Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
Aliza Groups, Inc. v. Roshan K. Noorani
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment declaring void a deed that purported to transfer a married couple’s community homestead because the named grantor, Karim Noorani, did not sign it and the son who signed Karim’s name had no authority to do so. The court applied Texas law that a forged deed is void, not voidable, and passes no title. Roshan Noorani’s summary-judgment evidence directly established that Karim never signed the deed and that neither spouse authorized the son to execute any deed or lien on the property. The buyer’s agency and equity arguments failed because they did not create a genuine fact issue on authorization, and its appellate authority theory was not preserved because it did not match the theory raised in the trial court. The court therefore affirmed the order quieting title in Roshan’s favor.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-property litigation, especially homestead disputes, an unauthorized signature on a deed can be attacked as a void forgery, and vague claims that a child or other family member had “authority” will not defeat summary judgment without competent evidence of actual authorization. Lock down the record early on who signed, who authorized, and whether the property was community homestead property."
In re O.L.M., a Child
COA01
In In re O.L.M., a Child, the mother tried to directly appeal temporary orders entered in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship. The First Court of Appeals treated the issue as purely jurisdictional and explained that Texas appellate courts may review interlocutory orders only when a statute expressly permits it. Relying on Texas Family Code section 105.001(e), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014, and prior cases, the court held that temporary SAPCR modification orders are not subject to interlocutory appeal. Because the mother used a notice of appeal instead of the proper potential vehicle of mandamus, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume an urgent temporary custody or SAPCR modification order can be appealed immediately. In Texas, temporary modification orders are generally not directly appealable, so lawyers should analyze appellate jurisdiction first, preserve a mandamus-ready record, and move quickly on mandamus if immediate review is truly necessary."
Michael Solomon and Andria Roque-Solomon v. The Law Office of Keith M. Harris and Keith M. Harris
COA14
In this Texas appeal, former clients sued their prior lawyers for legal malpractice, but at trial the court excluded all causation and damages evidence under Rule 193.6 after a dispute over whether initial disclosures had actually been served. The exclusion swept too far: it barred the plaintiffs’ own testimony and a timely designated expert, then led directly to a directed verdict and take-nothing judgment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held Rule 193.6 does not permit exclusion of a named party’s testimony and does not justify a blanket evidentiary wipeout that effectively disposes of the case. Because the order functioned as a death-penalty sanction, the trial court was required to consider lesser sanctions, such as a continuance, before imposing it. The failure to do so was an abuse of discretion, so the judgment was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 193.6 is a disclosure-enforcement tool, not a shortcut to end a case. If an exclusion request would knock out a party’s own testimony or otherwise leave the other side unable to present the merits, the court must treat it like a case-dispositive sanction and consider lesser remedies first."
Chappell v. State
COA01
In Chappell v. State, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a life-sentence conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child after rejecting claims of ineffective assistance and evidentiary error. The case centered on a child’s disclosure of sexual abuse to her mother, followed by testimony from the mother, stepfather, and the child about the disclosure, surrounding circumstances, and the child’s later behavioral changes. The court applied the usual Strickland framework to the ineffective-assistance claim and held the record did not overcome the presumption that counsel acted reasonably or show prejudice. On the evidentiary issues, the court emphasized preservation principles, concluding there was no preserved, harmful error in admitting the challenged disclosure-related testimony. The opinion’s practical significance is its reminder that when child outcry and related statements are involved, appellate success depends on specific, timely objections and a clear record identifying the hearsay theory and purpose of the evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven custody, SAPCR, protective-order, and termination litigation, the fight is usually won or lost through precise evidentiary objections and a clean appellate record. Don’t rely on broad hearsay complaints—identify each statement, each hearsay layer, and the exact basis for admissibility or exclusion, because preservation failures can sink both trial objections and later appellate attacks."
Jason Murray Davis and Davis & Santos, P.C. v. Graham Weston; Carowest Land Ltd.; Graham Weston as Trustee of Countyline Land Trust; and Kuehler Road, LLC f/k/a Kuehler Road, Ltd.
COA03
In this divorce-related crossover dispute, the Austin Court of Appeals held that former clients’ claims against their longtime lawyer and his firm for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud by nondisclosure could proceed despite a TCPA motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs alleged the lawyer had represented Graham Weston, related family entities, and other family interests over many years, then switched sides and represented Graham’s wife in the divorce while using trust and confidential information gained from those prior relationships. The court analyzed the case as a substantive conflict-and-loyalty dispute rather than merely an attack on protected petitioning or litigation conduct. Relying on the record, including prior disqualification findings that described the lawyer as effectively a family attorney with fiduciary duties to Graham, the court concluded the suit was not subject to TCPA dismissal on the record presented and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In entity-heavy divorces, a lawyer’s prior work for one spouse, family businesses, trusts, or the broader family enterprise can create fiduciary-duty exposure that survives early dismissal. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a strong record on the practical scope of prior representation and frame conflict claims as loyalty, confidentiality, and nondisclosure violations—not just complaints about litigation activity."
