Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Interest of C.S.S.
COA03
The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal to terminate child-support wage withholding where the obligor claimed he had overpaid, but the Office of the Attorney General’s records and the trial court’s unchallenged findings showed unpaid arrearages and accrued interest remained. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, treated the unchallenged findings as binding, and held that under the Family Code, withholding may continue after current support ends if arrears and interest are still owed. Because the obligor did not produce competent evidence disproving the OAG’s accounting, the trial court properly denied relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Ending current child support does not end income withholding if arrearages and interest remain. If you want withholding terminated, you need a real evidentiary accounting—not just a claim that the numbers seem too high—and on appeal you must specifically challenge findings of fact or they will likely control the outcome."
In re Levi Hardy
COA08
After a bench-trial divorce decree was signed, the wife moved for new trial and, after the original judge recused, a successor judge granted the motion without stating reasons. The husband sought mandamus, arguing the order was arbitrary because it set aside a nonjury decree without explanation and was entered by a judge who had not heard the evidence. The Eighth Court of Appeals denied relief, holding that the Texas Supreme Court’s merits-based mandamus review of new-trial orders under Columbia Medical, United Scaffolding, and Toyota is tied to protection of the constitutional right to a jury trial and has not been extended to bench-trial family-law cases. Because this was a nonjury divorce case and the relator did not show the order was void or otherwise exceptionally subject to mandamus review, any complaint about the new-trial ruling must await appeal after a new final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law bench trials, do not count on mandamus to undo an order granting new trial—even if the order gives no reasons and even if a successor judge entered it. Treat motions for new trial as a serious merits threat, make a full record in opposition, preserve findings and post-judgment issues carefully, and prepare for retrial unless you have a true voidness or other extraordinary mandamus ground."
In the Matter of the Name Change of A.J.G., a Child
COA08
In *In the Matter of the Name Change of A.J.G., a Child*, the El Paso Court of Appeals reversed a trial court order requiring a mother to pay $400 in reduced court costs after she filed a Rule 145 statement showing she could not afford fees in a minor name-change case. The appellate court held that her sworn indigency statement and supporting benefit, income, asset, and expense information were uncontroverted, and that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an off-record interview process and attached documents rather than admissible evidence presented in a proper evidentiary hearing. Because the existing record showed inability to pay and no valid evidentiary basis for reduced costs, the court directed that the case proceed without payment of court costs or fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family-law client files a compliant Rule 145 indigency statement, the court cannot impose filing fees or even reduced costs based on informal interviews, assumptions, or off-record documents. Make sure any challenge to indigency is handled through a formal, on-the-record evidentiary hearing with admissible proof; otherwise, the indigency showing should stand."
Gallegos v. State
COA04
In Gallegos v. State, the Fourth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support an indecency-with-a-child count alleging contact with a child’s breast even though the child said the defendant touched her “chest.” The court analyzed the issue under a context-based sufficiency framework, relying on the child’s young age, her undeveloped anatomy, and her testimony distinguishing her “chest” from other body areas like her stomach and tummy. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Arroyo, the court concluded a rational factfinder could infer she meant her breast area. The court also rejected unpreserved jury-charge complaints for lack of egregious harm and upheld the assessed court costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child’s imperfect or age-limited body-part vocabulary does not automatically destroy the evidentiary value of the child’s statement. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, courts may rely on context—age, developmental stage, narrative detail, and differentiation among body areas—to draw reasonable inferences about what the child meant. The case also underscores that charge complaints must be preserved to have real appellate traction."
In the Interest of D.A.V. and N.B.V., Children
COA04
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR modification order naming the father sole managing conservator and the mother possessory conservator because the mother’s pro se appeal was fatally defective. After striking her original brief and allowing rebriefing, the court held the amended brief still failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 because it lacked record citations, legal authority, and developed analysis. The court also emphasized that the appellate record did not include the reporter’s record from the November 20, 2025 modification hearing that produced the order under review, making meaningful review impossible. Applying the rule that even pro se litigants must comply with appellate procedure, the court held the mother waived her complaints and affirmed the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law appeals, the merits do not matter if the appellant cannot present a compliant brief and the reporter’s record from the actual hearing that produced the challenged order. Preservation, Rule 38.1 compliance, and record control are often outcome-determinative—especially in custody modification cases reviewed for abuse of discretion."
