Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Carlos Franco Hernandez a/k/a Carlos Alberto Hernandez Orta v. The State of Texas
COA02
In a criminal appeal arising from sexual assault allegations involving a 13-year-old, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed two trial objections that commonly surface in family-law crossover cases: (1) whether the jury charge improperly included a Penal Code § 8.04(a) voluntary-intoxication instruction when the defendant did not affirmatively plead intoxication as a defense, and (2) whether admitting the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) nurse’s written report was reversible error as improper “bolstering.” The court held the intoxication instruction was proper because the record contained evidence of drinking from multiple sources (including the defendant’s admissions and the history reflected in the SANE documentation), and Texas law allows the instruction whenever evidence could lead jurors to think intoxication excuses conduct; the instruction tracked the statute and did not comment on the weight of the evidence. The court also held the SANE report was not excludable or reversible on a “bolstering” theory; bolstering is not a free-standing basis to exclude otherwise admissible evidence, and the argument largely collapses into hearsay/predicate issues that were not the focus of the appellate complaint. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When dealing with SANE/medical records and repeated narratives in SAPCR or protective-order trials, “bolstering” is usually the wrong objection—and often an easy one to defeat if the exhibit is independently admissible. The real battleground is foundation, purpose, and embedded hearsay (plus Rule 403/redactions). Also, if intoxication evidence is in the record, expect courts to give clarifying/limiting instructions to prevent a “drinking excuses it” theme—so plan your proof and objections accordingly and preserve the correct grounds."
In the Matter of J.D.
COA14
J.D., a determinate-sentence juvenile adjudicated for capital murder and aggravated robbery, challenged the juvenile court’s decision under Texas Family Code § 54.11 to transfer him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Institutional Division rather than release him on parole near age nineteen. Although J.D. presented evidence of educational progress, good institutional behavior, treatment participation, remorse, and reentry plans, the record also showed the extreme seriousness and pattern of the offenses, incomplete serious-violent-offender treatment, continuing safety concerns, testimony from the murder victim’s family, and transfer recommendations from TJJD and the prosecutor. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals explained that § 54.11(k)’s factors are permissive, the juvenile court need not address or give equal weight to every factor, and conflicting evidence concerning rehabilitation and risk is for the juvenile court to weigh. Because some evidence supported the safety-driven transfer decision, the appellate court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a discretionary, factor-based proceeding, evidence of rehabilitation does not compel the requested outcome when the record also supports serious safety concerns. Trial counsel should connect each item of evidence to the governing statutory factors and develop concrete evidence of either continuing risk or real-world risk reduction. On appeal, an argument that the judge should have weighed conflicting evidence differently will rarely establish abuse of discretion; the stronger challenge identifies a legal error, a procedural defect, or the complete absence of evidence supporting a necessary determination."
Robinson v. Kelley
COA01
In an appeal from a Brazoria County SAPCR modification order, the parties entered a later agreed modification order while the appeal was pending. Appellant’s counsel notified the First Court of Appeals by letter that the agreed order eliminated the need to continue the appeal, and appellee did not oppose. The court construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and, because appellant no longer sought appellate relief and there was no live controversy to resolve, dismissed the appeal under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a) and 43.2(f), also dismissing all pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you settle a parenting-plan modification dispute during the appeal and the trial court signs an agreed modification order that replaces the challenged order, the court of appeals will typically end the case quickly—sometimes even treating an informal “no longer necessary” communication as a dismissal request. Be intentional: decide whether you want immediate dismissal, an abatement while performance occurs, or continued appellate leverage, and communicate that clearly in a formal motion whenever possible."
Strong v. State
COA02
In Strong v. State, a murder defendant sought a jury-charge instruction giving him the statutory presumption that his use of deadly force in self-defense was reasonable. The trial court refused because the presumption under Texas Penal Code §§ 9.31 and 9.32 is unavailable when the actor is “engaged in criminal activity” at the time of the force. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals held the record conclusively showed Strong was engaged in criminal activity—unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under Penal Code § 46.04—because he admitted he was a felon, knew he could not possess firearms, and used a firearm during the incident. Strong attempted to avoid the “criminal activity” bar by arguing § 46.04 was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, which (he claimed) would mean his possession was not “criminal activity” and the presumption instruction was required. The court rejected using an as-applied Second Amendment attack as a vehicle to obtain the presumption instruction on these facts and affirmed. Holding: the trial court did not err in denying the presumption-of-reasonableness instruction because Strong’s felon-in-possession status was contemporaneous criminal activity, and his as-applied constitutional challenge did not entitle him to the statutory presumption in the charge.
