Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC
COA02
In Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, the Second Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se restricted appeal because the appellant had previously been declared a vexatious litigant and was subject to a Chapter 11 prefiling order. The court analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 11.101, 11.103, and 11.1035, which require a vexatious litigant to obtain permission from the appropriate local administrative judge before filing an appeal and mandate dismissal if that permission is not obtained. After the court gave Nicholson an opportunity to provide the required permission order, she instead produced materials showing that permission had been denied. Because no statutory exception applied, the court held that dismissal was mandatory.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a pro se appellant is subject to a Chapter 11 vexatious-litigant prefiling order, appellate review can be stopped at the threshold unless the appellant first gets written permission from the local administrative judge. For family law lawyers, that makes vexatious-litigant status and the existence of a permission order an early procedural checkpoint that may support dismissal without reaching the merits."
In the Interest of M.B., a Child
COA02
In a private termination suit brought by grandparents, the trial court failed to appoint an amicus attorney or attorney ad litem for the child. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code Section 107.021(a-1), which states that a court 'shall' appoint a representative unless it specifically finds the child’s interests are adequately represented by a non-conflicted party. Because the trial court made no such finding and acknowledged the child's interests were unrepresented, the appellate court held that the failure to appoint a representative was a mandatory statutory error. The court concluded this constitutes reversible error that is not subject to a harmless error analysis, necessitating a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"In private termination and adoption proceedings, the appointment of a representative for the child is a non-discretionary statutory duty; trial counsel must ensure an amicus or ad litem is appointed or obtain an express 'no-conflict' finding on the record to prevent the judgment from being automatically reversed on appeal."
Pyrtle v. Fowler
COA14
In Pyrtle v. Fowler, a dispute arose between former cohabitants regarding the ownership and use of a home and a 2012 Lexus. The trial court granted a temporary injunction allowing the plaintiff to remain in the home and retain control of the vehicle pending trial. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether these assets met the requirements for equitable relief. The court held that while real property is considered unique and justifies an injunction to preserve the status quo, personal property like vehicles does not qualify because any harm can be adequately compensated through money damages (such as rental costs or loss-of-use value). Consequently, the court affirmed the injunction as to the residence but struck down the provisions regarding the motor vehicles.
Litigation Takeaway
"While courts will readily issue injunctions to protect your right to occupy a unique residence during a lawsuit, they generally will not do the same for vehicles or personal property because those losses can be fixed with a check for damages."
Mahasneh v. Mahasneh
COA02
A former wife sought a protective order against her ex-husband after he engaged in a persistent pattern of stalking, including placing a GPS tracker on her vehicle and surveilling her workplace. The trial court issued a 30-year protective order under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and awarded her attorney's fees. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals examined whether the evidence supported such a long duration and whether the attorney's fees were sufficiently proven. The court affirmed the 30-year protective order, ruling that Chapter 7B allows for long-term orders based on stalking without the "future family violence" findings required by the Family Code. However, the court reversed the attorney's fees award, holding that counsel's testimony was too conclusory and failed to meet the strict "lodestar" requirements—specifically failing to detail the hours worked, the hourly rate, and the specific tasks performed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning a protective order does not exempt you from strict evidentiary rules for attorney's fees; always provide a detailed "lodestar" breakdown—including specific tasks, hours, and rates—or risk losing the fee award on appeal. Additionally, consider utilizing Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure for stalking cases, as it can provide longer-term protection than the Family Code with different evidentiary requirements."
The City of Arlington v. Airport Properties, Inc.
COA02
After Airport Properties, Inc. sued the City of Arlington, the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea, and the City filed an interlocutory appeal. While the appeal was pending, Airport Properties nonsuited all its claims against the City. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162, which provides an 'absolute right' to nonsuit claims before all evidence is introduced. Because the City had no pending counterclaims for affirmative relief, the court held that the nonsuit extinguished the live controversy, rendering the interlocutory appeal moot and stripping the appellate court of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A plaintiff can use a Rule 162 nonsuit as a 'kill switch' to moot a pending interlocutory appeal and reset the jurisdictional battle, provided the respondent has not anchored the litigation with an independent claim for affirmative relief."