In re Steven Joseph Slivinski
COA14
In this original habeas proceeding, Steven Joseph Slivinski challenged a Galveston County family-law contempt restraint and sought interim relief. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the narrow civil habeas standard under Texas Government Code section 22.221(d), explaining that habeas review does not revisit the merits of the contempt ruling but asks only whether the relator is unlawfully restrained because he was denied due process or because the underlying order is void. The court held Slivinski failed to show either a due-process violation or a void order, so his restraint was not shown to be unlawful. The court therefore denied both habeas relief and interim relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Habeas relief from a family-law contempt order is a narrow remedy. To win, the relator must present a tight record showing unlawful restraint based on a true due-process defect or a void underlying order—not just alleged trial-court error. In enforcement cases, precise drafting, clear notice, and a complete appellate record are critical."
McBride v. Rios-Flores
COA08
In McBride v. Rios-Flores, the Eighth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the underlying family-law dispute because the appeal failed on briefing. After striking the appellant’s original brief for noncompliance with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4 and 38.1, the court gave notice, a deadline to cure, and an express warning that continued noncompliance could result in dismissal. The appellant timely filed an amended brief, but it still consisted largely of conclusory bullet points with almost no meaningful record citations and no developed legal analysis connecting authority to the facts. Applying Rules 38.1, 38.9(a), 38.8(a), 42.3, and 44.3, the court explained that while briefing rules are construed liberally to preserve appellate review, that liberality does not require the court to research arguments or search the record on a party’s behalf. Because the amended brief still flagrantly violated the appellate rules after an opportunity to cure, the court struck the brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.
Litigation Takeaway
"A family-law appeal can be lost before the court ever reaches custody, modification, support, or property issues if the brief does not actually brief them. Conclusory complaints, bare statutory citations, and weak record references are not enough; the appellant must identify the ruling challenged, state the standard of review, cite the controlling law and the exact record support, and explain why reversal is required. For appellees, this case is a useful reminder that persistent, serious briefing defects can justify waiver arguments, a motion to strike, and ultimately dismissal after notice and an opportunity to cure."
In the Interest of B.G.T. aka E.T., a Child
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. The case began when both Mother and newborn tested positive for amphetamine, and the record later showed ongoing methamphetamine use, repeated positive and refused drug tests, untreated mental-health issues, incarceration, failure to complete court-ordered services, and an unsafe proposed home with a known drug user. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest factors, the court emphasized that unchallenged predicate findings and overlapping endangerment evidence strongly supported best interest, especially when contrasted with the child’s stable and successful placement with relatives. The court held that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won with comparative, current evidence: ongoing drug use, untreated mental illness, service-plan noncompliance, incarceration, and unsafe housing can outweigh a biological parent’s rights when the child is thriving in a stable placement. On appeal, leaving predicate grounds unchallenged can sharply narrow the fight and make a best-interest-only challenge much harder to win."
Gomez v. Richard
COA06
In Gomez v. Richard, the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could render summary judgment after a defendant died but before any estate representative or heir was substituted into the case. After a suggestion of death was filed, the trial court still granted no-evidence summary judgment for the deceased driver and his employer. The appellate court held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 152, once a party dies, the suit cannot proceed against that person unless a proper substitute—such as an executor, administrator, or heir—is brought in through scire facias or an equivalent substitution procedure. Because no substitute was joined for Richard, he became a legal non-entity for purposes of the litigation, and the judgment as to him was void. The court vacated that portion of the judgment and dismissed that part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As to the surviving employer, however, the court held the no-evidence motion was sufficiently specific and that the plaintiffs failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence, so the summary judgment for the employer was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party dies before judgment, stop and fix the parties before the court does anything else. In Texas, failing to substitute a proper representative under Rule 152 can make a later order void, not merely erroneous. In family cases, that gives lawyers a powerful basis to challenge or prevent rulings entered after a spouse, conservator, or other key litigant dies."
Shepard v. Shepard
COA05
In this divorce appeal, the wife, acting without a lawyer, challenged numerous rulings including recusal decisions, due-process concerns, evidentiary limits, ADA accommodation issues, temporary orders, and the trial court’s confirmation of the marital residence as the husband’s separate property. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach those merits because, even after being notified of defects and given a chance to amend, her brief still failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. Applying the rule that pro se litigants must follow the same appellate briefing standards as attorneys, the court held that the amended brief lacked clear argument, meaningful record citations, and supporting legal authority. Because nothing was properly presented for appellate review, the court dismissed the appeal under Rule 42.3(c).
Litigation Takeaway
"A family-law appeal can be lost before the court ever considers the merits if the brief does not clearly connect preserved complaints to the record, legal authority, and the applicable standard of review. Even serious complaints about recusal, temporary orders, property characterization, or trial fairness will not be reviewed if the appellant does not comply with Rule 38.1—and pro se parties get no special exemption."