Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
In the Interest of S.W., a Child
COA14
In In re S.W., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of parental rights after concluding legally and factually sufficient evidence showed endangerment under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E). The court focused on a continuing course of conduct, not a single event: Father’s coercive control over Mother, interference with her mental-health treatment, refusal to cooperate with the Department, obstruction of access to information and the home, and overall instability surrounding the newborn. Applying established endangerment standards, the court held the evidence permitted a firm conviction that the parents’ conduct jeopardized the child’s physical and emotional well-being even without proof of actual physical injury. The court also held that the same evidence supporting endangerment supported the best-interest finding under section 161.001(b)(2), so it did not need to reach the remaining predicate grounds, and Father lacked standing to challenge conservatorship after termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pattern evidence matters. A sustained record of coercive control, untreated mental-health issues, blocked medical care, refusal to cooperate, and household instability can support both endangerment and best interest, even without a single dramatic injury to the child. For practitioners, the case is a reminder to build or rebut a cohesive narrative tying adult conduct directly to child safety and parenting capacity."
Bizimana v. Ogunsanya
COA03
In this SAPCR appeal, the father challenged temporary orders governing conservatorship, child support, prenatal expenses, and interim attorney’s fees, arguing procedural and substantive error at the temporary-orders stage. The Third Court of Appeals explained that under the Family Code, SAPCR temporary orders are interlocutory and, once a final order is signed, those temporary rulings merge into and are superseded by the final judgment. Because the father’s appellate complaints were aimed primarily at the temporary orders rather than the final SAPCR order, those complaints were moot and could not support reversal. The court further noted that any attack on the final judgment had to be based on the final-hearing record, and prior temporary-hearing testimony was not part of that record unless properly admitted. Finding no reversible error in the final order itself, the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want appellate relief after a final SAPCR order, challenge the final order—not just the temporary orders. Temporary rulings usually become moot once final judgment is signed, so family-law litigators must build and preserve a full final-hearing record and frame appellate issues around the final judgment’s actual provisions."
In the Interest of K.L.B., a Child
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to K.L.B., holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient on endangerment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), best interest under § 161.001(b)(2), and appointment of DFPS as sole managing conservator. The court analyzed the case as a pattern-of-conduct record: a medically fragile child suffered severe chronic malnutrition and developmental regression after missed medical follow-up, discontinued nutritional support, the mother’s daily marijuana use and failed substance-abuse services, and the mother’s refusal to protect the child from a violent caregiver in the home. The child’s dramatic improvement in foster care, combined with the mother’s instability, noncompliance, and inability to prove a safe home, supported the trial court’s findings and judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment and best interest are often proven through cumulative patterns, not one dramatic event. In custody and termination cases alike, chronic medical neglect, substance use, and failure to protect a child from household violence can strongly support sole conservatorship, supervised access, or termination—especially when the child improves once placed in a safe, stable environment."
Morales v. Lowenberg
COA03
In Morales v. Lowenberg, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a settlement email satisfied Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11 when it contained definite material terms, was accepted before the stated deadline, and ended with the sender’s typed professional signature block used to authenticate the message. The court analyzed Rule 11’s writing and signature requirements functionally rather than formalistically, concluding that the signature requirement is met when the surrounding circumstances show the sender intended the name block to authenticate the offer. Because the offeree unequivocally accepted before expiration, a binding settlement was formed, and the sender’s later attempt to revoke it was ineffective. The court affirmed enforcement of the agreement but modified the attorney’s-fees award to exclude fees unrelated to enforcing the Rule 11 settlement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat settlement emails like they can bind your client. In Texas family cases, an email with material terms, acceptance language, a deadline, and a typed signature block may become an enforceable Rule 11 agreement even if no formal decree or release has been signed yet. If you do not want to be bound until a later document is executed, say so expressly, and if you seek enforcement, segregate fees tied only to enforcement work."
Ting Jiang v. Michael Glenn Dawson
COA01
In this Texas divorce appeal, the wife argued that Oregon law should have governed characterization of two Oregon houses acquired during the marriage and that the jury should have received Oregon-law and additional inception-of-title instructions. The First Court of Appeals held that because the Texas divorce court had personal jurisdiction over both spouses, Texas law governed characterization of the marital estate for division purposes, even as to out-of-state real property. Applying Texas Family Code section 7.002 and related authority, the court concluded the requested Oregon-law instructions were not legally correct and that the wife failed to show the submitted charge misstated Texas law. The court therefore affirmed the refusal of the requested instructions and upheld the property-characterization framework used at trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a Texas divorce, the location of real estate does not usually determine which marital-property law controls. If both spouses are before the Texas court, practitioners should generally try characterization issues under Texas law, tailor jury-charge requests accordingly, and preserve any instruction complaints with precise, legally correct proposed language."