Litigation Takeaway
"When firearms are involved, a party’s prohibited-possessor status can strip away “presumptive reasonableness” / stand-your-ground framing. If the person with the gun was committing a firearms-possession offense at the time, Texas courts can treat that as contemporaneous “criminal activity” that defeats favorable self-defense presumptions—even if the party tries to reframe the issue with a constitutional challenge. In family cases, that supports protective orders, firearm surrender provisions, and best-interest arguments focused on ongoing illegality and risk."
Corey Morrell v. Burton Baker, Individually and in his Professional Capacity; Lummus, Hallman, Pritchard & Baker, P.C.; and Mercer Transportation Co., Inc.
COA02
In a multi‑defendant, multi‑claim lawsuit, the trial court granted a combined Rule 91a and TCPA motion, dismissing several causes of action “with prejudice,” but the same order stated that the plaintiff’s “only remaining claims” were certain numbered counts in a referenced “Third Amended Petition.” The record did not contain that pleading, and the plaintiff pointed out the order’s internal inconsistency (dismissed claim titles versus allegedly surviving numbered counts). The trial court denied a motion to clarify and later signed a separate order awarding attorney’s fees under Rule 91a.7 and TCPA § 27.009(a)(1), including a Mother Hubbard clause and enforcement language, and it restricted discovery as to one defendant until fees were paid. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed finality under Lehmann/Elizondo by looking first to the face of the orders and then the record. Because the dismissal order itself indicated claims remained pending and was ambiguous/internally inconsistent about what survived, and because the fee order contemplated ongoing litigation and did not supply unmistakable finality language, the court held there was no final judgment disposing of all claims and parties. With no applicable statute authorizing an interlocutory appeal in this posture, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 91a/TCPA win plus a fee award is not automatically appealable. Before noticing appeal, confirm the order unmistakably disposes of all claims and all parties (or obtain a severance). Do not rely on a Mother Hubbard clause or enforcement language to create finality—any “remaining claims” language, references to the wrong live pleading, or other internal inconsistencies can trigger a jurisdictional dismissal and waste months while the trial court case keeps moving."
In the Matter of J.D.
COA14
J.D., a juvenile serving a 25-year determinate sentence for capital murder and aggravated robbery, challenged the juvenile court’s decision under Texas Family Code § 54.11 to transfer him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) to the Institutional Division of TDCJ (TDCJ–ID) to complete his unserved sentence rather than release him to parole supervision. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals treated the transfer decision as discretionary and asked only whether the record contained “some evidence” tied to the § 54.11(k) factors supporting transfer. Although J.D. presented evidence of rehabilitation (good institutional behavior, educational progress, and favorable therapeutic notes), the court held the juvenile judge could credit competing evidence and weigh factors differently. The court emphasized the extreme violence and manner of the offenses, TJJD’s recommendation to transfer, J.D.’s incomplete capital/serious violent offender treatment, and testimony about victim-family and community safety concerns. Because these items provided some evidence supporting transfer, the court affirmed and held the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering transfer to TDCJ–ID rather than parole release.
Litigation Takeaway
"In § 54.11 determinate-sentence transfer hearings, “doing well” in TJJD may not overcome a safety-driven record. Expect trial courts to give heavy weight to offense severity, incomplete specialized treatment, and TJJD/prosecutor recommendations—and appellate courts will usually affirm if there is some evidence supporting transfer. For family-law cases that hinge on whether a youth returns to the home, treat the juvenile transfer record as critical evidence for risk, safety planning, and temporary orders."
Estate of Samantha Skaggs; Robbin Skaggs, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Samantha Skaggs; and Walter Skaggs Sr. v. Peternett, Inc. d/b/a Showdown
COA02
In this Tarrant County case, the plaintiffs sued a bar under the Texas Dram Shop Act but failed to conduct any discovery during the applicable period. Although their pleadings stated they intended to conduct discovery under Level 3, they never obtained a signed Level 3 discovery-control plan. The trial court applied default Level 2 deadlines, quashed the plaintiffs' late discovery requests, denied a continuance, and granted a no-evidence summary judgment after striking the plaintiffs' unauthenticated evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Level 2 rules govern by default unless a signed Level 3 order is entered, and the plaintiffs waived their right to contest the summary judgment by failing to challenge the exclusion of their evidence on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pleading for 'Level 3' discovery is not enough to extend your deadlines; you must obtain a signed Level 3 discovery-control plan from the court. Without that signed order, default Level 1 or Level 2 deadlines apply, and a failure to conduct discovery within those windows can lead to the quashing of late discovery and an indefensible no-evidence summary judgment. Furthermore, always ensure your summary judgment evidence is authenticated and specifically cited, as 'document dumps' are easily excluded."
