Opinion Library

Property Division Enforcement

Rodriguez v. Torres

COA13

After a divorce decree awarded Alma Rodriguez a $115,000 money judgment against Levi Medina, Rodriguez alleged Medina fraudulently transferred two Brownsville parcels to his daughter after Rodriguez recorded an abstract of judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for Medina and the daughter, but the court of appeals reversed. Applying Texas Business and Commerce Code § 24.005(a)(1), the court held Rodriguez produced more than a scintilla of evidence of actual intent through multiple badges of fraud: transfer to an insider, transfer after the debt and judgment lien arose, transfer of substantially all reachable Texas assets, and a later no-compensation transfer to a church in Mexico. The court also held res judicata did not bar the suit because the fraudulent-transfer claims were based on post-decree conduct, not the divorce court’s original property adjudication.

Litigation Takeaway

"In post-divorce collection cases, direct proof of fraudulent intent is not required to defeat summary judgment. If a debtor spouse moves property to a relative after judgment or after an abstract is recorded, build the case around UFTA badges of fraud—timing, insider status, lack of consideration, and depletion of reachable assets—because those facts alone can create a triable issue."

Child Custody

In the Interest of P.J., a Child

COA14

In In the Interest of P.J., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order appointing the Department as sole managing conservator after concluding the parental presumption in Texas Family Code section 153.131 was rebutted. The court analyzed the evidence cumulatively and held it was legally and factually sufficient to show that appointing Mother as managing conservator would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development. Key facts included Mother’s failure to protect the child from her boyfriend’s physical abuse, the child’s expressed fear of the boyfriend, Mother’s refusal of a safety plan, housing instability, inadequate supervision, food insecurity, and broader concerns about unmet medical and basic needs. The court also rejected Mother’s complaints about charge error, evidentiary rulings, child support, and possession restrictions.

Litigation Takeaway

"To overcome the parental presumption, build a cumulative significant-impairment record tied to concrete danger: tolerated third-party abuse, refusal to protect, instability, and unmet basic needs. For parents defending these claims, denial is not enough—document separation from unsafe partners, current stability, and a credible protective plan."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Dorsett v. State

COA05

In Dorsett v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld convictions for injury to a disabled individual and injury to a child under Penal Code § 22.04, rejecting arguments that conflicting and uncertain witness testimony made the evidence legally insufficient. The court applied Jackson v. Virginia and deferred to the trial court’s role as factfinder, holding that direct testimony from the victims and another child witness, combined with corroborating physical evidence, officer observations, and medical-style testimony about the injuries, allowed a rational factfinder to find bodily injury and identity beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the existence of a custody dispute and inconsistencies in details did not negate otherwise probative abuse evidence when the record was viewed cumulatively and in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Litigation Takeaway

"In abuse-related family-law cases, inconsistency alone rarely defeats a claim. Trial courts may credit imperfect testimony when it is supported by photos, injuries, third-party observations, physical conditions in the home, timelines, or other corroborating evidence, and a custody-dispute motive defense will not overcome a well-built cumulative record by itself."

Miller v. Boyd

COA14

In Miller v. Boyd, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment because the trial court effectively denied a verified continuance after the defendant’s attorney withdrew under Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.08 as a necessary witness. Applying Villegas v. Carter, the court held that when withdrawal is ethically required, the resulting gap in representation is generally not the client’s fault or negligence. The court reviewed the full procedural history, including substitute counsel’s appearance only one week before the summary-judgment hearing, the client’s documented health issues, the first-request status of the continuance, the finite sixty-day delay requested, and the lack of material prejudice to the opposing party. On that record, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by forcing the hearing forward without giving replacement counsel meaningful time to prepare, reversed the final summary judgment, and remanded the case.

Litigation Takeaway

"If counsel must withdraw because Rule 3.08 makes the lawyer a necessary witness, treat the continuance as a due-process issue, not a mere scheduling request. Build a verified record showing the withdrawal was ethically compelled, the client was not at fault, substitute counsel needs real preparation time, and a short delay will not materially prejudice the other side."

Evidence

Rogers v. State

COA14

In Rogers v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed admission of extensive prior abuse evidence in an injury-to-a-child prosecution against a mother. The court held that repeated prior acts against the same children were highly probative of intent, state of mind, credibility, and the nature of the parent-child relationship under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 38.37 and 38.371, and that Rule 403 did not require exclusion because the probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or cumulativeness. The court also held that after the mother blurted out in front of the jury that her daughter was lying, the State could introduce the daughter’s earlier forensic-interview statement as a prior consistent statement to rebut the accusation of fabrication.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, prior incidents within the same family relationship can be powerful context evidence when tied to endangerment, intent, credibility, or the parent-child dynamic, and generic Rule 403 objections usually will not be enough to keep them out. Lawyers should also be careful when accusing a child or other witness of fabrication, because that attack may open the door to otherwise inadmissible prior consistent statements."

