Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
Romano v. Arrowhead Hill Farm, Inc.
COA09
In Romano v. Arrowhead Hill Farm, Inc., the Appellants challenged a no-evidence summary judgment, arguing the motion was legally insufficient because it failed to separately list the specific elements of three distinct DTPA sub-claims. The Beaumont Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i) in conjunction with the DTPA's statutory requirements. The court found that because 'producing cause' is an essential element common to all claims under Texas Business & Commerce Code § 17.50(a), specifically challenging that single element was sufficient to put the Appellants on notice. The court held that a no-evidence motion is sufficiently specific if it identifies a single element common to multiple theories of recovery, and affirmed the judgment because the Appellants failed to provide evidence in response.
Litigation Takeaway
"Defeat "kitchen sink" pleadings efficiently by using a precision-strike no-evidence motion for summary judgment that targets a single essential element—such as damages or causation—common to multiple overlapping claims."
Thomas v. Clark
COA02
In Thomas v. Clark, the plaintiff's defamation suit was dismissed for want of prosecution (DWOP) after he failed to request timely citation, failed to submit a scheduling order, and missed a dismissal hearing. Thomas filed an unverified motion to reinstate, arguing excusable neglect. The Second Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, reasoning that a trial court possesses both inherent authority and statutory power under Rule 165a to manage its docket regardless of the case's underlying merits. The court held that because Rule 165a(3) explicitly requires a motion to reinstate to be verified, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion due to the verification defect, even if the non-appearance was accidental.
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural technicalities can defeat even the most meritorious claims. If a case is dismissed for want of prosecution, the motion to reinstate must be verified; failing to include a proper verification is a fatal error that allows the court to deny reinstatement regardless of your excuse for the delay."
Salinas v. Tovar
COA13
In Salinas v. Tovar, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could compel a defendant to produce his cell phone and iCloud data for forensic examination in an invasion of privacy suit involving allegations of illegal recording. The court analyzed the "act of production" doctrine under the Fifth Amendment, which provides that the physical act of handing over a device is a testimonial communication that confirms the device's existence and the party's control over it. Because the defendant faced potential criminal liability, and the plaintiff failed to prove that his possession of the phone was a "foregone conclusion," the court held that the order compelling production violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The court distinguished between permissible orders to preserve evidence and unconstitutional orders to affirmatively produce it.
Litigation Takeaway
"The Fifth Amendment's "act of production" doctrine can shield cell phones and digital devices from forensic discovery in civil cases if the act of turning them over confirms the party's possession of potentially incriminating evidence. To successfully compel production, a litigator must establish the device's existence and the opponent's possession through independent evidence—such as service provider records—to satisfy the "foregone conclusion" exception."
Howard v. Kimball
COA07
In Howard v. Kimball, the Seventh Court of Appeals addressed an "accidental finality" trap where a trial court order both denied a plea to the jurisdiction and included language stating the suit was "dismissed." To resolve this ambiguity, the appellate court applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.2, abating the appeal and remanding the case to the trial court for clarification. Under the Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. standard, the court analyzed whether the order clearly and unequivocally disposed of all parties and claims. Once the trial court issued amended orders explicitly stating the case would "continue to trial," the appellate court held that the order was interlocutory and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"To avoid "accidental finality" caused by clerical or drafting errors, always include explicit language in non-final orders stating that the matter remains on the active docket and "shall continue to trial." If you encounter an ambiguous order that inadvertently triggers an appeal, use a TRAP 27.2 abatement as a procedural tool to secure a trial court clarification and return the case to the active docket."
Protection of Sarah K. Wallis v. Alexis M. Etheridge
COA12
After Sarah Wallis applied for a protective order against Alexis Etheridge, the trial court denied the application but ordered Wallis—the unsuccessful petitioner—to pay $1,110 in attorney's fees to Etheridge’s counsel. Wallis appealed both the denial and the fee award. The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the protective order because Wallis failed to file a reporter's record, forcing the court to presume the evidence supported the trial court’s ruling. However, the court reversed the attorney’s fee award, ruling that Texas Family Code § 81.005 only authorizes fees against a party found to have committed family violence. Since there was no finding that Wallis committed violence, the trial court abused its discretion by shifting the fee burden to her.
Litigation Takeaway
"Prevailing as a respondent in a protective order case does not automatically trigger a right to attorney's fees. Under the Texas Family Code, fees are generally reserved for 'bad actors' found to have committed family violence; otherwise, a respondent must successfully pursue formal sanctions for groundless or bad-faith filings to recover their legal costs."
