Opinion Library

Child Custody

In the Interest of J.M.

COA02

In In re J.M., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a mediated settlement agreement in a SAPCR that satisfies Texas Family Code section 153.0071(d) is binding and must be reduced to judgment under section 153.0071(e). After Mother signed an MSA appointing the Department as managing conservator and giving her supervised possession largely by mutual agreement with Grandmother, she later sought a new trial to obtain more specific and enforceable visitation terms, arguing the agreed structure gave Grandmother too much discretion and was fraudulently induced. The court rejected that effort, explaining that Mother did not dispute the MSA’s statutory compliance, the final order tracked the parties’ agreement, and she offered no evidence proving any recognized exception such as fraud. Because a motion for new trial cannot be used to rewrite an irrevocable MSA simply because implementation later proves unsatisfactory, the trial court properly denied relief and the judgment was affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"Treat every custody MSA as final drafting, not a rough outline. If the agreement complies with section 153.0071, the court will usually enforce it as written, so vague 'mutual agreement' possession terms and supervision details must be negotiated before signing. If the problem is fraud or coercion, build proof immediately; if the problem is later noncooperation or changed circumstances, use modification or enforcement—not a motion for new trial to get a better deal."

Salzido v. State

COA02

In Salzido v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for indecency with a child by sexual contact, rejecting the argument that the absence of DNA or other physical corroboration made the evidence legally insufficient. The court held that under Article 38.07(a), the child complainant’s detailed testimony alone could support the conviction if the jury believed it, and appellate review required deference to the jury’s credibility determinations under Jackson v. Virginia and Article 38.04. The court also affirmed the exclusion of the grandmother’s testimony about the child’s flea-market statement, concluding the record did not show the child was still dominated by the stress of the alleged event, so the statement did not qualify as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2).

Litigation Takeaway

"In family cases involving child-abuse allegations, do not assume the lack of medical, forensic, or third-party corroboration defeats a claim if the factfinder credits specific testimony. At the same time, do not assume a child’s out-of-court statement about abuse automatically fits the excited-utterance exception; you must build a record showing the child was still under the stress of the event when speaking."

Appeal and Mandamus

Monte Albert v. Madeena V. Albert

COA03

In this divorce appeal, the husband challenged the decree’s debt allocation, attorney’s fee award, and related rulings with arguments focused largely on alleged Army misconduct and the wife’s supposed incompetence. The Third Court of Appeals held that his complaints were waived because his briefs lacked record citations, developed legal analysis, and supporting authority, even after he was given a chance to rebrief. The court also refused to consider exhibits attached to the appellate brief that were not part of the trial record and held that any competency-related complaint was neither preserved nor adequately briefed. The divorce decree was therefore left undisturbed.

Litigation Takeaway

"Appellate complaints in family-law cases live or die on briefing. If a party does not tie each issue to the actual appellate record, preserved trial-court error, and supporting authority, the court of appeals can treat the issue as waived—even after giving a chance to rebrief."

Appeal and Mandamus

In re La Joya Independent School District

COA13

In this mandamus proceeding, La Joya ISD challenged a trial court order compelling production of emails, texts, memoranda, letters, and recordings from an outside-counsel-led internal discrimination investigation. The court analyzed whether the district made a prima facie showing that the communications were made to facilitate legal services under Texas Rule of Evidence 503 and that the investigative materials were prepared in reasonable anticipation of litigation under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.5. Relying on the legal-services contract, pre-suit notice letter, counsel’s affidavit, and the scope of the requested materials, the court held the files were protected by attorney-client privilege and work product, that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production, and that mandamus was proper because disclosure of privileged material cannot be cured on appeal.

Litigation Takeaway

"When discovery targets a lawyer-directed internal investigation, relevance is not enough. Build a privilege record with affidavits, engagement documents, and objective signs of anticipated litigation; if the court still orders production of privileged files, mandamus may be the fastest and best remedy."

Fields v. State

COA02

In Fields v. State, the defendant sought recorded calls and text messages with a confidential informant under Article 39.14, arguing the materials were discoverable and relevant to her defense. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Article 39.14 does not override privileges because the statute requires disclosure only of material that is 'not otherwise privileged.' Applying Texas Rule of Evidence 508, the court concluded the requested communications were protected because producing them would reveal the informant’s identity. The court further held that the defendant did not make the concrete showing needed to trigger Rule 508’s exception for testimony necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence, and she also failed to show the materials contained exculpatory information. Because no exception defeated the privilege, the trial court properly denied discovery.

Litigation Takeaway

"Broad discovery rights do not automatically defeat privilege. In family-law litigation, if requested recordings, messages, reports, or third-party communications would reveal protected identities or privileged source information, the requesting party must do more than show relevance—they must identify a valid exception and build a concrete record showing why disclosure is legally required."