Daniel Matthew Bible v. The State of Texas
COA03
In this criminal appeal with family-law crossover implications, the defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an indecency-with-a-child-by-contact conviction as to alleged “breast” touching. Although the complainant initially answered “No” when asked directly whether her breast was touched and described the contact as stopping at the “bra line,” the court reviewed the entire record under the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the jury’s role as factfinder. The jury saw the complainant demonstrate the hand movement across her chest and reviewed an admitted body diagram she highlighted to show the area touched. A forensic interviewer testified that the complainant’s “bra line” demonstration included the breast, and a forensic nurse explained that young children have breast tissue and that the highlighted area encompassed the breasts. Considering the demonstrations, diagram, and corroborating contextual evidence, the Third Court of Appeals held a rational juror could find breast contact beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don’t assume a witness’s damaging sound-bite answer (e.g., “No, he didn’t touch my breast”) defeats an abuse allegation when the testimony includes location descriptors (“bra line”), in-court demonstrations, and marked diagrams. Courts can treat demonstrative evidence—especially when supported by CAC/forensic interviewer and medical testimony—as enough to prove anatomically specific contact, and factfinders may credit that totality over semantic inconsistencies. In custody/protective-order litigation, build (or attack) the foundation and clarity of diagrams/gestures and the “translator” testimony that links imprecise language to legally significant anatomy."
Chase Allen Curtis v. Gabrielle Analisa Laplante
COA04
In a bifurcated divorce proceeding, the trial court found an informal marriage existed between Curtis and Laplante beginning in January 2014 under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2), then entered a divorce decree and divided property as community. On appeal, Curtis challenged the sufficiency of the informal-marriage finding. The Fourth Court of Appeals applied § 2.401(a)(2), which requires proof that the parties (1) agreed to be married, and after that agreement (2) lived together in Texas as spouses and (3) represented to others in Texas that they were married—concurrently. The court emphasized that the “agreement” element requires a present, mutual decision to be married, not merely engagement or plans for a future ceremony, and that occasional “husband/wife” references do not, by themselves, establish a present agreement. Reviewing the evidence against the specific date found (January 2014), the court held the proof was factually insufficient to establish the required concurrence of the statutory elements as of that time. Because the divorce decree and property division depended on the existence of a marriage, the court reversed and remanded. The court also held the absence of additional findings of fact and conclusions of law was not reversible because it did not prevent Curtis from presenting his sufficiency challenge; any inconsistency between the decree and findings was resolved under Rule 299a by giving controlling effect to the findings for appellate review.
Litigation Takeaway
"Informal marriage is a make-or-break issue: the proponent must prove a present, mutual agreement to be married plus Texas cohabitation and Texas holding out, all occurring together on a defensible inception date—not just a long relationship, engagement, or sporadic “husband/wife” talk. Build (or attack) the case with date-specific, corroborated evidence (documents and third-party testimony), because factual-sufficiency review can overturn an informal-marriage finding and collapse the divorce/property-division framework."
In the Interest of M.Z. and M.C.Z., Children
COA05
In a Dallas County divorce after a 23-year marriage, the community estate included the husband’s executive deferred-compensation “performance units,” which would pay only upon future contingent events (e.g., IPO, dividend, sale) and could be forfeited. The only valuation evidence was uncontroverted expert CPA testimony that the units had no presently ascertainable fair market value as of trial, but were not worthless and could be divided in kind. The trial court nevertheless treated the units as 100% community property, awarded 100% of them to the husband, and assigned a $0 value in the just-and-right division. Applying the abuse-of-discretion framework with embedded legal-sufficiency review under Texas Family Code § 7.001, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that evidence showing “no current calculable FMV” does not support a finding of “no value,” and the record contained no affirmative evidence that the units were worthless. Because the performance units were a material portion of the community estate, the erroneous $0 valuation tainted the overall division. The court reversed the property division and remanded for a new, proper division of the community estate (affirming the divorce otherwise).
Litigation Takeaway
"Contingent does not mean worthless. If an asset can’t be reliably valued today (executive compensation, earnouts, carried interests, options), a court cannot simply assign $0 without evidence of actual worthlessness—especially if it awards the entire asset to one spouse. Build a record that either (1) proves worthlessness, or (2) supports a division-in-kind or other non-speculative mechanism, and tie any valuation error to overall “just and right” harm when the asset is material."