Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Crystal Flack v. Michael Mendoza, Sr.
COA08
In this transferred appeal from a Travis County bench-tried divorce, the wife challenged a property division she claimed was impermissibly disproportionate—particularly a provision awarding the husband the first $30,000 of proceeds from the sale of the marital home. The El Paso Court of Appeals applied the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code § 7.001 (“just and right” division) and emphasized that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, requiring the court to imply all findings necessary to support the decree. On the record presented, the implied findings could support unequal allocations based on equity considerations such as the wife’s unilateral withdrawals and trading losses that depleted community assets, removal of funds from a joint account shortly before filing, the husband’s post-separation payment of home carrying costs, and the decree’s stated rationale tying the $30,000 offset to the wife’s lack of good-faith participation in the litigation. The court also rejected the notion that a no-fault (insupportability) divorce bars a disproportionate division; fault is only one of many permissible factors. Holding that the wife failed to show the division was arbitrary, unsupported by evidence, or manifestly unfair—especially given the lack of concrete valuation proof and the presence of implied findings—the court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Property-division appeals are won or lost at trial: build a valuation record and request findings of fact. Without numbers and without findings, appellate courts will imply facts supporting a “just and right” division and rarely reverse—even if the decree looks unequal (like awarding one spouse the first $30,000 of sale proceeds). Litigation conduct and dissipation/waste evidence can justify disproportionate offsets in a no-fault divorce if tied to the record."
Westcott Law Group PLLC v. Paychex, Inc.
COA14
Paychex obtained a judgment titled “Final Default Judgment” against Westcott Law Group after Westcott missed its answer deadline. But Westcott had transmitted an answer and counterpetition over the weekend, which—under Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(f)(5)—was deemed filed at midnight on the next business day, making Westcott’s counterclaims (conversion, fraud, and DTPA violations) on file when the trial court signed the default judgment that Monday. On restricted appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals first addressed jurisdiction and applied Texas finality law for non-conventional dispositions (including defaults): a judgment is final only if it actually disposes of all claims and parties or states with unmistakable clarity that it does so. Although the order was labeled “Final Default Judgment” and contained standard execution/enforcement language, it did not mention or dispose of Westcott’s counterclaims and did not include unequivocal all-claims/all-parties finality language. The court therefore held the judgment was interlocutory; and because Texas statutes authorize restricted appeals only from final judgments, no interlocutory restricted appeal was available. The court dismissed the restricted appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, leaving the counterclaims (and the case) pending in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not rely on a “final” caption. Before appealing—or enforcing—confirm the order either expressly disposes of every pleaded claim (including counterclaims, attorney’s fees, sanctions, reimbursement, and declaratory relief) or contains unmistakably clear all-claims/all-parties finality language. If anything remains pending, the “judgment” may be interlocutory, appellate deadlines may not run, and any attempted (restricted) appeal can be dismissed for want of jurisdiction."
Holloway v. State
COA02
In an indecency-by-exposure prosecution, the defendant objected under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 to the State’s use of “context” evidence surrounding the charged incident: a non-graphic photo of the child complainant and testimony about closely timed, related encounters (an earlier exposure-like incident involving the child’s mother, a later door-checking/Ring-video incident at her home, and another school-area exposure-type event). The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied Rule 403’s pro-admission presumption and the Gigliobianco balancing factors, emphasizing that evidence is not excluded merely because it is harmful; exclusion requires that unfair prejudice substantially outweigh probative value. Because the defense made intent (intent to arouse or gratify) a contested issue, the surrounding-incident evidence had heightened probative force to show sexual intent and to provide a coherent narrative explaining recognition and the complainant’s mother’s reactions. The court also noted safeguards reducing 403 risk, including limiting instructions and the absence of undue delay or cumulativeness. It held the trial court acted within the zone of reasonable disagreement in admitting both the contextual testimony and the child’s photograph and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 403 is a “substantial imbalance” rule, not a “keep it nice” rule: when intent, danger, or credibility is disputed, closely connected prior/other incidents and contextual photos can come in to “connect the dots,” especially if you (1) tie the evidence to a specific contested issue (intent/absence of mistake/fear), (2) show tight temporal and factual proximity, (3) keep the presentation non-cumulative, and (4) request/offer limiting instructions. Conversely, if you argue accident/mistake/innocent intent, expect the court to allow more context evidence and preserve your position with targeted objections and Rule 105 limits."
