Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Bowles v. Bowles
COA04
In Bowles v. Bowles, the parties disputed whether Flea Away, LLC was community property because the LLC was formed during the marriage, or Simon Bowles’s separate property because it was merely the later legal form of a business he already owned before marriage. The Fourth Court of Appeals applied Texas Family Code sections 3.001 and 3.003, along with inception-of-title and tracing principles, and focused on whether the LLC was a new acquisition or simply a mutation of the preexisting sole proprietorship. Simon proved by clear and convincing evidence that the original Flea Away business had been awarded to him as his separate property in a prior California divorce, and the evidence showed continuity of the same enterprise after it began operating as an LLC. Because there was no admitted evidence of any transfer, conveyance, or issuance of ownership to Lilian, the court held the LLC remained Simon’s separate property and affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Forming an LLC during marriage does not automatically turn a separately owned business into community property. In a business-characterization fight, the winning strategy is to prove or disprove continuity: the spouse claiming separate property needs a clean tracing chain from the original asset to the new entity form, while the spouse challenging that claim must produce evidence of an actual transfer, capitalization, or new ownership event—not just testimony that the business changed or that the spouse worked in it."
Brennan Short v. Jamie Short
COA04
In Short v. Short, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that although a deed from one spouse to the other during marriage creates a presumption of gift, that presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence when the deed does not contain an express separate-property recital. Wife owned the Boerne home before marriage, later deeded Husband a one-half interest during a refinance intended to pay off other debt and lower monthly payments, and testified she did not intend a gift. Relying on In re J.Y.O., the court held parol evidence of her intent was admissible, found sufficient evidence that the transfer was a financing accommodation rather than a donative transfer, and affirmed the trial court’s characterization of the entire property as Wife’s separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
"An interspousal deed is powerful, but not always dispositive. In Texas property-characterization disputes, a spouse can defeat the gift presumption with clear and convincing evidence showing the transfer was made for refinancing or debt-service purposes rather than out of donative intent—especially when the deed lacks an express separate-property recital. Plead lack of donative intent and any fraud, duress, or mistake theories, and preserve objections if the other side tries unpleaded issues."
Flores v. Flores
COA04
In Flores v. Flores, a post-divorce appellant sought to proceed on appeal without paying costs under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. After the court reporter effectively contested his statement of inability to afford costs, the trial court held the required Rule 145(f) evidentiary hearing. Flores did not appear, and the trial court relied on evidence from the family-law record showing prior findings of net monthly income, business ownership, earning capacity, real-property interests, and an $80,000 vehicle purchase to find he could afford appellate costs. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that Rule 145(f) places the burden on the declarant to prove inability to afford costs, that a filed indigency statement alone is not enough once contested, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the contest and requiring payment of costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you claim you cannot afford appellate costs in a family-law case, you must prove it with admissible evidence at the Rule 145 hearing. Prior divorce findings about income, assets, business ownership, and spending can defeat an indigency claim, and failing to appear at the hearing is often fatal."
In the Interest of J.J. III and D.R.L.J., Children
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and he also challenged best interest. But he did not challenge the separate constructive-abandonment finding under subsection (N). The Fourth Court of Appeals applied the settled rule that one valid predicate ground under section 161.001(b)(1), coupled with a best-interest finding under section 161.001(b)(2), is enough to affirm termination. Because subsection (N) was an independent ground and was left unchallenged, the court treated it as established on appeal and affirmed the termination order without needing to decide the father’s attacks on subsections (D) and (E).
Litigation Takeaway
"In a termination appeal, you must challenge every independent predicate ground that can support the judgment. If even one statutory ground is left unchallenged, the court can affirm so long as the best-interest finding stands, making issue selection on appeal potentially case-dispositive."
In the Interest of E.C.O. and A.J.O., Children
COA05
In this family-law appeal, the appellant filed a Rule 145 statement claiming he could not afford appellate costs or bond, but the opposing party contested indigency. The Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court acted within its discretion in sustaining the contest because the appellant admitted he earned about $180,000 per year, had a monthly surplus after expenses, owned a vehicle of value, and failed to provide documentary proof showing he could not pay all or part of the costs or provide security despite a good-faith effort. The court also upheld the trial court’s detailed post-abatement findings, treated unobjected-to unsworn hearing statements as evidence, rejected any right to a second evidentiary hearing after abatement, found omission of Rule 145(f)(4) notice harmless, and held the installment-payment complaint was waived.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 145 has no automatic high-income bar, but indigency must be proven with evidence, not conclusions. In family-law appeals, lawyers should treat a Rule 145 contest like a mini-trial: develop proof of income, surplus, assets, and discretionary spending if contesting indigency, and if proving indigency, bring records showing why the client cannot pay even part of the costs or post security despite a genuine good-faith effort."