In the Interest of T.M., a Child
COA11
In this parental termination case, the Department sought to terminate a mother's rights after her child, T.M., tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana. The mother contended the exposure was accidental due to her work as a hotel housekeeper, but the Department also cited her failure to keep the child away from a drug-using father. The Court of Appeals analyzed the endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b), determining that the mother's choice to bring the child to a high-risk workplace and allow unsupervised contact with the father supported endangerment. However, the Court also scrutinized the Department's compliance with Section 161.001(f), which requires clear and convincing evidence of reasonable efforts to return the child. Ultimately, the Court issued a partial reversal and remand, holding that the Department failed to satisfy its high evidentiary burden for every mandatory statutory finding required to support the irrevocable termination of parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug exposure is not a "universal solvent" that excuses the Department from its burden of proof; practitioners must ensure that every statutory element, particularly the requirement for reasonable reunification efforts under Section 161.001(f), is supported by clear and convincing evidence to avoid reversal on appeal."
Blevins v. Brown
COA07
In Blevins v. Brown, a plaintiff filed suit for slander and tortious interference but failed to include specific factual details regarding the alleged defamatory statements. After the defendant filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff attempted to file an amended petition on the day of the hearing to cure the defects. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict between the general amendment provisions of Rule 65 and the specific requirements of Rule 91a.5(c), determining that the specific three-day deadline for Rule 91a amendments is mandatory and supersedes general rules. The court held that the trial court properly refused to consider the late amendment and affirmed the dismissal, ruling that defamation claims lacking specific factual predicates constitute legally baseless 'threadbare recitals.'
Litigation Takeaway
"Precision is paramount when pleading 'crossover' torts like defamation in family law; you must provide specific facts—the who, what, when, and where—in your petition and remember that the Rule 91a amendment window closes strictly three days before the hearing."
In Re Estate of Wright
COA11
In a contested probate case transferred from a Throckmorton County court to a district court, a contestant challenged the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction, alleging the transfer order was procedurally defective. The court of appeals analyzed Texas Estates Code § 32.003, which mandates transfers of contested probate matters in counties without statutory probate courts. The court held that because the transfer was mandatory and the case had actually moved, any clerical or internal inconsistencies in the transfer order were non-jurisdictional procedural defects that the contestant waived by failing to object in the trial court. Additionally, the court found that testimony stating a will was never revoked 'to the best of [the witness's] knowledge' constituted probative evidence to support admitting the will to probate.
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural defects in a transfer order between courts are not 'jurisdictional silver bullets' and must be preserved by a timely objection in the trial court; otherwise, the complaint is waived. Furthermore, personal knowledge testimony framed as 'to the best of my knowledge' regarding the non-revocation of a document is sufficient probative evidence to support a trial court finding."
In the Interest of L.L., a Child
COA02
After a trial court terminated a Father's parental rights to his child, L.L., based on endangerment and best-interest findings, his appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous. The Second Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal existed. Finding no non-frivolous issues, the court affirmed the termination decree. However, the court clarified that under Texas Family Code § 107.016 and the Texas Supreme Court's precedent in In re P.M., appointed counsel’s obligations do not end at the intermediate court; the duty to represent the parent continues through potential proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court unless counsel is relieved for good cause.
Litigation Takeaway
"In parental termination cases, an appointed attorney's duty of representation is "sticky"—it persists through the exhaustion of all appeals, including a petition for review to the Texas Supreme Court, even if the intermediate court determines the appeal is frivolous."
Gonzalez v. Montalvo
COA14
In a dispute over the partition of several hundred acres of estate property, the appellant challenged the trial court's order to sell the land and its denial of a jury trial. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals first clarified that a "phase-one" partition order—which determines if property should be sold or divided in kind—is a final, appealable judgment. On the jury issue, the court held that a party cannot rely on a jury demand and fee payment made by another party who has since nonsuited their claims, as a nonsuit restores the parties to their pre-filing positions. Regarding the partition itself, the court found the trial court applied the wrong legal standard by focusing on whether individual tracts could be split equally rather than whether the aggregate estate could be fairly divided. The court affirmed the denial of the jury trial but reversed the order of sale.
Litigation Takeaway
"Always file your own jury demand and pay the fee; relying on an opponent’s request is a 'trap' because a nonsuit will immediately strip you of that jury right. Furthermore, in partition litigation, the 'phase one' order is not interlocutory—you must appeal the decision to sell versus divide immediately or lose the right to challenge it."