Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Interest of C.G.H. and C.H.H., Children
COA07
In a SAPCR modification appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals upheld an order requiring the children to attend public school after the current year and affirming counseling provisions for the children and mother. Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held there was sufficient evidence of a material and substantial change and best interest, including testimony about the private school’s lack of accreditation, uncertified teachers, academic delay, and concerns about transparency and safety, as well as evidence of the mother’s manipulative conduct and interference with the father-child relationship. The court deferred to the trial court’s resolution of conflicting testimony and also held the mother waived her First and Fourteenth Amendment complaints by failing to preserve them in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a schooling or counseling modification to stick, build a child-specific record with objective academic proof, concrete safety or co-parenting concerns, and a narrowly tailored request. And if you intend to raise constitutional objections to educational or therapeutic provisions, preserve them clearly in the trial court or they will be waived on appeal."
In the Interest of P.S.R.F., D.M.R.F., D.A.R., P.R.R., B.I.R., B.E.R., B.L.R., and Y.R.R., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to eight children after appointed counsel filed an Anders brief and the court independently reviewed the record for any nonfrivolous appellate issue. The court emphasized that the evidence supported endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), relying on proof of the mother’s continuing pattern of drug abuse and the resulting danger and instability for the children, which showed a substantial risk of harm and parental incapacity. Because no arguable challenge existed to the predicate grounds or best-interest finding, the court affirmed, but it denied appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M. because appointed counsel’s duties continue through exhaustion of appeals.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and custody-related litigation, substance-abuse evidence is most powerful when developed as an ongoing pattern tied directly to child danger, instability, and impaired parenting—not as isolated bad acts. Appellate lawyers should also remember that Anders review in parental-rights cases requires meaningful attention to § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) findings, and appointed counsel usually must stay on the case through the petition-for-review stage."
Laura Mann v. Manuel Diaz Cabrera
COA14
In this Harris County family-law appeal, the appellant voluntarily moved to dismiss her own appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals did not address the underlying divorce or SAPCR issues because the only question before it was whether dismissal should be granted. Finding the motion unopposed and no indication that dismissal would impair any party’s right to relief, the court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, leaving the trial-court judgment in place without any merits ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"A voluntary appellate dismissal is usually a clean exit, but it does not undo the trial court’s order. Family-law litigators should make sure the client understands that abandoning the appeal typically cements the judgment below unless the parties seek and obtain additional relief."
Kong v. Department of Family and Protective Services
COA10
In Kong v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order striking a paternal aunt’s petition in intervention seeking managing conservatorship of two children after the parents’ rights had already been terminated. The aunt filed nearly five months after the final termination order. The court held the filing was untimely for two independent reasons: intervention generally must occur before final judgment, and once the termination order became final and plenary power expired, the closed case could not be reopened by a new intervention unless the judgment had first been set aside; separately, Texas Family Code section 102.006(c) barred a relative’s post-termination conservatorship request filed more than 90 days after termination. The court also rejected any attempt to save the pleading by treating it as an original SAPCR rather than an intervention, because the statutory deadline still controlled. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in striking the aunt’s filing.
Litigation Takeaway
"Deadlines and standing can end a family-law case before best-interest evidence ever matters. If a relative wants conservatorship after termination, counsel must act quickly—preferably before final judgment and, at minimum, within Family Code section 102.006(c)’s 90-day window. Post-judgment relabeling of a pleading will not cure untimeliness once finality and statutory standing barriers attach."
In the Interest of G.L.M., a Child
COA11
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asserting no nonfrivolous issues. The Eleventh Court independently reviewed the record and held the evidence was legally sufficient to support termination under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), based on the mother’s pattern of drug and alcohol abuse and the resulting danger to the child, as well as the best-interest finding. The court also held that the trial court improperly relied on former section 161.001(b)(1)(O) because that predicate ground had been repealed by the 2025 amendments and the case was still pending after the amendment’s effective date. Rather than reverse, the court modified the termination order to delete the void subsection (O) finding, affirmed the order as modified, and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
"Two practical lessons stand out: first, family-law lawyers must update pleadings and proposed orders for statutory changes because a repealed predicate ground can become void in a pending case; second, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) remain critically important on appeal because they can sustain termination and carry collateral consequences in future custody litigation. The case also reminds appointed counsel that an Anders affirmance does not automatically end representation in a termination appeal."
Brian Alex Bermudez v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Bermudez v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a family-violence assault conviction and the denial of a motion for new trial. The defendant argued his lawyer had an actual conflict because counsel had pending criminal charges of his own, that counsel was ineffective for not securing an additional witness to testify the complainant was intoxicated, and that the trial court wrongly excluded the complainant’s testimony after a sequestration violation. The court held the conflict claim failed because the record did not show counsel’s personal charges adversely affected any specific trial decision; in fact, counsel affirmatively pursued intoxication as a central defense theme. The omitted-witness claim also failed because the proposed testimony was cumulative of other evidence showing intoxication and did not address the assault itself. Finally, the court held the trial court acted within its discretion under Rule 614 by excluding the complainant after the defendant discussed another witness’s testimony with her during a jail call, creating a concrete risk of tailored testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, Bermudez is a strong crossover case on three recurring themes: sequestration matters, speculative conflict claims usually fail, and cumulative omitted-witness testimony rarely justifies post-judgment relief. If a witness has been exposed to trial testimony through calls, texts, or hallway updates, the court has broad discretion to exclude that witness to protect the integrity of the proceeding. And if a party attacks counsel based on personal legal troubles, the attack must be tied to a specific adverse effect on representation—not just optics or suspicion."