Hollman v. State
COA05
In Hollman v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether four photographs of a complainant’s injuries and damaged phone were properly authenticated when the witness could not recall the exact date they were taken. Applying Texas Rule of Evidence 901, the court held the State met its threshold burden because the complainant had personal knowledge, recognized the photos, testified she was present when they were taken, and said they fairly and accurately depicted the injuries and damage from the assault. The court rejected the argument that Rule 901 requires proof of a precise date or that the photos were taken exactly at or near the event, explaining that such uncertainty generally goes to weight rather than admissibility. The court affirmed admission of the photographs and modified the judgment to reflect the correct enhanced offense level.
Litigation Takeaway
"Exact-date recall is not required to authenticate a photograph. In family-law cases, a witness with personal knowledge who can testify a photo fairly and accurately depicts injuries, property damage, living conditions, or the aftermath of an incident will often satisfy Rule 901 even without a precise timestamp; if chronology matters, attack or defend the exhibit on linkage, weight, relevance, or alteration—not on a nonexistent exact-date requirement."
In re Paula Law
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a party seeking a pre-suit deposition under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 must do more than file a verified petition reciting the rule. Alliantgroup wanted to depose former employee Paula Law before filing suit to investigate possible non-compete, confidentiality, and trade-secret claims. The court scrutinized whether Alliantgroup had satisfied Rule 202.4(a)(2), which requires a finding that the likely benefit of the deposition outweighs its burden or expense. It concluded Alliantgroup neither pleaded specific, case-based facts explaining that balance nor proved those facts with competent evidence at the hearing. Because verified pleadings ordinarily are not evidence, and no testimony, admitted affidavits, stipulations, or other evidence supported the order, the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the Rule 202 order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 202 is an extraordinary pre-suit tool, not a shortcut to fish for claims. If you want a pre-suit deposition, you must plead specific facts showing why the deposition’s likely benefit outweighs its burden and back that up with actual evidence. If you are opposing Rule 202 in a family-law-adjacent dispute, attack both the pleadings and the proof—especially any attempt to rely on a verified petition alone."
In the Interest of A.O.K. and A.O.K., Children
COA05
In this divorce and SAPCR appeal, the father challenged the child-support provisions of an agreed final decree, arguing the trial court prevented him from presenting testimony and financial evidence and set support incorrectly. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that, even after notice and an opportunity to amend, his brief still failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 because it did not present coherent issues, meaningful legal analysis, preservation citations, record support, or reversible-harm analysis. The court also emphasized that, because no reporter’s record was requested, it had to presume the missing evidence supported the judgment and all necessary implied findings. With no reviewable appellate issues and an inadequate record, the court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"On appeal, even potentially sympathetic family-law complaints are lost if the brief is conclusory and the record is incomplete. Preserve error, order the reporter’s record, and tie each issue to specific rulings, record cites, governing law, and harm—or expect waiver and affirmance."
Tijerina v. State
COA12
In Tijerina v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld the admission of testimony from a second child victim under Article 38.37 in a continuous-sexual-abuse prosecution. The case turned largely on credibility because there was no physical evidence, eyewitness, or confession. The court held the trial judge could reasonably find that the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the separate acts against the other child, and that the testimony was highly probative because it showed a similar pattern of abuse in the household. Applying Rule 403, the court concluded the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial because it was similar in kind to the charged conduct, was not more inflammatory, and was important to help the jury evaluate credibility and pattern in a delayed-outcry case.
Litigation Takeaway
"When abuse allegations rise or fall on credibility, similar-act evidence involving another child or household member can be powerful if you build a tight record showing genuine similarity, need, and a proper non-character purpose. For family-law lawyers, Tijerina is a blueprint both for offering pattern-abuse evidence in custody or protective-order litigation and for opposing it by attacking similarity, reliability, remoteness, and cumulativeness rather than relying on a generic prejudice objection."
In re Phillip Snyder
COA12
In In re Phillip Snyder, the Tyler Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief from an order denying a special appearance in a child name-change case because the relator failed to provide a complete mandamus record. Snyder argued that, as an Ohio resident with no Texas contacts, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. But under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7(a), a relator must provide a properly authenticated record including all relevant hearing testimony and exhibits. Because Snyder filed only part of the special-appearance hearing transcript, the court could not determine what evidence or arguments the trial court considered and therefore could not assess whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion. The court denied mandamus without reaching the merits of the jurisdictional challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Family Code cases, mandamus may be the only immediate way to challenge a special-appearance ruling, so record preparation is everything. If the hearing included live testimony, exhibits, or relevant argument, file the full authenticated reporter’s record and all material documents—or expect the appellate court to deny relief without ever reaching the merits."