Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In re Marriage of Runyon
COA10
In In re Marriage of Runyon, a husband challenged a divorce decree that awarded his wife a $47,990 money judgment, allowed her to relocate their child to Florida, and ordered $1,840 in monthly child support. The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on all counts. The court analyzed the property division under the Murff factors, concluding that the husband's high income as an anesthesiologist compared to the wife's lower earnings justified an unequal division. Regarding the move to Florida, the court applied the Lenz factors and found relocation was in the child's best interest due to the presence of extended family. The court held that the trial court acted within its broad discretion and that the wife's legal pleadings were sufficient to support the remedies awarded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Trial courts have immense discretion in dividing property and determining a child's residence; if there is a significant income gap or a clear best-interest benefit to relocation (like family support), appellate courts are highly unlikely to reverse the decision."
In the Interest of B.C., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals largely upheld a post-answer default SAPCR order against a pro se father. The court concluded the record showed he had actual notice of the trial setting, his eve-of-trial email continuance request was not verified or supported by affidavit as Rule 251 requires, and his post-judgment effort to set aside the default did not establish reversible error under the standards governing post-answer defaults. The court also rejected his other complaints as unpreserved, inadequately briefed, or contradicted by the record. But it modified the final order to strike the child’s surname change because the mother never pleaded for that relief, and a court may not grant affirmative relief not supported by the live pleadings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Two family-law lessons stand out: post-answer defaults are hard to undo without a properly supported Craddock record, and even in SAPCR cases a final order cannot include affirmative relief that was never pleaded. Plead every item of requested relief, and if you seek to set aside a default, use a properly signed, sworn, and fully developed motion."
In the Interest of A.S., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) and § 161.001(b)(2). Mother sought termination after Father failed to pay support, had no in-person contact following a Rule 11 agreement suspending access pending a mental-health evaluation, and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on both the predicate ground and best interest. The court emphasized that a failure-to-support termination requires proof of the parent’s actual ability to support the child during each month of the relevant twelve-month period; a prior support order or arrearage evidence alone is not enough. Applying deferential legal- and factual-sufficiency review, the court held the trial judge could disbelieve Father’s testimony minimizing his income and infer from the broader financial record that he had some ability to pay but failed to support the child in accordance with that ability. The same evidence, together with Father’s prolonged absence and instability in the parent-child relationship, supported the best-interest finding. The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a § 161.001(b)(1)(F) case, the winning record is a month-by-month ability-to-pay record, not just proof of arrearages. Petitioners should build concrete evidence of income, resources, and spending during the statutory twelve-month window, while respondents need disciplined documentary proof of genuine inability to pay because unsupported excuses and credibility problems can be fatal."
Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger v. Deere Credit, Inc.
COA11
The Eastland Court of Appeals reversed a restricted-appeal default judgment entered against an individual defendant and a limited partnership. The court held that Shelia Unger’s signed pro se letter, which denied liability, asserted that payments had been made and the equipment returned, and asked the court to dismiss the suit, was sufficient to constitute an answer on her own behalf because Texas courts liberally construe informal pro se filings that give fair notice of a defensive position. The same letter could not serve as a valid appearance for the limited partnership because a non-attorney cannot represent an entity. Even so, the court held the trial court erred by treating the record as though no response existed and by signing a default judgment the same day the motion was filed, without notice or an opportunity for the entity to cure the representation defect. The judgment was reversed and remanded as to both defendants.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law-adjacent default practice, any timely pro se filing by an individual that disputes the claims may defeat a no-answer default, even if informal. And if a business entity attempts to respond through a non-lawyer, the safer course is to force counsel to appear and give notice and a chance to cure—not rush to default—because due-process defects can unravel the judgment on restricted appeal."
Sheehan v. Sheehan
COA11
In Sheehan v. Sheehan, the divorce decree awarded the wife $64,661.44 from a BB&T account in the husband’s name, but he later depleted the account and failed to deliver the funds. On enforcement, the husband argued that a money judgment would improperly modify the decree because the specific account no longer contained the money. The Eleventh Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that Texas Family Code §§ 9.002, 9.006, and especially 9.010 allow a trial court to enforce an existing property award through a money judgment when direct delivery of the awarded property is no longer an adequate remedy. Because the decree had already awarded the wife that sum, reducing the undelivered award to a money judgment did not change the substantive property division; it simply implemented it. The court also affirmed attorney’s fees under § 9.014.
Litigation Takeaway
"A spouse cannot defeat a divorce decree’s property award by draining the account or liquidating the asset from which payment was supposed to come. If the decree already awarded a sum certain, the court can enforce that award with a money judgment—and attorney’s fees—without impermissibly modifying the decree."
