Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
In the Matter of J.T., a Juvenile
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile adjudication for sexual assault, rejecting a legal-sufficiency challenge focused solely on identity. The complainant testified that he fell asleep next to J.T. during a sleepover, awoke to the assault, and identified J.T. based on the sleeping arrangements, prior familiarity, and surrounding circumstances, even though he could not make a complete facial identification in the dark. Applying the criminal beyond-a-reasonable-doubt sufficiency standard used in juvenile cases, the court held that the trial court, as factfinder, could credit the complainant’s testimony, disbelieve J.T.’s denial, and find identity proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The adjudication and disposition were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A single credible witness can be enough. In abuse-driven family cases, trial courts may rely on one witness’s testimony—especially when it is specific, internally consistent, and supported by contextual facts like sleeping arrangements, familiarity, immediate confrontation, or behavioral changes—and appellate courts will rarely reweigh those credibility calls."
In the Interest of K.L.M., a Child
COA05
In this default SAPCR appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court exceeded the record in two respects. First, it reversed and rendered the child-surname change because Mother’s testimony—that the parents were unmarried and she wanted the child to bear her surname—did not establish the required good cause or show that the child’s substantial welfare and best interest required the change. Second, it reversed and remanded the retroactive child-support award because the record lacked sufficient evidence of Father’s net resources during the relevant period and the statutory factors required by Family Code sections 154.009 and 154.131. The court affirmed the remainder of the order, including the finding that Father had a history or pattern of family violence, concluding the evidence was sufficient on that issue.
Litigation Takeaway
"A default prove-up is not a shortcut around pleadings and proof. Even in uncontested SAPCRs, name changes and retroactive support require evidence tied to the governing statutes and factors; if the record is thin, the judgment is vulnerable on appeal. By contrast, targeted testimony that directly addresses the family-violence standard can be enough to sustain that finding."
In the Interest of K.R.N.S., a Child
COA14
In a privately filed SAPCR between two parents, the father appealed the final order and, construed liberally, argued that his retained trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena witnesses, respond to arguments, cite favorable authority, and better present the child’s best-interest case. The Fourteenth Court did not reach whether counsel performed deficiently because it treated the right-to-counsel question as dispositive. Relying on Family Code section 107.013 and cases such as In re D.T., the court explained that ineffective-assistance claims in Texas family cases are cognizable only when a constitutional or statutory right to counsel exists, such as in certain governmental Subtitle E proceedings. Because this was a private SAPCR, not a suit filed by a governmental entity, and the father identified no other source of a right to counsel, the court held his ineffective-assistance complaint was unavailable and affirmed the final SAPCR order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In private SAPCRs and other non-governmental family cases, appellate courts generally will not reverse based on complaints that a party’s own retained lawyer performed poorly. Unless a statute or the constitution creates a right to counsel, the proper appellate focus is trial-court error, preservation, sufficiency, or abuse of discretion—not ineffective assistance."
In the Interest of D.D.D.-H. a/k/a D.D.D.H., A.R.M., and O.N.H. a/k/a O.H., Children
COA01
The First Court of Appeals held that termination could not rest on former Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(O) because the Legislature repealed that predicate ground before the termination decree was signed and made the change applicable to pending cases. The court treated that as a statutory-validity issue rather than a sufficiency issue. Even so, it affirmed because legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under subsections (D) and (E), based on evidence of Mother’s physical abuse of one child, indifference to his welfare, unstable and unsafe living conditions, inability to meet basic needs, and ongoing mental-health and possible substance-abuse concerns. The court also held the same pattern of abuse, instability, and unmet needs was sufficient to support the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Check the statute in effect on the date judgment is signed, not just the date of pleading or trial. A repealed ground can invalidate part of a judgment, but reversal may still be avoided if another independently supported ground and the best-interest finding survive—especially in termination cases involving subsections (D) and (E), which carry lasting collateral consequences."
In re Costco Wholesale Corporation
COA14
In In re Costco Wholesale Corporation, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by granting Rule 202 pre-suit discovery based only on a verified petition and attorney declarations. The petitioner sought broad deposition and document discovery before filing a personal-injury suit, arguing she needed the information to identify additional parties and avoid delay from a possible federal removal. The court emphasized that Rule 202 requires proof, not pleading, and that verified pleadings are not competent evidence. Because no admissible evidence was offered at the hearing, and because the petitioner failed to prove either that the discovery would prevent a failure or delay of justice or that its likely benefit outweighed its burden, the Rule 202 order could not stand. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 202 is not a shortcut to merits discovery. If you want pre-suit discovery, you must present competent evidence from a witness with personal knowledge and prove a real Rule 202 necessity; if you are opposing it, attack the lack of evidence, the availability of ordinary post-filing discovery, and any speculative claim of urgency."
