Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Pesca Holding LLC v. Skoldeberg
COA04
In Pesca Holding LLC v. Skoldeberg, a jury trial was held regarding alleged fraud in a business sale. Although the defendants prevailed on the liability claims, they failed to include a question about attorney’s fees in the jury charge. The trial court, believing an informal agreement to bifurcate the issues existed, later convened a second jury trial specifically for fees. On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals analyzed whether a party waives attorney's fees by failing to submit them to the initial factfinder. The court held that because attorney’s fees are questions of fact for the jury, they are waived unless the record contains a clear and unambiguous bifurcation agreement, such as a written Rule 11 agreement. Finding no such agreement in the record, the court reversed the $800,000 fee award and rendered a take-nothing judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on an informal or "handshake" agreement to handle attorney’s fees after a jury trial; if the fee question isn't in the jury charge and you don't have a signed Rule 11 agreement to bifurcate, you waive your right to fees the moment the jury is discharged."
Justin Eugene Howard v. The State of Texas
COA06
In Howard v. State, the Sixth Court of Appeals addressed the requirement for jury unanimity when the State proves multiple distinct criminal acts to support a single charged count. The defendant was convicted of three counts of child sex offenses, but argued on appeal that the jury charge failed to require the jurors to agree on which specific incident formed the basis of the conviction for two of those counts. The court affirmed Count I because the evidence described only one discrete act for that timeframe, making a general unanimity instruction sufficient. However, it reversed Counts II and III, holding that the State's reliance on a 'course of conduct' narrative without a specific-unanimity instruction created a risk of a non-unanimous 'patchwork' verdict, which constituted egregious harm under the Almanza standard.
Litigation Takeaway
"In cases involving 'multiple acts over time'—common in protective orders and SAPCR proceedings—litigators must force the opposing party to identify specific, discrete incidents rather than relying on a generalized course of conduct. Failure to demand this specificity allows a factfinder to reach a 'composite' finding based on different incidents, whereas requiring incident-level clarity creates a stronger record for appeal and prevents relief based on vague, aggregated allegations."
In re Mark Warner
COA05
Relator Mark Warner filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a trial court's order for sanctions and turnover. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition on two procedural grounds without reaching the merits. First, the court found the relator failed to provide a properly 'sworn or certified' record because his unsworn declaration lacked the specific 'penalty of perjury' language required by Texas law. Second, the court held that because the relator was represented by counsel in the trial court, he was not permitted to file a pro se petition, as Texas law prohibits 'hybrid representation.'
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural precision is non-negotiable in mandamus proceedings. To avoid summary denial, ensure every document in the record is authenticated with a declaration specifically invoking the 'penalty of perjury' and remember that a represented party cannot 'go rogue' by filing pro se motions or petitions while still appearing through counsel."
Joseph Christopher Cole v. The State of Texas
COA12
In Joseph Christopher Cole v. The State of Texas, the Twelfth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court can assess court-appointed attorney’s fees against a defendant who had previously been found indigent. The court analyzed Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 26.04(p), which establishes a legal presumption that a party found indigent remains so for the remainder of the proceedings unless a "material change" in financial circumstances occurs. Because the record lacked any affirmative evidence that the defendant’s financial status had improved, the court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order reimbursement. Consequently, the appellate court modified the trial court's judgment to delete the assessment of attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"The "once indigent, always indigent" presumption is a powerful shield; if you seek to recover court-appointed fees or ad litem costs from a party previously declared indigent, you must proactively build an evidentiary record demonstrating a "material change" in their financial resources before the final judgment is entered."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Njipwo
COA07
In a Williamson County divorce case, the husband insisted that Cameroon law govern the property division. When the trial court rejected this, the husband explicitly requested on the record to discharge his attorney and signed a handwritten withdrawal order to proceed pro se. The trial court subsequently divided the marital estate based on unsworn property spreadsheets and attorney statements. On appeal, the husband challenged both the withdrawal of his counsel and the evidentiary basis of the property division. The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the decree, holding that the "invited error" doctrine precluded the husband from complaining about a withdrawal he specifically requested. Additionally, the court found that the husband waived any objection to unsworn evidence by failing to object at trial and proceeding on an agreed factual basis.
Litigation Takeaway
"Be cautious when making mid-trial demands; once you explicitly request a procedural change—such as discharging your lawyer—or fail to object to the use of unsworn property summaries, the "invited error" and waiver doctrines may permanently bar you from challenging those issues on appeal."