In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B.
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed a Brazos County order terminating a father’s parental rights after appointed counsel filed an Anders brief. The court independently reviewed the full record, including the father’s pro se response, and held the appeal was wholly frivolous. In addressing the required endangerment grounds under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), the court relied on severe evidence that father physically abused another child in the home, that the children at issue were exposed to that dangerous environment, that father minimized the abuse as discipline, failed to accept responsibility, failed to show meaningful therapeutic progress, and had no recommendation for reunification despite technical service completion. The court also held that appointed counsel in a termination appeal may not withdraw solely because counsel filed an Anders brief; absent additional good cause, counsel must continue representation through any petition-for-review stage.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and other child-safety cases, courts focus on actual danger and whether the parent truly changed—not just whether services were completed. Abuse of one child, denial or minimization, and failure to benefit from therapy can support findings that other children remain at risk. For appointed appellate counsel, an Anders brief does not automatically end the representation."
Raymond Matthew Thibault v. The State of Texas
COA01
In this criminal appeal, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for indecency with a child by contact and upheld the admission of extraneous-act evidence that the defendant sought or took breast photographs of women, including a prior incident involving another thirteen-year-old girl. The court held the evidence was admissible for noncharacter purposes under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), especially to show intent and to rebut any claim that the touching or photographing was accidental or mistaken. The court also concluded under Rule 403 that the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, particularly given the similarity of the prior conduct and the limiting instruction. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Prior sexualized conduct may be admissible when it is tied to a specific disputed issue like intent, grooming, or absence of accident—not just bad character. In family-law cases, lawyers should frame or attack this kind of evidence with precision under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403, because those rulings can heavily affect custody, possession, and protective-order outcomes."
In re Tracy Hoots
COA12
In In re Tracy Hoots, a pro se relator sought mandamus relief in a family-law dispute, alleging her children were removed without lawful process and that the trial judge had a conflict of interest. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the petition failed to comply with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7: it included no certified or sworn copy of any challenged order, no adequate mandamus record, and identified no specific trial-court ruling or refusal to act that could be reviewed. Applying the rule that mandamus requires a sufficient record showing a clear abuse of discretion, and that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as lawyers, the court held the relator failed to establish entitlement to extraordinary relief and denied the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus is won or lost on the record. In family-law cases, even serious complaints about child removal, due process, or judicial bias will fail unless the petition identifies a specific reviewable trial-court action and includes a Rule 52 appendix and mandamus record with certified or sworn materials supporting every factual assertion."
Paul O’Brien v. Tiffanie O’Brien
COA03
In a divorce appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code section 109.001 does not limit a trial court to only the precise temporary relief it granted within 60 days after the notice of appeal. Because the trial court had timely entered a valid temporary order pending appeal, it retained continuing jurisdiction under sections 109.001(b-3) and (b-4) to later modify that order after notice and hearing if circumstances had materially and substantially changed and the modification was equitable and necessary for the child’s safety and welfare. The court rejected the husband’s argument that any new relief requested after the 60-day window was jurisdictionally barred, distinguishing Morris v. Veilleux as a case where no timely temporary order had existed to modify. The court abated the appeal so the trial court could consider the requested modification under the correct legal standard.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you get a timely temporary order pending appeal, the trial court’s power is not frozen in place after 60 days. Lawyers should focus less on a blanket jurisdiction objection and more on building or attacking the statutory modification record: changed circumstances, equity, and a clear child-welfare connection."
Nunez v. Nichols
COA03
In Nunez v. Nichols, the Austin Court of Appeals considered whether sufficient evidence supported an order requiring a father to pay ongoing and retroactive support for his adult disabled daughter under Texas Family Code section 154.302, plus health-insurance and unreimbursed medical-expense obligations. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because it showed the daughter’s serious physical and psychiatric conditions began before age eighteen, continued into adulthood, and left her requiring substantial care and personal supervision while not capable of self-support. The father’s evidence of limited independence, including travel and a restricted driver’s license, went to weight rather than negating the statutory elements, and his expert did not provide a vocational basis to establish employability. The court therefore affirmed the support and medical-support portions of the order, but reversed and remanded the $25,468.46 attorney’s-fee award because the record lacked the detailed proof of hours, rates, and value of services required to support that amount.
Litigation Takeaway
"For adult disabled-child support cases, courts want functional proof, not just diagnoses: build a timeline showing pre-majority onset, current inability to be self-supporting, and the need for substantial day-to-day supervision. For opponents, isolated signs of independence are usually not enough without developed evidence of actual self-sufficiency. And regardless of who wins on the merits, an attorney’s-fee award can still be undone on appeal if counsel does not present disciplined lodestar-style proof."