Kelsey v. Rocha
COA13
In Kelsey v. Rocha, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a bill of review seeking to set aside an agreed divorce decree nearly four years after it became final. Kelsey argued the decree was procured through fraud and duress, mischaracterized his separate property as community property, awarded Rocha an unfair share of the estate, and was invalid because no marriage existed. The court applied Texas’s strict bill-of-review standard, requiring proof of a meritorious claim or defense, wrongful prevention from asserting it, and that the failure to assert it was unmixed with the petitioner’s own fault or negligence. The court emphasized that Kelsey had been served, participated in the divorce, and signed a notarized agreed decree containing recitals that he read and understood it and signed voluntarily without coercion or duress. His complaints largely attacked the substantive correctness of the property division—issues for direct appeal, not a late equitable attack—and he failed to show he was prevented from raising them earlier. Because he did not satisfy the elements for bill-of-review relief, the court held the trial court properly denied his petition and left the agreed divorce decree in place.
Litigation Takeaway
"Final agreed divorce decrees are extremely hard to unwind through a bill of review. If a party believes property was mischaracterized, the division was unjust, or the marriage itself is disputed, those issues must be raised and preserved in the original case or by direct post-judgment review. Strong decree recitals about voluntariness, understanding, and fairness can be powerful protection against later attacks."
In the Interest of L.W. & M.W., Children
COA12
The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed a modification order removing the mother from managing conservatorship and appointing the children’s maternal grandparents as joint managing conservators. The court held the evidence was sufficient to show a material and substantial change and that modification was in the children’s best interest where the mother’s home had become an unsafe, neglectful environment involving recurring parties, alcohol and drug use, sexual activity, criminal conduct, firearms incidents, and unstable overnight guests. Applying deferential abuse-of-discretion review, and implying findings in support of the judgment because no findings of fact were requested, the court concluded the evidence also rebutted the parental presumption by supporting a finding that the mother’s continued appointment would significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development. The court further upheld unusually severe restrictions on the mother’s possession and communication because the trial court expressly found those limits were necessary to protect the children.
Litigation Takeaway
"In nonparent modification cases, grandparents can overcome the parental presumption with a strong, fact-specific record showing a persistent pattern of neglectful or dangerous home conditions—not just that they offer a better home. For parents, repeated evidence of drugs, alcohol, criminal activity, unsafe guests, and instability around the children is extremely hard to overcome on appeal, especially without requested findings of fact. Build or attack the case at trial, because abuse-of-discretion review gives trial courts broad latitude to impose even very restrictive access orders when tied to child safety."
In the Interest of E.A.A., a Child
COA12
In *In the Interest of E.A.A., a Child*, the Twelfth Court of Appeals dismissed a child-related appeal after the pro se appellant failed to file the docketing statement required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. The court sent two notices and gave the appellant an opportunity to cure, but no docketing statement was filed by the final deadline. Applying Rule 42.3(c), the court held dismissal was proper because the appellant failed to comply with the appellate rules after notice. The court also emphasized that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as attorneys, so self-representation did not excuse the default.
Litigation Takeaway
"Family-law appeals can be lost before briefing begins if basic appellate filing requirements are ignored. Treat the docketing statement and other initial appellate filings as mandatory, monitor deficiency notices immediately, and do not assume a pro se party will receive procedural leniency."
Brooks v. Wycough
COA12
In Brooks v. Wycough, a rural property dispute returned to the Tyler Court of Appeals after the trial court struck Brooks’s affidavit as a sham and granted summary judgment against his remaining equitable claims. The appellate court held that the sham-affidavit doctrine applies only when a later affidavit clearly contradicts prior sworn testimony on a material point without adequate explanation. Because Wycough relied on alleged inconsistencies between Brooks’s affidavit and his pleadings—and especially superseded pleadings—the doctrine did not apply. The court emphasized that superseded pleadings are displaced by amended pleadings and that pleadings generally are not competent summary-judgment evidence. It therefore held the trial court erred in disregarding the affidavit as a sham on that basis and rejected expanding the doctrine beyond its evidentiary foundation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not try to strike an affidavit as a sham by comparing it to earlier pleadings. In Texas summary-judgment practice, you need a contradiction with prior sworn testimony, not just inconsistent advocacy in petitions. For family lawyers, this is especially useful in property and reimbursement disputes where theories evolve through amended pleadings."