Opinion Library

Evidence

Travarius Leon Dent v. The State of Texas

COA13

In Dent, the court affirmed admission of the father’s prior injury-to-a-child deferred-adjudication evidence after he testified that he was a strict but not physically abusive parent and suggested the child fabricated sexual-abuse allegations in retaliation for discipline. The court held that this testimony opened the door by creating a false impression about his parenting and made the prior child-injury evidence relevant for non-propensity purposes: rebutting that impression and undermining his retaliation/fabrication defense. The court also held that the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403, because the State had a real need for rebuttal evidence tailored to the defense theme, and the limiting instruction properly restricted the jury’s use of the evidence without commenting on the weight of the evidence.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases, a parent who claims to be merely “strict” and blames allegations on retaliation or coaching may open the door to prior abuse evidence. Frame the evidence as rebuttal of a false parenting narrative and fabrication defense—not just bad-character proof—and seek a careful limiting instruction."

In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B.

COA10

The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights after an independent Anders review found no nonfrivolous appellate issues. The court nevertheless specifically analyzed Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) under In re N.G., relying on evidence of severe abuse in the home, the father’s failure to accept responsibility, unresolved safety concerns despite service completion, and the absence of any therapeutic support for reunification. The court also held that appointed counsel in a parental-rights appeal may not withdraw merely because an Anders brief was filed; under In re P.M., counsel must show independent good cause to withdraw.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas termination appeals, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) will get specific appellate review even in an Anders case, so trial counsel must build a record on abuse, exposure, accountability, and actual remediation—not just service completion. Appointed appellate counsel should also expect to remain on the case through any petition-for-review stage unless they can show good cause beyond filing an Anders brief."

Property Division

Aliza Groups, Inc. v. Roshan K. Noorani

COA02

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment declaring void a deed that purported to transfer a married couple’s community homestead because the named grantor, Karim Noorani, did not sign it and the son who signed Karim’s name had no authority to do so. The court applied Texas law that a forged deed is void, not voidable, and passes no title. Roshan Noorani’s summary-judgment evidence directly established that Karim never signed the deed and that neither spouse authorized the son to execute any deed or lien on the property. The buyer’s agency and equity arguments failed because they did not create a genuine fact issue on authorization, and its appellate authority theory was not preserved because it did not match the theory raised in the trial court. The court therefore affirmed the order quieting title in Roshan’s favor.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-property litigation, especially homestead disputes, an unauthorized signature on a deed can be attacked as a void forgery, and vague claims that a child or other family member had “authority” will not defeat summary judgment without competent evidence of actual authorization. Lock down the record early on who signed, who authorized, and whether the property was community homestead property."

Modifying the Parenting Plan

Khandria v. Al-Muslim

COA14

In Khandria v. Al-Muslim, the father sought to modify a prior SAPCR/divorce decree that gave him no specific possession or access, arguing the original decree effectively gave the mother unchecked control and that circumstances had materially changed because she was now somewhat open to reunification. The Fourteenth Court first held that this argument was an improper collateral attack on the original decree: any defect in the decree was non-jurisdictional, making the decree at most voidable and subject to direct appeal, not later repair through modification. On the merits, the court held the evidence did not require findings of a material and substantial change or present best interest under Family Code section 156.101. The mother’s testimony showed only cautious, therapy-based openness while continuing to express concerns about the child’s loss of trust, and the father’s reluctance to commit to therapeutic recommendations undercut his request for immediate access. The court also affirmed denial of the father’s request to reduce child support because the record showed assets and earning capacity despite his claimed setbacks.

Litigation Takeaway

"A modification case is not a do-over for errors in the original decree. If the real complaint is that the prior order was legally defective, that issue usually must be raised by direct appeal. And in access-modification cases, vague evidence that a parent’s attitude has softened is not enough—lawyers need concrete proof of post-decree change and a child-centered reunification plan, especially when the relationship has been fractured for years."

In the Interest of C.F., a Child

COA11

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights, concluding legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence that the parents used methamphetamine while caring for the infant, the child himself tested positive for methamphetamine, there were domestic-violence concerns, the home environment was unstable and unsafe, and the father later violated community supervision, was incarcerated, failed to complete services, and offered only a speculative post-release plan. Applying the Holley best-interest framework and sufficiency standards, the court held the trial court could reasonably infer ongoing danger and lack of stability from the father’s past and present conduct.

Litigation Takeaway

"Courts give heavy weight to concrete evidence of child endangerment—especially drug exposure, domestic violence, criminal instability, unsafe housing, and failure to complete services—and they may use past conduct to predict future risk. In any custody or termination case, promises of future improvement usually will not overcome a documented record of recent instability unless backed by credible, verifiable proof of rehabilitation, housing, employment, and safety."

