Opinion Library

Evidence

Lowell Williams v. The State of Texas

COA13

In Williams v. State, the defendant challenged the admission of underwear and related DNA testing in a sexual-assault prosecution involving his stepdaughter, arguing the State failed to properly authenticate the clothing and establish an adequate chain of custody. The court held that Texas Rule of Evidence 901 sets only a low, prima facie threshold: the complainant’s testimony identifying the clothing she pulled out for police, supported by body-camera footage and the surrounding collection-and-testing evidence, was sufficient to support a finding that the items were what the State claimed. Because there was no affirmative evidence of tampering, substitution, or alteration, any gaps in handling went to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibility. The court therefore affirmed the trial court’s admission of the clothing and DNA evidence.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas family litigation, a witness with personal knowledge can often authenticate physical evidence without a perfect chain of custody. If you can identify the item and tell a coherent story connecting it to collection or testing, Rule 901 is usually satisfied; absent real evidence of tampering, chain-of-custody complaints generally attack weight, not admissibility."

In the Interest of E.B.J., J.B.J., B.B., and C.B.J., Children

COA14

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s rights to all four children and Father’s rights to the three girls, holding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence of a deliberate pattern of severe physical abuse of Brian, including multiple hand fractures in different stages of healing, corroborated by medical testimony, school observations, child disclosures, and Charlotte’s testimony describing ongoing abuse and concealment. As to Father, the court held that subsection (E) was also satisfied because evidence showed he knew of Mother’s abuse and failed to protect the children. The court further held that abuse directed at one child can support endangerment findings as to siblings, and that the Department did not need to prove a material and substantial change in circumstances as an element of its termination claim in this post-2023 proceeding. Because subsection (E) and best interest were supported, the court did not reach the remaining predicate grounds.

Litigation Takeaway

"Endangerment cases are built on patterns, not isolated incidents: severe abuse of one child, combined with the other parent’s failure to intervene, can justify termination and strongly influence conservatorship disputes involving all siblings. For litigators, the case shows the value of tying together medical proof, child statements, witness observations, therapy evidence, and parental denial to prove a continuing safety threat."

Evidence

Stockton v. State

COA13

In Stockton v. State, the court considered whether statements a domestic-violence complainant made to a responding officer and later to a paramedic, both captured on body-camera video, were barred by the Confrontation Clause after the complainant became unavailable at trial. Applying Crawford, Davis, Bryant, and Texas authority, the court focused on the objective primary purpose of the exchanges. It concluded the officer’s initial questions were asked during an unfolding domestic-disturbance response when the scene was not yet secure and the officer did not know who was involved, whether the suspect remained nearby, or whether weapons or additional danger existed. It likewise concluded the paramedic’s questions were aimed at assessing possible strangulation injuries and addressing immediate medical and safety concerns. Because both exchanges were primarily emergency-response and medical-assessment interactions rather than formal evidence-gathering for prosecution, the statements were non-testimonial, and the trial court properly admitted the videos.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, early body-cam, 911, and EMS statements can carry major evidentiary weight even if the complainant later recants, disappears, or refuses to testify. The key fight is often whether the statements were made during an ongoing emergency and for safety or medical purposes, which strengthens admissibility and persuasive value in custody, protective-order, and divorce litigation."

Child Custody

Adrian Ross Bey v. Virginia Pond

COA14

In a bill-of-review proceeding, a father sought to set aside a prior SAPCR judgment. The mother obtained dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, and the Office of the Attorney General separately succeeded in quashing the father’s subpoena. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Rule 91a is categorically unavailable in suits brought under the Texas Family Code, and that this bar extends to a bill of review attacking a SAPCR judgment because the proceeding’s purpose was to undo and retry a Family Code case. The court also rejected the argument that the dismissal could be affirmed under the trial court’s inherent authority, noting the father was not given a proper opportunity to present the prima facie merits of his bill of review. The court reversed the Rule 91a dismissal and remanded, but affirmed the order quashing the subpoena.

Litigation Takeaway

"Do not use Rule 91a as a dismissal shortcut in Family Code litigation—even in a procedurally separate bill of review. If the case arises under the Family Code, counsel must use authorized tools such as special exceptions, summary judgment where proper, jurisdictional challenges, or a merits hearing, and should preserve error if a court tries to dispose of the case under Rule 91a anyway."

In the Interest of S.K. and A.K., Children

COA02

In this parental-rights termination appeal, the mother did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence but instead argued that the jury charge improperly defined “endanger” and that her appointed counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge drug-test evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the jury-charge complaint was waived because no objection was made in the trial court, and longstanding Texas Supreme Court precedent forecloses any due-process exception to ordinary preservation rules in termination cases. The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim because the criminal forensic licensing and accreditation statutes the mother relied on apply only in criminal cases, so counsel was not deficient for failing to make a meritless objection. The court affirmed the termination order.

Litigation Takeaway

"Termination cases do not get a free pass on error preservation. If you want to complain about the jury charge on appeal, you must object clearly and on the record in the trial court. And ineffective-assistance arguments will fail if the omitted objection had no valid legal basis—especially when counsel tries to import criminal evidentiary rules into a civil family-law case."

