Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Huskey v. White
COA14
In Huskey v. White, the father sought to terminate child support as his son reached adulthood, while the mother and the Office of the Attorney General asked the court to order indefinite support under Texas Family Code section 154.302 for an adult disabled child. After a bench trial, the trial court found the son’s developmental and language-related disabilities existed or were known before age eighteen, that he required substantial care and personal supervision, and that he would not be capable of self-support, then ordered the father to continue paying $1,420 per month indefinitely. On appeal, the court applied abuse-of-discretion review and held the record contained probative evidence supporting those findings, including the child’s diagnoses, special-education history, modified coursework, low literacy, inability to drive or live independently, dependence on his mother, and SSI benefits. The court also emphasized that because no findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested, it would imply all findings necessary to support the judgment if supported by the record. The support amount was likewise upheld, and the father’s complaint about an improper judicial comment was waived for lack of preservation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Adult-disabled-child support cases are won or lost on a functional record, not labels alone: build or attack evidence showing whether the child can actually live and work independently. And after a bench trial, always request findings of fact and conclusions of law, because failing to do so gives the appellee a major advantage on appeal."
Dongmei Pan and Arconslp LLC v. Lihua Wang and Shufeng Zhang
COA14
In Pan v. Wang, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected efforts to turn promises made during an extramarital affair into actionable fraud or fiduciary-duty claims. The dispute involved both affair-related allegations and separate business, wage, and property issues, including financial transfers, a joint venture, unpaid salary, and ownership of real property. Relying on Texas public policy favoring preservation of marriage, the court held that Texas does not recognize claims based on promises to leave a spouse, marry a paramour, or continue an adulterous relationship, and that an affair alone does not create a fiduciary relationship or legally justifiable reliance. Applying that rule, the court upheld the trial court’s refusal of jury submissions and exclusion of duplicative evidence aimed at those non-cognizable theories, while affirming the judgment on the remaining ordinary commercial and property claims.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts will not award damages for broken promises made in the course of an affair. In family-law and related property litigation, lawyers should separate adultery facts that may matter for recognized issues—like property tracing, reimbursement, or fault—from barred tort or reliance theories based on promises to divorce, marry, or continue the relationship."
In the Interest of I.W.O., a Child
COA10
In this SAPCR modification appeal, Mother argued the trial court wrongly kept the parties’ child from testifying live before the jury about his schooling, medical care, visitation with Father, and desire not to live with Father. The Waco court held that a child’s testimony is not exempt from ordinary evidentiary rules and that Rule 403 can permit exclusion when the proposed testimony would be needlessly cumulative of evidence already admitted through therapists, counselors, providers, the custody evaluator, the parents, and an offer of proof. The court distinguished Callicott as a competency case, not a rule creating an automatic right to present a child witness. Even assuming exclusion was error, the court found no reversible harm because the child’s views were already in the record and Mother could not show the absence of live testimony probably caused an improper judgment. The judgment appointing Father sole managing conservator was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a child to testify in a custody-modification jury trial, do more than say the child’s preferences are important. Be prepared to show what the child will add that no other witness or record already covers. And if the testimony is excluded, a detailed offer of proof is essential—but it will not win reversal if the same substance is already elsewhere in the record."
Rideout v. Rideout
COA02
In Rideout v. Rideout, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a Chapter 7B protective order after finding sufficient evidence that a former husband engaged in stalking of his ex-wife in the post-divorce co-parenting context. The evidence showed a continuing course of conduct: repeated unwanted appearances at her church, child activities, gym, restaurants, and stores; hostile and excessive AppClose messages; apparent monitoring of her vehicle and location; and disregard of prior communication limits and a 30-foot stay-away restriction. Applying Chapter 7B and Penal Code sections 42.072 and 42.07, the court treated the case as a pattern-based stalking record rather than isolated incidents, giving weight to both Hallie’s testimony that she felt scared and alarmed and the objective reasonable-person standard. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support reasonable grounds that Colby committed stalking and affirmed the two-year protective order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases, stalking can be proven through a pattern of unwanted surveillance, repeated proximity, hostile co-parenting messages, and violations of prior boundaries—even when the conduct happens around children’s events or other ordinary shared spaces. Build the case as a chronology, preserve app messages and location-monitoring evidence, and use prior Rule 11 agreements or injunctions to show notice, intent, and a continuing course of conduct."
In the Interest of G.S.S. and S.D.S., Children
COA11
In a Department-filed termination case, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 107.013(a)(1) required the trial court to appoint counsel for an indigent incarcerated father who appeared in opposition to termination. Although the record contained significant evidence of domestic violence, substance abuse, incarceration, and danger to the children, the appellate court focused on the threshold procedural issue: the father requested appointed counsel, was indigent, and opposed the suit, so the statute was triggered. Because the trial court denied counsel without a hearing, the court held that the father’s statutory right to counsel was violated and reversed the termination order as to him, remanding for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas termination cases, appointed-counsel issues are not housekeeping—they can undo an otherwise strong judgment. If an indigent parent appears in opposition to a government-filed termination suit, counsel must be appointed under Family Code § 107.013, including for incarcerated parents, and failure to do so is a reversal trap."
