Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
IN THE INTEREST OF T.F., A CHILD
COA02
In this case, a father appealed the termination of his parental rights. His court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, stating that after a thorough review of the record, there were no valid legal grounds for an appeal, and simultaneously moved to withdraw as counsel. The Second Court of Appeals performed its own independent review of the record and agreed that the appeal was frivolous, affirming the trial court's termination order. However, the court denied the attorney's motion to withdraw. Applying the Texas Supreme Court's standard from In re P.M., the court held that an appointed attorney’s duty in a termination case continues through the filing of a petition for review with the Texas Supreme Court, and the mere fact that an appeal is frivolous does not constitute 'good cause' to allow an attorney to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
"In parental termination cases, an appointed attorney’s obligation to their client is extensive; filing an Anders brief due to a lack of merit does not automatically permit the attorney to withdraw. Counsel must remain on the case through the Texas Supreme Court stage unless they can demonstrate specific 'good cause'—such as a conflict of interest—that is independent of the appeal's lack of merit."
In re Juan Pardo
COA13
In this mandamus proceeding, Relator Juan Pardo sought to vacate trial court orders for his arrest via ex parte writs of attachment. Although Pardo was represented by two attorneys of record, he filed the petition pro se. The Real Party in Interest moved to dismiss, arguing that Texas law prohibits 'hybrid representation.' The Thirteenth Court of Appeals agreed, holding that a party in a civil case cannot represent themselves while concurrently being represented by counsel. Because the petition was procedurally improper, the court dismissed it without prejudice and lifted a previously granted emergency stay, effectively exposing the Relator to the trial court's enforcement orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pro se filings made by a party who is still represented by counsel of record are considered a procedural nullity. Clients must formalize the termination of their legal representation before attempting to file original proceedings independently, or they risk immediate dismissal and the loss of emergency stays."
IN THE INTEREST OF D.J., A CHILD, Appellant
COA05
After losing his job, a father sought to terminate his child support obligation but refused to produce discovery documents regarding his retirement accounts and foreign property interests. The trial court granted a directed verdict against him, denying the modification and imposing a $4,800 discovery sanction. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the modification, holding that a party seeking to change support must provide full financial transparency to allow the court to calculate "net resources." However, the court reversed the monetary sanction because the trial record lacked specific evidence, such as attorney fee invoices or testimony, to justify the $4,800 amount.
Litigation Takeaway
"Transparency is mandatory in support modification cases; losing your primary income does not excuse you from disclosing your broader financial estate. Additionally, any party seeking discovery sanctions must ensure the record contains specific evidentiary proof linking the amount of the sanction to the actual costs or fees incurred."
Dennis Maurice Jones v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Jones v. State, the defendant sought to introduce his mother’s testimony about his mental-health history during an aggravated-assault trial. When the State objected on relevance, defense counsel expressly told the trial court the testimony was offered only to support an insanity defense and “not attempting to get any sort of lesser included reckless charge.” The trial court excluded the testimony. On appeal, Jones argued the exclusion was error because the evidence would have supported a lesser-included offense instruction. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and the “matching” preservation doctrine (Clark v. State), holding the appellate complaint did not match what was requested at trial. Because counsel affirmatively disclaimed the lesser-included theory, the trial court was never asked to rule on admissibility for that purpose and there was no preserved error to review. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not “narrow-proffer” yourself into an appellate waiver. If evidence is relevant to multiple theories (e.g., best interest, statutory presumptions, significant impairment, danger), state all applicable grounds and avoid affirmative disclaimers like “not for X.” Appellate courts will hold you to the exact theory presented to the trial judge, and a trial-level disclaimer can permanently foreclose a later appeal."
EDWARD GENE MOODY JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
COA02
In Moody v. State, the defendant challenged a felony DWI conviction, arguing (1) the search-warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause for a compelled blood draw and (2) the State failed to prove the two prior DWI convictions (“jurisdictional priors”) required to elevate the offense to a felony. Applying the highly deferential totality-of-the-circumstances review and the “four corners” rule, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held the magistrate had a substantial basis to find probable cause where the affidavit described a vehicle accident, witness reports that the defendant smelled of alcohol and threw beer cans into a ditch, the officer’s own odor-of-alcohol observation, failed field sobriety tests, and the defendant’s admission he drank two 24-ounce beers. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to link Moody to the 1995 and 2022 DWI judgments for enhancement purposes; remoteness did not undermine the priors’ validity, and the State provided documentation and corroborating testimony connecting Moody to those convictions. The court affirmed the felony DWI conviction and sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody and SAPCR cases, don’t dismiss “old” alcohol-related convictions or a parent’s calm demeanor during an incident. Build an endangerment narrative using (1) certified priors (even decades old) and (2) contemporaneous, concrete “four corners” facts from police/fire/witness reports (accident details, odor, discarded containers, refusals, admissions) to support testing requests and restrictions like supervised visitation."