Paul Coleman v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Coleman, the defense tried to call a key witness who would testify that the defendant was never alone with the complainant and did not commit the charged acts. After a hearing outside the jury’s presence, the trial court found the witness had a legitimate Fifth Amendment privilege because she still faced possible prosecution arising from the same incident. When she refused on cross-examination to answer how the complainant got to the hotel—a non-collateral fact central to the same transaction—the court excluded her testimony entirely. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Texas law does not require a trial court to admit selective exculpatory testimony when meaningful cross-examination on the same events is blocked by a valid privilege claim, and that exclusion did not violate compulsory process or due process.
Litigation Takeaway
"A witness does not get to tell only the helpful part of the story and then invoke the Fifth to avoid cross-examination on the same transaction. In Texas family cases involving abuse allegations, hidden assets, fraud, or other parallel criminal exposure, Coleman is a strong tool to exclude a selective witness if the anticipated Fifth Amendment invocation will block meaningful cross on non-collateral facts."
Warner v. State
COA03
In Warner v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals addressed whether Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072 requires the State’s child-outcry notice to contain a standalone summary of the child’s allegations within the four corners of the notice itself. The State identified the child’s mother as the outcry witness and referenced police statements previously produced in discovery that substantially summarized the child’s abuse disclosures. Rejecting the defendant’s proposed four-corners rule, the court focused on the statute’s purpose—preventing unfair surprise—and held that timely notice is sufficient when it identifies the witness and directs the defense to written materials already produced that fairly summarize the expected testimony. Because the notice and incorporated police statements gave the defense adequate written notice more than 14 days before trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the outcry testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
"Substance beats format. When notice rules require a summary of abuse-related allegations, a court may accept a notice that specifically identifies the witness and clearly incorporates previously produced written materials, rather than repeating everything in one self-contained filing. For family lawyers, the best practice is still a clean standalone summary, but if you are challenging notice, focus on prejudice, timing, witness identification, and whether the incorporated documents actually disclose the expected testimony—not just the lack of a single four-corners notice."
Garcia v. State
COA01
In Garcia v. State, the First Court of Appeals rejected two appellate complaints arising from a child-sexual-abuse trial: an ineffective-assistance claim tied to outcry-witness objections and a mistrial request after an alternate juror mistakenly joined guilt-innocence deliberations. On the outcry issue, the court applied Strickland and held the record did not show counsel performed deficiently by failing to renew objections at trial when the evidence allegedly diverged from the Article 38.072 pretrial ruling; without a developed record and a showing the objection would have been sustained, the claim failed. On the alternate-juror issue, the court treated the error as harm-based rather than structural. Because the trial court removed the alternate, reseated the proper juror, instructed the jury to begin deliberations anew, and the record showed no actual prejudice, denial of a mistrial was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Preservation and harm control appeals. If trial evidence shifts from the basis of a pretrial evidentiary ruling, counsel must object specifically and contemporaneously. And when a procedural irregularity occurs, reversal is not automatic—lawyers must build a concrete record showing why the error probably affected the outcome despite any curative steps."
City of Houston v. Tamike Crumpton
COA14
In City of Houston v. Crumpton, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the City could not obtain reversal of an order denying its immunity-based summary-judgment motion because it failed to challenge an independent ground supporting that ruling: the plaintiff’s argument that the motion was premature due to incomplete discovery. The court applied the rule that when a trial court’s general order may rest on multiple independent grounds, the appellant must attack them all or affirmance is required. The court also held that the City’s effort to dismiss the Houston Airport System and George Bush Intercontinental Airport as non-jural entities was outside the scope of an interlocutory appeal under CPRC § 51.014(a)(8), because capacity or jural-existence complaints are collateral and non-jurisdictional, not immunity questions. The immunity ruling was affirmed, and the non-jural-entity portion of the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any interlocutory immunity appeal, attack every possible basis for the trial court’s ruling—especially a discovery-prematurity argument—or you can lose without the court ever reaching the merits. And do not assume a non-jural-entity or capacity argument can ride along in an immunity appeal; those issues usually must be handled in the trial court and preserved for a later appeal."
Quesada v. Bonilla
COA04
In Quesada v. Bonilla, a contractor and homeowners signed a mediated settlement agreement resolving a construction dispute, but before judgment was rendered the contractor filed a motion to set aside the agreement and expressly withdrew consent, claiming duress, coercion, and lack of understanding. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that this revocation barred the trial court from rendering an agreed judgment on the MSA under Padilla and Quintero. Although the homeowners’ motion to enforce was likely sufficient to plead a contract-enforcement theory, the trial court still could not decide the disputed enforceability issues through a bare motion hearing based only on argument and the agreement itself. Because the court enforced the MSA without a proper evidentiary or merits-based procedure, the judgment was reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"A signed settlement is not the same thing as consent to judgment. If a party revokes consent before rendition, the court generally cannot enforce the deal through a quick motion-to-enter hearing; the proponent must plead and prove contract enforcement through a proper merits process. For family lawyers, this is a strong procedural authority against shortcut enforcement of disputed non-statutory settlements and a reminder to preserve revocation in writing before judgment."