Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In Re Krystal D. Hunter
COA14
Krystal Hunter filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking the Fourteenth Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to pause (abate) a third-party intervenor's claims in her family law case. The appellate court denied the petition, concluding that Hunter failed to meet the high burden required for extraordinary relief. The court analyzed the trial court's decision under a two-part test, determining that managing the timing of an intervention is a discretionary function of the trial court and that Hunter failed to show the court was legally required to stop the proceedings. Furthermore, the court held that any potential errors could be addressed through the standard appeal process after a final judgment, meaning Hunter did not lack an adequate remedy at law.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family law, stopping an intervenor from participating in your case via an emergency mandamus petition is extremely difficult. Because trial judges have broad discretion over their own dockets, you must demonstrate either a mandatory legal requirement to pause the case or show "irreparable harm" that cannot be fixed on a normal appeal later. Practically, it is often more effective to challenge an intervenor's standing early through a Motion to Strike rather than seeking a mid-litigation pause."
Bustamante v. Bustamante
COA01
In Bustamante v. Bustamante, the First Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court's order granting a bill of review—which vacated a prior 2023 judgment without resolving the underlying merits—could be immediately appealed. The court analyzed Texas jurisdictional principles, noting that appellate review is generally limited to final judgments unless a statute specifically authorizes an interlocutory appeal. Because the order only 're-opened' the litigation and did not fall under the authorized list of interlocutory appeals in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"The granting of a bill of review is a non-appealable interlocutory order if the underlying merits remain unresolved. Practitioners must proceed through a second trial on the merits before they can challenge the propriety of the bill of review on appeal."
Shelton v. Flores
COA14
In Shelton v. Flores, a government employee (Shelton) attempted to dismiss claims against himself by filing a Rule 91a motion under the Texas Tort Claims Act's (TTCA) election-of-remedies provision after both he and his employer, the City of Houston, were sued. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.106(e), which states that an employee shall be dismissed 'on the motion of the governmental unit.' The court held that because the City did not join or file the motion to dismiss Shelton, the statutory condition precedent was not met. The court concluded that individual employees lack standing to 'self-dismiss' under this provision without the employer’s active participation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Government employees, such as CPS caseworkers or law enforcement officers, cannot unilaterally exit a lawsuit under the TTCA election-of-remedies provision unless the government agency they work for formally moves for their dismissal. This provides family law litigants with strategic leverage to keep individual defendants in a case for discovery purposes, especially when an agency is reluctant to admit the employee was acting within the scope of their employment."
Lalita R. Morey v. Oaks of Devonshire Homeowners Association, Inc.
COA01
After a July 14, 2025 final judgment, the appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 23, 2025—outside the 30-day deadline in TRAP 26.1 and also outside the 15-day grace period in TRAP 26.3—and filed no post-judgment motions that would have extended the timetable to 90 days. The First Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction over a standard appeal because an untimely notice of appeal does not invoke appellate jurisdiction under TRAP 25.1(c). The appellant then asked the court to treat the late notice as a restricted appeal, but the court refused because a restricted appeal has its own jurisdictional prerequisites and the notice must strictly include the statements required by TRAP 25.1(d)(7) (including non-participation in the hearing and no timely post-judgment filings). Because the notice did not contain those mandatory declarations, the court could not construe it as a restricted appeal and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appellate deadlines are unforgiving: if you miss the 30-day notice-of-appeal deadline (and the 15-day extension window), you’re out—unless you properly perfect a restricted appeal. If you need a restricted appeal, your notice must expressly track TRAP 25.1(d)(7)’s required statements; a generic notice of appeal cannot be “converted” later by briefing or argument."
Brown v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Brown v. State, police returned to an apartment for a second search after an initial search warrant had expired. Rather than seek a new warrant, officers relied on consent from the apartment manager and the victim’s family (who were clearing out the unit) and on the defendant’s own statement during an interview that he did not live there and had not lived there for 18 months. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the suppression issue under Fourth Amendment standing principles, applying Texas’s abandonment doctrine (disclaimer of a possessory/privacy interest defeats a reasonable expectation of privacy) and the apparent-authority consent doctrine (a warrantless search is valid if officers reasonably believe the consenting third party has authority). Under the totality of circumstances—primary tenant deceased, unit being vacated by the family, manager’s consent, and Brown’s explicit disavowal of residency—the court held Brown lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search; the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. The court also rejected claims of judicial bias, charge error, and ineffective assistance, and affirmed the murder conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Move-out disclaimers can become legal waivers: if a party tells police, a landlord, or a court “I don’t live there,” that statement can be used to establish abandonment and defeat privacy/standing arguments—making warrantless entry/search more defensible based on third-party consent. In family-law crossovers (protective orders, divorce/custody disputes), counsel should carefully manage residency/possession statements and build evidence of continuing ties (keys, utilities, mail, property left behind) if privacy or possessory rights will matter."