Patrick Lawler v. The State of Texas

COA02

In Lawler v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld convictions for sexual performance by a child and multiple aggravated sexual assault offenses arising from a child’s disclosures to school staff, forensic interviewers, and a caregiver. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because the child’s statements were inconsistent and evolved over time, and he also claimed double jeopardy based on multiple punishments involving the same child. Applying deferential legal-sufficiency review, the court held that the jury could credit the child’s testimony despite omissions, inconsistencies, and incremental disclosures, and could reasonably infer inducement from the defendant’s authority and the child’s statements that he “had to” comply. The court also held that double jeopardy was not violated because the convictions were based on distinct acts occurring on different occasions, not the same unit of prosecution. The court modified the judgments to remove unpronounced fines and otherwise affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases involving child abuse allegations, inconsistent or piecemeal child disclosures do not automatically defeat the case. Build the record incident-by-incident and outcry-by-outcry, preserve the child’s language, and separate distinct acts, dates, and recipients so the factfinder can credit the child and draw reasonable inferences from authority, dependency, and context."

Modifying Child Support

In the Interest of M.A., a Child

COA02

In In re M.A., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Family Code Section 154.130(a)(3) does not require a trial court to make child-support findings on its own unless the ordered support actually deviates from the statutory guideline amount. The father argued the modified support order was effectively above-guidelines because the court ordered $1,610 per month without making deviation findings. The appellate court rejected that argument after applying the statutory framework: Father had one child before the court and one other child not before the court, so Section 154.129 required a 17.5% multiple-family guideline percentage, and because his net monthly resources exceeded the statutory cap, that percentage applied only to $9,200 under Section 154.125. Since 17.5% of $9,200 equals $1,610, the order matched the guideline amount exactly and was not a deviation. The court also held that Father's challenge to only one modification ground did not warrant reversal because the trial court found alternative grounds under Section 156.401(a).

Litigation Takeaway

"Before complaining that a child-support order lacks Section 154.130 findings, first do the guideline math. If the court simply applied the correct multiple-family percentage and the statutory net-resources cap, the order is still a guideline order, not a deviation. Real appellate issues usually lie in the net-resources evidence, the cap, the other-child adjustment, or preservation—not in demanding findings the statute never required."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Patrick Lawler v. The State of Texas

COA02

In Lawler v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld multiple child-sex-offense convictions against a sufficiency and double-jeopardy challenge. The court held that the child’s disclosures to several adults, two forensic interviews, and trial testimony were legally sufficient despite inconsistencies because credibility and reconciliation of conflicting statements were for the jury. It also held that the convictions did not violate double jeopardy because the evidence let the jury tie each count to a distinct act or criminal episode, and it modified the judgments to conform unpronounced fines to the oral pronouncement.

Litigation Takeaway

"For family-law cases involving abuse allegations, generalized proof is weaker than incident-specific proof. If you need restrictions, supervised access, protective relief, or family-violence findings, build the record so each requested ruling is tied to a distinct act, disclosure, time, or circumstance. Multiple outcry statements can still be powerful even when imperfectly consistent, so long as the factfinder can reasonably distinguish what event each statement describes."

Williams v. State

COA01

In Williams v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that a party does not preserve error about excluded or redacted portions of a record by making only a generic objection that the exhibit is incomplete or misleading. The defendant argued on appeal that redacted mental-health and prior-history references in a Children’s Assessment Center record were necessary to support an alternate explanation for the complainant’s allegations, but at trial he did not specifically articulate that theory, did not offer the unredacted record, and did not make an adequate offer of proof showing the substance and relevance of the excluded material. The court therefore held the evidentiary complaint was not preserved, and it likewise held that the defendant forfeited his due-process 'complete defense' argument because that constitutional ground was not distinctly raised in the trial court.

Litigation Takeaway

"If you believe a redacted or partial record creates a misleading picture, do more than say it is incomplete. Tender the omitted material, explain exactly why it is admissible and relevant, obtain a ruling, and preserve the substance of the exclusion through an offer of proof or sealed exhibit. And if you want to rely on a constitutional theory, raise that theory expressly in the trial court too."

Modifying the Parenting Plan

In the Interest of S.G.H. and W.C.H., Children

COA13

In In re S.G.H. and W.C.H., the trial court dismissed a modification case for want of prosecution, and after plenary power expired Father filed a separate bill of review. Although the trial court granted the bill of review and vacated the dismissal, it later signed a new modification order in the original cause number rather than retrying the merits in the bill-of-review proceeding. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that granting a bill of review does not restore plenary power in the original case; instead, any retrial must occur in the separate bill-of-review action. Because the 2024 modification order was signed in the original cause years after dismissal, it was void, so the court vacated the order and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Litigation Takeaway

"A bill of review can wipe out an old judgment, but it does not reopen the original case for a new merits ruling. In family cases, lawyers must move all post-bill-of-review litigation into the bill-of-review cause number; if the court signs a modification or other merits order in the old dismissed case after plenary power expired, that order may be void and the entire effort wasted."