Appeal and Mandamus

Brys v. Cobb

COA01

In Brys v. Cobb, the First Court of Appeals held that when a properly authenticated California judgment was filed in Texas under the UEFJA on July 21, 2023, it immediately became a Texas judgment. The judgment debtor waited more than a year to file a motion for new trial and later asked the Texas court to declare the foreign judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court did not reach the underlying jurisdictional challenge to the California judgment because the dispositive issue was timing: under Chapter 35 and Texas Rules 306a and 329b, any attack on a domesticated foreign judgment must be brought through the same procedures and within the same deadlines that apply to Texas judgments. Because the trial court’s plenary power expired 30 days after domestication and no timely post-judgment motion was filed, the later orders granting a new trial and declaring the judgment void were themselves void. The court vacated those post-deadline orders and left the domesticated California judgment fully enforceable in Texas.

Litigation Takeaway

"Treat the UEFJA filing date like the signing date of a Texas final judgment. If you want to attack a domesticated foreign judgment, move immediately—waiting can forfeit even a personal-jurisdiction or voidness challenge. If you represent the creditor, a proper UEFJA filing can quickly become a powerful enforcement and settlement tool once the deadline passes."

In the Interest of E.T., E.T., E.T., and E.D., Children

COA11

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s rights to four children and the father’s rights to one child, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support best-interest findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court analyzed the Holley best-interest factors through the parents’ history of endangering conduct, emphasizing that the mother’s partial service-plan compliance did not outweigh a failed monitored return and cocaine-positive tests for both her and one child, and that the father’s federal drug conviction and incarceration supported findings of continuing instability and inability to parent. Giving deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the court held the trial judge could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas best-interest litigation, partial compliance with services is not enough if the larger record shows relapse, criminal conduct, poor judgment, or instability. A failed monitored return, positive drug tests during reunification, and incarceration for serious drug offenses can outweigh favorable evidence and are powerful predictors of future risk."

In the Interest of A.M., a Child

COA06

The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to A.M. after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support Father’s predicate grounds under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (N) and the best-interest findings as to both parents. The court analyzed Father’s repeated incarcerations, criminal conduct, long-term absence, and inability to provide a stable home holistically rather than in isolation, holding that this pattern constituted endangering conduct and constructive abandonment. It also held that A.M.’s history of instability, trauma, failed placements, both parents’ continued incarceration, and evidence that she was moving toward acceptance of adoption supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in her best interest.

Litigation Takeaway

"In termination and other family-law cases, incarceration rarely stands alone—the winning record ties repeated criminal conduct and absence to a larger pattern of instability, lack of caregiving, and the child’s need for permanence. Trial lawyers should build a child-specific chronology showing how parental unavailability affected this child, because appellate courts will review endangerment holistically and defer heavily to credibility-based best-interest findings."

Appeal and Mandamus

In re G.M.

COA02

In this mandamus proceeding, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code Section 156.102 is triggered by the date a modification petition is filed, not the date the hearing occurs. Father filed within one year of the prior order and sought to change the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence, so he was required to file a sufficient supporting affidavit. After the trial court found the affidavit insufficient, Section 156.102(c) required it to deny the requested relief and refuse to proceed. By nevertheless conducting an evidentiary hearing and entering temporary orders, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.

Litigation Takeaway

"If you seek to change primary residence within one year of the last order, the affidavit requirement is a hard gatekeeper. The key date is the filing date, and once a court finds the affidavit insufficient, it cannot simply go forward with a hearing anyway. For movants, draft a fact-specific affidavit that tracks the statute; for respondents, press for an early ruling and preserve error if the court proceeds despite an insufficiency finding."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Lartigue v. Farias

COA01

In Lartigue v. Farias, the First Court of Appeals held that a civil stalking claim under Chapter 85 was not subject to dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The dispute arose after Lartigue, in the context of separate unauthorized-practice litigation, sent repeated emails and placed repeated calls to attorney Farias that included abusive language, threats, and statements implying an in-person confrontation. Lartigue argued the communications were protected because they related to pending litigation and thus involved free speech and petitioning. The court rejected that framing and focused on the gravamen of the live claim: threatening, harassing, repeated conduct that allegedly caused fear and disrupted Farias’s work. Because the stalking claim was based on alleged intimidation rather than protected speech or petitioning activity, the TCPA did not apply at step one, so the court affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss without reaching prima facie proof or defenses.

Litigation Takeaway

"Not every communication connected to a lawsuit is TCPA-protected. When the real target of the claim is repeated threats, harassment, stalking, or intimidation, courts may stop the TCPA analysis at step one. In family-law cases, that makes pleading and framing critical: emphasize the coercive conduct, unwanted contacts, escalation, and safety impact—not just the fact that the parties were already in litigation."