Opinion Library

Miller v. Boyd

COA14

In Miller v. Boyd, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment because the trial court effectively denied a verified continuance after the defendant’s attorney withdrew under Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.08 as a necessary witness. Applying Villegas v. Carter, the court held that when withdrawal is ethically required, the resulting gap in representation is generally not the client’s fault or negligence. The court reviewed the full procedural history, including substitute counsel’s appearance only one week before the summary-judgment hearing, the client’s documented health issues, the first-request status of the continuance, the finite sixty-day delay requested, and the lack of material prejudice to the opposing party. On that record, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by forcing the hearing forward without giving replacement counsel meaningful time to prepare, reversed the final summary judgment, and remanded the case.

Litigation Takeaway

"If counsel must withdraw because Rule 3.08 makes the lawyer a necessary witness, treat the continuance as a due-process issue, not a mere scheduling request. Build a verified record showing the withdrawal was ethically compelled, the client was not at fault, substitute counsel needs real preparation time, and a short delay will not materially prejudice the other side."

Evidence

Rogers v. State

COA14

In Rogers v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld admission of extensive prior-abuse evidence in a child-injury prosecution arising from a mother’s alleged physical abuse of her son and daughter. The defendant argued the many prior incidents were overly prejudicial and cumulative under Rule 403, and also challenged admission of the daughter’s prior forensic-interview statement after accusing her in court of lying. The court held the prior incidents were admissible under Code of Criminal Procedure articles 38.37 and 38.371 because they involved the same child complainants and were probative of intent, state of mind, and the nature of the parent-child relationship, not just propensity. Applying the Rule 403 balancing test, the court concluded the evidence’s substantial contextual and credibility value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or cumulativeness. The court also held that the defendant’s in-court accusation of lying opened the door to admission of the daughter’s prior consistent statement to rebut fabrication and rehabilitate credibility.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases, repeated abuse or coercive incidents are most persuasive when framed as relationship-context evidence showing intent, state of mind, credibility, and household dynamics—not merely bad-character proof. And before accusing a child or parent of fabrication, counsel should consider whether that attack will open the door to prior consistent statements such as forensic interviews, school reports, or counselor disclosures."

Bruce Horn v. Karla Horn

COA14

In Horn v. Horn, a brother challenged an intra-family transfer of a Houston home to his sister, alleging their elderly parents lacked capacity, that signatures were forged, and that the deed-related documents were defectively executed. After a bench trial with no findings of fact or conclusions of law requested, the trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals presumed all findings necessary to support the judgment and held the appellant failed to show reversible error because his briefing did not adequately develop the legal arguments with supporting authority and record citations as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). The court therefore treated key deed-invalidity and evidentiary complaints as waived and affirmed the judgment.

Litigation Takeaway

"Serious allegations like incapacity, forgery, and defective acknowledgment will not win on appeal without a trial record tied to the execution date, preserved objections, requested findings in a bench trial, and fully developed appellate briefing with authority, record cites, and harm analysis."

Child Custody

In the Interest of K.H. and D.H., Children

COA02

In this SAPCR appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the trial court could not deny Mother all possession and access to her children because no live pleading sought that relief at the time of trial. Although the Department’s earlier petition had included more severe allegations and requests, it expressly abandoned termination and instead asked that both parents be named possessory conservators, with Mother receiving supervised access. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301 and cases holding that judgments must conform to live pleadings, the court concluded that a request to restrict or supervise access under Family Code section 153.193 is not the same as a request to eliminate access altogether, and abandoned claims could not support the final order. The court reversed and remanded the portions of the orders denying Mother access, but affirmed the conservatorship rulings because Mother did not show an abuse of discretion as to the trial court’s refusal to appoint her as a conservator.

Litigation Takeaway

"If you want a Texas court to deny a parent all possession and access, you must plead that relief expressly and keep it live through trial. Requests for supervised, restricted, or limited visitation do not authorize a no-access order, and oral abandonment of broader relief can create reversible Rule 301 error if the final judgment goes beyond the live pleadings."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Dorsett v. State

COA05

In Dorsett v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld convictions for injury to a disabled individual and injury to a child under Penal Code § 22.04, rejecting arguments that conflicting and uncertain witness testimony made the evidence legally insufficient. The court applied Jackson v. Virginia and deferred to the trial court’s role as factfinder, holding that direct testimony from the victims and another child witness, combined with corroborating physical evidence, officer observations, and medical-style testimony about the injuries, allowed a rational factfinder to find bodily injury and identity beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the existence of a custody dispute and inconsistencies in details did not negate otherwise probative abuse evidence when the record was viewed cumulatively and in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Litigation Takeaway

"In abuse-related family-law cases, inconsistency alone rarely defeats a claim. Trial courts may credit imperfect testimony when it is supported by photos, injuries, third-party observations, physical conditions in the home, timelines, or other corroborating evidence, and a custody-dispute motive defense will not overcome a well-built cumulative record by itself."

