination cases the Supreme Court requires preservation and that conservatorship orders—unlike termination—remain modifiable (distinguishing cases like *Stary* tied to protective orders). The court further concluded the jury was asked to decide conservatorship status (permissible), and because the jury refused to place the father in any conservatorship role, the trial court properly denied possession and access as a consequence of that status determination. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a conservatorship submission sets up a potential “no access” outcome, you must preserve error at the charge conference—object to the burden of proof and the form of the questions and obtain rulings. Saying “no objections” will almost certainly waive appellate review, and courts will not rescue the issue by rebranding it as fundamental error or “de facto termination.”"
Daniel Kenneth Meek v. The State of Texas
COA09
In a family-violence assault prosecution, the State and its witnesses repeatedly referred to the complainant (and domestic violence complainants generally) as the “victim.” Defense counsel objected once—arguing the person was only a “complaining witness” because it had not been established she was a victim—but did not clearly invoke due process/presumption-of-innocence grounds and did not object again as the terminology continued throughout trial. On appeal, the defendant reframed the complaint as a constitutional due-process/fair-trial violation. The Ninth Court of Appeals analyzed the issue as an error-preservation question under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and the Marin/Clark/Broxton line of cases, explaining that even constitutional fair-trial complaints are generally forfeitable and must be preserved by timely, specific objections that comport with the theory urged on appeal, and renewed when the complained-of matter recurs (Fuentes). Because the single trial objection was not sufficiently specific/constitutional and was not renewed with each later use of “victim,” the court held the complaint was forfeited and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If opposing counsel or witnesses repeatedly label someone a “victim” before any finding of wrongdoing, you must preserve the issue with precision: object early, state the exact legal basis you intend to raise (due process/presumption of innocence, improper bolstering/opinion, Rule 403 unfair prejudice, etc.), get a ruling, and either secure a clear running objection or object each time the term is used. One vague objection will not preserve a later constitutional appellate complaint."
In re Jesus Ybarra
COA07
In an adult parentage suit, the trial court ordered the alleged father (relator) to submit to genetic testing. Although he sought a stay and obtained a written order plus findings and conclusions, he did not file for mandamus until almost a year later—after the court issued a renewed testing deadline and warned noncompliance could lead to contempt. The Seventh Court of Appeals treated mandamus as an equity-governed remedy and held the unexplained delay was unreasonable and barred relief; a later contempt warning did not “restart the clock” or create new mandamus issues because the relator’s statutory/constitutional complaints (retroactivity, privacy, due process) were the same when the original testing order was issued. The court also rejected the relator’s request to prospectively prohibit a future contempt proceeding on double-jeopardy grounds as unripe and an impermissible advisory opinion. Mandamus was denied without reaching the merits of the challenges to the testing order.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you plan to challenge a genetic-testing (or other intrusive, effectively unreviewable) family-law order by mandamus, act fast—equity favors the diligent, and waiting until enforcement ramps up or contempt is threatened is often too late. Contempt warnings usually don’t reset mandamus deadlines, and appellate courts won’t pre-approve defenses to hypothetical future contempt proceedings."
Jose Guevara-Molina v. The State of Texas
COA04
In this Texas criminal appeal, the defendant challenged six convictions for knowing possession of child pornography found on his cell phone, arguing the State failed to prove he knowingly possessed the images and separately complaining about admission of message screenshots. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and Texas Penal Code § 43.26’s “care, custody, control, or management + knowledge” concept, the Fourth Court of Appeals treated the proof as a combined-force, circumstantial-evidence case: (1) the phone was seized from the defendant’s person and he admitted it was his (including the number and length of ownership), supporting control of the device; (2) a forensic extraction located the images in multiple locations on the phone, including a user-restricted “private folder,” supporting an inference of knowing retention rather than accidental presence; and (3) the defendant’s admissions (including identifying the child depicted) and related message traffic supported knowledge of the images’ existence and character. The court rejected the argument that the State had to prove he created, saved, moved, or viewed the files. On the evidentiary issue, the court held the complaint was waived because trial counsel objected on hearsay grounds, but on appeal argued lack of authentication; the appellate theory did not comport with the trial objection under Texas preservation rules. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any case turning on “digital possession” (including SAPCR and protective-order hearings), you can prove control and knowledge without a smoking-gun admission by stacking: device nexus (seized from person/owned), forensic artifacts in multiple locations (especially secure/private folders), and contextual admissions/messages. And if you want appellate leverage, object on the right ground—mislabeling an authentication problem as “hearsay” can waive your best issue."