Appeal and Mandamus

In re Rachel Michelle Atherton

COA09

In this original proceeding arising from a divorce, the parties’ marital residence was sold under temporary orders and the net proceeds were deposited into the court’s registry. Rachel Atherton argued the residence was the parties’ homestead and asked the trial court to either release enough proceeds for her to buy a replacement home before the six-month exemption period in Texas Property Code section 41.001(c) expired, or toll the exemption while the funds remained unavailable in the registry. The Beaumont Court of Appeals relied chiefly on London v. London and the protective purpose of section 41.001(c) to hold that when homestead-sale proceeds are unavailable because they are held in the court registry, the six-month exemption may be equitably tolled. Because no party showed a valid lien against the homestead proceeds and the trial court’s failure to rule threatened forfeiture of the exemption solely through delay, the court held the trial court abused its discretion. Mandamus was conditionally granted, directing the trial court to timely rule on the motion or preserve the exempt status of the proceeds while in the registry and for six months after delivery.

Litigation Takeaway

"If divorce-related homestead sale proceeds are sitting in the court registry, do not let the six-month exemption deadline pass without action. Ask early for either release of funds or an order tolling the exemption, and if the trial court’s inaction threatens loss of homestead protection, mandamus may be the right remedy."

In the Interest of A.A., a Child

COA01

In *In re A.A.*, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a termination order based on endangerment grounds after the Department removed an infant following a domestic-violence incident and concerns about the mother’s mental-health stability. The court held the evidence was legally sufficient to support predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and also legally sufficient on best interest. But applying the clear-and-convincing factual-sufficiency standard, the court concluded the Department relied too heavily on the mother’s past conduct and not enough on the full record showing current improvement: completed services, resumed medication, negative drug tests, recent housing and employment stability, substantial visitation, and a bond with the child. Because that disputed evidence was too significant to permit a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Litigation Takeaway

"Past endangerment and a strong foster placement do not automatically prove termination is in a child’s best interest. In close child-related cases, lawyers must build a record that addresses present circumstances—service completion, stability, compliance, bonding, and why those facts do or do not reduce risk—because factual-sufficiency review can undo a ruling that rests mainly on historical misconduct."

Property Division

In the Matter of the Marriage of Latricia Mundorf and Dillon Dan Mundorf

COA13

In Mundorf v. Mundorf, the court of appeals considered whether a divorce decree improperly awarded one spouse’s separate property to the other as part of the community estate. The husband proved, and the wife conceded on appeal, that several horses and one tract acquired before marriage were his separate property. Applying the community-property presumption, the clear-and-convincing standard for rebuttal, and Eggemeyer’s rule against divestiture of separate property, the court held the trial court had no authority to award those proven separate-property horses to Wife, making reversal automatic as a matter of law. The court declined to recharacterize other disputed assets where Husband’s briefing lacked record citations or developed analysis, upheld the finding that the 570 FM 1358 property was community based on conflicting evidence, and upheld the characterization of DM High Roller as Wife’s separate property based on tracing testimony and admissions. Because the decree divested Husband of proven separate property, the court reversed and remanded the overall property division.

Litigation Takeaway

"Characterization wins or loses property cases in Texas divorce. If you can clearly trace an asset as separate property, the court cannot award it to the other spouse, and divestiture will usually require reversal without a harm analysis. But separate-property claims must be proved and briefed asset by asset with precise record citations, because weak tracing and undeveloped briefing will leave the community presumption intact."

Appeal and Mandamus

In re Aaron Nicholas Thomas

COA09

After a trial court entered a default protective order, it granted the respondent’s motion for new trial during its plenary-power period based on alleged defective service and lack of notice. The relator sought mandamus, arguing among other things that he did not receive notice of the new-trial hearing. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held mandamus was unavailable because this was a nonjury new-trial order entered while the trial court still had plenary power, so the relator had an adequate appellate remedy: he could seek reconsideration and reinstatement in the trial court and, if necessary, challenge the ruling on appeal from a final order. The court also concluded the complained-of notice problem did not create the extraordinary circumstances needed for mandamus relief, and the order was not void.

Litigation Takeaway

"If a family-court judge sets aside a default order in a bench proceeding while plenary power is still open, do not assume mandamus is the answer. First build your record in the trial court, move for reconsideration, and preserve any service or notice complaints for a later appeal; absent a void order or truly exceptional harm, appellate courts will expect you to use those ordinary remedies."

In the Interest of E.B.J., J.B.J., B.B., and C.B.J., Children

COA14

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). The record showed Mother engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children through severe and escalating abuse of Brian, corroborated by medical testimony, school observations, and the children’s statements. As to Father, the court held that knowing exposure to Mother’s abuse and failure to protect the children likewise supported an endangerment finding. The court also relied on trauma evidence, the parents’ shifting explanations and denials, and the children’s safety and permanency needs to uphold best interest. Because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough, the court did not need to reach the other predicate grounds or the parents’ argument that the Department had to prove a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Litigation Takeaway

"Endangerment cases are won or lost on pattern, corroboration, and parental insight. A documented course of abuse, failure to protect, inconsistent explanations, and refusal to acknowledge responsibility can support termination—and in non-termination SAPCR cases, the same proof can justify major restrictions on conservatorship and possession."