Opinion Library

Termination of Parental Rights

In the Interest of I.S.

COA09

In *In the Interest of I.S.*, the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed a jury-tried termination order after concluding Father waived his appellate sufficiency complaints by failing to preserve them in the trial court. The case arose after the Department sought termination following evidence that the parties’ infant suffered multiple serious injuries, including a femur fracture and liver injury, that medical providers considered suspicious for abuse and inconsistent with the parents’ explanations. On appeal, Father challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting predicate grounds under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N), as well as best interest, but the court held that in a civil jury trial those complaints had to be preserved through recognized procedural steps such as a directed-verdict motion, charge objection, JNOV, motion to disregard, or motion for new trial. Because Father did not take the required steps, the court did not reach the merits of his sufficiency complaints. The court also rejected Mother’s issues, affirming termination, holding that the Department’s appointment as managing conservator stood once termination was affirmed, and concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for mistrial.

Litigation Takeaway

"In any Texas family case tried to a jury, even a strong appellate sufficiency argument is worthless if counsel does not preserve it. Legal-sufficiency complaints require the right trial-court vehicle, and factual-sufficiency complaints in a jury case generally require a motion for new trial. Treat jury-charge objections and post-verdict motions as essential trial work, not appellate clean-up."

Brys v. Cobb

COA01

In Brys v. Cobb, the First Court of Appeals held that when a properly authenticated California judgment was filed in Texas under the UEFJA on July 21, 2023, it immediately became a Texas judgment. The judgment debtor waited more than a year to file a motion for new trial and later asked the Texas court to declare the foreign judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court did not reach the underlying jurisdictional challenge to the California judgment because the dispositive issue was timing: under Chapter 35 and Texas Rules 306a and 329b, any attack on a domesticated foreign judgment must be brought through the same procedures and within the same deadlines that apply to Texas judgments. Because the trial court’s plenary power expired 30 days after domestication and no timely post-judgment motion was filed, the later orders granting a new trial and declaring the judgment void were themselves void. The court vacated those post-deadline orders and left the domesticated California judgment fully enforceable in Texas.

Litigation Takeaway

"Treat the UEFJA filing date like the signing date of a Texas final judgment. If you want to attack a domesticated foreign judgment, move immediately—waiting can forfeit even a personal-jurisdiction or voidness challenge. If you represent the creditor, a proper UEFJA filing can quickly become a powerful enforcement and settlement tool once the deadline passes."

In the Interest of M.H.E., a Child

COA02

In a pending SAPCR, Mother tried to appeal a trial court order requiring mediation and dispute resolution. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order was appealable under Texas jurisdictional rules, explaining that direct appeals generally lie only from final judgments or from interlocutory orders made appealable by statute. Because the mediation order did not dispose of all parties and claims, the SAPCR remained pending, and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal from this type of case-management order, the court held it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

Litigation Takeaway

"Don’t assume an unfavorable family-law procedure order can be appealed right away. Mediation and other case-management orders are usually not appealable unless they are part of a final judgment or a statute expressly allows interlocutory review; if immediate relief is necessary, mandamus—not direct appeal—is often the proper vehicle."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Michael Colbert v. State of Texas

COA12

In Colbert v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld an assault/family-violence conviction even though the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution. The defendant argued on appeal that trying the case the day after he elected to represent himself violated Article 1.051(e) and due process, but the court held that complaint was not preserved because he did not object, request a continuance, or otherwise raise the issue in the trial court; in fact, he stated he was ready to proceed. On the merits, the court applied the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, concluding that the complainant’s 911 statements, her similar statements to the responding officer, and the defendant’s own admission that he may have hit her with the television were sufficient to support the finding of bodily injury despite her later recantation.

Litigation Takeaway

"Recantation does not erase family-violence evidence, and preservation matters. In family-law cases, judges may credit contemporaneous 911 calls, officer testimony, and party admissions over a later walk-back, so lawyers should gather and present that evidence early. And if notice or due-process problems arise in a rushed hearing, counsel must object, request specific relief, and make a record immediately or the complaint may be lost on appeal."

In re Cristina Gallegos Ortega

COA13

In this original proceeding, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a Hidalgo County trial court improperly used temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to order a child returned from Texas to Mexico. The father alleged the child had always lived in Mexico, that Mexican custody proceedings were already pending, and that concerns existed about the child’s tourist-visa status, school enrollment, the mother’s immigration status, and criminal allegations tied to the child’s removal from Mexico. The appellate court concluded those facts did not show abandonment, mistreatment, abuse, or an immediate threat to the child as required by Texas Family Code § 152.204. Because emergency jurisdiction cannot be used as a substitute for home-state jurisdiction or to accomplish a merits-based transfer of possession, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its emergency order and writ of attachment.

Litigation Takeaway

"UCCJEA emergency jurisdiction is narrow and requires evidence of a real, immediate danger to the child—not wrongful removal allegations, immigration concerns, or a desire to return the child to the home-state forum. In cross-border custody cases, Texas courts cannot use § 152.204 as a shortcut to decide possession when another country is the child’s home state and no actual emergency is proven."

