Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In re Hoa Tran and Trang Tran
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that once defendants properly controverted a plaintiff’s medical-expense affidavit under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 18.001, they were entitled to nonparty discovery from the medical provider about how the charges were set and whether they were reasonable. The trial court had allowed only limited inquiry but barred broader topics concerning billing methodology, reimbursement history, referral relationships, and outsourced imaging arrangements. Relying on Texas’s broad discovery rules and cases such as In re North Cypress Medical Center Operating Co. and In re K&L Auto Crushers, LLC, the court concluded those topics were relevant to the live defense that the claimed medical expenses were unreasonable. Because the categorical restrictions prevented the defendants from developing that defense and could not be adequately remedied on appeal, the court found an abuse of discretion and granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the other side puts medical or treatment bills in issue, do not treat the invoice as untouchable. Once the charges are properly controverted, targeted discovery into the provider’s billing practices, reimbursement history, referral relationships, and third-party service arrangements may be available—and a blanket order blocking that discovery can justify mandamus."
In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile
COA13
In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed the notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still not enough to invoke jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within that grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension in the appellate court that reasonably explains the delay. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion or equivalent filing until after the grace period expired, the late explanation could not cure the defect, and the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law-related appeals, a late notice of appeal is not self-curing just because it lands within Rule 26.3’s grace period. If the notice is late, counsel must also file a Rule 26.3 extension motion in the appellate court within that same window, with a reasonable explanation. Do not wait for a clerk’s defect notice or assume a later response will save jurisdiction."
Perricone v. Perricone
COA11
In Perricone v. Perricone, the Eastland Court of Appeals addressed a contested Rule 145 statement of inability to afford court costs in litigation arising from divorce and custody-related disputes. After a defendant challenged the indigency filing, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found the declarant’s financial statement contained material misrepresentations and omissions, including unsupported claims of means-tested benefits, undisclosed assets, and inaccurate income and valuation information. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f), the court held that once a contest is filed, the burden shifts to the declarant to prove inability to pay by a preponderance of the evidence. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate court deferred to the trial court’s credibility findings and concluded the record supported denial of indigency status. The court also held that the challenger’s unsworn declaration was sufficient because it substantially complied with Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 132.001 despite minor technical defects.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 145 form is only the starting point. If the other side contests indigency, the party claiming inability to pay must back it up with credible, documented proof, and courts will closely examine omissions, inconsistencies, household support, and prior financial representations. For family-law litigators, Perricone is a roadmap both for attacking weak indigency claims and for preparing defensible ones."
In re Sandra Ramirez
COA08
In In re Sandra Ramirez, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by transferring venue from El Paso County to Kaufman County without a Rule 87-compliant setting, notice, and hearing. The movant argued the matter was effectively set during a status conference and heard by submission, but the mandamus record and certified register of actions showed no actual setting or hearing. Relying on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 87 and Henderson v. O’Neill, the court concluded unsupported attorney assertions could not establish compliance, rejected the argument that Ramirez failed to preserve error, and conditionally granted mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the transfer order.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the other side wants to transfer venue, they must create a clean Rule 87 record with an actual setting, proper notice, and a hearing or documented submission setting. In family-law cases, an informal status conference or off-record discussion is not enough, and a transfer order entered without those procedural safeguards is a strong candidate for immediate mandamus relief."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Fred Garland Henson and Tiffanie Karon Henson and in the Interest of C.R.H., a Child
COA12
In Henson v. Henson, the Tyler Court of Appeals addressed whether a divorce decree could both restrict a father’s possession and require him to complete a battering intervention program, parenting classes, and negative drug tests before he could later seek modification of that no-contact order. The court held that the trial court acted within its broad authority under Chapter 153 to impose a no-contact possession restriction based on evidence of methamphetamine use, family violence, and danger to the child. But it also held that Chapter 156 exclusively governs when a party may seek modification, so the trial court could not add extra-statutory preconditions to filing a future modification action. The improper filing barriers were ordered deleted from the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts can impose very strict current possession restrictions to protect a child, but they cannot block a parent’s statutory right to file a future modification suit by adding decree-based prerequisites. When drafting protective orders, tie treatment, testing, or classes to possession or reunification—not to courthouse access."
