Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In re West Fork Group, LLC
COA14
A trial court orally granted a motion for new trial and recorded the decision in a docket entry within the required timeframe, but it failed to sign a written order until after its 'plenary power' (jurisdictional authority) had expired. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b, a motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law if a written order is not signed within 75 days of the judgment, and the court’s power to act ends 30 days after that. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Supreme Court precedent and held that oral pronouncements and docket entries cannot substitute for a signed written order. Because the written order was signed after the 105-day deadline, it was void, and the court granted mandamus relief to vacate all orders entered after the deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas litigation, a judge's oral ruling 'from the bench' is not legally binding for the purpose of extending court deadlines—only a signed, written order counts. If you are seeking a new trial, you must ensure the judge signs the written order before the 75-day 'operation of law' deadline; otherwise, you hit a jurisdictional cliff that can render all subsequent wins void and reinstate the original judgment."
In re A.R.M.
COA08
In an original proceeding arising from a divorce and SAPCR, the relator sought mandamus to vacate various trial-court orders and requested an emergency stay. The Eighth Court of Appeals denied relief because the petition and record did not strictly comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52: the petition omitted required sections and the Rule 52.3(j) certification, provided no meaningful citations to legal authority, and was supported by an appendix/record that was neither sworn nor certified. The court further held mandamus was improper because the relator asserted a final divorce decree had been signed and a direct appeal was pending, making appeal an adequate remedy for the decree and for interlocutory rulings that merged into the final judgment. Separately, the court struck the appendix and mandamus record for containing unredacted sensitive data about a minor in violation of TRAP 9.9 (authorized by TRAP 9.4(k)) and dismissed the stay motion as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus in Texas family cases is unforgiving: (1) strict TRAP 52 compliance is a threshold requirement—missing sections, lack of authority, or an unsworn/uncertified record can sink the case before the court reaches the merits; (2) if a final divorce/SAPCR judgment exists (or you allege finality), appeal is usually the adequate remedy and interlocutory complaints typically must be raised in that appeal; and (3) TRAP 9.9 redaction is mandatory—filing unredacted child identifiers can get your record struck and destroy your ability to obtain emergency relief."
In re the Commitment of George Dewey Stark
COA05
In this civil-commitment case, George Dewey Stark appealed a judgment declaring him a sexually violent predator, arguing that existing Texas Supreme Court precedent effectively eliminated a required statutory element, thereby violating his due process rights. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the substance of the argument and determined it was a constitutional challenge to the law as applied. The court held that under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, even constitutional and due-process complaints must be raised in the trial court to be preserved for appeal. Because Stark failed to object or raise this theory during the trial proceedings, the court found the issue waived and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Constitutional and due-process arguments are not "get out of jail free" cards for a failure to object at trial. To save an issue for appeal—even one involving fundamental rights—you must make a specific and timely objection in the trial court and obtain a ruling."
Vijayalakshmi Nadar v. Thinakar Nadar
COA05
In a post-divorce property-division enforcement fight, the ex-wife sought to compel delivery/transfer of property awarded to her in the 2017 decree (safe-deposit contents, stock, and compensation tied to a Mumbai flat), while the ex-husband countered that she had wrongfully remained in possession of the Plano residence awarded to him and sought reimbursement for payments he made on debt tied to a vehicle awarded to her. The trial court managed the matters together (hearing the enforcement the same day as a bill of review) under a previously agreed scheduling order and limited each side to one hour total; it denied all relief requested by the wife, held her delivery-type claims for the safe-deposit contents and stock time-barred, and awarded the husband money judgments for damages related to her continued occupancy of the residence and for vehicle-debt payments. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the wife failed to preserve any due-process/case-management complaint about consolidation or time limits, (2) the trial court did not err in applying limitations to the wife’s delayed enforcement requests for delivery/transfer relief, and (3) sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s discretionary enforcement remedies awarding the husband $195,000 for extended post-decree occupancy of the residence and $9,600 for vehicle-debt reimbursement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Post-divorce “enforcement” is time-sensitive and proof-driven: delay can bar your affirmative requests by limitations and simultaneously expose your client to large offsetting money judgments for ongoing noncompliance (like staying in a house the decree awarded to the other spouse). Preserve procedural objections (time limits/consolidation) with a timely objection, offer of proof, and ruling, and come to a short bench trial with clean, documented damages and payment histories."
Blanca Concepcion Gutierrez-Morales v. Adrian Jesus G. Morales
COA08
After a mediated settlement in a Texas partition suit over a family home was reduced to a judgment requiring a $40,000 buyout, the appellant moved for new trial claiming “newly discovered evidence” (alleged incorrect ownership percentages based on adoption-related facts, an alleged attorney conflict from a separate probate matter, and newly learned information about the home’s condition supported by photos). The motion was overruled by operation of law, and the appellant appealed only the denial of the new-trial motion. The Eighth Court of Appeals treated preservation as the threshold issue under Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(b), explaining that an operation-of-law denial preserves complaints only when the issue can be properly presented without taking evidence. Because a newly-discovered-evidence new-trial ground requires competent, admissible proof of the required elements (post-trial discovery, diligence, non-cumulative nature, and materiality/probable effect on the result), the movant must request and obtain a hearing and introduce evidence into the record. Attachments to the motion (e.g., a birth certificate, docket sheet, and photos) were not a substitute for evidence introduced at a hearing. With no hearing and no evidentiary presentation, the complaint was waived, leaving nothing for appellate review; the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your motion for new trial depends on facts outside the trial record (like “newly discovered evidence”), you must timely request and obtain a hearing and put competent, admissible evidence into the record. Letting the motion die by operation of law—especially with only unauthenticated attachments—waives the issue on appeal and can turn a potentially strong argument into a complete preservation loss."
