Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
Griffith v. Barrett
COA14
In Griffith v. Barrett, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a temporary injunction was void because the order did not set the case for trial on the merits as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. The injunction stated only that it would remain in effect until final judgment or further order, which the court found was not a substitute for an affirmative merits trial setting. Applying the strict-compliance rule from InterFirst Bank and Qwest, the court treated the omission as a facial defect that rendered the injunction void, reversed the order, dissolved the injunction, and remanded without reaching other issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want temporary injunctive relief in a family-law-adjacent case, draft the order like a real Rule 683 injunction. An order that says it lasts until final judgment is not enough; the injunction itself must set the case for trial on the merits. For the responding party, this is a strong procedural attack point that can dissolve an overbroad injunction before litigating the underlying facts."
Hutton v. Alfrido
COA14
In Hutton v. Alfrido, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from a final protective order for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was filed too late. Although the appellant filed a timely post-judgment motion that functioned like a motion for new trial and extended the deadline to 90 days after the order was signed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a), the notice of appeal still had to be filed by February 3, 2026, or within the additional 15-day Verburgt grace period by February 18, 2026. Filing on February 27 was outside both deadlines. The court also rejected the appellant’s apparent attempt to rely on a later denial of a motion to set aside or reconsider the protective order, explaining that such a denial is not independently appealable and does not create a new appellate deadline. And because the record showed only a docket-sheet notation—not a signed order—there was no appealable later order in any event. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, calendar appellate deadlines from the original final order, not from a later ruling on a motion to reconsider or set aside. A post-judgment motion may extend the deadline, but it does not restart it indefinitely, and docket-sheet entries are not appealable orders. If there is any doubt, get a signed order, calculate the Rule 26.1 and Verburgt deadlines immediately, and file the notice of appeal early."
Patrick Adam Ortiz v. The State of Texas
COA08
The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed Patrick Adam Ortiz’s convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child and two indecency-with-a-child counts. The defense argued the child complainant was not credible because she delayed reporting, previously did not disclose abuse to CPS, had some inconsistencies, and her mother allegedly wanted to use the allegations in a custody dispute. The court held those points went to weight and credibility for the jury, not legal sufficiency. Applying ordinary sufficiency and preservation rules, the court concluded the complainant’s detailed testimony alone was enough to prove repeated qualifying acts over the required period, and it rejected the remaining complaints about judicial comments, charge and indictment defects, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance, and double jeopardy.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, “this was raised for custody leverage” is not a silver bullet. Courts may still credit abuse allegations when the record shows repeated access, a detailed disclosure history, explainable delay, and contextual corroboration. Lawyers should build or attack these cases through chronology, access, prior statements, and corroborating circumstances—not motive rhetoric alone."
In re Malik Adonis Dartell Conyers
COA05
In this original proceeding arising from a child-return dispute, the relator asked the Dallas Court of Appeals to prohibit enforcement of a trial court’s return order and to stay related proceedings. The court did not reach the merits. Instead, it held the petition failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52 because it lacked the required certification and was supported largely by documents that were neither sworn nor certified, leaving an insufficient record for extraordinary relief. The court also denied the emergency motion as moot after denying the petition and struck the filings for including unredacted sensitive data in violation of Rule 9.9.
Litigation Takeaway
"Emergency appellate relief in family-law cases can be lost on procedure alone. If a writ petition is missing the Rule 52 certification, relies on unauthenticated attachments, or includes unredacted sensitive information, the court may deny or strike the filing without ever considering the underlying custody or child-return issue."
In re Brittany Hilbert
COA05
In this original proceeding arising from a conservatorship-related case, the relator asked the Dallas Court of Appeals to vacate a final order, attorney’s-fee award, and interim conservatorship or possession rulings based on parental-presumption and best-interest complaints. The court did not reach those merits because the mandamus filing was procedurally defective: the appendix and record were not supported by properly certified or sworn copies as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7, the challenged final order and relevant hearing transcript were missing, and the petition disclosed unredacted sensitive data in violation of Rule 9.9. Applying Walker v. Packer and Dallas mandamus-record precedent, the court held that the relator failed to provide a sufficient record to establish entitlement to mandamus relief and struck the filing for the confidentiality violation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus relief can be lost before the court ever considers the merits. In family-law emergency appellate practice, lawyers must file a complete, properly authenticated mandamus record, include the exact order and any necessary reporter’s record, and scrub all sensitive information under Rule 9.9. Even serious conservatorship complaints will fail if the filing is procedurally noncompliant."