In the Interest of M.Z. and M.C.Z., Children
COA05
In a divorce case, the trial court’s final decree required the wife to sell a New Mexico residence for “fair market value.” The husband later sought enforcement and a receiver; the trial court found the decree too indefinite for contempt but issued a post-judgment “clarification order” defining “fair market value” and awarding the husband attorney’s fees and costs. While that clarification-order appeal was pending, the Dallas Court of Appeals in a separate appeal partially reversed and remanded the community-property division of the same divorce decree due to a valuation error involving performance units. Because the clarification order was tethered to the now-reversed/remanded property-division framework, any decision about the decree’s ambiguity or the propriety of the clarification would not affect the parties’ rights going forward, making the appeal moot. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and vacated the clarification order in full, including the fee and cost award.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you pursue (or defend) clarification/enforcement orders while the property division is on appeal, a later partial reversal/remand of the decree can render those post-judgment orders moot and wipe out associated attorney’s-fee awards. Manage parallel proceedings carefully, consider sequencing/abatement, and preserve independent bases for fees and relief that can survive changes to the underlying decree."
In the Interest of E.D.A., Child
COA04
In a Department of Family and Protective Services termination case, Mother challenged only the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and the legal/factual sufficiency framework, applying the Holley factors and the statutory permanency and safety considerations in § 263.307. The court emphasized Mother’s admitted heroin relapse, her refusal to submit to any of eighteen requested drug tests (supporting an inference of continued use), her failure to complete key service-plan requirements (assessment/treatment, counseling, parenting class), and her pattern of missed visits as evidence of present and future danger and diminished parental ability. Against that risk evidence, the court credited proof of the child’s stability, bonding, and needs being met in an adoptive foster placement, including testimony about the child’s dysregulation after visits and the foster parents’ structured support. The court held the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won on a cohesive narrative: relapse plus refusal to test and failure to engage services can be powerful, forward-looking danger evidence—especially when contrasted with a child’s stability and bonding in the proposed placement. If you represent the accusing party, document test requests and noncompliance and pair it with concrete stability evidence; if you defend the parent, avoid a “refusal/disengagement” record by testing, completing treatment-focused services early, and documenting consistent visitation and objective sobriety."
Payne v. Boyd
COA04
In Payne v. Boyd, a nonlawyer brother (Donald) attempted to prosecute a lawsuit for the named plaintiff (Darrell) based on a power of attorney arising from Darrell’s pending criminal matter. Defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction asserting Donald lacked capacity and standing. The Fourth Court of Appeals distinguished capacity (a procedural defect that must be raised by verified pleading under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93) from standing (a jurisdictional requirement that can be raised by plea to the jurisdiction and is not waivable). Because defendants did not file a Rule 93 verified pleading, any capacity challenge was waived. But Donald still lacked standing because he pleaded no personal injury to himself and could not manufacture standing by claiming agency under a POA to assert Darrell’s constitutional/statutory claims. The standing defect deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction, and dismissal was proper without leave to replead because the defect was incurable as to Donald.
Litigation Takeaway
"A power of attorney is not a license to litigate. Even if the other side fails to preserve a Rule 93 verified “capacity” objection, you can still knock out proxy-driven filings by attacking standing with a plea to the jurisdiction—standing is nonwaivable and requires the filer to allege their own concrete injury. Preserve both: verified Rule 93 capacity challenge + plea to the jurisdiction on standing."