In the Interest of R.A., a Child
COA02
Father appealed after a Texas trial court dismissed a UCCJEA temporary emergency-jurisdiction case involving a child already subject to a Washington custody order. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals did not reach whether the Texas dismissal was correct when entered. Instead, it focused on mootness and the provisional nature of Texas Family Code § 152.204. After the appeal was filed, Washington—the state with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction—entered temporary custody orders addressing the child’s safety, care, therapy, and Father’s access. Because those later Washington orders superseded the emergency relief Father sought to preserve in Texas, the court held there was no longer any effective appellate relief available and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is only a short-term bridge, not a way to convert Texas into the permanent custody forum. In interstate custody disputes, if the decree state continues exercising jurisdiction and enters operative custody orders, any Texas appeal tied to emergency jurisdiction may become moot fast."
Cylear v. Johnson-Cylear
COA03
In Cylear v. Johnson-Cylear, the husband argued the trial court had to order the marital home sold based on an alleged agreement incident to divorce. The court rejected that claim because the appellate record contained neither a signed written agreement nor a reporter’s record of any enforceable open-court Rule 11 agreement. It also held that temporary orders requiring the house to be listed for sale were only interim directives and did not amount to a Family Code section 7.006(b) finding that an agreement was just and right. Even if some prior agreement existed, the parties repudiated any nonbinding deal by later trying the property division as a contested issue. The court therefore affirmed the decree awarding the home to the wife.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a divorce property agreement to control the final decree, make it provable and make it binding: get it signed and filed, or recite it in open court on the record, and obtain an express just-and-right finding if needed. Temporary orders about listing or managing property are not a substitute, and trying the issue on the merits can amount to repudiation of any earlier nonbinding agreement."
Brigham v. State
COA05
In Brigham v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defendant challenging an Article 38.072 outcry ruling must preserve the exact complaint made on appeal. The defense broadly objected to the forensic interviewer being designated as the outcry witness "in this case," but on appeal argued a narrower theory: that the interviewer may have been proper for some incidents, yet the child’s mother was the proper outcry witness for one specific alleged event. The court emphasized that outcry analysis is event-specific in multi-incident abuse cases, that the objecting party must distinctly identify the incident and the earlier qualifying disclosure, and that trial courts are not required to parse an undeveloped theory. Because the defense did not make that event-specific argument in the trial court, the complaint was not preserved under Rule 33.1(a), and the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your evidentiary objection is event-specific, your record must be event-specific too. In abuse-related family cases, broad objections to CAC, therapist, parent, or forensic-interviewer testimony will not preserve a narrower appellate complaint unless counsel clearly identifies the particular incident, the competing witness, and why that earlier disclosure legally qualifies."
Mack v. State
COA04
In Mack v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals rejected a legal-sufficiency challenge to child-sexual-assault convictions where the child did not visually observe the perpetrator during the assaults. The court applied Jackson v. Virginia and article 38.07, emphasizing that identity may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence and that a child complainant’s testimony alone can support conviction. Here, the child testified she recognized the defendant by his distinctive smell, cigarette odor, breath, bodily presence, and the surrounding household circumstances, and she later identified him in court. The court held that the cumulative force of that testimony, along with corroborating outcry context, was enough for a rational jury to find identity beyond a reasonable doubt despite the absence of physical evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child’s abuse allegation is not weak just because the child did not see the alleged abuser or there is no forensic proof. In family-law cases, courts may give significant weight to sensory-based identification, household context, and outcry testimony when assessing safety, credibility, and possession restrictions. If you are advancing the claim, build the full context carefully; if you are defending it, attack the reliability of the identification itself—not merely the lack of corroboration."
In the Interest of A.T.G., A.G.G., A.G.G. II, A.G.G., and A.G.G., Children
COA07
In In re A.T.G., the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s rights to two children after the record showed a long-running pattern of domestic violence against the mother, excessive corporal punishment of the children, and a home environment dominated by fear and aggression. Although sexual-abuse allegations that triggered the case became uncertain by trial, the court held that the remaining evidence independently satisfied Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court analyzed subsection (D) as addressing the children’s endangering conditions and surroundings and subsection (E) as addressing the father’s endangering conduct, concluding that repeated assaults, abusive discipline with objects, intimidation, and the children’s persistent fear were legally and factually sufficient under both grounds. The court therefore upheld termination and the related no-contact relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domestic violence is not collateral to custody or termination litigation—it is direct evidence of child endangerment. Even if one major allegation weakens, a well-developed record showing a pattern of violence, abusive discipline, intimidation, and child fear can still support severe restrictions or termination."