Travis v. Vanderbilt
COA03
In Travis v. Vanderbilt, the parties resolved a divorce and related protective-order dispute through a statutorily compliant mediated settlement agreement that incorporated an agreed protective order lasting for the parties’ lifetimes. After signing the MSA and the protective order as to both form and substance, and waiving post-order relief and appeal, the respondent later argued the lifetime term was improper because the order contained no family-violence finding and should have defaulted to a two-year duration. The Third Court treated the issue as one of consent and waiver, not statutory construction. Relying on the binding effect of Family Code section 6.602 MSAs and the rule that a party generally cannot attack an agreed judgment absent a jurisdictional defect or vitiated consent, the court held that any complaint about the protective order’s duration was waived. The court affirmed denial of the motion to reconsider and left the lifetime agreed protective order in place.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your client signs a divorce-related MSA and agreed protective order as to both form and substance, especially with an express waiver of post-order relief and appeal, do not expect to undo negotiated terms later by recasting them as statutory defects. In family-law settlements, protective-order duration, findings, and collateral consequences must be negotiated and drafted carefully on the front end because consent will usually waive non-jurisdictional complaints."
In the Interest of N.H.S. and H.A.F., Children
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). Mother challenged only best interest on appeal, so the court focused on the Holley factors and section 263.307 considerations, relying on evidence of repeated abuse allegations, prior CPS “reason to believe” findings, the children’s fear of Mother, self-harm and trauma tied to that fear, unsafe and unsanitary home conditions, medication noncompliance, positive drug tests during the case, and the children’s improvement in foster care. Although Mother completed some services and her related criminal charge was dismissed after pretrial intervention, the court held that favorable evidence did not outweigh the broader pattern of danger, instability, and emotional harm, and it affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won on a layered record, not a single bad incident. Evidence of abuse history, child fear, trauma symptoms, mental-health noncompliance, unsafe home conditions, and the child’s improvement in a stable placement can collectively support strong best-interest findings, while partial rehabilitation or service completion may not overcome a record showing ongoing danger and instability."
Wallace v. Powell
COA05
In Wallace v. Powell, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a bill of review after Wallace tried to overturn an underlying summary judgment by attacking only the affidavit supporting the traditional summary-judgment ground. The court explained that a bill-of-review petitioner who participated in the underlying case must make a prima facie showing of a meritorious appellate ground likely to succeed on appeal. Because the underlying judgment rested on both traditional and no-evidence summary-judgment grounds, Wallace had to challenge both independent bases. His failure to address the no-evidence ground, identify evidence raising a fact issue, or explain why that ruling would have been reversible was fatal, so he could not establish the threshold meritorious-ground-of-appeal element.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you are using a bill of review to attack a final judgment, you must show a likely winning appellate issue against every independent ground supporting that judgment. In family cases, attacking only the weakest affidavit or one legal theory is not enough when the order could also stand on a separate no-evidence, standing, limitations, or other dispositive ground."
Ortiz v. Nelapatla
SCOTX
In Ortiz v. Nelapatla, the Texas Supreme Court decided whether a partial counteraffidavit under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001 defeats an entire medical-expense affidavit or only the portions actually challenged. Ortiz submitted affidavits from three medical providers to prove past medical expenses, but Nelapatla’s counteraffidavits disputed only specific portions of two providers’ bills. The trial court nevertheless excluded those two provider affidavits in full absent live expert testimony, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court analyzed the text of § 18.001, especially its allowance for controverting “all or part” of an affidavit, and held that the statute does not impose an all-or-nothing result. Unchallenged portions of a compliant medical-expense affidavit remain competent evidence of reasonableness and necessity and may go to the factfinder without live expert testimony. Because the lower courts excluded the affidavits too broadly, the Court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"A targeted challenge only creates a targeted evidentiary problem. If the other side’s § 18.001 counteraffidavit attacks only certain medical charges, the remaining unchallenged charges should still be admissible without live expert proof. In family-law cases involving uninsured medical expenses, therapy bills, counseling costs, or medical-needs evidence, lawyers should separate disputed from undisputed charges and press for admission of the uncontested portion."
Morales v. Morales
COA01
In this Harris County divorce, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a property division that included confirmation of the husband’s Raspberry Lane property as separate property, a reimbursement award to the community for mortgage principal paid on that separate property, and allocation of a six-figure SBA loan tied to the wife’s LLC. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard governing just-and-right divisions, with sufficiency review folded into that analysis, and noted that implied findings supported the decree because no past-due notice for findings was filed. Even so, implied findings could not replace evidence. The court held the record supported treating Raspberry Lane as separate property and did not reject the reimbursement framework or equitable lien securing that award. But it concluded the trial court lacked sufficient evidentiary support to assign the SBA debt as the wife’s personal liability where the evidence showed the loan belonged to Action Ready Mix, LLC and there was no adequate proof of personal liability. Because that unsupported debt allocation could have distorted the overall just-and-right division, the court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
Litigation Takeaway
"In divorce cases, debt allocation must be proved as carefully as asset characterization. If a liability belongs to an LLC or corporation, do not assume the court can assign it personally to a spouse without loan documents, guaranties, or another legal basis. And when pursuing reimbursement for community funds used on separate property, prove the separate character, trace the payments, and tie the remedy clearly to the overall property division."