HIGH RISK PREGNANCY DOCTORS, PLLC AND VIOLETTA LOZOVYY, Appellants v. LINCOLN PROPERTY COMPANY D/B/A LINCOLN HARRIS CSG AND DOUGLAS MACLAY III, Appellees
COA02
In High Risk Pregnancy Doctors, PLLC and Dr. Violetta Lozovyy’s dispute with a leasing agent and landlord, the plaintiffs claimed they were induced to sign a commercial lease by an oral promise that the lease would be “ineffective” or otherwise “dealt with” if Dr. Lozovyy failed to obtain hospital staff privileges within 120 days. The written lease, however, unambiguously required those privileges and contained no contingency or “escape hatch.” The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, applying the Rule 91a standard, held the fraud claim failed as a matter of law because “justifiable reliance” cannot be based on an oral representation that is directly contradicted by the clear terms of the signed contract. The court also held the DTPA claim was time-barred: the two-year limitations period was not tolled by the discovery rule because the alleged injury—the contradictory contract language—was discoverable at signing, and failing to read the contract is a lack of reasonable diligence. The court affirmed dismissal of all claims.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the written agreement says one thing and an alleged oral promise says another, Texas courts treat reliance on the oral promise as legally unjustifiable—making fraud-based attempts to unwind a signed deal vulnerable to early dismissal. In family cases, this is strong authority to defeat “side-deal” or “work-around” claims attacking MSAs/Rule 11 agreements and to resist late-filed fraud/DTPA-style claims where the complaining party could have discovered the issue by reading what they signed."
Richardson v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Richardson v. State, the defendant challenged (among other issues) the court costs assessed after his convictions, arguing that the district clerk’s bill of costs conflicted with the trial court’s oral pronouncement that costs would not be payable until his release from TDCJ confinement. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected Richardson’s ineffective-assistance claims under Strickland, but addressed the costs dispute by applying the rule that when a written judgment or ministerial clerk cost bill conflicts with the trial court’s oral pronouncement made in the defendant’s presence, the oral pronouncement controls. The court also reviewed the bill of costs for record support and found a $55 subpoena service fee was unsupported. The court affirmed the convictions, modified the judgment to delete the unsupported subpoena fee, and further modified the judgment/bill of costs to state that court costs are not payable until Richardson is released from confinement, consistent with the trial court’s oral ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"In enforcement and contempt cases—especially when someone is jailed—don’t let boilerplate orders or an auto-generated clerk bill of costs undo what the judge said on the record. If the court orally waives or defers fees/costs, ensure the written order and commitment match; otherwise move to correct/modify because the oral pronouncement controls and unsupported cost items can be struck."
AHMED OLAYIWOLA, Appellant V. FITNESS INTERNATIONAL LLC D/B/A LA FITNESS; FITNESS INTERNATIONAL GP, LLC; L.A. FITNESS INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P.; AND “L.A. FITNESS”
COA14
After appealing a trial court's dismissal of his claims, Ahmed Olayiwola filed a voluntary nonsuit of all underlying claims against all parties while the appeal was pending. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals examined whether the appeal could continue despite the absence of a live controversy at the trial level. Relying on the principle that appellate courts lack jurisdiction over moot disputes, the court determined that the nonsuit effectively extinguished the controversy. The court held that because there was no longer a justiciable issue for the court to resolve or a judgment that would have any practical legal effect, the appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction under Rule 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
"A voluntary nonsuit in the trial court acts as a 'tactical reset' that moots a pending appeal; this allows a party to effectively 'vacuum' the appellate court's jurisdiction to avoid an unfavorable precedent or a poorly developed record, provided the opposing party has not filed a counterclaim for affirmative relief."
In Re Jose Francisco Quintero and JQ Brick Repair & Restoration Services, LLC
COA14
In a mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether experts who author counteraffidavits under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 18.001 are protected from deposition by the consulting expert privilege. The trial court had ordered the depositions of four experts who provided counteraffidavits but were not designated as testifying witnesses. Analyzing Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 192.3(e) and 192.7, the appellate court determined that because the experts were not designated to testify and their work was not reviewed by any testifying experts, they remained privileged consultants. The court held that serving a counteraffidavit does not constitute a waiver of the consulting expert privilege, and thus the trial court abused its discretion by compelling the depositions.
Litigation Takeaway
"Attorneys can effectively challenge the reasonableness of medical or professional expenses by using Section 18.001 counteraffidavits from consulting experts who remain immune from deposition, so long as those experts are never designated to testify and their work product is not shared with testifying experts."
In re Michael David Jones
COA10
The Tenth Court of Appeals dismissed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Michael David Jones, who sought immediate release from jail regarding criminal charges. The court analyzed the Texas Government Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, determining that intermediate appellate courts lack original jurisdiction over criminal habeas matters, as that power is reserved for the Court of Criminal Appeals, district courts, and county courts. The court held that while it has the authority to hear original habeas petitions in civil cases—such as family law contempt proceedings—it has no legal authority to reach the merits of a habeas claim arising from criminal detention.
Litigation Takeaway
"Understand the 'why' behind a client's incarceration before filing for relief. If a client is jailed for civil contempt (like unpaid child support), the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to hear a writ of habeas corpus. However, if the client faces criminal charges (like custodial interference), the writ must be filed in a trial court first. Filing in the wrong forum leads to a jurisdictional dismissal and keeps your client in jail longer."