In re Bradley Welsh
COA02
In a child-support enforcement proceeding, the trial court orally found Bradley Welsh in contempt on April 8, 2026 and ordered him confined for sixty days, but did not sign the written contempt and commitment order until thirty-six days later. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that due process permits only a short and reasonable time between an oral contempt finding with confinement and the signed written order under Ex parte Calvillo Amaya. The court rejected arguments that later work-release discussions meant the contempt ruling was incomplete or that Welsh invited the delay, concluding the hearing had effectively ended and the postponement was caused by the court’s process. Because the delayed written order violated due process, the contempt and commitment order was void, and the court granted habeas relief and vacated the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas contempt practice, an oral confinement ruling is not enough. If a court orally finds contempt and orders jail time, the written contempt and commitment order must be prepared and signed almost immediately; otherwise the order may be void regardless of the underlying violation. Family-law lawyers should have proposed contempt orders ready at the hearing and, for respondents, should closely compare the oral ruling date to the signature date for a potential habeas challenge."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Caroline Brookshire and Trenton Brookshire and in the Interest of R.L.B., D.B.B. and H.A.B., Children
COA12
In this Texas family-law appeal arising from a contested divorce and SAPCR, the appellee argued the judgment should be affirmed because the appellate record was supposedly incomplete: although audio and video exhibits were admitted and included in the record, the court reporter did not identify the exact timestamps or clips played at trial. The Tyler Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and held that the incomplete-record presumption in Rule 34.6(c) applies only when an appellant elects to proceed on a partial reporter’s record. Because the appellant requested the complete reporter’s record and the admitted digital exhibits were actually included, the absence of clip-by-clip transcription or timestamp notation did not make the record incomplete. The court therefore rejected the appellee’s request for a presumption in favor of the judgment and allowed merits review to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want appellate review of digital evidence, request the full reporter’s record and make sure the admitted audio/video exhibits are included. Brookshire also teaches trial lawyers not to rely on the court reporter to identify clips—state timestamps and excerpts on the record whenever possible—but an appellee cannot turn that imprecision alone into an automatic affirmance under Rule 34.6(c)."
In re A.T.
COA04
In re A.T. involved a post-divorce enforcement action seeking criminal contempt for missed child-support and medical-support payments allegedly due in 2022. The enforcement motion and resulting contempt order were both based on a November 8, 2019 final divorce decree, but that decree had been set aside on February 21, 2020 and replaced the same day by an amended decree. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that criminal contempt requires disobedience of a valid, operative court order, so a vacated decree cannot serve as the basis for contempt. Because the relator was not restrained under the contempt order, mandamus—not habeas—was the proper remedy, and the court conditionally granted mandamus, holding the contempt order void.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing or defending any family-law enforcement action, confirm the exact operative order in effect on the date of the alleged violation. If contempt is based on a vacated or superseded decree, the contempt order is void, and defects in notice, service, and the required order to appear can create additional due-process problems."
In the Interest of A. A. S.
COA03
In a restricted appeal from a private termination suit, the Third Court of Appeals held that termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent had the ability to support the child during each month of the relevant twelve-month period. Although the grandmother proved the mother had been ordered to pay support and paid nothing, the court concluded that nonpayment and the existence of a prior support order do not establish actual ability to pay. Because the written termination order relied solely on subsection (F) and the record contained no evidence of the mother’s employment, income, assets, or other facts showing ability to support during the statutory period, the evidence was legally and factually insufficient. The court reversed the termination order and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you plead termination under § 161.001(b)(1)(F), arrearage evidence alone is not enough. You must build a month-by-month record showing the parent’s actual ability to support during the statutory period; if that proof is missing, subsection (F) is vulnerable on sufficiency review, including in a restricted appeal after a default prove-up."
Diaz-Perez v. State
COA04
In Diaz-Perez v. State, the defendant challenged his convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child by arguing, among other things, that the trial court improperly admitted the mother’s outcry testimony because the State’s Article 38.072 written summary allegedly did not specifically disclose penile penetration. The Fourth Court of Appeals did not need to definitively decide whether the summary was too imprecise because any error was nonconstitutional and harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). The court emphasized that the child later testified without objection to the same penetration detail, making the complained-of testimony cumulative and not outcome-determinative. The court also rejected ineffective-assistance claims tied to the failure to obtain a rebuttal expert because the appellate record did not show an available expert, proposed testimony, or resulting prejudice. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family-law cases, winning an evidentiary objection is not enough if the same fact comes in later through another witness or exhibit without objection. Preserve the issue across the full proof chain, because appellate courts are likely to treat notice or disclosure defects as harmless when the challenged allegation is later proved through cumulative evidence."