Osbaldo Gonzales v. The State of Texas
COA07
In a single-count aggravated sexual assault of a child case alleging digital penetration, the child and outcry witness testified the act happened “twice.” The defendant argued this created a material variance from the one-count indictment and raised double-jeopardy concerns because it was unclear which incident supported the conviction. The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected the variance framing, holding the proof matched the indictment’s elements (digital penetration) and the record did not clearly establish two distinct criminal episodes (the “twice” testimony could describe multiple penetrations within one encounter). The court explained that if the evidence could be read as multiple discrete acts, the proper doctrine is jury unanimity/state election—not variance—and that complaint must be preserved by requesting an election or a specific unanimity instruction. Because the defense requested neither, any election/unanimity complaint was waived. The court also noted that when no election is made and multiple incidents are tried under one count, double jeopardy can bar later prosecution of either incident placed in evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a child’s testimony suggests “more than once” conduct under a single-count sexual-assault indictment, don’t mislabel it as a “variance” argument. If you need the State pinned to one episode, you must timely demand an election or a tailored unanimity instruction; otherwise the issue is waived on appeal. Strategically, declining to force election may actually expand double-jeopardy protection and prevent later charges based on other incidents mentioned at trial—an important consideration in parallel family-law cases that rely on criminal-case records."
Roy Jones, III v. Sheryl Harris
COA14
After a 1976 divorce decree provided that each spouse would receive half the equity upon sale of the marital home, the house was never sold and the ex-husband remained in possession for decades. After his death, his son claimed 100% ownership based on a recorded 1976 quitclaim deed purportedly signed by the ex-wife and, alternatively, adverse possession. The ex-wife filed a partition/title action in Brazoria County district court seeking to cancel the deed and confirm her undivided interest. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the suit was properly treated as a present title/partition dispute—not an impermissible modification or enforcement action confined to the divorce court’s continuing jurisdiction under Family Code Chapter 9—so the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction. On the merits, the court affirmed the rejection of adverse possession because long-term exclusive possession and payment of expenses did not establish hostile repudiation against a co-owner, especially in light of evidence that the decedent continued to acknowledge the ex-wife’s ownership. The court also upheld the jury’s forgery finding and the trial court’s evidentiary rulings admitting the decedent’s out-of-court ownership statements (and related probate inventory language) under applicable hearsay doctrines, and affirmed denial of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel.
Litigation Takeaway
"Decades after divorce, “zombie property” disputes may be litigated as partition/title cases in district court even when the property division originated in a divorce decree. And don’t assume possession equals ownership: to win adverse possession against an ex-spouse/co-tenant, you need clear, communicated repudiation—while the other side can defeat limitations with admissions (family statements, probate filings) showing continued recognition of shared ownership and can use those same facts to attack a late-produced deed as forged or unreliable."
Butler v. Taylor
COA01
In a bench-tried divorce, the husband appealed complaining the trial court failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law and challenging the decree’s property division (including a townhome), conservatorship/possession provisions, and child-support ruling. The First Court of Appeals held the husband waived any complaint about missing findings because, although he timely requested findings under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296, he did not timely file a Rule 297 notice of past-due findings. Without findings, the appellate court implied all facts necessary to support the judgment and reviewed the decree under the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Applying inception of title, the court concluded the record supported treating the Yorktown Meadow Lane townhome as the wife’s separate property because she acquired it before marriage; the husband’s testimony that he paid down the mortgage did not change characterization and did not establish a separate-property reimbursement/tracing claim (and the trial court could credit testimony that the payoff was intended as a gift). The court also rejected the husband’s conservatorship/possession and child-support complaints, noting broad trial-court discretion and that portions of the husband’s briefing were inadequately developed and thus waived. The divorce decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a Texas bench-tried divorce, calendar Rule 296/297 deadlines with zero slack: a late Rule 297 past-due notice waives the right to findings and forces the appeal into implied-findings territory, where the court will presume facts supporting the decree. Also, property-characterization and reimbursement claims live or die on proof—deeds for inception of title, tracing documents for the source of funds, and clear evidence on gift vs. reimbursement intent—because abuse-of-discretion review plus implied findings makes reversal unlikely."