In re PVF Industrial Supply, Inc.
COA06
In a personal injury case with broad implications for family law tort and business disputes, the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant can designate a responsible third party (RTP) after the statute of limitations has expired. The trial court had denied the designation because the defendant did not identify the RTP in its initial disclosures. The appellate court conditionally granted mandamus relief, reasoning that Section 33.004(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code only bars late designations if a defendant fails to comply with a 'timely disclosure' obligation. Because the defendant’s Rule 194 disclosure deadline fell after the limitations period had already passed, there was no breach of duty. The court held that an erroneous denial of an RTP designation 'skews' the comparative-responsibility framework of the trial, making mandamus the appropriate remedy as the error cannot be adequately cured on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A defendant's duty to disclose responsible third parties is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, not the expiration of the statute of limitations; if your disclosure deadline falls after limitations expires, you are not barred from designating an RTP, and a trial court's refusal to allow that designation is a 'skewing' error that justifies immediate mandamus relief."
McNamara v. Bartolomei
COA04
McNamara sued his former attorney for defamation per se following a statement made in a court-ordered response during a habeas proceeding. The trial court granted summary judgment for the attorney on two independent grounds: attorney immunity and the judicial-proceedings privilege. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that McNamara's failure to challenge the judicial-proceedings privilege on appeal required affirmance under the unchallenged independent-ground rule. Substantively, the court held that the judicial-proceedings privilege provides absolute immunity for statements made in the course of litigation, meaning defamation claims based on such statements are barred even if the statements are false or made with malice.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, statements made in pleadings, affidavits, or other court filings are protected by an absolute judicial-proceedings privilege, shielding parties and counsel from defamation liability regardless of malice. Furthermore, if a trial court grants summary judgment on multiple grounds, an appellant must challenge every single ground in their brief, or the appellate court will automatically affirm the ruling."
F.M.H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
This case involved an appeal by a mother whose parental rights were terminated following a bench trial she failed to attend. The Department of Family and Protective Services sought termination based on neglectful supervision, drug use, and the mother's failure to engage in any court-ordered services, such as therapy and drug testing. After the trial court terminated her rights, her court-appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, asserting that the appeal was frivolous. The Third Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record, evaluating the evidence under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b) regarding endangerment and constructive abandonment. The court found that the mother's total lack of participation in services and the children's successful placement in stable, prospective adoptive homes provided legally and factually sufficient evidence for termination. The court held that no arguable grounds for appeal existed and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"A parent’s total failure to engage in court-ordered services and absence from trial creates an evidentiary record that is nearly impossible to challenge on appeal. For practitioners, meticulously documenting "referral fatigue"—the repeated offering and subsequent rejection of rehabilitative resources—and treating missed drug tests as evidence of endangerment are critical steps to ensuring a termination decree survives an Anders review and provides permanency for the children."
McCarver v. McCarver
COA12
After a husband failed to pay a $90,000 "financial security" judgment required by a divorce decree and premarital agreement, the wife sought a post-judgment turnover order and the appointment of a receiver. The husband attempted to block the order by asserting affirmative defenses such as waiver and release, arguing the premarital agreement's separate property protections shielded his assets. The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order, analyzing the doctrine of res judicata. The court held that because the premarital agreement's terms were already litigated (or could have been) during the divorce, the husband was barred from raising those contractual defenses to challenge an enforcement proceeding. Additionally, the court clarified that a turnover order is a final, appealable judgment, allowing for standard appellate timeline extensions.
Litigation Takeaway
"You only get "one bite at the apple" regarding premarital agreement defenses. If a party intends to use a prenuptial agreement to protect assets or waive liabilities, those arguments must be fully exhausted before the divorce decree becomes final; once a turnover proceeding begins, the court will only consider statutory exemptions, not contract-based defenses that were already adjudicated."
F.M.H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In this case, a mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her two children after she failed to complete any court-ordered rehabilitation services, including drug testing and domestic violence classes. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the record after her appointed counsel filed an Anders brief, which argued that the appeal was frivolous. The court reviewed the mother's history of neglectful supervision, crack cocaine use, and sporadic contact with her children against the evidence that the children were thriving in stable, prospective adoptive homes. Ultimately, the court held that the mother's total failure to engage in her service plan and the children's best interests justified the termination of her parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"A parent's total failure to participate in court-ordered services and drug testing creates a nearly insurmountable hurdle on appeal, as the court will likely find no arguable grounds to reverse a termination when the children have achieved stability elsewhere."