In re J.M.B. II
COA03
In a Travis County juvenile delinquency case, the State filed a Rule 162 nonsuit/motion to dismiss before any adjudication hearing. The trial court initially dismissed the petition but, the next day, signed an order vacating the dismissal and reset the case for adjudication based on policy concerns (including community safety and judicial confessions). The Third Court of Appeals held that, under Family Code § 51.17(a), the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply in juvenile cases absent conflict, and Rule 162 gives a plaintiff an absolute right to nonsuit before resting, leaving the trial court with a ministerial duty to dismiss unless collateral matters (pending claims for affirmative relief) remain. Because no collateral matters were shown, the trial court had no discretion to undo the nonsuit by vacating the dismissal and resetting the case. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order vacating the dismissal, reinstate the nonsuit-based dismissal, and enter the nonsuit in the minutes.
Litigation Takeaway
"A properly timed Rule 162 nonsuit is mandatory, not discretionary: absent collateral claims for affirmative relief (fees, sanctions, counterclaims), the court must dismiss and cannot later “revive” the case for policy or case-management reasons. If a trial court refuses to honor—or tries to vacate—a nonsuit dismissal, mandamus can be the fastest way to enforce the ministerial duty and stop a case from being pushed back to trial."
Claudia Lucius Williams Smith v. Kenneth Wayne Allen
COA14
In this heirship dispute, the court addressed whether a Harris County home purchased in 1972 was separate or community property. The resolution turned on whether the decedent, Lossie Mae Smith, was informally married to Tom Willie Smith at the time of purchase. The trial court found no informal marriage existed in 1972, pointing to a deed identifying Lossie as a single woman ("feme sole") and testimony from siblings that Tom was not in her life at that time. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that because a key letter supporting the marriage claim was never formally admitted into evidence—only placed in the court file—it lacked probative weight. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the separate-property characterization.
Litigation Takeaway
"Evidence that is merely 'in the court file' is not the same as evidence admitted at trial. To prove an informal marriage or challenge property characterization, you must formally admit your documents into evidence and preserve all procedural objections—such as concerns about legal representation or notice—at the trial level, or you risk losing your right to appeal those issues."
City of Houston v. Sancelia Fonteneaux
COA14
A plaintiff sued the City of Houston (and METRO) for negligence after a bus door allegedly closed on her arm while she was boarding. The City sought dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing the pleadings showed no Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) motor‑vehicle waiver because the bus was operated by METRO, a separate entity, not a City employee. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied Rule 91a’s pleading-only framework—accepting the petition’s facts as true, liberally construing them, and drawing reasonable inferences—and held the live petition plausibly alleged the TTCA motor‑vehicle waiver in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021(1) by alleging the injury arose from the operation/use of a motor vehicle and, alternatively, that the bus was owned/operated/maintained and/or driven by the City (or METRO), permitting an inference at the pleading stage that a City employee acting within scope could have operated the bus. The court also refused the City’s request to render judgment based on its pending traditional summary-judgment motion because the trial court had not ruled and Rule 91a does not allow evidence-based, “backdoor summary judgment” review. The denial of the Rule 91a motion was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 91a is not a shortcut to win an immunity or “wrong entity” fight on disputed facts. If the petition pleads a concrete motor-vehicle injury mechanism and plausibly ties operation of the vehicle to a governmental unit—even in the alternative—the case will usually survive early dismissal and move into discovery; defendants should use evidence-based tools (plea to the jurisdiction/summary judgment) rather than a pleading-only Rule 91a attack."
