Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Fusilier v. State of Texas ex rel. Galloway
COA04
Joshua Fusilier appealed a civil protective order issued in favor of Valencia Galloway, arguing that his subsequent acquittal in a related criminal case necessitated the order's dissolution and that the evidence against him was insufficient. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the order, explaining that civil protective orders and criminal trials operate under different legal standards—"preponderance of the evidence" versus "beyond a reasonable doubt." The court held that a complainant's credible testimony regarding a physical struggle is legally sufficient to support a finding of family violence, and a "not guilty" verdict in criminal court does not invalidate a civil court's finding that violence was likely to occur.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, a criminal acquittal does not automatically overturn a civil protective order. Because the 'burden of proof' is lower in civil proceedings, a family court can still maintain a protective order even if the state fails to secure a criminal conviction for the same conduct."
Robert Garrison Cheshire v. The State of Texas
COA12
In a consolidated appeal from child–sexual-assault convictions, Cheshire argued the evidence was legally insufficient because both complainants had made inconsistent statements and there was recantation-related evidence in treatment notes and to third parties, and he also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and reversible error from denial of a continuance. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and deferring to the jury on credibility conflicts, the Twelfth Court of Appeals held a rational jury could find the elements of aggravated sexual assault of a child beyond a reasonable doubt based on the complainants’ detailed disclosures in protocol-based forensic interviews, their in-court testimony, corroborative context including a journal discovered during treatment, and testimony explaining delayed disclosure/recantation dynamics. The court further held Cheshire failed to meet Strickland because the record did not demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice, and it found no reversible error in the continuance ruling because he did not make a concrete, record-supported showing of specific harm from the denial. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Recantation and inconsistent statements rarely end the inquiry—when a case includes a structured forensic interview, detail-rich outcry evidence, corroborating context (e.g., journals/treatment disclosures), and testimony explaining delayed disclosure or recantation, courts typically treat contradictions as jury credibility issues. In family-law SAPCR/protective-order strategy, build (or attack) the “credibility mosaic”: protective parties should preserve forensic-interview and corroboration evidence and explain recantation dynamics; accused parties must go beyond impeachment and develop affirmative proof of contamination, motive, or methodological flaws, and make a detailed record for any continuance request."
Paredes v. State
COA08
In a prosecution for indecency with a child, the defendant challenged the admission of an unindicted extraneous sexual offense involving the same complainant. The defendant argued the evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. The El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed the evidence under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.37, which permits propensity evidence in specific child-sex cases, and the Gigliobianco factors for Rule 403 balancing. The court found the evidence was highly probative of intent and propensity and that the State had a significant "need" for the evidence because the defense's strategy centered on attacking the victim's credibility. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, as its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In cases involving family violence or sexual misconduct where credibility is the central issue, "pattern" evidence of other bad acts is often admissible to rebut claims of fabrication. To win the Rule 403 balancing test, practitioners should emphasize the factual similarities, temporal proximity, and the heightened "need" for such evidence when the opposing party's theme is that the victim is lying or coached."
Gary D. Pickens v. City of Greenville, Texas
COA05
In Pickens v. City of Greenville, a plaintiff filed a mandamus action under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA) after a city failed to respond to multiple record requests. After the suit was filed, the parties entered into a Rule 11 settlement agreement where the City 'voluntarily' produced the records. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiff's request for mandatory attorney's fees and dismissed the case as moot. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that to 'substantially prevail' under Texas Government Code § 552.323(a), a plaintiff must obtain judicially sanctioned relief—such as a court order or judgment—that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties. Because the production was secured via a contract (Rule 11) rather than a judicial mandate, the plaintiff did not meet the prevailing party standard.
Litigation Takeaway
"To recover attorney's fees in a Public Information Act mandamus action, do not accept a 'voluntary' production via a Rule 11 agreement. You must secure a signed court order or an agreed final judgment that explicitly compels the production of documents to ensure your client qualifies as a 'prevailing party.'"
Jay Morgan v. The State of Texas
COA03
Jay Morgan appealed his conviction for indecency with a child, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing. Morgan’s motion was based on a post-trial affidavit from his ex-fiancée, who claimed she had recanted her incriminating statements to investigators before the trial but was told she did not need to testify. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether the affidavit established "reasonable grounds" for relief, concluding it was too conclusory and failed to demonstrate why the evidence could not have been presented at trial with reasonable diligence. The court also held that the complainant’s testimony was legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict, affirming the conviction with a minor clerical modification.