Child Custody

Hoisington v. State

COA11

In Hoisington v. State, the Eastland Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by exposure. The defendant argued the proof failed because there was no DNA evidence, no recovered pornography, and no conclusive forensic findings. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferred to the jury’s credibility determinations. The child complainant gave age-appropriate, internally consistent testimony describing exposure, sexual contact, oral contact, and digital penetration that tracked the statutory elements. Her account was reinforced by consistent disclosures to a SANE nurse and forensic interviewer, medical findings consistent with her description, and corroboration of a specific detail about a pink sex toy. The court held that a child complainant’s testimony alone can sustain the findings if believed, and the absence of DNA or other definitive forensic proof did not render the evidence insufficient.

Litigation Takeaway

"In abuse-driven family cases, do not let the case rise or fall on DNA or conclusive physical proof. A child’s specific, developmentally appropriate, and consistent disclosures—especially when supported by outcry, forensic interview, medical evidence, or corroborating details—can be enough to justify protective relief, while credibility attacks must focus on real inconsistencies or contamination concerns rather than generic claims of “no forensic evidence.”"

In Re Edward Scott Rubin

COA05

In In re Rubin, the relator sought habeas relief from contempt and incarceration orders entered in a Dallas County family-law case. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the contempt challenge because the relator failed to provide competent proof of present confinement, which is a threshold requirement for habeas relief from a contempt commitment. Relying on prior cases distinguishing inadequate indirect proof from reliable evidence such as a sheriff’s affidavit, the court held the filing did not establish current restraint on liberty. The court also struck the petition and appendix because they contained unredacted sensitive information about minor children in violation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9, and it denied habeas relief, rendering the emergency request for release moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"In a family-law contempt habeas, the merits do not matter unless you first prove the client is actually in custody with competent evidence such as jail records or a sheriff’s affidavit. And even in emergency filings, scrub every appendix for minors’ identifying information or risk having the filing struck."

General trial issues

Mulford v. 1st Service Solutions

COA06

In Mulford v. 1st Service Solutions, a former executive sued for more than $800,000 in unpaid commissions, but he never served mandatory initial disclosures, filed witness and exhibit lists less than 30 days before trial, and produced nearly 180 pages of documents only days before trial. The defendants moved to strike under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The Texarkana Court of Appeals treated the issue as a mandatory-exclusion question rather than a discretionary sanctions dispute, holding that once the record showed the evidence and witnesses were not timely disclosed, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to prove good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. Because he did not establish either exception, the trial court properly excluded the exhibits and witness testimony, and that exclusion left him unable to prove his claim. The court affirmed the take-nothing judgment and held any continuance complaint was waived.

Litigation Takeaway

"Rule 193.6 can win or lose a case before the merits are ever tried: if your documents, witnesses, or trial exhibits were not timely disclosed, the court must exclude them unless you prove good cause or no unfair surprise/prejudice. In family law, that can wipe out tracing claims, custody witnesses, valuation evidence, or fee proof, so build trial evidence through timely Rule 194 disclosures and prompt supplementation from the start."

Russo v. State

COA04

In Russo v. State, the defendant argued that only the district court that originally placed him on deferred adjudication could later revoke supervision and adjudicate guilt unless the case was formally transferred under Code of Criminal Procedure articles 42A.151 and 42A.754. The Fourth Court of Appeals rejected that argument, explaining that no statutory transfer occurred at all; instead, another district judge in the same county, sitting in a court with concurrent jurisdiction, heard the revocation proceeding. Relying on Texas Government Code section 24.003, article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution, and Mata v. State, the court held that same-county district judges may hear and determine matters pending in another district court without a written transfer or bench-exchange order unless a contrary statute or rule requires one. The court therefore affirmed the revocation, adjudication, and sentence.

Litigation Takeaway

"Before attacking an order because a different same-county district judge heard the case, distinguish a true jurisdictional or mandatory-transfer defect from mere internal court assignment. If the courts share concurrent jurisdiction and no statute or local rule requires transfer, the absence of a written transfer or bench-exchange order likely will not make the order void."

Estate of Lavon Matrick Frisby

COA12

In Estate of Frisby, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a petitioner could not use a bill of review to attack an adverse summary judgment when she had an ordinary appellate remedy and failed to pursue it. The petitioner tried to revive fraud, notice, heirship, and probate-defect allegations through a bill of review after losing a 2025 state-court suit and not appealing that judgment. Relying on longstanding Texas bill-of-review doctrine, including Wembley and Caldwell, the court treated exhaustion of legal remedies as a threshold requirement and concluded that the missed direct appeal barred equitable relief as a matter of law. The court also concluded that complaints about the lack of an evidentiary hearing and dismissal before service were waived for inadequate briefing, while noting that a separate hearing is not always required at the prima facie stage.

Litigation Takeaway

"A bill of review is a last-resort remedy, not a backup plan for a missed appeal. In family-law cases involving divorce decrees, custody orders, property divisions, or enforcement judgments, the first question is whether the complaining party exhausted available post-judgment and appellate remedies; if not, the case may be defeated on that threshold ground before the court ever reaches allegations of fraud, lack of notice, or concealment."