In re Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.
COA05
In a commercial vehicle accident case, the employer (Old Dominion) challenged a discovery order requiring the production of personnel records for two of the driver's supervisors. Old Dominion argued that because it had stipulated to respondeat superior liability (vicarious liability) and sought bifurcation, the records were irrelevant to the remaining issues. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the request under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3, finding that because the plaintiff also pleaded direct corporate negligence and gross negligence, the documents—specifically training records, evaluations, and job descriptions—were relevant to proving the company's 'conscious indifference.' The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the order was narrowly tailored, included privacy protections, and sought information relevant to institutional culpability that a vicarious liability stipulation does not resolve.
Litigation Takeaway
"A party's stipulation to one form of liability does not serve as a 'discovery kill switch' for evidence related to other pleaded theories. Narrowly tailored discovery into supervisor training, performance, and knowledge remains discoverable to prove 'conscious indifference' or direct corporate misconduct, even when vicarious liability is conceded."
In re Brandon Charles Cole
COA05
Relator Brandon Charles Cole filed a petition for writ of mandamus after the trial court denied his motions to recuse in two related cases. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the petition on both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, the court found the Relator failed to provide a sworn or certified record of the trial court proceedings as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7. Substantively, the court applied Texas Supreme Court precedent holding that a denial of a motion to recuse does not satisfy the 'no adequate remedy by appeal' requirement for mandamus relief. The court held that because the recusal issue can be raised on appeal following a final judgment, mandamus intervention is unavailable, and the petition was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot use a mandamus petition to immediately overturn a judge's refusal to recuse themselves; instead, you must proceed to trial and reserve the issue for a standard appeal after the final decree. Furthermore, any attempt at mandamus requires a strictly certified or sworn record—procedural errors alone are sufficient for the appellate court to dismiss your petition."
Nemarugommula v. VHS San Antonio Partners, LLC
COA04
Dr. Vishal Nemarugommula sought a temporary injunction to prevent Baptist Medical Center from reporting his disciplinary suspension to the Texas Medical Board and the National Practitioner Data Bank, claiming the peer-review process was a 'sham' and reporting would cause irreparable reputational and financial harm. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed the requirements for injunctive relief, specifically whether the physician demonstrated a probable right to recovery and irreparable injury. The court held that because an independent fair-hearing panel substantiated the underlying misconduct (unauthorized medical record access), the physician failed to show a probable right to relief, and the hospital's mandatory reporting duties outweighed the physician's claim of reputational damage.
Litigation Takeaway
"In litigation involving high-asset professionals, 'reputational harm' is rarely sufficient to enjoin mandatory reporting of disciplinary actions to licensing boards; courts will prioritize statutory transparency over a litigant's attempt to 'sanitize' their record during a divorce or custody battle."
In re Brandon Charles Cole
COA05
In this original proceeding, Relator Brandon Charles Cole challenged the trial court's denial of his motions to recuse via a petition for writ of mandamus. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition, focusing on two primary issues: procedural non-compliance and the availability of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court found that Cole failed to provide a sworn or certified record as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7. Substantively, the court held that under Texas Supreme Court precedent, the erroneous denial of a recusal motion does not satisfy the requirements for mandamus relief because the issue can be fully addressed through a direct appeal following a final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas civil and family law litigation, mandamus is generally unavailable to challenge a trial court's refusal to recuse. Practitioners must focus on meticulously perfecting the appellate record and preserving the bias issue for a post-judgment appeal rather than seeking mid-stream intervention."
Ralston v. Ralston
COA07
Two family members, James and Anthony Ralston, were involved in a dispute over the ownership and possession of a residence. After a district court issued a partial summary judgment quieting title in Anthony’s favor and voiding James’s claims, Anthony initiated a forcible detainer (eviction) action in the county court at law. James argued that the county court lacked jurisdiction because the title dispute was still 'active' since the district court's judgment was only partial and not yet final. The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the eviction, holding that once a district court adjudicates title—even through an interlocutory or partial summary judgment—the jurisdictional bar for forcible detainer actions is removed. The court also held that a notice to vacate is not required to be signed to be valid under Texas Property Code § 24.005.
Litigation Takeaway
"In intra-family property disputes, you do not need a final, appealable judgment to begin eviction proceedings; an interlocutory or partial summary judgment from a district court quieting title is sufficient to establish jurisdiction for a forcible detainer action in a lower court."