In Re Edward Scott Rubin

COA05

In In re Rubin, the relator sought habeas relief from contempt and incarceration orders entered in a Dallas County family-law case. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the contempt challenge because the relator failed to provide competent proof of present confinement, which is a threshold requirement for habeas relief from a contempt commitment. Relying on prior cases distinguishing inadequate indirect proof from reliable evidence such as a sheriff’s affidavit, the court held the filing did not establish current restraint on liberty. The court also struck the petition and appendix because they contained unredacted sensitive information about minor children in violation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9, and it denied habeas relief, rendering the emergency request for release moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"In a family-law contempt habeas, the merits do not matter unless you first prove the client is actually in custody with competent evidence such as jail records or a sheriff’s affidavit. And even in emergency filings, scrub every appendix for minors’ identifying information or risk having the filing struck."

General trial issues

Mulford v. 1st Service Solutions

COA06

In Mulford v. 1st Service Solutions, a former executive sued for more than $800,000 in unpaid commissions, but he never served mandatory initial disclosures, filed witness and exhibit lists less than 30 days before trial, and produced nearly 180 pages of documents only days before trial. The defendants moved to strike under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The Texarkana Court of Appeals treated the issue as a mandatory-exclusion question rather than a discretionary sanctions dispute, holding that once the record showed the evidence and witnesses were not timely disclosed, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to prove good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. Because he did not establish either exception, the trial court properly excluded the exhibits and witness testimony, and that exclusion left him unable to prove his claim. The court affirmed the take-nothing judgment and held any continuance complaint was waived.

Litigation Takeaway

"Rule 193.6 can win or lose a case before the merits are ever tried: if your documents, witnesses, or trial exhibits were not timely disclosed, the court must exclude them unless you prove good cause or no unfair surprise/prejudice. In family law, that can wipe out tracing claims, custody witnesses, valuation evidence, or fee proof, so build trial evidence through timely Rule 194 disclosures and prompt supplementation from the start."

Estate of Lavon Matrick Frisby

COA12

In Estate of Frisby, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a petitioner could not use a bill of review to attack an adverse summary judgment when she had an ordinary appellate remedy and failed to pursue it. The petitioner tried to revive fraud, notice, heirship, and probate-defect allegations through a bill of review after losing a 2025 state-court suit and not appealing that judgment. Relying on longstanding Texas bill-of-review doctrine, including Wembley and Caldwell, the court treated exhaustion of legal remedies as a threshold requirement and concluded that the missed direct appeal barred equitable relief as a matter of law. The court also concluded that complaints about the lack of an evidentiary hearing and dismissal before service were waived for inadequate briefing, while noting that a separate hearing is not always required at the prima facie stage.

Litigation Takeaway

"A bill of review is a last-resort remedy, not a backup plan for a missed appeal. In family-law cases involving divorce decrees, custody orders, property divisions, or enforcement judgments, the first question is whether the complaining party exhausted available post-judgment and appellate remedies; if not, the case may be defeated on that threshold ground before the court ever reaches allegations of fraud, lack of notice, or concealment."

Russo v. State

COA04

In Russo v. State, the defendant argued that only the district court that originally placed him on deferred adjudication could later revoke supervision and adjudicate guilt unless the case was formally transferred under Code of Criminal Procedure articles 42A.151 and 42A.754. The Fourth Court of Appeals rejected that argument, explaining that no statutory transfer occurred at all; instead, another district judge in the same county, sitting in a court with concurrent jurisdiction, heard the revocation proceeding. Relying on Texas Government Code section 24.003, article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution, and Mata v. State, the court held that same-county district judges may hear and determine matters pending in another district court without a written transfer or bench-exchange order unless a contrary statute or rule requires one. The court therefore affirmed the revocation, adjudication, and sentence.

Litigation Takeaway

"Before attacking an order because a different same-county district judge heard the case, distinguish a true jurisdictional or mandatory-transfer defect from mere internal court assignment. If the courts share concurrent jurisdiction and no statute or local rule requires transfer, the absence of a written transfer or bench-exchange order likely will not make the order void."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

July 14, 2026

Tyler Carl Allen v. The State of Texas

COA14

In Tyler Carl Allen v. The State of Texas, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed revocation of Allen’s community supervision after the State proved at least one alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Allen, who had been on supervision for assault family violence, was alleged to have violated multiple conditions. The court focused on the probation officer’s unrebutted testimony that Allen failed to complete required community-service hours at the ordered minimum rate of 16 hours per month in several specified months. Applying settled revocation law, the court held that the State need prove only one violation, that the trial court could credit the probation officer’s testimony, and that this single proved violation was sufficient to support revocation. The court also held that Allen’s complaint that his seven-year sentence was excessive was not preserved because he did not raise it in the trial court.

Litigation Takeaway

"One clean, well-proved violation can be enough to uphold a court’s ruling when the governing burden is low and the opposing party leaves the evidence unrebutted. For family lawyers, the case underscores the value of proving exact noncompliance with written court-ordered conditions and preserving any fairness or proportionality complaints in the trial court."