Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
In The Interest of K.F.N., K.D.N., and K.N., Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s order terminating a mother's parental rights based on a history of physical abuse and unresolved substance dependency. Although the mother maintained a documented bond with her children and partially completed her court-ordered service plan, the court applied the Holley factors to determine that the children's needs for safety and stability outweighed the parental relationship. The court held that evidence of the mother’s prior criminal history involving injury to a child and her failure to remain sober during the proceedings was legally and factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding for termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"A parent-child bond does not act as a "veto" against the termination of parental rights; courts prioritize a child's need for a safe, drug-free environment over emotional ties when a parent has a history of endangerment or ongoing substance abuse."
In the Matter of the Estate of Henry Matthew Platt
COA09
In a dispute over the validity of a holographic will, the sister of the decedent attempted to disqualify the will through expert handwriting testimony. However, the expert's comparison samples (exemplars) did not consist of the decedent's own signature, but rather signatures the decedent allegedly made on behalf of his parents. The trial court excluded the expert's testimony, and the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed. The court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, concluding that because the expert lacked a 'control' sample of the decedent's actual name and signature, there was an unreliable foundation and an 'analytical gap' that rendered the opinion inadmissible.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expert testimony is only as reliable as the data supporting it; if your handwriting expert relies on representative or third-party signatures rather than authenticated personal signatures, the testimony is likely to be excluded for lack of foundation."
VKA Investments, LLC v. Anthony Baiamonte, III
COA01
After the parties mediated a settlement while an appeal was abated, they filed an agreed joint motion asking the First Court of Appeals to reinstate the appeal solely to dismiss it, tax costs per their agreement, and—critically—issue the mandate immediately. Applying TRAP 42.1(a)(1) (dismissal by agreement), TRAP 42.1(d) (costs by agreement), and TRAP 18.1(c) (mandate may issue with the judgment by agreement), the court treated the settlement as controlling and found no reason to keep the merits alive. The court reinstated the case on its docket, dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits, ordered each side to bear its own appellate costs, and directed the clerk to issue the mandate concurrently with the opinion and judgment, eliminating the usual post-judgment waiting period and making the trial-court judgment immediately final for practical purposes.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an appeal settles—especially in divorce or custody cases where delay can be leverage—don’t just dismiss the appeal. File an agreed joint motion that (1) dismisses under TRAP 42.1 and (2) expressly requests an immediate mandate under TRAP 18.1(c). That single request can collapse the normal rehearing/petition timeline, accelerate finality, and help lock in settlement performance (QDROs, property transfers, schedule changes) before “buyer’s remorse” or appellate gamesmanship sets in."
Adame v. The State of Texas
COA13
The defendant was convicted of animal cruelty after admitting to squeezing and stomping a pet cockatoo that died shortly thereafter. On appeal, the defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because the State failed to provide expert medical testimony or a necropsy to prove the cause of death, and claimed his admissions were unreliable due to his intoxication. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that expert testimony is unnecessary when an injury's effects are visually obvious to a layperson. The court further determined that a jury, as the sole judge of credibility, may rely on a defendant's inculpatory admissions even if they are made while intoxicated or contain factual inaccuracies.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expert veterinary testimony and formal necropsies are not required to prove animal cruelty in cases where the injury is obvious to a layperson. Family law practitioners can use this 'evidentiary shortcut' to more efficiently establish patterns of coercive control, family violence, or 'best interest' factors using only lay testimony, photos, and the opposing party's admissions."
Salmeron v. Atascocita Forest Community Association
COA01
Homeowners who had sued to stop an HOA foreclosure were electronically served with the HOA’s plea to the jurisdiction and notice of submission, but they did not respond by the submission date and the trial court granted the plea and dismissed the case. On motion for new trial, the homeowners argued Hurricane Beryl caused a power/internet “system outage” that prevented timely receipt of e-service and warranted relief under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(f)(6), along with a three-day extension under Rule 21a(c) and relief under the Craddock framework. The First Court of Appeals held that Rule 21(f)(6) does not provide automatic tolling based on a general disaster; the movant must present specific, evidence-backed facts showing when notice was actually received or when the outage ended and why they could not act (including seeking a continuance) once access was restored. Because the homeowners offered no concrete timeline for restoration of electricity/access or diligent efforts to monitor e-service—and their participation in a later hearing undercut the claim that they were unable to engage with the court—the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying new trial and letting the dismissal stand. The court also held the three-day rule for mail service does not apply to e-service, and the motion for new trial was too conclusory to satisfy Craddock’s “no conscious indifference” requirement.
Litigation Takeaway
"E-service deadlines start immediately and aren’t automatically extended by storms or outages. If you miss a deadline and claim a “technical failure,” you must prove it with a detailed outage timeline (when access returned/when notice was actually seen), show diligent efforts to check the case, and seek prompt relief (e.g., continuance/extension) as soon as you can—otherwise the judgment/dismissal is likely to stand."