Crayton v. State
COA03
After being convicted of intoxication manslaughter, John Edgar Crayton, Jr. was assessed court costs without the trial court conducting the mandatory 'ability-to-pay' inquiry required by Article 42.15(a-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Crayton appealed, arguing the omission was reversible error. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory scheme alongside recent precedent, determining that the inquiry is a procedural right rather than a fundamental one. The court held that because Crayton failed to object to the omission during sentencing when given the opportunity, he forfeited the error on appeal. Furthermore, the court held the error was not reversible because the law provides a post-judgment mechanism for defendants to seek relief due to financial hardship at any time.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on a trial court to perform a 'mandatory' statutory inquiry regarding a client's ability to pay fees or costs; counsel must proactively object to any omission on the record or risk waiving the issue for appeal. In the event of a waiver, practitioners should utilize post-judgment hardship statutes to seek relief rather than pursuing a likely-to-fail appeal."
Landry v. Landry
SCOTX
In Landry v. Landry, the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court could properly characterize investment accounts as separate property when an expert's tracing analysis contained a minor four-month gap in personal review. The court of appeals had reversed the trial court's finding, speculating that the missing months could have changed the character of the funds. However, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the expert’s testimony—which established a consistent 16-year pattern of account activity—provided legally sufficient evidence under the clear and convincing standard. The Court emphasized that when records are in the trial record and expert testimony remains unrebutted, minor gaps in an expert's review do not invalidate the trial court's findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"When defending or asserting a separate property claim, a consistent long-term pattern established by an expert is a powerful tool that can overcome minor gaps in documentation. To successfully challenge such a claim, a party cannot rely solely on cross-examination or pointing out technical omissions; they must typically provide their own rebuttal expert to prove that those gaps are material to the account's characterization."
Angel Serna v. The State of Texas
COA07
In an aggravated-assault “family member” prosecution, the defense sought to impeach the complainant with alleged methamphetamine use to support the defendant’s fear/state-of-mind theory. The trial court excluded the drug-use impeachment evidence. On appeal, the defendant reframed the exclusion as violating the constitutional right to confrontation and to present a complete defense, but the court of appeals treated the issue as one of preservation: trial counsel argued only relevance/state of mind at trial and did not clearly invoke confrontation/due-process/complete-defense grounds or obtain a ruling on those constitutional theories as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court therefore held the constitutional complaint was waived and did not reach the merits. The court also rejected an ineffective-assistance claim at punishment based on failure to call additional mitigation witnesses because the record did not overcome the presumption of reasonable trial strategy and the proposed testimony was largely cumulative, with no showing of a reasonable probability of a different punishment outcome.
Litigation Takeaway
"Preservation is theory-specific: if excluded evidence (like drug use) is critical to impeach credibility or support a “complete defense,” you must expressly state the constitutional grounds and secure a ruling—relevance/state-of-mind arguments won’t preserve confrontation/due-process complaints for appeal. Also, “we should have called more witnesses” claims are difficult to win on appeal without a developed record showing counsel’s reasons were unreasonable and the omitted evidence likely would have changed the result."
Crayton v. State
COA03
In Crayton v. State, a defendant challenged the assessment of court costs because the trial court failed to conduct a mandatory inquiry into his 'ability to pay' as required by Article 42.15(a-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether this statutory 'shall' requirement created an absolute right or a forfeitable one. Applying Court of Criminal Appeals precedent, the court determined that the inquiry is not a fundamental systemic requirement. Therefore, because the defendant failed to object at sentencing, he forfeited the error under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court further held that the omission was not reversible error because the defendant retained a statutory right to seek post-judgment relief for financial hardship at any time.
Litigation Takeaway
"In quasi-criminal enforcement matters, 'mandatory' statutory duties are not self-executing for purposes of appeal. If a trial court fails to conduct a required financial inquiry or make a specific finding, you must interpose a timely objection on the record to preserve the error. If you miss the opportunity to object, look to post-judgment statutory remedies for financial hardship rather than relying on an appeal for reversal."
David Aston v. James Whittington and Tara Whittington
COA05
In a contract dispute that went to trial in Hunt County, the trial court entered a post‑answer default judgment after defendant David Aston and his counsel failed to appear for the reset trial setting. Aston timely moved for new trial supported by affidavit evidence that he did not know of the trial date and relied on counsel to communicate settings; plaintiffs countered with proof that Aston’s counsel received and opened the court’s electronic notice and argued counsel’s inaction should be imputed to Aston. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the matter as a straightforward Craddock analysis for post‑answer default judgments and held the trial court abused its discretion by denying a new trial: (1) the failure to appear was shown to be the result of mistake/accident rather than intentional conduct or conscious indifference, and the court declined to import the summary‑judgment “imputation” framework into the Craddock default context; (2) Aston “set up” meritorious defenses by pleading legally cognizable defenses and offering prima facie support, which does not require proving the case at the new‑trial stage; and (3) once Aston alleged no delay or injury, plaintiffs failed to show concrete retrial prejudice beyond the inconvenience of trying the case. The court reversed the post‑answer default judgment and remanded for a merits trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Post‑answer defaults are disfavored in Texas, and a party who misses trial because of notice breakdowns or calendar‑conflict missteps can often win a new trial under Craddock—especially when the client swears they lacked actual knowledge of the setting, promptly sought relief, and sets up a real defense. On the flip side, to keep a default, the nonmovant must bring evidence of actual retrial prejudice (lost witnesses/evidence, time‑sensitive issues), not just “they opened the e‑notice” or “a new trial is inconvenient.”"