In the Interest of A.Z., a Child
COA02
In a private SAPCR termination case, an incarcerated father failed to appear for the final hearing. The trial court had mailed him notice of the setting with instructions and a phone number to call the bailiff to appear telephonically. Father did not call in, and his mailed request asking the court to coordinate with his prison unit was file-stamped after the hearing. The trial court proceeded, found predicate grounds under Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) (failure to support) and (L) (conviction for a listed offense, here sexual assault under Penal Code § 22.011), found termination in the child’s best interest, and terminated Father’s rights. On appeal, Father argued the court lacked personal jurisdiction (based on alleged noncitizenship), that proceeding without him violated his right of access to courts, and that the court should have granted a new trial. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held Father’s personal-jurisdiction complaint was waivable and was forfeited by his participation after answering; the trial court provided a workable means of remote participation and was not required to halt the hearing based on a late-received request; and under the post-answer default/new-trial framework (Craddock/Dolgencorp), Father failed to show his nonappearance was not due to conscious indifference and otherwise did not meet the requirements for a new trial. The termination judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an incarcerated parent receives clear notice and a workable telephonic-appearance procedure, failure to timely follow it (or to secure prison-side coordination well in advance) is unlikely to overturn a termination on “access to courts” grounds. Preserve jurisdiction defenses early (special appearance before answering) and, after a post-answer default, support any motion for new trial with evidence meeting Craddock/Dolgencorp—conclusory complaints and late-filed requests usually won’t suffice."
In the Interest of J.D., R.D.-G., K.G., and L.G., Children
COA02
In this case, the Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father following reports of drug use, child abandonment, and instability. The Father, who was incarcerated for deadly conduct throughout the case, challenged the trial court's finding that termination was in the children's best interest. Mother’s court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, signaling that her appeal lacked nonfrivolous legal issues. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the record under the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, focusing on Father's history of incarceration, his minimization of Mother’s drug issues, and the children’s successful bonding within their foster placements. The court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding and affirmed the termination of both parents' rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest determinations often hinge on a parent's credibility and insight. Minimizing risks—such as ignoring a partner's drug use or failing to provide a concrete timeline for stability—can be fatal to a parent's case. For parents facing litigation, demonstrating accountability and providing a realistic, child-centered plan for the present is far more persuasive than making aspirational promises for the future."
In the Interest of A.B., A Child
COA05
In a divorce governed by a premarital agreement (PMA) eliminating community property and treating each spouse’s earnings as separate, the parties disputed ownership of a diamond ring purchased during marriage with Husband’s earnings and allegedly titled in his name. The trial court found the ring was initially Husband’s separate property under the PMA but that Husband later made an interspousal gift of the ring to Wife, confirming it as Wife’s separate property. On appeal, Husband challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting donative intent, delivery, and acceptance under the clear-and-convincing standard. Applying abuse-of-discretion review (with legal/factual sufficiency as factors) and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Husband gifted the ring based on Wife’s testimony and circumstances: Wife selected/designed the ring, the jeweler delivered it to her, she wore it as her wedding ring for years, Husband bought a matching band later, he returned it after cleanings/appraisals, and he never demanded its return at separation. The court affirmed the decree confirming the ring as Wife’s separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even with a “no community property” premarital agreement, high-value personal items can still change character through an interspousal gift. At trial, build (or attack) the gift elements—donative intent, delivery, and acceptance—using the parties’ conduct over time (possession, daily use, repairs/cleanings, related purchases, and separation behavior), because on appeal a supported gift finding is difficult to overturn under abuse-of-discretion review."
Ava Washington v. Margaret Victoria
COA01
In a probate will contest arising from a late-in-life hospice will, the proponent of a 2016 will argued the decedent changed his estate plan because his daughter had financially exploited him, while the daughter contended the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to end-stage illness and cognitive impairment. The First Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient under City of Keller/“more than a scintilla” review for a reasonable jury to find the decedent had testamentary capacity at the time of execution. However, the court reversed and remanded because the trial court allowed testimony supporting an inflammatory “she took his money” narrative to explain motive for disinheritance, yet excluded the daughter’s responsive rebuttal evidence. The court treated this one-sided evidentiary ruling as an abuse of discretion and concluded the exclusion probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment, making the error harmful and requiring a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the court lets your opponent introduce a damaging “financial exploitation/bad actor” story to sway motive and credibility, you must be allowed to rebut it. Preserve the issue with a clear offer of proof and a ruling—because even where the verdict is supported by legally sufficient evidence, an asymmetrical evidentiary ruling that leaves the jury with an unanswered accusation can be reversible harmful error."