Litigation Takeaway
"A post-trial "recantation" affidavit is not an automatic ticket to a new hearing; to reopen a case or set aside an order, the moving party must show the new evidence is specific, material, and could not have been discovered earlier through reasonable diligence."
Simon Rico, Jr. v. State
COA06
In Simon Rico, Jr. v. State, an appellant who was initially declared indigent and provided with court-appointed counsel substituted his representation for a private, retained attorney. When the retained attorney determined the appeal was frivolous, he attempted to follow the Anders v. California protocol by filing an Anders brief. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed whether these constitutional safeguards apply to non-indigent parties, concluding that the purpose of Anders is to provide indigent appellants with advocacy equal to those who can afford counsel. The court held that the substitution of retained counsel rebuts the presumption of continued indigency, meaning the attorney is not required to file an Anders brief and must instead follow the standard withdrawal procedures under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.5.
Litigation Takeaway
"In parental termination appeals, the rigorous Anders briefing requirement disappears the moment a party retains private counsel; hiring an attorney rebuts the presumption of indigency and shifts the procedural burden for withdrawing from a meritless appeal to the standard requirements of TRAP 6.5."
In the Interest of K.B., a Child
COA12
In the Interest of K.B., the Twelfth Court of Appeals reviewed the termination of parental rights where the parents challenged the sufficiency of evidence for endangerment and the admission of hearsay statements from the child’s siblings. The court analyzed the 'excited utterance' exception, determining that the siblings' visible distress—including crying and fearful demeanor—was a sufficient foundation for admitting their statements regarding the parents' intoxication. Furthermore, the court found that driving while intoxicated with a child in the vehicle, combined with neglectful physical conditions, provided legally and factually sufficient evidence of endangerment under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1). The court held that the termination was in the child's best interest and affirmed the trial court's decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Simply 'checking the boxes' of a service plan is insufficient for parents to avoid termination if they fail to acknowledge the underlying issues, such as substance abuse; additionally, visible physical manifestations of a child's stress can provide the necessary predicate to admit hearsay under the excited utterance exception."
Benavidez v. State
COA04
In Benavidez v. State, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault and appealed his sentence on the grounds that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify by stating he 'couldn’t even take that stand' to take responsibility. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed the issue under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and the precedent set in Cockrell v. State, which requires a timely objection to preserve error for appellate review. The court held that because the defense failed to object during the closing argument, the complaint was forfeited. Furthermore, the court reaffirmed that Texas no longer recognizes an 'incurable argument' exception, meaning even egregious constitutional violations in jury arguments are waived without a contemporaneous objection.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on the 'incurable' nature of an opponent’s error to save you on appeal; if you do not object to an improper comment during closing arguments—such as a parent’s 'failure to take responsibility' or choice to remain silent—you waive that error entirely. To fully protect the record, you must object timely, request an instruction to disregard, and move for a mistrial."
Calvin Dorsey Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA12
After a trial commenced, it became apparent that a juror lacked sufficient English proficiency to understand the proceedings. The defendant moved for a mistrial, but the trial court denied the motion because the issue was not raised during jury selection. The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed, analyzing the distinction between absolute disqualifications and waivable challenges for cause. The court held that a juror's inability to comprehend English is a waivable challenge that must be exercised during voir dire; failure to do so precludes a mistrial or a later challenge to the jury's composition.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely solely on a juror's self-certification of English proficiency on their questionnaire; you must actively vet their comprehension through open-ended questions during voir dire or risk waiving any future objection to their fitness to serve."
Shamsa v. Reagan
COA05
In Shamsa v. Reagan, a homeowner who acquired her property via a divorce decree sued her neighbor for adverse possession over a disputed boundary strip. The neighbor argued the homeowner lacked standing because the divorce decree contained a scrivener's error in the legal description of her own lot. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed constitutional standing, concluding that the right to assert title via adverse possession depends on the claimant's actual appropriation of the disputed land, not the perfection of the record title to their adjacent property. The court held that Reagan had standing and title to the strip, but reversed the award of attorney’s fees because Texas law does not provide a statutory basis for fees in adverse possession suits.
Litigation Takeaway
"Clerical errors in a divorce decree's property description do not automatically strip a party of the right to sue third parties for land ownership; however, clients should be prepared to bear their own legal costs in adverse possession cases as attorney's fees are generally not recoverable."