Evidence

Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas

COA10

In this criminal crossover opinion with clear family-law implications, the Waco Court of Appeals held that Sanchez waived his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial complaint because he never made an unambiguous speedy-trial demand and never obtained an adverse ruling. His priority-setting request, ready announcements, court appearances, and rejection of a plea offer were not enough, especially where the record also showed defense-acquiesced and defense-caused delays. The court also upheld admission of an examining physician’s testimony and report recounting a child’s statements translated from Spanish by an advocacy-center employee, concluding the trial court properly treated the translator as a language conduit after developing a reliability record under Saavedra, and any confrontation complaint failed because the child testified and was cross-examined at trial. The conviction was affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"If delay matters, preserve it precisely: file a clear motion for prompt trial or hearing, state the prejudice, object to resets, and get a ruling. And when child statements come through a translator, admissibility will often turn on whether the proponent builds a record showing the interpreter was neutral, qualified, and functioning only as a language conduit."

In re Anabel Lopez Perez

COA03

In In re Anabel Lopez Perez, the relator sought mandamus relief in the Third Court of Appeals to force an Austin County Court at Law judge to execute or clarify a QDRO arising from a divorce. The court did not reach the merits of the QDRO dispute. Instead, it analyzed Texas Government Code sections 22.221 and 22.201(d) and held that its ordinary mandamus power extends only to trial judges within its appellate district, and Austin County is not in the Third Court’s district. The relator also failed to show that mandamus was necessary to protect or enforce the Third Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The petition was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Litigation Takeaway

"Before filing mandamus in any post-divorce property case, especially a QDRO or decree-clarification dispute, confirm that the respondent judge sits within the appellate court’s territorial district. A strong merits argument cannot overcome filing in the wrong court, and family-law subject matter does not create mandamus jurisdiction."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

K.C. v. D.R.

COA02

In K.C. v. D.R., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a protective order entered against a father’s romantic partner after the child’s mother alleged threatening conduct, including an encounter involving a ski mask and baseball bat during a custody-related dispute. The court rejected the respondent’s argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or misapplied Family Code Chapter 71, explaining that Section 71.0021 can cover violence or threats directed at a person because of that person’s dating relationship with a shared third party; the applicant and respondent do not have to have dated each other. The court also rejected complaints about due process, evidentiary rulings, defensive theories, and overbreadth because they were inadequately preserved, inadequately briefed, or unsupported by accurate authority and record citations. The court ultimately held that the protective order was properly issued and emphasized that pro se litigants must comply with the same appellate briefing and preservation rules as attorneys.

Litigation Takeaway

"Chapter 71 protective orders can reach threats by a parent’s current partner against the other parent even when those two people never dated each other, so long as the conduct fits the statute’s third-party dating-violence language. For litigators, the bigger lesson is procedural: preserve every complaint, tie it to the record and the statute, and brief it accurately—Texas appellate courts will not rescue unsupported or sloppy arguments, even from pro se parties."

Evidence

Harolyn Graves-Johnson v. The State of Texas

COA14

In this aggravated-assault family-violence appeal, the defendant argued the trial court wrongly excluded handwritten letters and prison messages allegedly sent by the complainant that she wanted to use to impeach him and to show the nature of their relationship under article 38.371. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion because the defense did not properly authenticate the communications and did not satisfy Texas Rule of Evidence 613 by confronting the complainant with the specific statements before offering the writings as extrinsic impeachment evidence. The court also explained that article 38.371 does not override ordinary evidentiary requirements, so unauthenticated and unsupported relationship evidence may still be excluded.

Litigation Takeaway

"Texts, jail messages, emails, and letters can be powerful family-violence evidence, but only if counsel lays the foundation. Authenticate the communication, connect it to the witness, give context, and if using it for impeachment, confront the witness with the exact statement first. Article 38.371 and broad “relationship evidence” arguments will not rescue sloppy predicate work."

Evidence

Vera v. State

COA03

In Vera v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed exclusion of a defense psychologist’s proposed testimony that stress-induced “fight-or-flight” physiology and alcohol effects reduced the defendant’s culpable mental state during a fatal bar fight. The court held the expert was qualified, but her opinions were too general and did not meaningfully connect the science to whether Vera intentionally or knowingly stabbed the victims; the testimony also risked confusing the jury by effectively smuggling voluntary-intoxication evidence in as a defense. The court further held that Vera was not entitled to a sudden-passion instruction because the escalating confrontation and intervening events did not amount to adequate cause that would render an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases involving family violence, child abuse, or coercive conduct, expert testimony about trauma, dysregulation, or “fight-or-flight” must be tightly tied to a specific legal issue and the party-specific facts. Generalized psychology that merely reframes intentional conduct as reactive can be excluded as unhelpful, confusing, or an improper excuse narrative."