Schrotel v. State
COA10
In Schrotel v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to uphold a family-violence assault conviction arising from a dispute between spouses. The complainant testified that her husband hit her with an exercise ball, put his hand on her throat, pushed her down, and kicked or stomped on her leg, causing pain. The responding officer did not witness the assault but observed that the complainant was upset and crying, saw a heel-shaped red mark on her leg, and photographed it. On appeal, the appellant argued the complainant was not credible and that inconsistencies between her testimony, the officer’s testimony, and his denial made the evidence insufficient. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court deferred to the jury’s role in resolving credibility and conflicts in the evidence, considered the cumulative force of the testimony and corroboration, and concluded that the complainant’s testimony plus modest contemporaneous corroboration was enough for a rational jury to find bodily injury to a family member beyond a reasonable doubt.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, a factfinder can credit one party’s detailed testimony even when the other party flatly denies it. You do not need perfect corroboration; modest supporting proof like photographs, officer observations, distress, or a prompt outcry may be enough to support findings affecting protective orders, conservatorship, possession, and related divorce issues."
In the Interest of S.M.T. and S.J.T., Children
COA14
In a pending SAPCR, the appellant tried to immediately appeal trial-court orders denying motions to correct the reporter’s record and clerk’s record. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the final-judgment rule, noted that interlocutory orders are appealable only when a statute expressly authorizes it, and found no statute permitting an interlocutory appeal from record-correction rulings. Because the challenged orders were purely interlocutory and did not dispose of all parties and claims, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot create appellate jurisdiction by appealing a procedural ruling about the contents of the record. In family-law cases, record-correction disputes usually must be handled through the proper correction procedures, preserved for review after a final judgment, or—if truly extraordinary—addressed by mandamus rather than a stand-alone interlocutory appeal."
Corpus v. State
COA11
In Corpus v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that a defendant did not preserve any complaint about the denial of a continuance where counsel made only an oral, unsworn mid-trial request to wait for subpoenaed mental-health records of an Article 38.37 witness. The court applied Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 29.03 and 29.08 and controlling precedent to treat the written-and-verified requirement as a bright-line preservation rule, with no due-process exception. The court also explained that, even on the merits, denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion because the defense knew before trial that the records were still outstanding and could only speculate about their usefulness, so there was no unexpected occurrence or concrete showing of materiality. The takeaway for family-law crossover purposes is that courts may never reach the substance of a continuance complaint if counsel fails to preserve it in proper written, verified form.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you need a continuance because key records have not arrived, do not rely on an oral trial request. File a written, verified motion, show diligence, explain specifically why the missing evidence is material, and make the record before trial if the problem is already known. Otherwise, even potentially important complaints about missing mental-health, school, CPS, or financial records may be waived on appeal."
Rademacher v. Rademacher
COA03
In Rademacher v. Rademacher, a wife sought to set aside a Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) during a divorce, claiming she signed it under duress. She argued that her various medical conditions, anxiety, and pressure from her attorney and the mediator—who warned her that trial would be expensive and risky—rendered her signature involuntary. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the agreement under Texas Family Code § 6.602, which provides that a properly formatted MSA is immediately binding and non-revocable. The court held that 'reality-testing' by counsel regarding litigation costs and outcomes does not constitute legal duress, and because the wife failed to prove that her free agency was destroyed, the MSA remained enforceable.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas divorce law, a signed Mediated Settlement Agreement is nearly impossible to undo; feelings of pressure, anxiety, or being told that trial is a bad financial move do not constitute 'duress' that would allow a party to back out of the deal."
Fuhrman v. Fuhrman
COA09
In Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, the Ninth Court of Appeals held that detailed tax-allocation provisions in an agreed divorce decree could be enforced as a contract in a separate post-divorce civil suit. The decree required Deloitte to prepare the parties’ 2020 returns, made Douglas responsible for the first $270,000 of 2020 federal income tax, and required the parties to split any excess equally. After Douglas paid his tax liability and demanded reimbursement, Nancy refused, arguing in part that Douglas had not fully performed because he did not provide a K-1. The court rejected that argument, concluding the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Douglas performed, tendered performance, or was excused, and that Nancy breached by failing to pay her allocated share. Because Douglas supported his calculation with returns, testimony, and a spreadsheet, the court affirmed a $187,244 damages award and $30,782.58 in attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If an agreed divorce decree allocates a financial obligation with commercial-contract precision, a former spouse may be able to enforce it later through a straightforward breach-of-contract suit and recover fees. For litigators, the lesson is to draft tax, indemnity, reimbursement, and equalization clauses with clear formulas, deadlines, and document-sharing duties—and to prove or defend those claims with actual evidence, not generalized complaints."