In re Lisa Marie Clontz
COA01
In In re Lisa Marie Clontz, the relator sought mandamus to force the family-law trial court to rule on a motion to transfer venue and a motion to reinstate. The First Court of Appeals held that filing motions with the clerk was not enough to prove the trial court had a ministerial duty to rule at that point. Applying settled mandamus law, the court distinguished between filing and presentment and required record proof that the motions were actually brought to the judge’s attention, that a ruling was requested, and that the court failed or refused to act within a reasonable time. Because the mandamus record showed only file-stamped motions and did not show presentment, a hearing or submission setting, or a filed demand for ruling, the court denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you may need mandamus based on a trial court’s failure to rule, do more than file the motion—create a record showing presentment, judicial awareness, and a clear request for a ruling. In family-law cases, preservation of the paper trail can determine whether appellate relief is available, regardless of the motion’s merits."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Brendan Potyondy and Meredith Potyondy and in the Interest of D.P., C.P., and B.P., Children
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision voiding the parties’ premarital agreement in their divorce. The trial court had found the agreement unconscionable based on the circumstances of signing—two days before the wedding, no separate counsel for the wife, and a perceived “double recovery” because the husband’s premarital assets were no longer traceable. The appellate court held that those reasons did not satisfy Texas Family Code section 4.006, emphasized that unconscionability in this context must be analyzed under the statute rather than general equitable concerns, and noted the absence of any finding that the wife signed involuntarily. Because the agreement’s equalization payment was part of the bargain the parties made, not an improper double recovery, the court reversed the property division and remanded for entry of a division consistent with the premarital agreement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts cannot set aside a premarital agreement just because it seems unfair in hindsight or because the signing circumstances look imperfect. To defeat enforcement, the resisting spouse must prove a statutory ground under Family Code section 4.006 and obtain findings that match that theory. For trial lawyers, this case is a strong reminder to build the record around voluntariness and statutory disclosure issues—not generalized fairness, tracing complaints, or lack-of-counsel themes standing alone."
Coleman v. State
COA05
In Coleman v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old murder defendant for adult prosecution under Family Code § 54.02. The appellant argued the transfer was improper because the investigation was not “full” and the written transfer order did not spell out every factor-specific finding or item of evidence. The court applied a two-step review: first testing the transfer findings for legal and factual sufficiency, then reviewing the ultimate waiver decision for abuse of discretion. It held that § 54.02 requires a full investigation, probable-cause finding, and specific reasons for waiver, but does not require an exhaustive recitation of every evidentiary detail or every statutory factor. Because the record included the ordered psychological, diagnostic, and social evaluations, testimony about the juvenile’s background and risk factors, and evidence supporting probable cause and community-welfare concerns, the findings were sufficient and the transfer order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, Coleman is a strong appellate-record case: when a statute requires findings or reasons, the trial court must be specific enough to satisfy the statute, but it does not have to write an encyclopedic order summarizing every exhibit, witness, or factor. On appeal, broad complaints that the court did not investigate enough or did not say enough usually fail unless tied to a true statutory prerequisite, a preserved objection, and a materially deficient record."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Craige Kevin Howlett and Corrine Howlett
COA07
In this Texas divorce appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the trial court could not support three $250,000 compensatory awards to the wife for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud on the community, and fraudulent inducement merely by pointing to the husband’s serious misconduct, including hidden accounts, altered bank statements, and unexplained transfers. The appellate court explained that damages must track the character of the property injured: if the alleged harm was to the wife’s separate estate, the record had to show a distinct separate-property injury; if the harm was to the community estate, the remedy had to proceed under Family Code section 7.009(b) through a reconstituted-estate and just-and-right division analysis. Because the findings did not tie each award to a specific legally recognized injury, did not show how the amounts were calculated, and did not determine the value of the community estate absent the fraud, the court reversed the compensatory awards, rendered that the wife take nothing on separate-estate claims, and remanded for further proceedings on any community-estate injury. The exemplary-damages award remained undisturbed because it was not challenged on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"In fraud-heavy divorce cases, proof of concealment or dissipation is not enough by itself. Lawyers must identify whether the alleged injury is to a spouse personally, to separate property, or to the community estate, then prove the correct remedy with tracing and valuation evidence. If the claim is really fraud on the community, the court needs findings showing the reconstituted estate and the math under Family Code section 7.009(b), not just a large round-number damages award."
In the Interest of E.A., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of E.A., a Child, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a bill of review seeking to set aside a default divorce decree. The former wife argued she was never served, which would excuse her from proving the usual bill-of-review elements, but the court held the record did not conclusively prove nonservice. The court relied on the substituted-service order and return, her admission that she lived at the service address, and contemporaneous evidence suggesting she knew about the divorce papers. Because nonservice was not established, she had to satisfy the traditional bill-of-review requirements, including showing that the judgment remained in place due to official mistake and without any fault or negligence on her part. The court held the failure to obtain a signed written order granting new trial within plenary power did not justify relief on this record, especially where counsel did not secure the signature and no direct appeal was pursued.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to overturn a default family-law judgment years later, a bare claim of nonservice is not enough when the service record and surrounding evidence point the other way. And if a judge orally grants a new trial, do not assume that saves the case—a written signed order must be entered before plenary power expires, or the original judgment stands."