In the Interest of J.C.D.Y. a/k/a J.Y., J.E.D.Y. a/k/a J.Y., M.M.D.Y. a/k/a M.Y., J.T.D.Y., a/k/a J.Y., Children
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s decision to terminate a mother’s parental rights following nearly a decade of chronic neglect and substance abuse. The case centered on whether "abject squalor"—including rodent infestations, lack of utilities, and malnutrition—combined with a history of marijuana use, met the high legal standard for termination. The court analyzed the evidence under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (P), focusing on the "cumulative effect" of the mother's conduct rather than isolated incidents. The court held that the persistent pattern of endangering living conditions and the prioritization of drug use over basic needs provided clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"A persistent pattern of "environmental endangerment," such as chronic lack of utilities and poor hygiene, can justify the termination of parental rights; specifically, historical CPS referrals that did not initially result in removal can be used later to establish a continuous course of conduct."
Leslie Parrish v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Parrish v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a seven-year delay in executing an arrest warrant barred the revocation of community supervision. The appellant asserted a "due diligence" defense; however, the court held that this statutory defense is strictly limited to violations for failure to report or failure to remain in a specified location. Because the State proved a separate violation—failure to provide written employment verification—the court affirmed the revocation, noting that a single proven violation is sufficient. Additionally, the court modified the judgment to remove a fine that was included in the written order but never orally pronounced by the judge, confirming that the oral pronouncement controls in the event of a conflict.
Litigation Takeaway
"A single technical violation of court-ordered supervision, such as failing to provide employment paperwork, is enough to support a revocation regardless of "due diligence" defenses on other counts. Always cross-reference the court's oral ruling against the written judgment to ensure no unauthorized fines or conditions were added."
Venisha Arnold v. Google LLC, YouTube LLC, Alphabet, Inc, Reddit, Inc, Felixlightner-Reddit Thread Starter, Rechlin-Reddit Admin, Boshau-Reddit Admin, Munx1er-Reddit Admin, Swhitt-Reddit Admin, and Texlex-Reddit Admin.
COA01
In Arnold, the appellant attempted to immediately appeal an order granting one defendant’s Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss. The trial court’s order dismissed only Reddit, left other defendants in the case, and expressly reserved the mandatory award of attorney’s fees/costs and potential sanctions for later determination—making the order interlocutory rather than final. The First Court of Appeals analyzed its jurisdiction under the final-judgment rule and the limited statutory authorizations for interlocutory appeals, focusing on Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(12), which allows an interlocutory appeal only from an order that denies a TCPA motion to dismiss. Because the Legislature did not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a TCPA motion, and the order was not otherwise final, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"TCPA asymmetry matters: if you win a TCPA motion to dismiss (including in divorce/SAPCR “family tort” skirmishes), your opponent generally cannot take an immediate appeal and must wait until a final judgment—unless the case is severed and made final. Conversely, if your TCPA motion is denied, you can appeal immediately. Plan orders and severance strategy with finality and fee issues in mind."
Angela Bass v. Mercedes Benz Financial Services USA LLC
COA01
Mercedes Benz Financial Services obtained a writ of sequestration against Angela Bass, effectively seizing or “freezing” specific personal property while the underlying case remained pending. Bass attempted to take an immediate (interlocutory) appeal from the trial court’s order granting the writ. The First Court of Appeals analyzed its own jurisdiction and reiterated that Texas appellate courts generally may review only final judgments unless the Legislature has expressly authorized an interlocutory appeal. Looking to Chapter 62 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (sequestration) and the interlocutory-appeal statute, the court concluded that an order granting a writ of sequestration is an interlocutory preservation remedy and is not among the categories made appealable by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014. While the appeal was pending, the trial court voided the sequestration order; the court further held that this eliminated any live controversy and rendered the appeal moot. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A sequestration order can quickly take property out of a party’s hands during litigation, but you generally cannot appeal it immediately. If you need relief, act in the trial court (motion to dissolve/attack bond/affidavit) and consider mandamus; otherwise, by the time a final judgment is entered—or the order is voided—the issue may be moot."
E-VOLVE ENERGY HOLDINGS, LLC v. MP2 ENERGY, LLC
COA05
In a dispute sent to AAA arbitration, E‑Volve sought to vacate/modify an award confirmed by the Collin County trial court, arguing the arbitrator exceeded her authority and made erroneous offset/damages determinations. The Dallas Court of Appeals first held the confirmation order was a final, appealable judgment because it contained clear, unequivocal Lehmann finality language (“disposes of all claims and all parties and is final and appealable”), even if the order lacked detailed recovery terms. On the merits, applying the FAA/TAA’s narrow vacatur/modification standards, the court held the party challenging an award bears the burden to provide a complete, authenticated arbitration record. Because no transcript of the final arbitration hearing existed (and appellant provided only unauthenticated materials), the appellate court was required to presume the missing evidence supported the award, making review of the alleged errors impossible. The court affirmed confirmation of the arbitration award.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want any meaningful chance to overturn or modify a private arbitration result—especially in high-stakes divorce/custody arbitrations—secure a court reporter and preserve an authenticated record. Without a transcript, appellate courts will presume the evidence supported the arbitrator, and challenges that the arbitrator exceeded their powers or got the facts wrong will usually be dead on arrival."