ATC Indoor DAS LLC v. MM CCM 48M Leasing, LLC and MM CCM 48M, LLC
COA05
A commercial tenant sued its landlord for breaching a long-term lease after the landlord bought a distressed shopping mall and unilaterally terminated the lease to close and redevelop the property. The landlord obtained summary judgment by asserting the affirmative defense of commercial impracticability, arguing the lease’s “basic assumption” (a functioning mall with patrons) had failed. The Dallas Court of Appeals applied Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 as used in Texas: impracticability requires an event that makes performance objectively impracticable, the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption of the contract, and the event must be unforeseeable. The court emphasized that impracticability is not mere unprofitability and focused on foreseeability: the landlord purchased the mall as a distressed property intending redevelopment, making closure and demolition foreseeable (and effectively self-created). Because the closure was not an unforeseeable event and did not render performance objectively impossible, the defense failed. The court reversed the summary judgment, rendered judgment that the landlord breached the lease, and remanded for determination of damages and attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"“My business failed” or “the deal stopped making economic sense” is usually not a legal excuse to dodge a settlement or property-division obligation. To prove impracticability under Texas law, the obligor must show a truly unforeseeable event that makes performance objectively impossible—not merely financially painful or unprofitable—especially where the risk was known, foreseeable, or the hardship was the party’s own strategic choice."
In the Matter of M.A.R. Jr., A Child
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court's order committing a minor, M.A.R. Jr., to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD). The conflict centered on whether the State had satisfied the "reasonable efforts" requirement of the Texas Family Code before removing the child from his home environment. Despite the child's diagnoses of autism and ADHD and his father's willingness to take custody, the Court analyzed the extensive history of failed interventions—including community supervision, psychiatric services, and a residential facility placement where the minor accumulated hundreds of incident reports. The Court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that local resources were exhausted and that commitment was necessary for the child's rehabilitation and public safety.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a child's removal from the home is at stake due to behavioral issues, the 'paper trail' is everything; a documented history of 'graduated sanctions' and failed local interventions is often the deciding factor in satisfying the legal 'reasonable efforts' standard."
Ronald L. Crawford, Jr., Appellant v. Yasser Aftab Sharif, Appellee
COA01
In a post-foreclosure eviction (forcible detainer), the occupant argued the foreclosure sale was fraudulent and that the trial court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the case necessarily involved title. The First Court of Appeals rejected that argument, explaining that Texas justice courts (and county courts on de novo appeal) have jurisdiction to decide only the right to immediate possession, not title, and that a challenge to foreclosure validity does not defeat jurisdiction unless possession and title are so intertwined that possession cannot be decided without first adjudicating title. Because the purchaser presented proof of the foreclosure purchase and notice to vacate, and the occupant did not show the title issues were inseparable from possession (and provided no reporter’s record), the courts could decide possession independently. The court affirmed the judgment awarding possession (and, given the absent record, presumed the evidence supported damages and attorney’s fees as well).
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, you usually can’t stop an eviction by attacking the underlying foreclosure or transfer: forcible detainer is about immediate possession, not who ultimately owns title. For family-law “holdover spouse” situations, use justice-court eviction when a decree/transfer document provides an independent right to possession (often via tenancy-at-sufferance language), and don’t expect a separate title/decree attack to automatically stall removal."
In Re Benjamin Oshea Calhoun
COA01
Benjamin Oshea Calhoun (pro se) filed an original petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First Court of Appeals seeking a reduction of bail set in his pending Harris County criminal case. The court focused on subject-matter jurisdiction, contrasting (1) Texas Government Code § 22.221(d), which gives intermediate courts of appeals original habeas jurisdiction only when a person is restrained for violating an order, judgment, or decree in a civil case (i.e., civil-contempt-type restraints), with (2) Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 11.05, which vests original criminal habeas jurisdiction in the Court of Criminal Appeals, district courts, and county courts. Because Calhoun sought original habeas relief directed to a criminal bond issue—outside the narrow civil-order restraint contemplated by § 22.221(d)—the court held it had no original habeas jurisdiction to consider the request and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction (without reaching the merits, and noting the petition’s TRAP 52 defects were not the primary basis for disposition).
Litigation Takeaway
"Forum-check habeas relief. Texas courts of appeals can entertain original habeas only for restraints tied to violation of a civil-case order (common in family-law contempt); they cannot take original habeas to reduce criminal bail. If the restraint is criminal (even if factually related to a family dispute), file original habeas in the proper trial court under Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.05 and reach the court of appeals only through appellate review."
In the Matter of Marriage of Melissa Ramirez and Silvestre Fermin Torres and In the Interest of R.S.T. and A.D.T, Children
COA13
In a family law dispute, Melissa Ramirez filed a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. Despite this, the trial court ordered her to pay half of the mediation fees without first holding an evidentiary hearing or issuing detailed findings as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f). Ramirez challenged the order using Rule 145(g)'s expedited review process. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals dismissed the challenge for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that because the trial court failed to follow the mandatory procedural steps of Rule 145(f), the resulting order was not technically issued 'under this rule,' making the expedited appellate process unavailable.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a trial court orders an indigent party to pay costs (such as mediation or amicus attorney fees) without first holding a formal hearing or providing detailed factual findings, you cannot use the expedited motion process in Rule 145(g) to challenge the order; instead, you must file a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the court to follow proper procedure."